



# **Dr. Karl A. Lamers Friedens-Stiftung** ***Dr. Karl A. Lamers Peace-Foundation***

Es ist unser Bestreben,  
junge Menschen für die Idee  
von Freiheit, Recht und Demokratie zu begeistern  
und ihnen zu zeigen,  
**dass der Frieden täglich neu errungen werden muss.**

*It is our aim to inspire  
young people for the idea  
of freedom, justice and democracy  
and to show them  
**that peace has to be won anew every day.***





Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

in konsequenter Fortführung meines lebenslangen politischen Wirkens für Frieden und Freiheit möchte ich meinen Beitrag leisten, junge Menschen zu fördern und auszuzeichnen, die in diesem Geiste handeln.

Deshalb gründete ich im Jahr 2018 meine Stiftung, die „Dr. Karl A. Lamers Friedens-Stiftung“. Der Sitz der Stiftung ist Heidelberg.

Die Stiftung hat das Ziel, Schülerinnen und Schüler, Studierende und Forschende in der Region, in dem Land und in der Institution zu stärken, die mich in meinem Leben entscheidend geprägt haben:

- mein ehemaliger Wahlkreis Heidelberg/ Weinheim
- die Republik Litauen
- Parlamentarische Versammlung der NATO
- Deutsche Atlantische Gesellschaft (DAG), Junge DAG, Youth Atlantic Treaty Association
- Universität Heidelberg

Zukunft braucht Erfahrung. Deshalb bringe ich mich auch weiterhin persönlich ein.

Zukunft braucht aber auch das überzeugende Engagement junger Menschen. Auf sie kommt es an, wenn wir auch morgen in Frieden und Freiheit leben wollen.

*Ladies and Gentlemen!*

*In the spirit of furthering my lifelong political engagement towards peace and freedom, I would like to make my contribution to promote and reward young people who act in this spirit.*

*This is the reason why I established my foundation in the year 2018, the so called "Dr. Karl A. Lamers Peace-Foundation". The foundation is located in Heidelberg.*

*Its aim is to encourage pupils, students and young researchers in the region, in the country and in the institution who have decisively shaped my life:*

- *My constituency Heidelberg/Weinheim*
- *The Republic of Lithuania*
- *NATO Parliamentary Assembly*
- *German Atlantic Association, Young German Atlantic Association, Youth Atlantic Treaty Association*
- *University of Heidelberg*

*The future needs experience. That's why I continue to get personally involved and thank everyone who supports this Peace-Foundation.*

*But the future of peace and freedom requires also strong dedication and engagement from the younger generation. It depends on them that we can live in peace and freedom tomorrow.*

*Es grüßt Sie herzlich/With kind regards*

*Karl A. Lamers*

## Grußwort | Greetings.....3

## Geschäftsstelle | Office.....6

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Die Preise   <i>The Prizes</i> .....                            | 7  |
| Vorstand und Jury  <br><i>Board of directors and jury</i> ..... | 8  |
| Wettbewerbsaufrufe   <i>Call for Papers</i> .....               | 9  |
| Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer  <br><i>Participants</i> .....   | 10 |

## Wettbewerbe und Essays | Competitions and Essays.....13

### 2019

#### Schulen | *Schools in Heidelberg/ Weinheim*

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Thema   <i>Topic</i> :<br>Wodurch wird der Frieden heute bedroht,<br>was können wir tun? ..... | 14 |
|--|----|

#### Litauen Mykolas Romeris Universität | *Lithuania Mykolas Romeris University*

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Thema   <i>Topic</i> :<br>15 Years of NATO membership of the Baltic<br>States – What role does trust play amongst<br>the members of the Alliance? ..... | 25 |
|---|----|

#### Parlamentarische Versammlung der NATO | *NATO Parliamentary Assembly*

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Thema   <i>Topic</i> :<br>NATO@70 – How can the alliance<br>continue to contribute to peace and<br>freedom in the future? ..... | 38 |
|---|----|

### 2020

#### Schulen | *Schools in Heidelberg/ Weinheim*

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Thema   <i>Topic</i> :<br>30 Jahre Mauerfall, was ist noch zu tun? ..... | 48 |
|--|----|

#### Litauen Mykolas Romeris Universität | *Lithuania Mykolas Romeris University*

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Thema   <i>Topic</i> :<br>In 2020, NATO is facing three major<br>challenges: Great Power rivalry,<br>international terrorism and humanitarian<br>crises. Which priorities should the<br>Alliance set from the perspective of<br>the Baltic states? ..... | 57 |
|--|----|

#### Parlamentarische Versammlung der NATO | *NATO Parliamentary Assembly*

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Thema   <i>Topic</i> :<br>In the 21 <sup>st</sup> century, how can NATO and<br>its member states develop a coherent<br>strategy towards the People's Republic<br>of China? ..... | 74 |
|--|----|

### 2021

#### Schulen | *Schools in Heidelberg/ Weinheim*

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Thema   <i>Topic</i> :<br>Zusammenhalt in der Gesellschaft –<br>gerade auch in schwierigen Zeiten ..... | 84 |
|---|----|

#### Litauen Mykolas Romeris Universität | *Lithuania Mykolas Romeris University*

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Thema   <i>Topic</i> :<br>NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg<br>refers to 2021 as a year of opportunity<br>to re-energize transatlantic relations and<br>to strengthen the bond between Europe<br>and North America. What significance<br>would this have for the Baltic States and<br>how can Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia<br>contribute to strengthen the transatlantic<br>partnership? ..... | 95 |
|--|----|

#### Parlamentarische Versammlung der NATO | *NATO Parliamentary Assembly*

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Thema   <i>Topic</i> :<br>What role do you see for NATO as an<br>alliance of democracies in these efforts?<br>How can NATO play its part in<br>defending and promoting democracy<br>and democratic values? ..... | 109 |
|--|-----|

### 2022

#### Schulen | *Schools in Heidelberg/ Weinheim*

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Thema   <i>Topic</i> :<br>Die Krisen in der Welt bekämpfen –<br>im Kleinen beginnen ..... | 120 |
|---|-----|

#### Litauen Mykolas Romeris Universität | *Lithuania Mykolas Romeris University*

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Thema   <i>Topic</i> :<br>NATO and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict:<br>What is at stake for the Baltic countries?.... | 125 |
|--|-----|

# INHALTSVERZEICHNIS | CONTENTS

## **Parlamentarische Versammlung der NATO | *NATO Parliamentary Assembly***

Thema | *Topic*:

What are two key lessons learned  
for NATO from Russia's invasion of  
Ukraine? ..... 139

## **Universität Heidelberg | *Heidelberg University***

Thema | *Topic*:

Proxys im staatlichen Cyberkonfliktaustrag:  
Eine vergleichende Analyse der  
VR China, Russlands, der USA und  
Israels ..... 148

## **2023**

### **Schulen | *Schools in Heidelberg/ Weinheim***

Thema | *Topic*:

Eine Welt ohne Kriege – eine Utopie?..... 150

### **Litauen Mykolas Romeris Universität | *Lithuania Mykolas Romeris Univerity***

Thema | *Topic*:

Russia's war in Ukraine and the  
"reinvention" of NATO: Is the Alliance  
doing enough to help Ukraine and to  
strengthen NATO's own deterrence  
and defence in Europe? ..... 163

### **Universität Heidelberg | *Heidelberg University***

Thema | *Topic*:

Emotional Climates in the Beirut  
Blast Anniversary Protests  
(Emotionale Klimata bei den  
Protesten zum Jahrestag der  
Explosion in Beirut) ..... 179

## **Pressemitteilungen | *Press releases* ..... 183**

Gründung der Stiftung 2018..... 184  
Pressemitteilungen 2019..... 185  
Pressemitteilungen 2020..... 191  
Pressemitteilungen 2021..... 193  
Pressemitteilungen 2022..... 194  
Pressemitteilungen 2023..... 197  
Pressemitteilungen 2024..... 200  
Universität Heidelberg 2022..... 201  
Universität Heidelberg 2023..... 202

**Danksagung | *Acknowledgements* ..... 204**

**Liste der Gewinnerinnen und  
Gewinner | *List of winners*..... 206**

**Impressum | *Imprint*..... 208**

## Postadresse – Postal address

Dr. Karl A. Lamers Friedens-Stiftung  
Dr. Karl A. Lamers Peace-Foundation  
Vangerowstraße 18/1  
D-69115 Heidelberg

## Geschäftsstelle – Office

Monika Becker  
Tel: +49 (0)6221 3 54 54 74  
geschaefsstelle@lamers-stiftung.de  
www.karl-lamers.de

## Vorstand – Chair

Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers

## Spendenaufruf – Appeal for Donations

In diesen Tagen eingehende Spenden werden auch zu dem Zweck genutzt, Menschen, die aus der Ukraine in unsere Region kommen, zu unterstützen. Der Vorstand wird über die Verwendung der Gelder entscheiden.

*Donations received these days will also be used to support people who come to our region from Ukraine. The Board of Directors will decide how the money is to be used.*

## Spendenkonto – donation account

Dr. Lamers Friedens-Stiftung  
Dr. Lamers Peace-Foundation  
DE87 6709 2300 **0033 1363 58**  
Spendenbescheinigungen werden ausgestellt.  
*Donation receipts will be issued.*

## DIE PREISE | THE PRIZES

In meinem ehemaligen **Wahlkreis Heidelberg/Weinheim** werden seit 2019 jedes Jahr Schülerinnen und Schüler eingeladen, eine Arbeit, eine Zeichnung, einen Aufsatz – zu einem jeweils vorgegebenen Friedens-Thema einzureichen. Eine sachkundige Jury sichtet und bewertet die Arbeiten. Unser Dank gilt allen jungen Menschen, die sich daran beteiligen, für ihr Mitmachen.

Die fünf Arbeiten, die ausgezeichnet werden, erhalten einen Förderpreis:

- **1. Preis: 600 EUR**
- **2. Preis: 500 EUR**
- **3. Preis: 400 EUR**
- **4. Preis: 300 EUR**
- **5. Preis: 200 EUR**

Die Preise übergebe ich persönlich im Rahmen einer kleinen Feier.

In **Litauen**, ein Land, dem in meinem politischen Leben seit Jahrzehnten eine herausgehobene Bedeutung zukommt und das ich aktiv auf seinem Weg in die Euro-Atlantischen Strukturen begleitet habe, zeichne ich seit 2019 jährlich drei Studierende aus, die durch eine wertvolle Arbeit auf dem Gebiet der in meinen Augen wichtigen transatlantischen Beziehungen (NATO) Besonderes leisten.

Am Wettbewerb, der von der Mykolas Romeris Universität (MRU) aufgerufen wird, können Studierende der MRU teilnehmen. Die Überreichung der Förderpreise erfolgt jährlich im Rahmen einer feierlichen Veranstaltung der MRU gemeinsam durch die Rektorin der Universität und den Gründer der Stiftung.

Die Abgeordneten der **Parlamentarischen Versammlung der NATO**, der ich von 1998 bis 2022 angehörte und über viele Jahre als Präsident, Vizepräsident und in anderen verantwortlichen Ämtern gedient habe, setzen sich in diesem einzigartigen Gremium leidenschaftlich für Frieden und Freiheit ein.

Mein Förderpreis in Zusammenarbeit mit der NATO-PV wurde von 2019 bis 2022 in jedem Jahr im Rahmen der ANNUAL SESSION – der Herbsttagung – verliehen.

Von 2024 an werden – in Zusammenarbeit mit **der Deutschen Atlantischen Gesellschaft (DAG)**, der **Youth Atlantic Treaty Association Germany (YATA Germany)** und der **Youth Atlantic Treaty Association International (YATA)** – junge Menschen im Rahmen eines weltweiten Wettbewerbs mit dem Dr. Karl A. Lamers Friedens-Preis ausgezeichnet.

Seit 2022 vergibt die Friedens-Stiftung jährlich einen Sonderpreis an der **Universität Heidelberg** für eine besonders herausragende Arbeit auf dem Gebiet der Sicherheit. Die Aushändigung erfolgt im Rahmen einer feierlichen Zeremonie zur Vergabe von Stipendien in der Alten Aula der Universität Heidelberg.

*Every year, pupils in my former **constituency Heidelberg/Weinheim** are invited to submit their works – a drawing or an essay – on a specific topic related to peace and freedom. An expert jury reviews and evaluates the works. We would like to thank all the young people who are taking part for their participation.*

*The five papers that will be awarded receive a sponsorship award:*

- **1<sup>st</sup> Prize: 600 EUR**
- **2<sup>nd</sup> Prize: 500 EUR**
- **3<sup>rd</sup> Prize: 400 EUR**
- **4<sup>th</sup> Prize: 300 EUR**
- **5<sup>th</sup> Prize: 200 EUR**

*I personally hand over the prizes during a small celebration.*

In **Lithuania**, a country that has been of great importance in my political life for decades and which I have actively accompanied on its way into the Euro-Atlantic structures, I annually award three students for their essays in the field of transatlantic relations. Students of Mykolas Romeris University (MRU) can participate in the competition. The awards are presented annually at the Opening Ceremony of the New Academic Year of the MRU jointly by the rector of the University and the chairperson of the Foundation.

Members of the **NATO Parliamentary Assembly**, to which I belonged from 1998 to 2022 and served for many years as President, Vice-President and in other responsible offices, are passionate about peace and freedom in this unique body. My sponsorship award for NATO-PA

was – until 2022 – awarded every year as part of the ANNUAL SESSION, the autumn meeting.

From 2024 onwards young people will be awarded the Dr. Karl A. Lamers Peace-Prize in cooperation with the **German Atlantic Association (DAG)**, the **Youth Atlantic Treaty Association Germany (YATA Germany)** and the **Youth Atlantic Treaty Association International (YATA)** as part of a global competition.

Since 2022 the Peace-Foundation has been awarding a special prize at the **Heidelberg University** for a particularly outstanding academic work in the field of security. The award takes place as part of a ceremony for the awarding of scholarships in the old auditorium of the Heidelberg University.

## VORSTAND UND JURY | BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND JURY

### Vorstand | Board of directors

Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers  
(Vorsitzender/Chairperson)  
Claudia Kischka (stv. Vorsitzende/  
Deputy Chairperson)  
Matthias Blatz  
Prof. Andreas-Norbert Fay  
Prof. Dr. Sebastian Harnisch  
Karl-Heinz Kamp (bis/until 2023)  
Hans-Peter Lange  
Gabriela Pavón de Naumann  
Ahmet Pekkip  
Prof. Dr. Karl-Heinz Riesenhuber (bis/until 2023)  
Dr. Jobst Wellensiek (†)  
Prof. Dr. Ulrich Zeitel

### Ständige Gäste | Permanent guests

Monika Becker (Geschäftsführerin/Manager)  
Bruni Hähnel (Assistentin Geschäftsführung/  
Assistant Manager)  
Sönke Asmussen (Jury)  
Gunter Maurath (Steuerberater/Tax consultant)  
Ulrich Kaschper (Rechtsanwalt/Lawyer)  
Andreas Stefan (Marketing)

### Jury

Sönke Asmussen  
Barbara Asmussen  
Monika Becker  
Indre Doci  
Bruni Hähnel  
Dr. Peer Hübel  
Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers  
Gabriela Pavón de Naumann  
Günter Reinhart (†)  
Kathrin Schmalzer



Es ist unser Bestreben, junge Menschen für die Idee von Freiheit, Recht und Demokratie zu begeistern und ihnen zu zeigen, dass der Frieden täglich neu errungen werden muss.

*It is our aim to inspire young people for the idea of freedom, justice and democracy and to show them that peace has to be won anew every day.*

### Schulen | *Schools in Heidelberg/ Weinheim*

#### **2019**

Wodurch wird der Frieden heute bedroht – was können wir dagegen tun?

#### **2020**

30 Jahre Mauerfall, was ist noch zu tun?

#### **2021**

Zusammenhalt in der Gesellschaft – gerade auch in schwierigen Zeiten

#### **2022**

Die Krisen in der Welt bekämpfen – im Kleinen beginnen

#### **2023**

Eine Welt ohne Kriege – eine Utopie?

### Litauen | *Lithuania*

#### **2019**

*15 years of NATO membership of the Baltic States – What role does trust play amongst the members of the Alliance?*

#### **2020**

*NATO is facing three major challenges: Great Power rivalry, international terrorism and humanitarian crises. Which priorities should the Alliance set from the perspective of the Baltic states?*

#### **2021**

*NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg refers to 2021 as a year of opportunity to re-energize transatlantic relations and to strengthen the bond between Europe and North America. What significance would this have for the Baltic States and how can Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia contribute to strengthen the transatlantic partnership?*

#### **2022**

*NATO and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: What is at stake for the Baltic countries?*

#### **2023**

*Russia's war in Ukraine and the "reinvention" of NATO: Is the Alliance doing enough to help Ukraine and to strengthen NATO's own deterrence and defence in Europe?*

### Parlamentarische Versammlung der NATO bis 2022 | *NATO Parliamentary Assembly until 2022*

#### **2019**

*NATO@70 – How can the Alliance continue to contribute to peace and freedom in the future?*

#### **2020**

*In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, how can NATO and its member states develop a coherent strategy towards the People's Republic of China?*

#### **2021**

*What role do you see for NATO as an alliance of democracies in these efforts? How can NATO play its part in defending and promoting democracy and democratic values?*

#### **2022**

*What are two key lessons learned for NATO from Russia's invasion of Ukraine?*

### Universität Heidelberg ab 2022 | *Heidelberg University from 2022*

#### **2022**

*Proxys im staatlichen Cyberkonfliktaustrag: Eine vergleichende Analyse der VR China, Russlands, der USA und Israels*

#### **2023**

*Emotional Climates in the Beirut Blast Anniversary Protests*

## 2019 Schulen | Schools in Heidelberg/ Weinheim

### Thema | Topic:

Wodurch wird der Frieden heute bedroht,  
was können wir tun? ..... 14

### Preisträger | Winners:

- 1. Preis:** Klasse 8d des Elisabeth-von-Thadden-Gymnasiums Heidelberg ..... 14
- 2. Preis:** Klasse 8b der Werkrealschule Unterer Neckar Ladenburg ..... 15
- 3. Preis:** Klassen 7–9 der Carl-Engler-Realschule Hemsbach, Fabian Stamm (9b), Lara Schulz (8b), David Santos (7b), Melina Weißwange (7b), Larissa Fehrke (7b), Naile Spasoli (8b) ..... 16
- 4. Preis:** Klasse 7 der Friedrich-Schiller-Gemeinschaftsschule Hemsbach ..... 19
- 5. Preis:** Sonderpreis: Sebastian Ohlig, 8. Klasse des St. Raphael-Gymnasiums Heidelberg ..... 20

## 2019 Litauen Mykolas Romeris Universität | Lithuania Mykolas Romeris University

### Thema | Topic:

15 Years of NATO membership of the Baltic States – What role does trust play amongst the members of the Alliance? ..... 25

### Preisträger | Winners:

- 1st Prize:** Ana Šurpickaja (MRU) ..... 25
- 2nd Prize:** Kipras Adomaitis (MRU) ..... 28
- 3rd Prize:** Laura Antanavičiūtė (MRU) ..... 33

## 2019 Parlamentarische Versammlung der NATO | NATO Parliamentary Assembly

### Thema | Topic:

NATO@70 – How can the alliance continue to contribute to peace and freedom in the future? ..... 38

### Preisträger | Winners:

- 1st Prize:** Imre Bartal ..... 38
- 2nd Prize:** Velislava-Mihaela Krachunova ..... 41
- 3rd Prize:** Pierre Dugué ..... 44

## 2020 Schulen | Schools in Heidelberg/ Weinheim

### Thema | Topic:

30 Jahre Mauerfall, was ist noch zu tun? ..... 48

### Preisträger | Winners:

- 1. Preis:** Klasse 9b des Bergstraßen-Gymnasiums Hemsbach ..... 48
- 1. Preis:** Klasse 9d des Elisabeth-von-Thadden-Gymnasiums Heidelberg ..... 52
- 3. Preis:** Klasse 8 des Heinrich-Sigmund-Gymnasiums Schriesheim ..... 54
- 4. Preis:** Klasse 9c der Gregor-Mendel-Realschule Heidelberg ..... 55

## 2020 Litauen Mykolas Romeris Universität | Lithuania Mykolas Romeris University

### Thema | Topic:

In 2020, NATO is facing three major challenges: Great Power rivalry, international terrorism and humanitarian crises. Which priorities should the Alliance set from the perspective of the Baltic states? ... 57

### Preisträger | Winners:

- 1st Prize:** Kipras Adomaitis (MRU) ..... 57
- 2nd Prize:** Eglė Juozėnaitė (MRU) ..... 63
- 3rd Prize:** Rimvydas Pekauskas (MRU) ..... 68

## 2020 Parlamentarische Versammlung der NATO | NATO Parliamentary Assembly

### Thema | Topic:

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, how can NATO and its member states develop a coherent strategy towards the People's Republic of China? ..... 74

### Preisträger | Winners:

- 1st Prize:** Velislava-Mihaela Krachunova ..... 74
- 2nd Prize:** Tim B. Lienemann ..... 78
- 3rd Prize:** Stephan Gräfe ..... 81

# TEILNEHMERINNEN UND TEILNEHMER | PARTICIPANTS

## 2021 Schulen | *Schools in Heidelberg/ Weinheim*

### Thema | *Topic:*

Zusammenhalt in der Gesellschaft – gerade auch in schwierigen Zeiten ..... 84

### Preisträger | *Winners:*

**1. Preis:** Maya Seitz des Bunsen-Gymnasiums Heidelberg, Jahrgangsstufe 1 ..... 84

**2. Preis:** Annika Portuné des Dietrich-Bonhoeffer-Gymnasiums Weinheim, Klasse 12 ..... 85

**3. Preis:** Tansania AG des Elisabeth-von-Thadden-Gymnasiums Heidelberg ..... 86

**4. Preis:** Carlotta Ritzhaupt des Bunsen-Gymnasiums Heidelberg, Jahrgangsstufe 1 ..... 89

**5. Preis:** Faizrou Tchagbele, Katrin Arndt, Caitlin Follo des Bergstraßen-Gymnasiums Hemsbach, Klasse 10b ..... 91

## 2021 Litauen Mykolas Romeris Universität | *Lithuania Mykolas Romeris University*

### Thema | *Topic:*

NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg refers to 2021 as a year of opportunity to re-energize transatlantic relations and to strengthen the bond between Europe and North America. What significance would this have for the Baltic States and how can Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia contribute to strengthen the transatlantic partnership? ..... 95

### Preisträger | *Winners:*

**1<sup>st</sup> Prize:** Veronika Horchakova (MRU) ..... 95

**2<sup>nd</sup> Prize:** Oles Sahan (MRU) ..... 100

**3<sup>rd</sup> Prize:** Arnoldas Rutkauskas (MRU) ..... 104

## 2021 Parlamentarische Versammlung der NATO | *NATO Parliamentary Assembly*

### Thema | *Topic:*

What role do you see for NATO as an alliance of democracies in these efforts? How can NATO play its part in defending and promoting democracy and democratic values? ..... 109

### Preisträger | *Winners:*

**1<sup>st</sup> Prize:** Peer K. Braak ..... 109

**2<sup>nd</sup> Prize:** Velislava-Mihaela Krachunova .... 112

**3<sup>rd</sup> Prize:** Alexander Weber ..... 116

## 2022 Schulen | *Schools in Heidelberg/ Weinheim*

### Thema | *Topic:*

Die Krisen in der Welt bekämpfen – im Kleinen beginnen ..... 120

### Preisträger | *Winners:*

**1. Preis:** Joshua Kumbartzki, Bunsen-Gymnasium Heidelberg, Stufe 11 ..... 120

**2. Preis:** Akshita Gudla und Sonja Exmann des Heidelberger Privatschulcentrums HPC, Klasse 11, BiG 8, Bilinguales Gymnasium ..... 120

**3. Preis:** Nea Brunn des Dietrich-Bonhoeffer-Gymnasiums Weinheim, Klasse 11 ..... 121

**4. Preis:** Iga Ciereszko und Hannah Sauer des Heidelberger Privatschulcentrums HPC, BiG 8, Bilinguales Gymnasium ..... 122

**5. Preis:** Johannes Kuhr des Bunsen-Gymnasiums Heidelberg, Stufe 2 ..... 122

## 2022 Litauen Mykolas Romeris Universität | *Lithuania Mykolas Romeris University*

### Thema | *Topic:*

NATO and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: What is at stake for the Baltic countries? .. 125

### Preisträger | *Winners:*

**1<sup>st</sup> Prize:** Ivanna Horaichuk (MRU) ..... 125

**2<sup>nd</sup> Prize:** Vladimir Komarnickiy (MRU) ..... 130

**3<sup>rd</sup> Prize:** Marita Gorgiladze (MRU) ..... 134

# TEILNEHMERINNEN UND TEILNEHMER | PARTICIPANTS

## 2022 Parlamentarische Versammlung der NATO | *NATO Parliamentary Assembly*

### Thema | Topic:

What are two key lessons learned for NATO from Russia's invasion of Ukraine? .....139

### Preisträger | *Winners:*

1<sup>st</sup> Prize: Noah Heinemann .....139

2<sup>nd</sup> Prize: Aida Lorca Arce .....142

3<sup>rd</sup> Prize: Kathrin Rief.....144

## 2022 Universität Heidelberg | *Heidelberg University*

### Thema | Topic:

Proxys im staatlichen Cyberkonfliktaustrag: Eine vergleichende Analyse der VR China, Russlands, der USA und Israels .....148

### Preisträger | *Winner:*

Dr. Kerstin Zettl-Schabath, Institut für Politikwissenschaften .....148

## 2023 Schulen | *Schools in Heidelberg/ Weinheim*

### Thema | Topic:

Eine Welt ohne Kriege – eine Utopie?.....150

### Preisträger | *Winners:*

1. Preis: Lily Carolin Hering des Bunsen-Gymnasiums Heidelberg, Stufe JG 1 .....150

2. Preis: Atakan Cakir des Bunsen-Gymnasiums Heidelberg, Stufe 12.....151

2. Preis: Lamija Salkic des Bunsen-Gymnasiums Heidelberg, Stufe 12.....152

3. Preis: Lonit Rustemi des Helmholtz-Gymnasiums Heidelberg, Stufe 11 .....153

4. Preis: Katinka Marie Thomas des Bergstraßen-Gymnasiums Hemsbach, Klasse 9b.....154

5. Preis: Davina Jaudes, Ceren Atmaca, Lenny Müller, Atalaya Caba, Emmelie Kraiter, Abrar Abras, Patryk Dzaman, Hasan Sayouf, Marvin Stahl der Marie-Marcks Schule des sonderpädagogisches Bildungs- und Beratungszentrums Heidelberg, Klasse 8 und 9 .....155

Sonderpreis: Clara Dietrich und Henriette Daun des Elisabeth-von-Thadden-Gymnasiums Heidelberg, Stufe 10 .....156

## 2023 Litauen Mykolas Romeris Universität | *Lithuania Mykolas Romeris University*

### Thema | Topic:

Russia's war in Ukraine and the "reinvention" of NATO: Is the Alliance doing enough to help Ukraine and to strengthen NATO's own deterrence and defence in Europe? .....163

### Preisträger | *Winners:*

1<sup>st</sup> Prize: Vilius Lapis (MRU).....163

2<sup>nd</sup> Prize: Volodymyr Tsybka (MRU) .....168

3<sup>rd</sup> Prize: Andra Mažrimaitė (MRU) .....172

## 2023 Universität Heidelberg | *Heidelberg University*

### Thema | Topic:

Emotional Climates in the Beirut Blast Anniversary Protests (Emotionale Klimata bei den Protesten zum Jahrestag der Explosion in Beirut) .....179

### Preisträger | *Winner:*

Laura Henselmann, Institut für Politikwissenschaften der Universität Heidelberg.....179

# 2019

## **Schulen | *Schools in Heidelberg/Weinheim***

Thema | *Topic:*

Wodurch wird der Frieden heute bedroht,  
was können wir tun? ..... 14

## **Litauen Mykolas Romeris Universität | *Lithuania Mykolas Romeris University***

Thema | *Topic:*

15 Years of NATO membership of the  
Baltic States – What role does trust play  
amongst the members of the Alliance? ..... 25

## **Parlamentarische Versammlung der NATO | *NATO Parliamentary Assembly***

Thema | *Topic:*

NATO@70 – How can the alliance  
continue to contribute to peace and  
freedom in the future? ..... 38

## Thema | Topic:

Wodurch wird der Frieden heute bedroht, was können wir tun?

### 1. Preis: 600 EUR, Klasse 8d des Elisabeth-von-Thadden-Gymnasiums Heidelberg Gottesdienstgestaltung zum Thema Aufrüstung, Frieden, Atomkrieg Wodurch wird der Frieden heute bedroht – was können wir dagegen tun?

In den letzten Jahren bestimmten vor allem negative Schlagzeilen das Bild von Europa. Vor allem von der EU. Das kann man sich eigentlich so gar nicht mehr vorstellen, dass so schlecht über Europa gesprochen wird.

Für uns als Klasse 8b der Werkrealschule Unterer Neckar stellt sich da grundsätzlich die Frage: Warum gibt es denn überhaupt die EU und was ist die Idee, die hinter dem gemeinsamen Europa steht?

Vor 75 Jahren lag Europa in Trümmern, denn seit Menschengedenken war das Verhältnis zwischen den europäischen Ländern bestimmt durch Vorurteile, Neid und Krieg. Nach der Katastrophe des Zweiten Weltkriegs hatten die Menschen den Krieg satt. Die Sehnsucht der Europäer nach Frieden und Wohlstand war Treibsatz für die Europäische Union. EU heißt also vor allem Frieden, heißt in der Folge auch Wohlstand und heißt auf keinen Fall nationaler Egoismus. Das scheinen heute ganz viele Politiker und Menschen vergessen zu haben. Jeder Furz wird aufgebauscht, jedes kleine Problem genutzt um den Leuten die Idee des gemeinsamen Europas madig zu machen.

Gerade aktuell und seit den letzten vier Jahren werden die Menschen, die bei uns Schutz suchen, nur als Problem gesehen, werden die Flüchtlinge von manchen als Parasiten bezeichnet und vor allem auch ausgegrenzt. Motto: „Das Boot ist voll“.

Wir, die Klasse 8b, haben uns überlegt: Was bedeutet Frieden für uns? Der wichtigste Begriff, den wir damit sofort in Verbindung gebracht haben ist Freundschaft. Wenn wir das Wort Freundschaft hören, fallen uns unsere Freunde ein. Viele von uns haben auch Freunde in der Klasse. Diese Schüler haben unterschiedlichste Nationalitäten. Die Nationalität spielt bei dieser

Freundschaft so gut wie überhaupt keine Rolle. Bedenkt man, dass viele Länder aus denen wir kommen früher Krieg miteinander führten, ist das sehr erfreulich. So, wie wir miteinander umgehen, ist es für uns undenkbar, dass in einem Land wie Deutschland oder generell in Europa je wieder Krieg herrscht. Krieg ist für uns weit weg, man hört davon lediglich im Fernsehen und Internet. Dass auch in Deutschland, bzw. Europa von 1914–1918 und 1939–1945 zwei große Kriege tobten, und welche direkten Folgen das für die Menschen in Europa hatte, davon hören wir in der Schule. Jede Familie in Europa kann von diesem Horror berichten. Auch unsere Großeltern und Urgroßeltern erzählen noch mit Schrecken davon. Wir können es nicht verstehen, dass Menschen, die vor Kriegen flüchten, zuerst nur als Problem gesehen werden. Wir können es aus der Geschichte nicht verstehen und vor allem nicht, wenn wir an unsere Klassengemeinschaft denken. Bei uns in der Klasse und überhaupt in der ganzen Schule ist es ehrlich überhaupt kein Problem, woher einer kommt. Das ist überhaupt nicht wichtig. Wichtig ist uns, ob einer in Ordnung ist, hilfsbereit und verlässlich, ob er oder sie gut zuhören kann, ob einer offen für Freundschaft ist.

Okay, jetzt würden wir gerne über Abdul sprechen. Abdul ist 15 Jahre alt und seit drei Jahren in Deutschland. Seit zwei Jahren ist er in unserer Klasse. Seine Familie kommt aus Syrien. In Syrien herrscht Krieg. Abduls Vater ist daraufhin mit seiner Familie nach Deutschland geflüchtet. Abdul hat schnell die deutsche Sprache gelernt, sein Vater hat Arbeit gefunden und auch seine Geschwister sind bei uns an der Schule und sind gut integriert. Abdul fühlt sich, nachdem er am Anfang eher schüchtern war, zunehmend wohl. Er hat viele von uns als Freunde gewonnen. Wir machen viel zusammen, spielen Fußball, gehen ins Kino, erzählen uns von heimlichen Dates. Für uns wäre es unvorstellbar, dass Abdul plötzlich ausgegrenzt werden würde oder gar verfolgt.

Abdul steht für unsere Klasse, steht für die Werkrealschule Unterer Neckar in Ladenburg. Wir lassen uns nicht gegeneinander aufhetzen, für uns ist Vielfalt ganz normal. Das ist unser kleiner Beitrag zum Frieden.

**2. Preis: 500 EUR, Klasse 8b der Werkrealschule Unterer Neckar Ladenburg**  
**Problem: Menschen mit Fluchterfahrung**  
**Wodurch wird der Frieden heute bedroht – was können wir dagegen tun?**

In den letzten Jahren bestimmten vor allem negative Schlagzeilen das Bild von Europa. Vor allem von der EU. Das kann man sich eigentlich so gar nicht mehr vorstellen, dass so schlecht über Europa gesprochen wird.

Für uns als Klasse 8b der Werkrealschule Unterer Neckar stellt sich da grundsätzlich die Frage: Warum gibt es denn überhaupt die EU und was ist die Idee, die hinter dem gemeinsamen Europa steht?

Vor 75 Jahren lag Europa in Trümmern, denn seit Menschengedenken war das Verhältnis zwischen den europäischen Ländern bestimmt durch Vorurteile, Neid und Krieg. Nach der Katastrophe des Zweiten Weltkriegs hatten die Menschen den Krieg satt. Die Sehnsucht der Europäer nach Frieden und Wohlstand war Treibsatz für die Europäische Union. EU heißt also vor allem Frieden, heißt in der Folge auch Wohlstand und heißt auf keinen Fall nationaler Egoismus. Das scheinen heute ganz viele Politiker und Menschen vergessen zu haben. Jeder Futz wird aufgebauscht, jedes kleine Problem genutzt um den Leuten die Idee des gemeinsamen Europas madig zu machen.

Gerade aktuell und seit den letzten vier Jahren werden die Menschen, die bei uns Schutz suchen, nur als Problem gesehen, werden die Flüchtlinge von manchen als Parasiten bezeichnet und vor allem auch ausgegrenzt. Motto: „Das Boot ist voll“.

Wir, die Klasse 8b, haben uns überlegt: Was bedeutet Frieden für uns? Der wichtigste Begriff, den wir damit sofort in Verbindung gebracht haben ist Freundschaft. Wenn wir das Wort Freundschaft hören, fallen uns unsere Freunde ein. Viele von uns haben auch Freunde in der Klasse. Diese Schüler haben unterschiedlichste Nationalitäten. Die Nationalität spielt bei dieser Freundschaft so gut wie überhaupt keine Rolle. Bedenkt man, dass viele Länder aus denen wir kommen früher Krieg miteinander führten, ist das sehr erfreulich. So, wie wir miteinander

umgehen, ist es für uns undenkbar, dass in einem Land wie Deutschland oder generell in Europa je wieder Krieg herrscht. Krieg ist für uns weit weg, man hört davon lediglich im Fernsehen und Internet. Dass auch in Deutschland, bzw. Europa von 1914–1918 und 1939–1945 zwei große Kriege tobten, und welche direkten Folgen das für die Menschen in Europa hatte, davon hören wir in der Schule. Jede Familie in Europa kann von diesem Horror berichten. Auch unsere Großeltern und Urgroßeltern erzählen noch mit Schrecken davon. Wir können es nicht verstehen, dass Menschen, die vor Kriegen flüchten, zuerst nur als Problem gesehen werden. Wir können es aus der Geschichte nicht verstehen und vor allem nicht, wenn wir an unsere Klassengemeinschaft denken. Bei uns in der Klasse und überhaupt in der ganzen Schule ist es ehrlich überhaupt kein Problem, woher einer kommt. Das ist überhaupt nicht wichtig. Wichtig ist uns, ob einer in Ordnung ist, hilfsbereit und verlässlich, ob er oder sie gut zuhören kann, ob einer offen für Freundschaft ist.

Okay, jetzt würden wir gerne über Abdul sprechen. Abdul ist 15 Jahre alt und seit drei Jahren in Deutschland. Seit zwei Jahren ist er in unserer Klasse. Seine Familie kommt aus Syrien. In Syrien herrscht Krieg. Abduls Vater ist daraufhin mit seiner Familie nach Deutschland geflüchtet. Abdul hat schnell die deutsche Sprache gelernt, sein Vater hat Arbeit gefunden und auch seine Geschwister sind bei uns an der Schule und sind gut integriert. Abdul fühlt sich, nachdem er am Anfang eher schüchtern war, zunehmend wohl. Er hat viele von uns als Freunde gewonnen. Wir machen viel zusammen, spielen Fußball, gehen ins Kino, erzählen uns von heimlichen Dates. Für uns wäre es unvorstellbar, dass Abdul plötzlich ausgegrenzt werden würde oder gar verfolgt.

Abdul steht für unsere Klasse, steht für die Werkrealschule Unterer Neckar in Ladenburg. Wir lassen uns nicht gegeneinander aufhetzen, für uns ist Vielfalt ganz normal. Das ist unser kleiner Beitrag zum Frieden.

**3. Preis: 400 EUR, Klassen 7–9 der Carl-Engler-Realschule Hemsbach, Fabian Stamm (9b), Lara Schulz (8b), David Santos (7b), Melina Weißwange (7b), Larissa Fehrke (7b), Naile Spasoli (8b)**

**Auseinandersetzung mit der „Macht der Worte“**

**Projektbeschreibung „Macht-Worte!“**

Im Rahmen der Projekttagge 2019 wurde von mir, Anne Schwarzer (Lehrerin an der Carl-Engler-Realschule Hemsbach) das Projekt „Macht-Worte“ angeboten. Es zielte ab auf die Auseinandersetzung mit der Macht der Worte – im positiven wie im negativen Sinn, um selbst im Anschluss einen Versuch zu starten, Worte zu „machen“.

Die Schülerinnen und Schüler der Jahrgangsstufen 7 bis 9 wurden in einer kurzen Einführungsphase mit Themenbereichen wie Fakenews, Soziale Netzwerke, Äußerungen von Machthabern dieser Welt, Hater-Kommentaren im Internet und anderen vertraut gemacht. In selbst gewählten Schwerpunkten vertieften sie ihre Kenntnis darüber und fertigten Collagen, Karikaturen, Videos oder Texte an, zu denen sie ihr Schwerpunkt inspirierte.

Gerne übersende ich Ihnen die in diesem Rahmen entstandenen Textprodukte und möchte sie für den Wettbewerb ins Spiel bringen.

Bei Rückfragen stehe ich Ihnen unter folgenden Kontaktdaten zur Verfügung:

Anne Schwarzer (Lehrerin)  
Carl-Engler-Realschule Hemsbach

**Wo sind wir? (Fabian Stamm, Klasse 9b, Carl-Engler-Realschule Hemsbach)**

Wo sind wir wenn, der Präsident von einer der größten Landesmächte, ja wenn ein dieser nicht einmal aus Fehlern lernen kann, wenn ein Werk das aber Millionen von Leuten das Leben kostete, das Königreiche zusammenbrechen ließ, wenn ein dieses Werk ohne Bedenken niedrigerissen, und die Welt damit in ein neues Chaos gestürzt wird, ja wo sind wir dann?

sind wir im Mittelmeer und retten Menschen, sind wir im Nahen Osten, oder sind wir in Asien und vernichten die Diktatoren? Befreien die Leute? Wahrlich ich sage euch: wir können nicht überall sein, doch mit der Hilfe anderer Länder

können wir es wenigstens versuchen, und das Werk, das sich Frieden nennt, retten, die Probleme dieser Welt gemeinsam anpacken, diskriminierende und rassistische Attentate verhindern, und schlussendlich den Frieden, den unsere Vorfahren so sehr versuchten zu bewahren, endlich perfektionieren.

**Was ist der Unterschied? (Fabian Stamm, Klasse 9b, Carl-Engler-Realschule Hemsbach)**

„Ich hätte gerne einen Negerkuss“, sagte die ältere Dame vor mir, als mir langsam klar wurde, dass es Zeit ist, Zeit etwas zu tun, jeden Tag sterben mehr und mehr Leute im Mittelmeer, im doch so blauen Mittelmeer, blau ja blau wie die Flagge der EU, genau die EU die doch so hoch und heilig versprach, versprach den leidenden Menschen zu helfen, egal welche Religion oder Farbe, doch das Meer färbt sich langsam immer eindeutiger, immer eindeutiger dunkel, dunkel wie die Herzen dessen, dessen die diese armen Menschen Tag für Tag ihrem Schicksal überlassen, wären diese Menschen anders wären sie mehr wie ihr, würdet ihr sie aufnehmen? ja? dann stelle ich euch diese Frage, unterscheiden sie sich von euch, tun sie das doch so stark?

nein, sie sind wie du und ich, wie er und sie, wie wir alle, und sie brauchen unsere Hilfe, jetzt oder nie, jetzt oder nie meine Freunde.

**Verdummen wir hier ? (Fabian Stamm, 9b, Carl-Engler-Realschule Hemsbach)**

Während die Politik immer schärfer wird, die Probleme immer größer werden, ja während die Welt immer schwerer zu regieren scheint, geben wir nach, lassen die Probleme Probleme sein, schalten ab kommt Politik ins Thema, halten die Ohren zu und schauen weg,

Verdummen wir hier?

Oder ist es so weit?

Sind wir am Verzweifeln und wissen nicht weiter? Oder lassen wir andere alles machen?

So sage mir: was passiert hier?

Diese Probleme werden sich nicht von alleine lösen, statt wegzuschauen, wegzuhören, wegzulaufen, müssen wir uns zusammenreißen und die Probleme als Volk angehen, als ein starkes Volk, und ein Volk kann nur vereint ein Volk sein, so lösen wir die Probleme als ein Volk, vereint unter der Europäischen Flagge.



### Das Recht nicht im Recht zu sein? (Fabian Stamm, 9b, Carl-Engler-Realschule Hemsbach)

Von einer Politik der Deutschen,  
zu einer der Diktatoren,  
zu einer der Reichen.

Wo ist der Unterschied, frage ich euch!  
Der Unterschied zwischen Kaiser, Diktator oder  
Reichem?

Es ist egal, wer regiert, unterdrückt wird ständig  
immer und immer wieder, einem wird weisge-  
macht, man hätte die Wahl, doch schlussendlich  
vereinen sich alle dort oben im Parlament, verei-  
nen sich gegen den Bürger, erhören ihn nicht,  
wie sie sollten, und die Opposition?  
Sie schweigt, ist ruhig und bleibt im Schatten,  
aus Angst ausgeschlossen zu werden.

Und so haben wir aus Gewalt, Trümmern, Zerfall,  
und Unterdrückung etwas erschaffen, das nicht  
nur nicht funktioniert, sondern auch noch den  
Bürger ausnutzt, in den Dreck wirft und ihn ver-  
gisst sobald sie stark genug sind.

Erst wenn der Bürger sich aufrappelt, gegen  
allen Verstand sich sträubt, und seine Meinung  
hinaus brüllt wie auf einem alten Markt, ja erst  
dann beachten sie den Bürger wieder, flehen ihn  
an und hoffen auf mehr Stärke, mehr Kraft, so  
dass alles von neu beginnen kann, der Kreislauf  
sich wiederholt.

### ANKLAGE VOR DEM DOPPELKREUZ (Lara Schulz, 8b, Carl-Engler-Realschule Hemsbach)

#### Meine Anklage:

Sie sehen tatenlos dabei zu, wie der Planet auf  
dem wir leben, auf dem Sie leben zu Grunde  
geht. [#americafirst](#)

Sie lassen zu, dass Kinder Monate oder sogar  
Jahre von deren Eltern und Familie getrennt sind.

[#makeamericagreatagain](#)

Sie geben jedem Bürger die Macht mit einer  
Waffe über das Leben eines anderen zu ent-  
scheiden. [#justice](#)

Sie lassen lieber zu, dass Menschen auf ihrer  
Flucht sterben, als dass sie ihnen den Zutritt zu  
ihrem Land erlauben. [#vereintesEuropa](#)

Sie lassen zu, dass Menschen sich in dem Land  
in dem sie Leben nicht zu Hause fühlen.

[#homeless](#)

Sie bringen den Profisport von Zusammenhalt  
und Spaß zu Menschenhandel, Ausbeutung und  
Misshandlung. [#fifa](#)

Sie machen die Angst der Menschen zu Hass,  
um sie für Ihre Sache zu gewinnen. [#hate](#)

**Mein Urteil:** [#mitgefühl](#)

### Anklage (Lara Schulz, Klasse 8b, Carl-Engler-Realschule Hemsbach)

#### Ich klage an:

1. Sie sehen tatenlos dabei zu, wie der Planet auf  
dem wir leben, auf dem Sie leben zu Grunde  
geht. Sie gehen sogar soweit, dass sie die Erd-  
erwärmung bestreiten und leugnen, dass  
etwas getan werden muss, um unsere Erde  
für die weiteren Generationen, wie Ihre Kinder  
und Enkel zu erhalten. Stattdessen konzent-  
rieren Sie sich lieber auf die Förderung Ihres  
heimischen Öls und die Vorteile für Ihr Land.  
Bedauernswerterweise vergessen Sie dabei,  
dass die Erde nicht nur aus den USA besteht.
2. Sie lassen zu, dass Kinder Monate oder sogar  
Jahre von deren Eltern und Familie getrennt  
werden. Denken Sie an Ihren Sohn! Wie hätte  
er sich mit fünf Jahren gefühlt? Alleine, ohne  
seine Familie an einem Ort, wo er nichts und  
niemandem kennt. Hätten sie so eine Kindheit  
für Ihre Kinder gewollt? Ich denke nicht.

Und doch lassen sie zu, dass jetzt, in diesem  
Moment Kinder Ihre Eltern vermissen.

3. Sie sind ein Befürworter von Waffen und sor-  
gen so dafür, dass Menschen das Recht selbst  
in die Hand nehmen und über Leben und Tod  
Ihrer Mitbürger entscheiden können.
4. Sie verweigern Menschen, die nach Schutz  
suchen den Zutritt zu Ihrem Land, weil sie  
nicht wollen, dass diese den gebürtigen Ame-  
rikanern die Arbeitsplätze wegnehmen. Aber  
gibt es überhaupt den „gebürtigen Amerika-  
ner“? Nein, denn Amerika ist nur durch Mig-  
ranten und Vielfalt zu dem geworden was es  
heute ist.
5. Sie sorgen dafür, dass Frauen sich in Ihrem  
Land weder ernstgenommen, noch respekt-  
voll behandelt oder unterstützt fühlen. Sie  
behandeln sie wie Menschen zweiter Klasse  
und geben Ihnen das Gefühl minderwertig zu  
sein.

6. Sie wandeln die Angst der Menschen in Hass um und bringen sie so dazu Ihrer rassistischer, sexistischer und respektloser Politik zu folgen.

### Information (David Santos)

Informationsaustausch ist allgegenwärtig  
Doch wann ist eine Info gefährlich?  
Angst statt Information unterm Kreuz der Kirche  
Angst sähen, um Gegenmittel aufzuzwängen  
Menschen nur noch als hirnlose Zombies,  
geleitet von Angst  
Angst benutzt, um ein Volk zu verführen  
Geschichte wiederholt sich  
Die Angst bleibt  
Angst vor Ungewissheit aus den Booten am  
Horizont  
Langsam sich bündelnd zu Missgunst  
Zu Hass, der die Menschen bis ins Mark prägt  
Wie eine Rose die durch Krankheiten welkt.  
Verdirbt unser Verstand an Alternativen Fakten.  
Wie sie uns einen Schleier auferlegt.  
Darum öffnet eure Augen.

### Niederschläge (Melina Weißwange, Larissa Fehrke, 7b, Carl-Engler-Realschule)

Ein großer YouTuber bin ich geworden,  
jeden Follower hab ich mir erworben.  
Abitur hab ich nicht,  
bin Influencer und steh im Rampenlicht.  
Hast du mich schon abonniert?  
Ich bin nämlich prominert.  
Deutsch brauch' ich nicht,  
ich hab' Geld – mehr brauch ich nicht.  
Ein großer Model das bin ich,  
Melina Weißwange so heiße ich.

Du willst ein großer YouTuber sein?  
Guck erst mal in mein Account rein.  
Letztens hast du dich vertippt,  
bitte geh' auf Insta – ich hab da nen Tipp.  
Ich create mir nen neuen Account:  
da mach ich dich fertig! Das glaubst du wohl  
kaum.  
Größer rausgekommen als ich das bist du nicht,  
Jetzt komm' und verzieh dich mit deinem hässlichen  
Gesicht!  
Ey komm – blamier dich nicht noch mehr als du  
schon hast, du bist n' richtig kleiner Sp...  
Die letzten Worte erspare ich mir,  
ich bin besser als du und das mal Vier.

Was hab ich ihr denn bloß getan, wir waren mal  
Freundinnen doch jetzt sind wir Feindinnen.  
Verdienst dein Geld mit Ach und Krach,  
ich schmeiß dich aus dem Autodach.

STOPP! Jetzt hör mal auf mit dem Gezicke,  
es passieren doch nur noch Missgeschicke.  
Das alles ist doch für den A...,  
der ganze Fame das macht doch kein' Spaß.  
Marketing das lässt dich doch nur gut aussehen,  
dabei sein ist doch alles, der ganze Hate, die  
ganze Beeinflussung nur um Geld zu verdienen?

Das bin nicht ich, das an mir und um mich rum  
ist alles nur Fake. Ich suchte den Stolz wie eine  
Droge. Früher war alles anders: meine Familie  
war immer für mich da. Letztendlich hab ich sie  
enttäuscht und im Stich gelassen. Jetzt sitze ich  
hier in diesem Raum und rede mit einer Kamera.  
Und für was ? Damit ich mitmischen kann. Aber  
zum Mischen ist nichts mehr da

### Ein Zombie der Angst (Fabian Stamm, 9b, Carl-Engler-Realschule Hemsbach)

„If you happy and you know it clap your hands“,  
doch wie kann ich fröhlich in die Hände klat-  
schen, wenn es doch so viel unglückliche Sachen  
auf der Welt gibt, Sachen, die einen schlecht  
stimmen.  
Oder sind die Überschriften, die man sieht,  
Unfälle,  
Attentate,  
Erdbeben,  
am Ende doch nur erfundene alternative Fakten?  
Sind sie es vielleicht nicht einmal wert anzu-  
schauen, wie soll man den Glauben wenn man  
blind wird?  
Blind vor Fakten, Fakten, an denen man nicht  
einmal festhalten kann, Fakten, die nicht real  
sind, sie einem aber so vorkommen als wären sie  
das, sie einem sagen die Welt wäre schlecht.  
So schlecht, dass man nichts mehr von ihr hören  
will.  
Zerstören Alternative Fakten also das Weltbild  
der Menschen?  
Oder noch schlimmer die Modernen Medien?  
Ein Fakt aber ist: sie machen die Welt, die doch  
so herrliche Welt, zur Hölle, und die Wissensbe-  
geisterten zu einem Zombie, einem Zombie der  
Angst, der Angst auf dieser Erde zu wandeln.

### **Friede, Freude, Eierkuchen (Naile Spasoli, 8b, Carl-Engler-Realschule Hemsbach)**

Man (und Frau) nehme  
viel starken Willen  
Und vermische diesen mit Toleranz und  
Selbstlosigkeit.  
Dazu kommen eine Prise Spaß und Humor.  
Als nächstes kühle man Hitzköpfe ab und füge  
sie der Mischung hinzu.  
Egoismus und Arroganz siebe man aus.  
Man lasse alles ruhen und backe es anschlie-  
ßend mit Liebe.  
Den fertigen Kuchen kann man nach Bedarf mit  
Freude dekorieren.

### **Sind wir es? (Fabian Stamm, 9b Carl-Engler-Realschule Hemsbach)**

Der Klimawandel,  
eine von uns Menschen erschaffene Strafe,  
eine wahrhaftig schlimme Strafe,  
die dennoch etwas Gutes mit sich bringt,  
oder wie manch einer sagen würde,  
etwas Grauensvolles.  
Denn die einzige Möglichkeit,  
die einzige Möglichkeit, wie wir diese Strafe  
bezwingen können,  
die einzige Möglichkeit ist,  
ja ist wenn jedes Land,  
jeder Bundesstaat,  
jede Insel,  
jede Stadt,  
jede Nachbarschaft,  
jede Familie,  
jeder Mensch,  
aufsteht und sagt,  
„ich werde etwas tun“,  
„ich werde das Schicksal unseres Planeten nicht  
jedem alleine überlassen, „ich werde helfen  
unseren Planeten zu retten“,  
ja erst dann können wir es schaffen, es schaffen  
gemeinsam ohne Konflikte auf diesem Planeten  
zu leben, auf unserem einzigen Planeten.

### **4. Preis: 300 EUR, Klasse 7 der Friedrich-Schiller-Gemeinschaftsschule Hemsbach Auseinandersetzung mit der Thematik „Krieg und Frieden“**

#### **Sie haben kein Dach über dem Kopf. Im Krieg verlieren viele Menschen ihre Heimat.**

Wir haben eine freie Heimat, können uns frei entfalten, können frei leben ohne Gewalt oder Krieg.

#### **Kinder müssen voller Angst und unter Furcht in den Krieg: Kinderrechte werden vernachlässigt.**

Dagegen können Kinder in friedlichen Ländern frei und gleichberechtigt aufwachsen.

#### **Schlechte Versorgung, Armut und Obdachlosigkeit sind für die Betroffenen Normalität.**

In Deutschland sorgen Polizei und Politik für Sicherheit und Ordnung.

#### **Es gibt Terroranschläge auf Menschen, die nicht getan haben.**

Es gibt Polizisten, die Terroranschläge klären.

#### **Menschen, die Macht wollen, fürchten sich vor nichts.**

Die Polizei hilft, dass Deutschland nicht gewalttätig ist. Und es gibt keinen Hass.

#### **Im Krieg gibt es so gut wie keine Bildung.**

Wir haben Bildung, verschiedene Bildungswege sind für uns offen und wir können arbeiten und Geld verdienen.

#### **Panzer zerstören Häuser und sogar ganze Städte. die Menschen verlieren alles, was sie hatten.**

Hier lebt man in Sicherheit und muss keine Angst haben, dass man gleich bombadiert wird.

#### **Sie müssen flüchten, die Flucht ist sehr gefährlich.**

Jeder von uns hat ein zu Hause.

#### **Krieg ist scheiße, nutzlos, blutig, bekloppt, gewalttätig, sinnfrei und gefährlich.**

Frieden bedeutet: Gemeinschaft, Sicherheit, Freiheit, Demokratie, Respekt, Unterstützung und zu Hause.

**5. Preis: 200 EUR, Sonderpreis: Sebastian Ohlig, 8. Klasse des St. Raphael-Gymnasiums Heidelberg**

**Privatheit und Überwachung im Internet  
„Sharing is caring. Privacy is theft. Secrets are lies.“ Diese Worte spricht die Protagonistin Annie Allerton in Dave Eggers Tech-Dystopie „The Circle“.**

Dennoch sind sie überraschendrealitätsnah. Wir leben in einem Zeitalter, in dem fast unser gesamtes Leben überwacht wird. Mehr und mehr unseres täglichen Tuns verlagert sich auf die Sphäre des Internets: Unsere Kontakte, unsere Arbeit, unser Einkaufen, unsere Freizeit. Laut der Postbank Digitalstudie 2019 verbringen die Deutschen im Schnitt ca. 50 Stunden pro Woche online.<sup>1</sup> Dies öffnet neue, vorher undenk- bare Überwachungsmöglichkeiten. Längst geht Überwachung nicht mehr primär auf das Konto staatlicher Akteure; Großkonzerne wie Facebook, Amazon und Google nehmen ihre Plätze ein. Das Ideal des Netizen, aller Technik Herr und niemandem Untertan, aktiv in der rechtsfreien Domäne des Internets, scheint einem Glasmens- chen gewichen zu sein. Andererseits formieren sich immerwährend neue Bewegungen, die auf ihre Privatheit und das Recht auf Selbstbestim- mung im Internet pochen. Mit diesem gesteigerten Bewusstsein für Privatheit auf politischer Ebene, am relevantesten durch die DSGVO, aber auch im gesellschaftlichen Diskurs, stellen sich folgende Fragen: Welchen Wert hat Privatheit in unserem Leben? Wo sind die Grenzen des Inti- men und des Öffentlichen? Und: Was können wir gegen Überwachung tun? Zusätzlich: Ist das überhaupt die richtige Frage?

„Privatsphäre bezeichnet den nichtöffentlichen Bereich, in dem ein Mensch unbehelligt von äußeren Einflüssen sein Recht auf freie Entfal- tung der Persönlichkeit wahrnimmt.“<sup>2</sup>

Die Privatsphäre ist also ein Raum zur Selbstfin- dung ohne externe Einflüsse. In der Soziologie ist der Begriff der Privatheit geläufiger, er elimi- niert den räumlichen Charakter der Begrifflich- keit und generalisiert den Umfang des Begriffs.

Privatheit ist nach Artikel 12 der allgemeinen Erklärung der Menschenrechte ein Grundrecht „Niemand darf willkürlichen Eingriffen in sein Pri- vatleben [...] ausgesetzt werden.

„Von der Soziologin Judee K. Burgoon stammt folgende Gliederung der Privatheit in 4 Teile<sup>3</sup>:

1. Informationelle Privatheit  
Die subjektive Hoheit über seine Daten und deren Weitergabe
2. Soziale Privatheit  
Die subjektive wahrgenommene Möglichkeit, sich Kontakt zu entziehen.
3. Physische Privatheit  
Die subjektiv wahrgenommenen Möglichkeit, sich körperlich entziehen zu können (Pufferzone.)
4. Psychologische Privatheit  
Die subjektiv wahrgenommene Kontrolle darüber, welche Emotionen man preisgibt und empfängt.

Wir werden im Verlauf dieses Beitrags jedoch nur die informationelle Privatheit betrachten, im kolloquialen Sprachgebrauch, bei dem die ein- zelnen Formen sowieso nicht allzu stark differen- ziert werden, ist dies meist, was unter Privatheit verstanden wird. Der Trendmonitor der Universi- tät Hohenheim zu Privatheit und informationelle Selbstbestimmung 2017 ergab eine starke Aus- prägung des Bewusstseins für informationelle Privatheit, andere Formen, beispielsweise die soziale oder psychologische Privatheit lagen den Befragten nicht derart am Herzen.<sup>4</sup>

Blicken wir einmal zurück in die frühen 2000er. Google war gerade am Kommen, das äußerst effektive, jedoch nicht im geringsten profitable Forschungsprojekt zweier Stanford Studenten: Larry Page und Sergei Brin. Durch den Konkur- renten überlegenen Suchalgorithmus hatte Google große Investitionen von Investoren wie Sequoia Capital erhalten, doch mit dem Platzen der Dotcom Blase 2002 geriet Google finanziell unter Druck.

Amit Patel ist meist derjenige, dem zugespro- chen wird, Google zu Big Data geführt zu haben, anfangs jedoch nur zur Verbesserung der Such- funktion. Es bestand so eine Art Symbiose zwi- schen den Google-Nutzern und der benutzten KI, erstere suchten eifrig und trainierten so die KI, bessere Ergebnisse auszugeben, zu beider- seitigem Nutzen. Beide Gründer lehnten Wer- bung vehement ab und sprachen 1998 gar bei der WWW-Konferenz: „Wir erwarten, dass durch Werbung finanzierte Suchmaschinen die Interes-

sen der Werbetreibenden, denen der Kunden zum Nachteil letzterer vorziehen werden. [...] Es ist von größter Bedeutung, eine Suchmaschine zu haben, die kompetitiv und transparent im akademischen Raum arbeitet.“<sup>5</sup> Zwangsläufigerweise stellte sich jedoch bald eine neue Mentalität ein, die Nutzung der riesigen Datenmengen zur Herstellung persönlicher, auf den individuellen Nutzer zugeschnittener Werbung. Trotz initialer Fehlschläge öffnete dies den Weg zum Internet-Giganten Alphabet (andere Konzerne wie Facebook traten bald in Googles Fußstapfen) und folglich auch zum Internet, wie wir es heute kennen.

Aus dieser frühen Zeit stammt auch „Der Nutzen der Computer Mediation“ des Google CFO und wirtschaftlichen Vordenkers Hal Varian. Er benennt zentral folgende 4 Punkte<sup>6</sup>:

1. Datenextraktion und Analyse
2. Neue Vertragsformen aufgrund besseren Monitorings
3. Personalisierung
4. Längerfristige Experimente.

Diese 4 Punkte, besonders der erste, sind die Stützpfeiler des „Überwachungskapitalismus“, der die Neustrukturierung des Cyberraums einleitete. Zentral zu dieser neuen Ordnung ist frei nach Shoshana Zuboff (Zuboff, Shoshana; Surveillance Capitalism)<sup>7</sup> folgendes: Das Sprichwort: „Wenn du nicht zahlst, bist du nicht der Kunde, sondern das Produkt“, ist falsch. Du bist das Rohstoffmaterial, aus denen das Produkt geformt wird.

Der Wandel vollzog sich wie folgt: Nicht mehr wurden die Daten als „Bonus“ zum Geschäft mit den vollbrachten Dienstleistungen angesehen, die Daten wurden zum Geschäft, die vorherige Dienstleistung wurde nun zum Mittel der Datengeneration degradiert. Die „wahren“ Kunden von Großkonzernen wie Google oder Facebook waren von diesem Zeitpunkt an nicht mehr die Nutzer, es waren Werbetreibende, denen man gezielte Werbung oder Behavioral Futures verkaufte, wie Verhaltensprognosen durch langanhaltende Überwachung und darauffolgende Analyse gewonnen. Der ehemalige Google CEO Schmidt formulierte es wie folgt: „Wir wissen wo du bist. Wir wissen wo du warst. Wir wissen so grob woran du gerade denkst.“<sup>8</sup>

Privatheit ist eng mit Überwachung verbunden, die beiden stehen in strikter Antithese zueinander, Überwachung wiederum erleichtert Manipulation, die Beeinflussung und Veränderung unserer Verhaltensweisen. Je mehr über uns bekannt ist, desto genauer können wir angesprochen werden, wie ein Freund, der deine Schwachstellen kennt.<sup>9</sup>

Die Manipulation kann sublim sein und „nur“ dem Zwecke der Werbung dienen: Einem Nutzer werden nach dem Joggen gehen Anzeigen für Laufschuhe geschaltet, sie können jedoch auch korrumpierend im politischen Dialog wirken.<sup>10</sup>

Ein Problem das in den Medien sehr viel Präsenz genießt, sind Filterblasen; jene bezeichnen einen Effekt, bei dem die eigene Meinung derart oft resoniert wird, dass man nur noch die eine Seite von einer Problematik erkennt, wahrnimmt und nur Meinungen ähnlich Gesinnter offen steht. Dieser Filterblaseneffekt kann auch zur Manipulation genutzt werden, in dem eine „selektive Filtermembran“ kreiert wird, die nur noch die Positionen wiedergibt, die vorgegebenen Schemata entsprechen und beispielsweise Nutzern, die ihre Informationen online beziehen, ein verzerrtes Wirklichkeitsbild präsentieren und so Information und Sachlichkeit, zwei Grundbausteine der Demokratie, hemmen und Polarisierung Auftrieb geben.<sup>11</sup>

Egal wie man jenes Argument sieht, es ist ein Fakt, dass der Mensch sich beobachtet anders verhält als im Privaten.<sup>12</sup> Jeder von uns hat etwas zu verbergen und trivialerweise ist aus gutem Grund nicht alles allen zugänglich, es gibt verschiedene Stufen des Vertrauens und der Intimität und eine in einem Kreis akzeptierte Bemerkung ist in einem anderen Umfeld ein gefährlicher Fauxpas.

Wir wertschätzen Privatheit als ein Maß der Kontrolle, der Selbstbestimmung über unsere Informationen und insbesondere deren Weitergabe, der Kontrolle des Wissens, was andere über uns haben, somit in gewissem Maße des Bildes, was sie von uns haben. Nicht umsonst fühlt man sich oft unwohl, wenn man mit einer einem unbekannt Person spricht und sie sagt, dass sie bereits viel von einem gehört habe. Es schleicht sich oft ein gewisses Unbehagen ein – „Was hat sie gehört?“ „Wovon weiß sie?“

Es ist somit eine Form der Selbstbestimmung zu entscheiden, wer wann weshalb deine Daten bekommt und es ist ein wert volles Gut, was zu Recht besonders in der europäischen Kultur ein hohes Ansehen genießt.

Viele Schritte wurden bereits auf dem Weg in eine Zukunft der informationellen Privatheit unternommen, am bekanntesten durch die DSGVO, die 2016 verabschiedet und 2018 in Kraft getreten ist. Ihre Bestimmung beinhalten unter anderem:

- Ein EU-Bürger muss klar seiner Datennutzung zustimmen und darf verständliche und schlüssige Informationen darüber fordern, wie und wieso seine Daten genutzt werden und an wen sie weitergegeben werden
- Das Recht, vergessen zu werden: Ein Bürger hat ein Recht darauf, dass seine Daten gelöscht werden<sup>13</sup>

Obwohl die DSGVO prinzipiell gute datenschutztechnische Ansätze zeigt und darlegt, ist sie manchen nicht weitgehend genug. Ailidh Callander moniert beispielsweise: „Die DSGVO ist das Fundament, nicht die Decke“.<sup>14</sup> Manchen geht die Einschränkung psychologisch manipulierender Werbung nicht weit genug, wieder andere kritisieren Schlupflöcher, beispielsweise für Parteien.<sup>15</sup>

Aus persönlicher Erfahrung weiß ich, dass oft mit gemischten Gefühlen auf die DSGVO geschaut wird. Trotz der theoretisch bestehenden Möglichkeiten der Cookie-Deaktivierung muss man sich hierfür oft erst auf Seiten von bis zu dreißig Partnern gehen, die oft versuchen, die Cookie-Deaktivierung so anspruchsvoll wie möglich zu gestalten. Auch in Schule und Arbeit sind die wahrgenommenen Auswirkungen dieser Grundverordnung oft eher negativ. Man betrachte die Schlagzeile: „Malen in der Kita bald verboten?“<sup>16</sup> nach der in einer brandenburgischen Kita das Beschriften mit Namen der von den Kindern gemalten Bilderverboten wurde, da es gegen Privatsphäre Auflagen verstoße. Auch für Vereine wurde das Leben oft schwer gemacht, manche gaben sogar mit den neuen Belastungen auf.<sup>17</sup> Datenschutz ist stets eine Abwägung, für das Individuum und den Regulator. Für jeden von uns stellt sich immer noch täglich die Frage. „Soll ich mir das Durchlesen der AGB antun?“

Soll ich mir die Mühe machen, alle Cookie-Einstellungen zu bearbeiten?": Bequemlichkeit gegen Daten – eine Entscheidung, die wir auf tagtäglich Basis fällen müssen.

Für den staatlichen Regulator ergeben sich wiederum andere Fragestellungen: „Schränken meine beabsichtigten Regelungen Kleinunternehmen ein? Ist der Nutzen meiner Regelung dem bürokratischen Aufwand entsprechend? Wie können wir regulieren, ohne legitime Geschäftsmodelle zu beschneiden und trotz oder gerademit der Regelung ein attraktiver Wirtschaftsstandort bleiben?“

Denn eines gilt es stets zu bedenken: „Daten sind der Rohstoff der Zukunft.“<sup>18</sup>

## Quellen:

- 1 Deinhardt, Christiana; „Postbank Studie 2019: So ist Deutschland online“;Elektroniknet.de;21.5.2019; <https://www.elektroniknet.de/elektronik/automation/deutschland-ist-online-165553.html> (zuletzt eingesehen:24.7.2019)
- 2 BVerfG, Urteil vom 15. Dezember 1999, Az. 1 BvR 653/96, BVerfGE 101, 361 - Caroline von Monaco II.
- 3 Braun, M., & Trepte, S. (2017). Privatheit und informationelle Selbstbestimmung: Trendmonitor zu den Einstellungen, Meinungen und Perspektiven der Deutschen. Stuttgart: Universität Hohenheim. [https://medienpsychologie.uni-hohenheim.de/fileadmin/einrichtungen/psych/Dateien/Laufende\\_Projekte/Trendmonitor\\_Privatheit\\_Hohenheim.pdf](https://medienpsychologie.uni-hohenheim.de/fileadmin/einrichtungen/psych/Dateien/Laufende_Projekte/Trendmonitor_Privatheit_Hohenheim.pdf)
- 4 Braun, M., & Trepte, S. (2017). Privatheit und informationelle Selbstbestimmung: Trendmonitor zu den Einstellungen, Meinungen und Perspektiven der Deutschen. Stuttgart: Universität Hohenheim. [https://medienpsychologie.uni-hohenheim.de/fileadmin/einrichtungen/psych/Dateien/Laufende\\_Projekte/Trendmonitor\\_Privatheit\\_Hohenheim.pdf](https://medienpsychologie.uni-hohenheim.de/fileadmin/einrichtungen/psych/Dateien/Laufende_Projekte/Trendmonitor_Privatheit_Hohenheim.pdf)
- 5 Sergey Brin & Lawrence Page, „The Anatomy of a Large Scale Hypertextual search Web Search Engine“, Computer Networks and ISDN Systems 30, nos, 1-7 (1998):18, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0169-7552\(98\)00110-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0169-7552(98)00110-X).
- 6 Varian, Hal R. 2010. „Computer Mediated Transactions.“ American Economic Review, 100 (2): 1-10. <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.100.2.1>
- 7 Zuboff, Shoshana, „The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a human Future at the new frontier of power“, 1.Edition, 2019; Profile Books Limited;
- 8 Saint, Nick; „Google CEO: We know where you are. We know where you have been. We can know more or less what you're thinking about“, Business Insider, 4.10.2010; <https://www.businessinsider.com/eric-schmidt-we-know-where-you-are-we-know-where-youve-been-we-can-more-or-less-know-what-youre-thinking-about-2010-10?IR=T>
- 9 Coustick-Deal, Ruth, „Responding to Nothing to hide, Nothing to fear“, Open Rights Group, 4.12.2015; <https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2015/responding-to-nothing-to-hide-nothing-to-fear>
- 10 Esguerra, Richard, „Google CEO Schmidt dismisses the importance of privacy“, Electronic Frontier Foundation(EFF); 10.12.2019; <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/12/google-ceo-eric-schmidt-dismisses-privacy>
- 11 Coustick-Deal, Ruth, „Responding to Nothing to hide, Nothing to fear“, Open Rights Group, 4.12.2015; <https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2015/responding-to-nothing-to-hide-nothing-to-fear>
- 12 „Beobachtete ändern ihr Verhalten“, Spiegel Online, 3.9.2013; <https://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/mensch/psychologie-beobachtete-veraendern-ihr-verhalten-a-920040.html>
- 13 „New EU Data Protection Rules take Place on Friday“, Pressemitteilung EU Parliament 24.5.2018; <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/de/press-room/20180522IPR04042/new-eu-data-protection-rules-take-effect-on-friday>
- 14 Dachwitz, Ingo; „Ein Jahr DSGVO: Zwölf Monate, zwölf Meinungen“; Netzpolitik.org; 25.5.2019; <https://netzpolitik.org/2019/ein-jahr-datenschutzgrundverordnung-zwoelf-monate-zwoelf-meinungen/>
- 15 Callander, Ailidh, „GDPR loopholes facilitate data exploitation by political parties“; GDPR Today, Issue No.3, March 2019; <https://www.gdprtoday.org/gdpr-loopholes-facilitate-data-exploitation-by-political-parties/>
- 16 Conrad, Conrad „Malen in der Kita bald verboten?-Kuriösitätenkabinett Teil 2“, Datenschutz Notizen, 20.2.2019; <https://www.datenschutz-notizen.de/malen-in-der-kita-bald-verbotten-kuriosaeten-kabinett-teil-2-2522098/>
- 17 Rosenberger, Walter; „Die Kehrseite des Datenschutzes: Wie die neue Datenschutzgrundverordnung unser Leben verändert“, Südkurier, 12.9.2018; <https://www.suedkurier.de/ueberregional/panorama/Die-Kehrseite-des-Datenschutzes-Wie-die-neue-Datenschutzgrundverordnung-unser-Leben-veraendert;art409965,9888849>
- 18 Funk, Albert; „Merkel: Daten sind der Rohstoff der Zukunft“, Tagesspiegel, 12.9.2015; <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/wirtschaft/digitalisierung-der-wirtschaft-merkel-daten-sind-der-rohstoff-der-zukunft/12312978.html>

## Bibliographie:

- „Beobachtete ändern ihr Verhalten“, Spiegel Online, 3.9.2013; <https://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/mensch/psychologie-beobachtete-veraendern-ihr-verhalten-a-920040.html>
- Braun, M., & Trepte, S. (2017). Privatheit und informationelle Selbstbestimmung: Trendmonitor zu den Einstellungen, Meinungen und Perspektiven der Deutschen. Stuttgart: Universität Hohenheim. [https://medienpsychologie.uni-hohenheim.de/fileadmin/einrichtungen/psych/Dateien/Laufende\\_Projekte/Trendmonitor\\_Privatheit\\_Hohenheim.pdf](https://medienpsychologie.uni-hohenheim.de/fileadmin/einrichtungen/psych/Dateien/Laufende_Projekte/Trendmonitor_Privatheit_Hohenheim.pdf)
- BVerfG, Urteil vom 15. Dezember 1999, Az. 1 BvR 653/96, BVerfGE 101, 361 - Caroline von Monaco II.
- Callander, Ailidh, „GDPR loopholes facilitate data exploitation by political parties“; GDPR Today, Issue No.3, March 2019; <https://www.gdprtoday.org/gdpr-loopholes-facilitate-data-exploitation-by-political-parties/>
- Conrad, Conrad „Malen in der Kita bald verboten?-Kuriösitätenkabinett Teil 2“, Datenschutz Notizen, 20.2.2019; <https://www.datenschutz-notizen.de/malen-in-der-kita-bald-verbotten-kuriosaeten-kabinett-teil-2-2522098/>
- Dachwitz, Ingo; „Ein Jahr DSGVO: Zwölf Monate, zwölf Meinungen“; Netzpolitik.org; 25.5.2019; <https://netzpolitik.org/2019/ein-jahr-datenschutzgrundverordnung-zwoelf-monate-zwoelf-meinungen/>
- Deinhardt, Christiana; „Postbank Studie 2019: So ist Deutschland online“; Elektroniknet.de;21.5.2019; <https://www.elektroniknet.de/elektronik/automation/deutschland-ist-online-165553.html> (zuletzt eingesehen:24.7.2019)
- Esguerra, Richard, „Google CEO Schmidt dismisses the importance of privacy“, Electronic Frontier Foundation(EFF); 10.12.2019; <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/12/google-ceo-eric-schmidt-dismisses-privacy>
- Funk, Albert; „Merkel: Daten sind der Rohstoff der Zukunft“, Tagesspiegel, 12.9.2015; <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/wirtschaft/digitalisierung-der-wirtschaft-merkel-daten-sind-der-rohstoff-der-zukunft/12312978.html>
- „New EU Data Protection Rules take Place on Friday“, Pressemitteilung EU Parliament 24.5.2018; <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/de/press-room/20180522IPR04042/new-eu-data-protection-rules-take-effect-on-friday>
- Rosenberger, Walter; „Die Kehrseite des Datenschutzes: Wie die neue Datenschutzgrundverordnung unser Leben verändert“, Südkurier, 12.9.2018; <https://www.suedkurier.de/ueberregional/panorama/Die-Kehrseite-des-Datenschutzes-Wie-die-neue-Datenschutzgrundverordnung-unser-Leben-veraendert;art409965,9888849>
- Saint, Nick; „Google CEO: We know where you are. We know where you have been. We can know more or less what you're thinking about“, Business Insider, 4.10.2010; <https://www.businessinsider.com/eric-schmidt-we-know-where-you-are-we-know-where-youve-been-we-can-more-or-less-know-what-youre-thinking-about-2010-10?IR=T>
- Schneier, Bruce; „Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control your World“, 1.Edition,2015;W.W.Norton&Company-New York,London;
- Sergey Brin & Lawrence Page, „The Anatomy of a Large Scale Hypertextual search Web Search Engine“, Computer Networks and ISDN Systems 30, nos, 1-7 (1998):18, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0169-7552\(98\)00110-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0169-7552(98)00110-X).
- Varian, Hal R. 2010. „Computer Mediated Transactions.“ American Economic Review, 100 (2): 1-10. <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.100.2.1>
- Zuboff, Shoshana, „The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a human Future at the new frontier of power“, 1.Edition, 2019; Profile Books Ltd.



1. Preis: Elisabeth-von-Thadden-Gymnasium



2. Preis: Werkrealschule Unterer Neckar Ladenburg



3. Preis: Carl-Engler-Realschule Hemsbach



5. Preis: Sebastian Ohlig, St. Raphael-Gymnasium



**Thema | Topic:**

15 Years of NATO membership of the Baltic States – What role does trust play amongst the members of the Alliance?

**1<sup>st</sup> Prize: 1.000 EUR, Ana Šurpickaja,**  
**Mykolas Romeris Universität (MRU)**  
**MYKOLAS ROMERIS UNIVERSITY**  
**FACULTY OF MYKOLAS ROMERIS LAW SCHOOL**  
**INSTITUTE OF PRIVATE LAW**  
**EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS**  
**LAW PROGRAMME** Vilnius, 2019

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  
THE BODY PART  
LIST OF BIBLIOGRAPHY

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

BS – Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia)  
CFI – The Connected Forces Initiative  
GDP – Gross Domestic Product  
JISR – The Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance initiative  
MS – Member States  
NATO – The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  
NIFC – The NATO Intelligence Fusion Center  
UK – The United Kingdom  
USA – The United States of America

**THE BODY PART**

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (hereinafter – NATO) – is an intergovernmental alliance with twenty nine Member States (hereinafter – MS), including three Baltic States (hereinafter – BS) which joined NATO in 2004. There was argued that an enlargement with three BS would expand „the area of Europe where wars do not happen“ thereby preventing conflicts that could draw Russia back into the region or necessitate NATO intervention. Proponents of enlargement see NATO as benign institution representing the Western „security community“ that serves to promote and foster cooperation among its members<sup>1</sup>.

A „NATO decision“ is the expression of the collective will of all twenty nine MS since all decisions are taken by consensus. The larger NATO becomes, the more problematic it becomes to

reach consensus on key issues<sup>2</sup>. Whereas there are a big number of participants in NATO, therefore, the question arises – how it is possible to find a consensus and make necessary decisions between such a large number of members with different cultures, preferences, aims, national interests and etc.? How such a big organisation can act effectively and viably? The author agrees with some authors' assumption that trust provides an important resource for cooperation<sup>3</sup>. Thus, the answer is the following – the MS of NATO can find a consensus between themselves because they trust each other. However, then other questions arise – what role does trust play amongst the members of the alliance and how it can be ensured by MS within the alliance? What MS need do in order keep trust in the eyes of other MS? Further in this work the author will try to answer into all these questions. Whereas, there are achieved a nice and symbolic number of years in participation in NATO of three Baltic States, therefore, further the author during examining the above provided questions will more focus on real examples of BS and their relation with the NATO: before joining the alliance and now as MS of the NATO.

Before evaluation of the role of trust amongst the members of the NATO, the author would like to provide and discuss some scholars' view whether trust is required at all for cooperation within organisation. For example, Robert Axelrod states that cooperation requires neither rationality nor trust. Also, the same opinion is observed in the statement of other authors, such as Karen Cook, Russell Hardin, and Margaret Levi. These scholars argue that mutually beneficial cooperation is possible without trust, while highlighting a variety of mechanisms to enable, aid, and expedite cooperation in the absence of trust, such as facilitating mutually beneficial conditions, monitoring, sanctions, and legislation. They state that for cooperation to work, the parties need simply to be able to identify each other and recognise that potential benefits outweigh any potential costs<sup>4</sup>. The author of this work, as was already stated in introduction – disagrees with such position. He agrees with other scholars which keep opposite view – they state that trust is necessary for cooperation within any organisation. For

example, according to Niklas Luhman, trust takes centre stage as an essential ingredient for the smooth functioning of society and thereby facilitates individual and societal wellbeing. Without trust, only very simple forms of human cooperation – effectively, those which can be fully transacted on the spot – are possible<sup>5</sup>. Although Luhman talks about human cooperation, however, the author thinks that this statement is also applicable to cooperation between members within organisation, especially NATO. This is so, because the NATO was founded in order to perform collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security<sup>6</sup> and there is a real question whether the country would like to participate in a mission in order to perform collective defence with the state it does not trust. The answer is only one – for sure, not. If country does not trust in other state, then it will not participate with that state in a mission or any other activity or process. Hence, trust is necessary between MS within any organisation and plays an essential role for effective functioning of such organisation.

So, it is determined that trust is necessary amongst members of the NATO. Now, it is necessary to examine how trust can be achieved and ensured by MS within the alliance and in which stages it is required. The author thinks, and will explain the reasons of such thinking, that trust is essential and plays an important role in the following stages:

- **Before joining the NATO.** To earn trust amongst existing members of the alliance is necessary before joining the NATO. The potential participant to the NATO will not become a real member of the alliance if it will not earn trust. This is so, because present members will not want to cooperate with a state it does not trust, they will not want to share experience with such state and etc. The real example, to this argument is the three BS. The Russia was against their joining of NATO. Some other MS (at that time) did not want to weaken relations with Russia and lessen trust with this country. Therefore, they were critical about enlargement of the NATO. Besides, the infrastructure, budget, military resources of these countries were limited and small, therefore, they need to prove that they will not be just „consumers“,
- but real and serious members which will perform their obligations. In order to prove it, the BS decided to participate in various missions before joining the NATO. For example, in 2003, the three BS all strongly supported the United States of America (hereinafter – USA) led coalition in Iraq, and all BS contributed forces to serve under USA and coalition command in the Iraq war. Also, all three BS have been very active in Afghanistan, and all have contributed contingents of hundreds of fighting troops, as well as civilian trainers, to serve under USA and NATO command<sup>7</sup>. Thus, the BS proved that they will take seriously their obligations to the MS of the NATO and that they share with the NATO the same values: democracy, liberty, and the rule of law<sup>8</sup>. Thus, such activity of the BS led that at that time existing MS of the NATO believed in serious intentions of the three BS and agreed to their joining NATO.
- **During participation in the NATO.** It is required to maintain and keep trust during participation in an alliance. If after joining the NATO a state losses trust amongst other MS of the alliance, then such country will be fictive and passive member of the NATO. This is so, because other MS will not take such member seriously and will not support its ideas and proposals. The maintenance of trust within the NATO is possible, for example, in the following:
    - **To share the risk and participate in various missions.** The participation in various missions and operations is also an important index showing other MS that a particular country is responsible, keeping its obligations and sharing the same values as all NATO MS do. For example, the three BS are also involved in ongoing combat operations in Afghanistan and peacekeeping operation in the Balkans as part of the Western alliance<sup>9</sup>. This shows that the BS are serious participants of NATO and that other MS trust them. If MS refuses to fulfill their promises and obligations or to share the risk with other MS, then trust is weakened within the alliance. For example, France disappointed the USA in the run-up to the January 2010 London Conference on Afghanistan when French president stated that his country would not send additional troops<sup>10</sup>. Such

position and statement of MS for sure lessen trust level within the alliance and thus, the effectiveness of the NATO.

- **To meet 2% of Gross Domestic Product (hereinafter – GDP).** The MS which keep their word and contribute as promised, are more trustable and admitted more seriously by other MS than countries which do not pay 2% of GDP. For example, although the three BS are small nations, however, they make a serious effort to support the Western security system, by striving, to meet the goal of 2% of GDP for defence<sup>11</sup>.
- **To specialise in specific areas.** It is normal in practice that small countries do not have an equal influence as big countries. This is why, it is recommended to small countries in order to be trustable and in order to have an influence on other members and to be heard, specialise and deep their knowledge in specific areas. Then big countries, before making decisions on specific issues, will consult with small countries on these specific issues<sup>12</sup>. This is why the Estonians have established the NATO Cyber Center of Excellence in Tallin and the Lithuanians have set up the NATO Center for Energy Policy in Vilnius<sup>13</sup>. Also, Danes like to discuss about ecology and climate changes, Latvians – about strategic communication and etc<sup>14</sup>.
- **To provide and share your experience (intelligence) and advices.** If any state had experience in one or some matters, then other MS seeing and knowing about experience of that country will rely on its decisions and proposals. It is recommended for MS to share their experience with other MS and not be afraid in saying loudly and openly opinion and giving advices on particular matter. Also, it is recommended to create the common training centres where the specialists would be trained. This will show other MS that a state is open and friendly member of the NATO which is honest and trusts in other participants, thus, they also, can trust to such a member. For example, the three BS in particular see the current Russian behavior in a much less benign light than the political leadership in the USA or older NATO nations do. The BS do not see evidence of any „reset“ in relations with Russia and

instead can point to many specific actions of the Russian Federation's government that demonstrate a clear hostility to NATO and Western interests, especially, that the BS know Russians and the language well<sup>15</sup>. Before the Georgia invasion the BS suffered from a credibility problem on the Russia issue due to the nature of their painful relationship with Russia in the past and the suspicion of other MS that the BS view is too colored by emotion to be taken seriously. However, after the Georgia invasion and later after annexation of Crimea, the destabilization of Eastern Ukraine and etc., trust that Russia might be an honest and cooperative partner was, at least for a time, shattered<sup>16</sup> and this led that other MS started more seriously listen the arguments of the BS. For example, Lithuania played an important role to support the United Kingdom (hereinafter – UK) for uniting all MS of the NATO and coordinating their actions in expelling over one hundred twenty Russians diplomats<sup>17</sup>. This was a significant diplomatic victory for the UK and this quick coordination of actions shows the trusting relationships the UK's government have built.

In order to develop an experts and professionals in military forces there was established the Baltic Defence College in Tartu. This College is the institution of higher military learning for the three BS<sup>18</sup>. Also, based on commitment displayed during the Prague Summit, the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center (hereinafter – NIFC) was created in Molesworth, UK, allowing MS to jointly develop, fuse and share information<sup>19</sup>. At Chicago Summit, the Alliance launched the Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (hereinafter – JISR) initiative and the Connected Forces Initiative (hereinafter – CFI)<sup>20</sup>

The author agrees with Stewart Webb, acknowledging that „intelligence sharing is the ultimate demonstration of trust and interoperability“<sup>21</sup> and such initiatives as establishment of NIFC, JISC and CFI shows that MS trust each other within the NATO.

- To develop national armed forces. In order to gain and increase trust between MS, the country need to improve its military forces in order

to add support in various missions and operations. For example, the three BS developed their armed forces very quickly and efficiently, receiving considerable aid and assistance from the Nordic nations and from NATO nations and the USA. By 2005, the BS had developed fairly sophisticated national security strategies that included dealing with irregular as well as conventional threats<sup>22</sup>.

In conclusion, trust is the main and essential element, an essence of effectively operating organisation, including the NATO. In order to achieve a consensus within the MS of the alliance that MS need trust each other. MS need to be trustable not only after joining the alliance, but also before, because the potential participant will not become a real member of the alliance if it will not earn trust. It is also important to every MS maintain trust within the NATO during participation in the alliance, because if it will not be trustable, then such country will be fictive and passive member of the NATO. To maintain trust during participation in the NATO is possible, for example, in the following: to share the risk and participate in various missions, to meet 2 % of GDP, to specialise in specific areas, to provide and share your experience (intelligence) and advices, to develop national armed force.

Finally, at the end of this work, the author would like to add that all three BS made a huge work in order to be trustable in the eyes by other members of the NATO, and now it can be concluded that BS are taken by other MS as serious and trustable partner of the alliance, despite the fact that BS are small countries.

#### References

- Andrew Kydd, „Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement”, *International Organization* 55, 4 (2001): 802, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078616>
- „What is NATO?“, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, accessed 2019 May 10, <https://www.nato.int/natowelcome/index.html>
- Florian Böller and Wilfried Mausbach, „NATO at 70: Trust and Mistrust among Allies”, paper presented at Heidelberg Center for American Studies Conference, Heidelberg, 8-9 April 2019.
- Francesca Granelli, „What Does it Mean for a Communication to be Trusted?“, *Defence strategic communications* 5, Autumn (2018): 184-185, <https://www.stratcomcoe.org/francesca-granelli-what-does-it-mean-communication-be-trusted>
- Ibid., 197.
- „The North Atlantic Treaty (1949)”, NATO publications, (2009).
- James S. Corum, „The Security Concerns of the Baltic States as NATO Allies”, *The Letort Papers* (2013): 4-5, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1171.pdf>; Lietuva ir NATO: 10 metų kartu. Straipsnių rinkinys (Vilnius: Lietuvos Respublikos Krašto apsaugos ministerija, 2014), 16-17, 114.
- Ibid., 42; Kydd, supra note 1: 805.
- Corum, supra note 7: 1-2.
- James M. Goldgeier, „The Future of NATO”, *Council Special Report*, 51 (2010): 19, [file:///C:/Users/c\\_anas/Downloads/NATO\\_CSR51.pdf](file:///C:/Users/c_anas/Downloads/NATO_CSR51.pdf)

- Corum, op. cit., 5; Lietuva ir NATO: 10 metų kartu. Straipsnių rinkinys, supra note 7: 118.
- Ibid., 116.
- Corum, op. cit., 37; Lietuva ir NATO: 10 metų kartu. Straipsnių rinkinys, op. cit., 119.
- Ibid., 116.
- Corum, supra note 7: vi.
- Ibid., 19-20; Nicholas Burns, „Does the US need NATO?“, *Quartz*, April 4, 2019, <https://qz.com/1585911/does-the-us-need-nato/>; Linas Linkevičius, „Building Trust in the NATO – Russia relationship: what NATO can offer“, *European Leadership Network*, March (2012): <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/building-trust-in-the-nato-russia-relationship-what-nato-can-offer/>
- Granelli, supra note 4: 178.
- Corum, op. cit., 6, 16.
- Jan Ballast, „Trust (in) NATO: The future of intelligence sharing within the Alliance”, *Research Paper*, 140 (2017): 7.
- Ibid., 8; Stephen J. Maranian, „NATO Interoperability: Sustaining Trust and Capacity within the Alliance”, *Research Paper*, 115 (2015): 5.
- Ballast, op. cit., 15.
- Corum, op. cit., 29.

#### List of Bibliography

##### Legal act:

- „The North Atlantic Treaty (1949)”, NATO publications, (2009). Doctrine:
- Ballast, Jan, „Trust (in) NATO: The future of intelligence sharing within the Alliance”, *Research Paper*, 140 (2017): 1-16.
- Böller, Florian, and Mausbach Wilfried. „NATO at 70: Trust and Mistrust among Allies.” Paper presented at Heidelberg Center for American Studies Conference, Heidelberg, 8-9 April 2019.
- Burns, Nicholas. „Does the US need NATO?”. *Quartz*, April 4, 2019. <https://qz.com/1585911/does-the-us-need-nato/>.
- Corum, James S. „The Security Concerns of the Baltic States as NATO Allies”. *The Letort Papers* (2013): 1-52. <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1171.pdf>.
- Goldgeier, James M. „The Future of NATO”. *Council Special Report*, 51 (2010): 1-33. [file:///C:/Users/c\\_anas/Downloads/NATO\\_CSR51.pdf](file:///C:/Users/c_anas/Downloads/NATO_CSR51.pdf).
- Granelli, Francesca. „What Does it Mean for a Communication to be Trusted?”. *Defence strategic communications* 5, Autumn (2018): 171-214. <https://www.stratcomcoe.org/francescagranelli-what-does-it-mean-communication-be-trusted>.
- Kydd, Andrew. „Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement”. *International Organization* 55, 4 (2001): 801-828. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078616>.
- Lietuva ir NATO:
- 10 metų kartu. Straipsnių rinkinys. Vilnius: Lietuvos Respublikos Krašto apsaugos ministerija, 2014. 10. Linkevičius, Linas. „Building Trust in the NATO – Russia relationship: what NATO can offer”. *European Leadership Network*, March (2012): <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/building-trust-in-the-nato-russiarelationship-what-nato-can-offer/>.
- Maranian, Stephen J. „NATO Interoperability: Sustaining Trust and Capacity within the Alliance”. *Research Paper*, 115 (2015): 1-8.

##### Other source (website):

- „What is NATO?”. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Accessed 2019 May 10. <https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.htm>

## 2<sup>nd</sup> Prize: 600 EUR, Kipras Adomaitis (MRU) 15 years of NATO membership of the Baltic States – What role does trust play amongst the members of the Alliance?

### Introduction

“Never again”. A common expression among European people after WWII which symbolised a universal desire to avoid another world war (Carlton University Centre for European Studies, 2019). In response, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was established shortly after to ensure collective security for Western Europe from possible Soviet aggression (NATO 2019). But even with the fall of this perceived threat, NATO still stands today, 70 years on. Despite disharmonies of interest occurring

throughout its time (a problem that usually fragments alliances), NATO continues to overcome these conflicts and survive, with 29 current members. How? Trust.

In this essay I will attempt to demonstrate that the role of trust provides a firm basis upon which cooperation becomes achievable and can effectively be carried out among the alliance members. Firstly, I will provide an overview of the international background that NATO is set against to show that it is one which innately promotes distrust and uncertainty; both of which hinder interstate cooperation. Then, I will show-case examples of how NATO falls victim to disharmonies of interest due to such background yet survives because of trust. To provide reasoning that trust is a crucial factor in facilitating cooperation, I will feature international relation trust theories from different perspectives; psychological, rational and social. In doing so I will attempt to explain the dynamics of trust within NATO and demonstrate that trust is significant in ensuring persistent cooperation between alliance members.

### **International Relations and Trust**

The world requires international cooperation. Ruzicka and Keating (2015) endorse that the problems facing humanity today cannot be solved within the confines of individual states, whether it be climate change, nuclear proliferation or basic human rights. All these issues fundamentally depend on the encounters of interstate relations and cooperation. Such relations foreground the existence of trust and distrust among states which form an important basis of how they relate to and interact with each other. This has a direct effect on the level of cooperation, as trust (or lack of) can either facilitate or hinder state encounters (ibid.).

Unfortunately, the international environment presents a challenging setting for the establishment and sustenance of trust between states; labelled as trusting relationships (ibid.). The unique characteristics of the international system is often labelled as anarchy, based on international relations theory (Lechner 2017). This concept of an anarchic international system stems from the absence of an overarching authority which could act as a central arbiter for

disputes and conflicts within the field of international relations. Where a domestic system has a recognised hierarchical order (the government), the global sphere does not. As a result, there is an immediate effect on how states view each other. Uncertainty about motives are strongly magnified in such a structural setting because (in essence) each state is equal to all others and thus entitled to act in its own best interest. As Kenneth Waltz (1979, p.88) summaries, "none is entitled to command; none is required to obey". Consequently, the anarchic international system prevents or at least significantly hinders the formation of trusting relationships and in turn, cooperation. As Hoffmann (2006) explains, in the absence of a legitimate central power, expectations of trustworthiness are destroyed because of the possibility that another state might act opportunistically and have a good chance of getting away with it; should they choose. Accordingly, leaders are wary to trust in the first place which can mean that despite sharing a mutual interest in solving a dispute, states will not cooperate or cooperate effectively because they fear the other might take advantage for its best interests (ibid.). However, international anarchy, its nature and effects can be interpreted in different ways. This is because, states do have some control over the characteristics of the international system by the way they operate within it. That is, depending on the actions of states, the possibility of forging trusting relationships is definitely possible. As Alexander Wendt (1992) puts it, "anarchy is what states make of it".

Thus, the anarchic international environment does cause a preposition of uncertainty within international relations meaning there is a wariness to trust which negatively affects cooperation. But it does not mean that formation of trusting relationships is impossible. Following this, I propose that the role of trust specifically within the NATO alliance, has been to act as a foundation upon which the members have been able to establish effective cooperation, especially during conflicts of interest.

### **NATO and Trust**

Alliances are states coming together in pursuit of a shared goal, mainly preparing for and acting against a common rival in a military conflict (Synder 2000). George Modelski (see Keating

2015, p.2) outlines that this military objective is what makes alliances different from other types of associations or regimes. Even so, states coming together to act in uniform, most alliances do not function for a relatively long time given the anarchic international environment. Overtime, disharmonies of interest occur, and the problems of uncertainty begin to dissolve the alliance. Friedman (1970, p.10) acknowledged this problem of uncertainty present in alliances because “the mere existence of a relationship based on security is no guarantee of amity or exemption from international rivalry within one’s own immediate circle”. So, an alliance in itself is no remedy to the problem of diverging interests and possibility of defection. As such most alliances are temporary and unstable. Dr.Karl Lamers (2019) clearly pointed this out by stating that “alliances on average last about 17 years”, yet NATO has survived for 70 and still “today is fresh, powerful and full of energy”. Both NATO’s size and stability overtime are what differentiate it from other alliances. This makes it unique because the more states there are in an alliance, the more likely it is that interests will diverge within the concept of an anarchic international system and destroy the alliance.

Naturally, NATO is not exempt from the issue of diverging interests, particularly given the fact that some of the members have had conflictual pasts and antagonistic overlapping interests (Keating 2015). Even in its early years, this problem was noticed by Hotz (1953), who underlined that “NATO’s major problem has been to establish a reasonable harmony among dissimilar national interests” (p.126). This was distinctly evident after the fall of the Soviet Union; the primary opposition of the defensive alliance at the time. Many speculated that NATO would be open to dissolution (Liska 1962) because without the common Soviet threat, the strategic priorities of the members will diverge and fragment the alliance (Keating 2015). More recently, Hallams et al (2013) expressed that the United State holds a belief that NATO should deploy to more areas outside of member state territory or so called ‘out of area business’. On the contrary, European members remain focused on limiting business to operations within Europe.

It is clear then that NATO is also vulnerable to disharmonies of interest within the anarchic international environment it operates within. Such disputes have the potential to break up alliances, and the former US ambassador to NATO agreed that “the lack of coterminous interests makes it remarkable that NATO is able to make any headway at all” (Deni 2013). It is exactly in the potential for disharmonies of interest that trusting relationships are important, because trust among NATO members could be the significant factor that has held the alliance together during turbulences by facilitating cooperation. I base this reasoning on NATO’s outstanding track record during its 70 years; no member has ever been attacked (Lamers 2019). Furthermore, NATO continues today as an alliance that is needed for the peace of Europe and for some members such as the Baltic States, it is considered as the only real ‘hard’ guarantor of security (Zajedova 1999). Lithuania (2019) strongly affirmed that “NATO is and will remain the most important and effective framework for collective defence, which guarantees national security and effective deterrence against potential aggression”. Latvia (2019) likewise stated that “thanks to membership of the most powerful military alliance, Latvia has become more secure than ever before”. Estonia (2019) agreed with its Baltic neighbours by expressing gratitude to membership in NATO stating, “Estonia’s security is better ensured than ever before because NATO guarantees a reliable military deterrence and collective defence”.

To better understand how the role of trust brings about cooperation in NATO, I believe it is necessary to consider some international relation trust theories. Such theories could provide answers about the behaviours and dynamics of NATO members; and in turn explain NATO’s longevity. There are three discrete perspectives of trust theory that provide an appealing insight of trust within NATO; psychological, rational and social (Ruzicka and Keating 2015).

### **Psychological Perspective: The Generalised Trustor**

The focus of psychological trust theory is based upon how trust affects decision-making of individuals in leadership positions (Keating 2015).

The generalised trustor theory by Brian Rathbun (2012) stands out when considering the role of trust within NATO. This theory suggests that there are individuals who are psychologically predisposed to trust in any given situation. As such these individuals, labelled as generalised trustors, will be more likely to accept binding commitments within institutions than those who are not predisposed to generally trust. Rathbun further explains that a generalised trustor holds “a belief that others are generally and inherently trustworthy which provides the confidence needed to cooperate even when the gains from cooperation are inconsistent over a long period of time”. The theory then goes on to propose that when key states of an alliance are made up of generalised trustors, a more cohesive and binding military alliance can be expected. Such theory therefore could potentially be applied to NATO, in particular to its key US member. There has been contention over the years from the US that it is over-burden sharing. In 2011, the former US secretary of defence, Robert Gates, openly accused European allies of being “willing and eager for American taxpayers to assume the growing security burden” (Lanoszka 2015, p.133). For instance, the NATO operations in Kosovo, the US was responsible for 70 % of all air sorties (Deni 2013). In 2014, the NATO countries agreed on a 2 % GDP threshold spending, but only 4 other members reached that 2 % target in 2017, with US reaching 3.7 % (McCarthy, Forbes, 2018). This signals that the US feels dissatisfied over the gains from NATO, as it has had to assume more of the burden. Yet, it continues to stay firmly within NATO implying that US leaders might be generalised trustors. Recently, the US Congress introduced a bill which could prohibit a US president from leaving NATO (Woody, Business Insider, 2019). Furthermore, president Trump himself stated that “we will be with NATO 100 percent, but as I told the other countries, you have to set up” (Gould, DefenseNews, 2019). Therefore, it would seem that the generalised trustor theory has applicability to the US. It would explain why the US continues to cooperate within the alliance, even if the gains might be perceived as inconsistent by it. The answer might be that the US is predisposed to trust; it is, a generalised trustor. In turn, this would provide reason as to how NATO has survived for 70 years. It has done

so because it has a highly cooperative key state which continually contributes to the alliance.

However, the generalised trustor theory, as Keating (2015) identifies, is an individual level theory. This means that the degree of generalised trust in a state is dependent on those in key political power to continue to win and as such, the theory depends on the continuous character of a states leadership. Thus, it would be considerably difficult to prove the empirical validity of this theory with the US and its 70-year membership in NATO. Nevertheless, this psychological perspective provides an interesting insight of the trust dynamics possibly present within NATO and how such can yield persistent cooperation. –

### **Rational Perspective: Trustworthy or Not?**

Rational trust theories focus on the problem of uncertainty present in the anarchic international environment, and how trust can mitigate such problem within an alliance. Keating (2015) explains that understanding trust from the rational perspective has grounded reasonableness because when it comes to security politics, the costs of defection by an alliance member can be seriously high. For this reason, establishing whether an alliance member is trustworthy can be of the “utmost importance” (ibid, p.5). Andrew Kyd’s (2001) rational perspective of trust within alliances argues “that trust is related to uncertainty about the underlying motivations or preferences of the other side” (p.810). He bases his explanation upon Schweller’s (1998, see Kyd 2001) classic international relations theory which makes a distinction between status quo and revisionist states. Status quo states are those who are content with the way things are and continue to seek security. On the contrary, revisionist states are not satisfied with the status quo and want to modify or completely overthrow it. If a state can persuade another that it is also status quo orientated, then cooperation should be feasible as both would want to reciprocate it due to having general interests in common. As such conflicts can be overcome through cooperation. This is where trust can be applied. It can be used to mitigate uncertainty as the level of trust shows the probability that one state believes the other to have similar preferences, or as Kyd summarises, whether a state is considered as trustworthy. Indeed, if a state is deemed as untrustwor-

thy, conflict cannot be overcome as cooperation is not seen as feasible. Thus, Kyd's rational theory, suggests that trust revolves around resolving uncertainty over the other sides preferences so that cooperation can occur between those identified as trustworthy and avoided with those identified as untrustworthy (Keating 2015). Applying this theory to NATO, can help to answer how NATO members overcome disharmonies of interest within an anarchic international setting. It would propose that members of NATO deem each other as status quo orientated or in other words, as having similar overall preferences. Therefore, even when disharmonies of interest arise (as to be expected in an anarchic international setting), these conflicts can be overcome through reassurance and cooperation, as members continue to have an overall common view at hand and trust that the others do also.

### Social Perspective: Respecting Norms

A social theory shares the same emphasis as a psychological one, that trust is not simply a rational prediction; although it is agreed that trust cannot occur without some type of consideration about the intentions of the other party (Keating 2015). In particular a social theory focuses on the formation of trusting relationships, as these suggest the possibility of long-term stability (Hoffman 2002), something NATO has definitely achieved. Kegley and Raymond (1990) advance a theory, that there are pre-existing social norms against breaking agreements and that such norms are what facilitate the development and continuance of trusting relationships. They agree that the anarchic international environment promotes distrust but express that states do not consistently enter into binding agreements through deceit. Rather they suggest, that states enter into an agreement in hope of keeping their promises so as to benefit from what they negotiated. This becomes a norm which entails that states should honour their commitments. Such norm becomes reinforced when other states believe it to be important and trust will be something that can be relied upon in order to support the sanctity of an agreement. That is, a member of an alliance will not break an obligation because they believe it would be detrimental to their external reputation as all other members consider the norm (of

honouring the negotiated obligations) to be important. As such, there is trust present among the members that all will follow the norm, which develops a trusting relationship between them. Applying to this NATO, when a conflict of interest arises, instead of a member breaking obligations and leaving the alliance (as they would be entitled considering its own best interests within the anarchic international environment), they rather seek cooperation so as to allow them to continue to honour their obligations. In turn, this trusting relationship that cooperation will be the first option, is developed and continues in the alliance.

Thus, this social theory can explain the longevity of NATO because all members seek cooperation during times of turbulence as there is an important norm of keeping promises. This norm is trusted to be respected in the alliance.

### Conclusion

It is interesting to consider trust theories from different perspectives because they can help to understand the role of trust which directly facilitates cooperation in NATO. The different viewpoints from each theory could propose an explanation of the role of trust on member relations. Such role being, that members consistently seek to cooperate instead of abnonnement. This may answer how NATO continues to survive today within an anarchic international setting, when other alliances usually fall.

The psychological generalised trustor theory (Rathbun 2012) allows to contemplate how NATO is a cohesive and distinguished alliance even when a key member becomes dissatisfied. This is due to them being a generalised trustor, whom will continue to seek cooperation. But this is an individual level theory that depends on the continuous character of changing leadership in a state and so cannot be seen as empirically valid. The rational trust theory by Andrew Kyd (2001) helps to understand how uncertainty present in the anarchic international environment can be mitigated by considering trustworthiness. For example, if a state is considered as trustworthy then the other trustworthy states will welcome cooperation with it due to being certain about its preferences. Applied to NATO, this theory would imply, that all the members deem each other as



trustworthy. This can illustrate NATO's successful 70 years because alliance members constantly reciprocate cooperation to overcome conflicts. From a social perspective, the presence of a trusting relationship will mean that there is a trusting expectation that obligations undertaken by alliance members will be fulfilled, as this is seen as an important norm. This would lead to cooperation being sought first rather than abandonment, which again can reaffirm NATO's longevity.

#### Bibliography:

Carleton University Center for European Studies, 2019. Europe after WWII [online]. Available via: <https://carleton.ca/ces/elearning/history/europe-after-wwii/> [Accessed 20 May 2019]

Deni, J.R., 2013. Alliance Management and Maintenance: Restructuring NATO for the 21st Century [eBook]. Aldershot: Ashgate. Available via: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/290945167\\_Alliance\\_management\\_and\\_maintenance\\_R\\_restructuring\\_NATO\\_for\\_the\\_21st\\_century](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/290945167_Alliance_management_and_maintenance_R_restructuring_NATO_for_the_21st_century) [Accessed 11 May 2019]

Friedman, J. R., Bladen, C., and Rosen, S.J., 1970. Alliance in International politics. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Gould, J., 2019. Trump says US backs NATO '100%' after report he discussed withdrawal. DefenseNews [online] 17 January. Available via: <https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2019/01/17/trump-says-us-backs-nato-100-after-report-he-discussed-withdrawal/> [Accessed 13 May 2019]

Hallams, E., Ratti, L., Zyla, B., 2013. Introduction- A New Paradigm for NATO?. NATO beyond 9/11. New Security Challenges [eBook], 1-23. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Available via: [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230391222\\_1#citeas](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230391222_1#citeas) [Accessed 12 May 2019]

Hoffman, A., 2002. A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations. European Journal of International Relations [online], 8 (3), 375-401. Available via: [http://www.aaronmoffman.com/uploads/1/9/4/7/1/9478265/conceptualization\\_of\\_trust.pdf](http://www.aaronmoffman.com/uploads/1/9/4/7/1/9478265/conceptualization_of_trust.pdf) [Accessed 14 May 2019]

Hoffman, A., 2006. Building Trust: Overcoming Suspicion in International Conflict [eBook]. New York: State University of New York. Available via: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/220009539\\_Building\\_Trust\\_Overcoming\\_Suspicion\\_in\\_International\\_Conflict](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/220009539_Building_Trust_Overcoming_Suspicion_in_International_Conflict) [Accessed 4 May 2019]

Hotz, A.J., 1953. NATO: Myth or Reality. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science [online], 288 (1), 126-133. Available via: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/000271625328800118> [Accessed 10 May 2019]

Keating, V.C. (2015). Trusting Relationships in the NATO Alliance. 9th Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Giardini Naxos, Italy, September 23-26 2015 [online]. Available via: <https://portal.findresearcher.sdu.dk/da/publications/trusting-relationships-in-the-nato-alliance> [Accessed 3 May 2019]

Kegley, C.W., Raymond, G.R., 1990. When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics [eBook]. Columbia: University of South Carolina. Available via: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272935020\\_When\\_Trust\\_Breaks\\_Down\\_Alliance\\_Norms\\_and\\_World\\_Politics](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272935020_When_Trust_Breaks_Down_Alliance_Norms_and_World_Politics) [Accessed 16 May 2019]

Kydd, A. (2001). Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement. International Organisation [online], 55 (4), 801-828. Available via: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3078616> [Accessed 6 May 2019]

Lamers, K.A., 2019. Dr. Karl Lamers Hearings. Presentation given at the "NATO Heading for London Summit: What lay in store?" conference hosted by Mykolas Romeris University on 28 May 2019 at the Mykolas Romeris University.

Lanoszka, A., 2015. Do Allies Really Free Ride?. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy [online], 57 (3), 113-52. Available via: [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277134581\\_Do\\_Allies\\_Really\\_Free\\_Ride](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277134581_Do_Allies_Really_Free_Ride) [Accessed 20 May 2019]

Lechner, S., 2017. Anarchy in International Relations. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies [online]. Available at: <https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/abstract/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-79> [Accessed 9 May 2019]

Liska, G., 1962. Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence. The Journal of Politics [online], 25 (2), 396-397. Available via: <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.2307/2127483> [Accessed 13 May 2019]

McCarthy, N., 2018. Defense Expenditures Of NATO Members Visualized [Infographic]. Forbes [online] 10 July. Available via: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2018/07/10/defenseexpenditure-of-nato-members-visualized-infographic/#4f2b4a6514cf> [Accessed 21 May 2019]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, 2019. Latvia's 15 years in the North Atlantic alliance and the 70th anniversary of NATO [online]. Available via: <https://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/news/latest-news/62988-latvia-s-15-years-in-the-north-atlanticalliance-and-the-70th-anniversary-of-nato> [Accessed 12 May 2019]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, 2019. Lithuania's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) [online]. Available via: <https://www.urm.lt/default/en/foreignpolicy/lithuania-in-the-region-and-the-world/lithuanias-security-policy/lithuanian-membership-in-the-north-atlantic-treaty-organization-nato> [Accessed 12 May 2019]

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2019. What is NATO? [online]. Available via: <https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html> [Accessed 19 May 2019]

Rathbun, B.C., 2012. Trust in International Cooperation: International Security

Institutions, Domestic Politics and American Multilateralism by Brian Rathbun [online], 127 (4), 697-699. Available via: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/j.1538-165X.2012.tb01140.x> [Accessed 22 May 2019]

Republic of Estonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019. Estonia and NATO [online]. Available via: <https://vm.ee/en/estonia-and-nato> [Accessed 12 May 2019]

Ruzicka, J., and Keating, V., 2015. Going global: Trust research and international relations. Journal of Trust Research [online], 5 (1), 8-26. Available via: <https://portal.findresearcher.sdu.dk/da/publications/going-global-trust-research-and-internationalrelations> [Accessed 1 May 2019]

Snyder, G.H., 2000. Alliance Politics [eBook]. New York: Cornell University Press. Available via: <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/alliancepolitics-by-glenn-h-snyder-ithaca-ny-cornell-university-press-1997-414p3995/50DCEEB69878A09192F2DD874AADC6F8> [Accessed 3 May 2019]

Waltz, K., 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Kipras Wendt, A., 1992. Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organisation [online], 46 (2), 391-425. Available via: [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858?seq=1#metadata.info\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858?seq=1#metadata.info_tab_contents) [Accessed 6 May 2019]

Woody, C., 2019. Senators from both parties have introduced a bill to keep Trump from ditching NATO, but they may not be able to stop him. Business Insider [online] 17 January. Available via: <https://www.businessinsider.com/law-to-keep-trump-from-leaving-nato-2019-1> [Accessed 28 May 2019]

Zajedova, I., 1993. The Baltic States Security and NATO Enlargement. Perspectives [online], 13, 79-90. Available via: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23615944> [Accessed 7 May 2019]

### 3<sup>rd</sup> Prize: 400 EUR, Laura Antanavičiūtė (MRU) MYKOLAS ROMERIS UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF COMMUNICATION INTERNATIONAL AND INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION

"Unus pro omnibus, omnes pro uno" or "one for all and all for one" – the catchphrase we all know from Dumas' Three Musketeers. If living by this motto is not a testimony and demonstration of pure trust, I am not sure what is. When you are ready to stand up and fight, or even sacrifice yourself for all, for others, it shows the kind of devotion and commitment that would not arise if there was no trust. Would going to a war be easy if you didn't think that your allies would do the same and battle for you, when you are the one in need? I think not, it is incredibly hard to fight for something you do not believe in, the feet would feel too heavy to lift off the ground and the heart too hesitant to fight passionately. That is why I believe trust is the component that you cannot build a strong and solid alliance without. The following essay will talk about one of the most successful alliances in history - North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and answer what role the trust plays amongst the members of it.

Glancing from the historical perspective some instances have proven that trust is crucial when trying to form an alliance. If we remember what happened in 1939 and under what conditions was Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed we can easily determine the agreement was condemned to fail, because we know that neither of the Allies trusted each other. The so called "Treaty of

Non-Aggression” between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany did not grant the peace, even Stalin did not believe that Hitler would not attack eventually. Even after these diplomatic relations between Germany and Soviet Union were established the mistrust and suspicions remained. In June 1941 operation “Barbarossa” begun and Germany invaded Soviet Union. It is clear that both sides were far from being trustworthy and credible from the very beginning. A lesson to learn from this historical piece – there is a very little chance to form a successful alliance with no trust.

If we have already mentioned the Musketeers’ slogan, we must now throw one more phrase on the table – “An attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies”. Once again, sounds like something that would be impossible to implement without trust. The phrase is an essential point of the Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which also makes the collective defence a cornerstone of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Undoubtedly, collective defence was also one of the main reasons Lithuania and other post – Soviet nations were so eager to join the Alliance. The inconvenient geopolitical situation of Lithuania made the NATO protection so desirable, and surely joining NATO became one of the greatest independent Lithuania’s achievements.

This year the Baltic States along with Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Bulgaria are celebrating their 15 years’ anniversary of the membership in NATO. However, I must admit that to this day many Lithuanians do believe that Lithuania has no power and influence in a 29 country Alliance and the country’s voice or needs cannot be heard. There shall be no secret that smaller countries often have their own insecurities and Lithuania is not an exception. Surviving between bigger neighbours can be a challenge and, in fact, historically had been a really tough one for Lithuania. Years spent under oppression being occupied, attacked – always in somebody’s way, Lithuania had to put up with the fact that there is no way we can go back the Grand Duke’s Vytautas’ times, when Lithuania’s shores trailed from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Therefore, yes, it is true that some Lithuanians do tend to experience a small country complex, with groundless

certitude that we are too small to be heard, to be important or even to have great achievements on a global scale. Why does it all matter? Well, one of the roles trust plays amongst the members of NATO is helping the smaller countries integrate well and feel like the rightful and equal members of the Alliance.

This role works because of several reasons. First of all, because of the consensus principle. Every single NATO member has a veto right when making important decisions, regarding the size or population of the country. We could say that the principle is also based on trust, every member is expected to try to reach an agreement that is best for everyone, if every member descends just a little bit, a consensus will be reached more easily. Therefore, admittedly, smaller countries do not use their veto rights carelessly whenever they want. There is also a common sense understanding that the countries that have nothing to do with the ongoing topic do not actively participate in the discussion. For instance, if a small country does not have an access to the sea or no interests, they will most probably not discuss NATO’s maritime strategy.

Another way how being a part of NATO helps to overcome the “small country complex” is when bigger countries show trust in smaller country’s specialization area. Without a doubt, every country of the Alliance can bring something unique or useful to the table. There shall be no prejudice if there is trust, no matter which country you are from, if you are a brilliant specialist in your area, even the biggest countries of the Alliance will listen to what you have to say. Every NATO member would agree that they cannot be specialized in every single subject that comes up and would accept the leadership of a smaller country that can offer the best specialists on the matter. For example, Denmark is one of the smaller countries, but has ecology as one of their priority subjects and, for this reason, are actively involved in the discussions and decision making about it.

The Baltic States ever since breaking free from the Soviet Union and joining NATO, we may assume, felt safe, knowing that the Alliance will come to their rescue in case of need or emergency. However not that long ago, in fact in 2007, we have encountered, well, a break of trust really.

What happened then was nothing else but an attack on Estonia. Just not a military one. It was a cyber- attack that occurred just after Estonians took down the Soviet memorial to the Red Army and moved it away from the city centre in Tallinn. The targets were Estonian media platforms, banks, parliament, ministries and other important organizations' websites. During the attack Pro-Russian messages and graffiti appeared on both governments' and president's web pages. The scale of the attack was massive, for three weeks the cyberspace of Estonia had been violated and disturbed. Therefore, during the moment of crisis, the heads turned to NATO, as "the attack on one of the members is considered as an attack on all of them". However, the Article 5 in this scenario was not invoked. The main obstacles to do that were the inability to trace or to prove the origins of the cyber - attacks to be coming from Russia as well as the fact that the definition of aggression against a member of the Alliance does not classify cyber - attacks as military attacks. Despite incident not involving territorial invasion, Estonia seemed to be really struggling and lacking ability to immobilize the attacks. Therefore, Estonians expecting major help from NATO and Article 5 not being invoked led to new trust issues inside of the Alliance. The doubt, whether smaller countries can feel safe and assured to have the protection of the Alliance, had emerged into the public sphere of the Baltic countries.

In Lithuania the trust in the allies, in NATO itself has varied as fifteen years have been passing by. After actively seeking the membership and Lithuanians very much looking forward to join the Alliance, just after entering the organization in 2004 the proportion of people trusting NATO was remarkably high. Then the numbers dropped noticeably after the 2005 incident when the Russian fighter Su - 27 violated Lithuanian - NATO airspace and crashed inside the territory of Lithuania. The event evoked criticism towards NATO with the media questioning where was NATO's air protection and disrupted the illusions that joining the Alliance meant that all the job of taking care of country's safety was done. Nevertheless, after understanding how important the

security issues are Lithuanians began to realize that the input, investments and general Lithuania's involvement in NATO matters must grow.

In such manner, especially, after annexation of Crimea (2014) and the whole Ukrainian crisis, when the fears of the dangers from the East in the region have grown and the defence matters are on the front page again, the trust in NATO has been growing lately. For instance, the survey ordered by the Lithuania's Ministry of National Defence in 2018 revealed that 86 percent of the polled Lithuanians (3 percent more than in 2015) are benevolent towards and assesses NATO positively while only 9 percent (1 percent less than in 2015) have contrary opinions. Moreover, 81 percent are in favour of constantly having forces of the Allies in the country's territory. The rather positive attitude and increase of trust strongly correlates with the actual measures and action taken in order to contribute to the welfare and safety of the Alliance.

Firstly, the financial measures and actions. If there was no trust inside the organization, would there be a point in or, to be more concrete, would there be any willingness to make financial commitments? Probably not, hence, we can say that trust amongst NATO members plays a role of ensuring that the states will be eager to put their resources onto NATO's common table. In 2014 at the Wales Summit of NATO, the Allies agreed and promised to increase their military spending and spend not less than 2 percent of national GDP on national defence. However, most of the countries are still far from succeeding to keep their faith and reach those 2 percent of GDP that are desired.

Consequently, the country that spends the most on defence – United States (~ 3,6% of GDP) is clearly unhappy about that. And Donald Trump as a President of course will make sure everyone knows about this dissatisfaction. Trump is known for his controversial utterances, sometimes illogical, sometimes extremely straightforward pronouncements, thus, his statements about NATO are no exception. From claiming total credit for increases in alliance's defence spending to accusing European members of owing massive

sums, the President of United States has been caught several times telling half - truths or false statements. And that, as a matter of fact, does not add on building trust inside the organization. Moreover, it threatens to dismantle the existing trust between United States and the Allies.

Even further, such public tactless acts are a danger to NATO's image. In this particular case, if the President of United States publicly scolds NATO leaders, presumably it will have negative impact on American people's viewpoint and attitude towards NATO. And, indeed, Americans have already been organizing protests against NATO. On the contrary, if the Allies trust each other that is reflected in all of the outside communication between organization and the media, press which results in forming a positive image of the organization in the eyes of the people of member nations.

And what is so important about people trusting the Alliance one may ask? It is not difficult to answer that the people are the state and not only they literally pay for country's defence, but they are the human resources that will defend their country or in NATO's case may defend an Ally country, in case of emergency. In Lithuania the compulsory military service has been removed in 2008, but in 2015 the conscription was reintroduced. This was a great success, as this allowed the society to feel the presence of the army closer, the trust in Lithuanian army grew, according to the survey made in 2018 (ordered by the Lithuania's Ministry of National Defence), 71 percent of the polled ones expressed trust in the army. Another survey made in 2017 showed that vast majority – 88 percent believed that it is every citizen's duty to defend their country. Most importantly, 71 percent believes that NATO would defend Baltic States if they were attacked, so the trust in both NATO and Lithuanian army is gratifying.

After all, the fifteen years of Baltic States membership in the Alliance had ups and downs, however, no one can deny the benefits that NATO had brought to the region from the granted protection to the fostering of the integration process of the Baltic countries when establishing close relations with the Western world. The trust that has been developed throughout these

15 years must be highly valued. The results of the trust developed amongst the members of Alliance are undeniably positive, because the role that trust plays in the Alliance, as discussed before, includes, firstly, making it easier for countries to commit financially and contribute to the welfare of the Alliance in all the ways possible, because you trust that other Allies will be contributing too; secondly, the presence of trust amongst the members helps to integrate new members, also smaller countries and help them find themselves being valued; thirdly, if the Alliance demonstrates trust in one another, it displays a positive image to the public. Of course, the essential role of the trust amongst members is assuring stability of the Alliance, no disunities and one common direction for all of the Allies to follow, creating shared values and putting the concentration of the Allies on one goal. As or the future, there is a great variety of dangers that can emerge as a threat to the Alliance, therefore maintaining the trust amongst Allies may become more important than ever. The sense of togetherness that trust establishes in the organization is the key for the Alliance to thrive and not become vulnerable in the face of any possible crisis.

#### **Bibliography:**

- Kashmeri, S. A. (2011). *NATO 2.0 : Reboot or Delete?* (Vol. 1st ed). Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books.  
 Kydd, A. (2001). *Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement*. *International Organization*, 55(4), 801–828.  
 Lietuvos Respublikos Krašto apsaugos ministerija. (2014). *Lietuva ir NATO: 10 metų kartu : [straipsnių rinkinys] / [redkolegija: pirmininkas Juozas Olekas ... [et al.]] ; [Lietuvos Respublikos Krašto apsaugos ministerija]*.



Certificates of Appreciation **1<sup>st</sup>-3<sup>rd</sup> prize (MRU)**



From left to right: Prof. Virgis Valentinavičius, Rector (MRU) Prof. Dr. Inga Žalėnienė, Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers. Winners: Ana Šurpickaja, Kipras Adomaitis, Laura Antanavičiūtė.

## Thema | Topic:

NATO@70 – How can the alliance continue to contribute to peace and freedom in the future?

**1<sup>st</sup> Prize: 1.000 EUR, Imre Bartal**

### Introduction

Although its demise had been predicted with impressive regularity, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is one of the great success stories of the free world. Our alliance defied all predictions of doom and has endured and grown, in the process becoming one of the longest-lasting alliances of the past five-hundred years<sup>1</sup>. The commitment to freedom, underpinned by democratic principles, the rule of law and the prosperity of market economies, makes our alliance a unique community of values. In a world full of change and uncertainty, this community remains as important and relevant as it had ever been. We as allies have already achieved much together, but in the new world of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, past achievements cannot be a guarantee of future success.<sup>2</sup> Pressures on our alliance abound, from within and without. This contribution seeks to present an overview of the challenges we face and sets out several proposals for ensuring that NATO can continue to contribute to peace and freedom in the future.

### Where do we stand?

NATO is confronted with a world where power is rapidly shifting in favour of other states. Russia has bolstered its military capabilities and, as we have witnessed, is not afraid to use it. China's ambition appears almost limitless as it spreads its economic and political influence to all corners of the world. The instability and conflicts of the Arab world have been directly felt in Europe. The mission in Afghanistan, against ISIS and other campaigns have shown the difficulties of defeating global terrorism. Climate change looms and threatens not just our own, but the security of the entire world. Within our ranks, we have a U.S. President who has called NATO's fundamental tenets into question. There are also concerns about the internal developments of some members' democratic processes and their commitments to crucial freedoms. Major divergences in strategic priorities and capabilities between allies

continue to plague the organisation. Furthermore, some allies are openly taking procurement decisions fundamentally at odds with alliance posture. Considering all these issues, one could reasonably argue that the organisation is in crisis. But it can equally be argued that crisis is NATO's middle-name and it is every bit capable of successfully confronting the tasks before it. There are five essential steps our alliance must take in order to ensure that this happens.

### I. Respond to humanitarian and environmental challenges

The scope for NATO-supported humanitarian missions will need to increase. No country or region can be secure and at peace if its people do not have access to the necessities of life and are threatened by their own governments. These are the types of missions through which NATO can prove that is not only ready to fight conflicts but also to create peace. So far, our alliance has made its most prolific humanitarian interventions in Kosovo and Libya. There are important lessons to be learned from these cases about the complexity of such campaigns, which have already been recognised<sup>3</sup>. In the future, our alliance must demonstrate that it has indeed learned the lessons of the past and can deliver long-term stability to affected regions. Increased cooperation with regional actors needs to be stepped up as this measure can go a long way towards building diplomatic bridges and trust. In addition, there is wide agreement about the potential security implications of climate change<sup>4</sup> and it is not a problem we will be able to avoid.<sup>5</sup> Proxy conflicts over resources are already being waged on the African continent, with crucial implications for the European continent<sup>6</sup> and weak state capacities are affecting the ability of governments to respond.<sup>7</sup> The melting of Arctic ice is already leading to competition for resources and opening up a potential new theatre of conflict, for which NATO will need to prepare.

### II. Remember our values and practice self-critique

President Donald Trump has been accused of surrendering American leadership and questioning U.S. commitment to allies.<sup>8</sup> It is right to say that he has not minced his words when talking

about NATO. However, when considering today's disagreements and disputes, it is important to keep history in mind. Heavy criticism of NATO by U.S. Presidents and American politicians has a very long tradition<sup>9</sup>. The fact that the U.S. has nonetheless consistently committed itself to NATO is a testament to the strength of the bond between our continents, which will not stand or fall during a single presidency. Indeed, many member states must take a hard-look at their place in the burden-sharing equation. The much debated two-percent target on defence spending cannot remain a mere symbol and allies cannot shy away from their commitments to the alliance, as some seemingly do, for which they are rightly criticised.<sup>10</sup> It is also right that troop and tank numbers alone cannot be the measure of security effectiveness, as Germany argues for instance<sup>11</sup>, but these are nonetheless essential aspects of overall military readiness. There is an urgent necessity for allies to be more honest with each other and to see their place in the alliance in the broad security context. Our alliance cannot endure merely with reference to domestic politics. We also cannot allow our common values to be sacrificed for the sake of short-term political expediency. This means member governments will sometimes have to make tough choices which are vital to ensure our alliance remains ready to confront threats.

### III. Embrace and develop hard power

There is talk of Thucydides making a comeback in terms of our understanding of conflict dynamics between great powers.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, he has something to teach us, but something that is often overlooked from his accounts of the Peloponnesian War. As the Athenians are besieging Melos, the Melians appeal to universal principles of justice as justification for their cause of neutrality, to which the Athenians simply reply; "you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power..."<sup>13</sup>. This passage has a simple meaning, which is that peace cannot be secured by weakness, since weakness can only lead to submission. Applied to our alliance today, Thucydides' account serves as a reminder that only a strong, well-equipped and united community of peoples will be able to confront the challenges of this

century and the threats to our freedoms. Here, we run into a difficulty. There is a fundamental unwillingness among the citizenries of many allies to fight for their countries, as shown by a WIN/Gallup Poll from 2015<sup>14</sup> while NATO is plagued by gaps in defence capabilities.<sup>15</sup> It is essential that member-states take measures to encourage their populations to serve and take steps to ensure their armed forces are equipped, numerous enough and trained for all possibilities. As one distinguished British historian points out, one of the most essential elements in the success of the Roman Republic was the number of troops it could muster – which meant the Romans might lose a battle, but never a war.<sup>16</sup> Numbers matter.

### IV. Establish strategies to combat methods of hybrid warfare

Since a state's resources are always limited, sowing internal discord is a less resource-intensive means of undermining one's opponents. Today, the Russian Federation is making effective use of this strategy to damage trust in our democracies and influence our elections. NATO is thus confronted with the question of how our open societies will be capable of countering information flows aimed at misinforming citizens and delegitimising governments with propaganda, fake news and conspiracy theories. It has already been acknowledged that the main implication of these methods of "hybrid warfare" is the need to design a defence posture and doctrine that enables allied governments to "compete in the grey zone" with regards to capabilities and legal frameworks.<sup>17</sup> Members should begin developing such a doctrine with haste. It must be remembered that we can use our information infrastructures to strengthen NATO too. Social media campaigns, such the hashtag #wearenato initiated this year go a long way towards engaging with the public, which is crucial for legitimising the organisation. At the most recent meeting of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Ambassador Ružička of Slovakia highlighted the importance of the campaign for raising awareness of NATO'S role for Slovakia and for generating consensus on foreign policy issues.<sup>18</sup> At the same time, contradicting dangerous narratives being spread by our enemies and those who support

them within our ranks is of vital importance. If these efforts are to be successful, they need to be targeted. That's why NATO should not shy away from enlisting the help of the private sector too if necessary, especially that of large digital companies with an immense reach, as part of a comprehensive strategy towards countering misinformation and hybrid tools of conflict.

#### V. Think beyond the North Atlantic space

It is already recognised that China is emerging as a key challenge for the alliance. The PRC is actively seeking to undermine the international rules-based order, compete with the U.S. in the development of military technologies and expand its political and economic influence into Europe<sup>19</sup>. The preservation of liberal democracy beyond NATO's borders concerns all, because if our values can suffer in what may only appear as distant regions of the world, it won't be long before they begin to suffer at home. Indeed, this fact is recognised by one of our former Secretaries-General, Fogh-Rasmussen, who has very recently argued in the British press for an assertive Europe that is willing to defend Taiwan from potential aggression by the PRC<sup>20</sup>. Threats are also emanating from rogue states such as North Korea, as well as the already mentioned increasing competition around access to the Arctic<sup>21</sup>. These issues need to assume a greater prominence in the vision of our alliance. In broader terms, these considerations confront the alliance with a more fundamental question about how far members would be willing to go for each other. Would they be prepared to rally to each other's assistance in distant conflicts? Afghanistan showed that they are willing, but will this determination persist in the future? Would the U.S. assist Europe in resolving problems in North Africa and the Middle East? The answer to that in the past has been yes, but would Europe come to the aid of the United States in case of a conflict in the Pacific? The answer to these questions must be an emphatic "yes". Otherwise, our alliance will suffer in credibility and purpose. United we will stand. Divided, we will fall.

#### Conclusion

As inter-governmental organisation, NATO's ability to contribute to peace and freedom in the future will depend on the will of its members and, by extension, that of its citizens. The path

won't be simple to tread but given our history, there every reason to be confident that the will to work together among allies will not falter. As shown in this contribution, our challenges are omnipresent. Therefore, we must think of NATO's mission of peace and freedom not as a purely transatlantic project, but a quintessentially global one. There is also much work to be done in promoting acceptance of a strong NATO and encouraging citizens to become engaged in security matters. Faced with limited resources, priorities will have to be set. These will in the long run demand more resources than are currently being deployed. The proposals outlined, though by no means exhaustive will make an essential contribution to our alliance's ability to contribute to peace and freedom in the coming decades. As a final note, it is worth mentioning there are growing voices calling for a "European Army" and "Strategic Autonomy" for Europe from the United States. If history teaches anything, it is that peace and freedom can only be secured by working together. That is why Secretary-General Stoltenberg was right to point out, above all in Berlin, that European unity can never replace transatlantic unity.<sup>22</sup>

#### References and Notes:

- Patrick T. Warren (2010). Alliance History and the Future NATO: What the Last 500 Years of Alliance Behaviour Tells us about NATO's Path Forward. 21<sup>st</sup> Century Defense Initiative Policy Paper, Brookings Institution.
- Gerald E. Connolly. NATO at 70: Why the Alliance remains indispensable. Draft Report of the Rapporteur, Political Committee, Subcommittee on Transatlantic Relations (PCTR) of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. 17th April 2017. Page 1.
- NATO Standard AJP-3.4.3. Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance. Edited A, Version 1, October 2015. Published by the NATO Standardization Office (NSO). Page IX.
- Tyler H. Lippert (2016). NATO, Climate Change and International Security. A Risk Governance Approach. Dissertation, Pardee Rand Graduate School. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. Page 12.
- Tom McEnchroe (21st May, 2019). 'NATO's biggest long-term future threat is climate change, suggests expert'. Radio Praha in English. Retrieved from: <https://www.radio.cz/en/section/curaffrs/natos-biggest-long-term-future-threat-is-climate-change-suggests-expert>
- NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Summary of the Meeting of the Political Committee. Sunday, 2nd June 2019. 152 PC 19 E, Published on 2nd July 2019. Page 2.
- Ernest Harsch (2019). 'Conflict resources: from 'curse' to blessing'. Africa Renewal, Magazine published by the United Nations, Issue April-July 2019. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/january-2007/conflict-resources-'curse'-blessing>
- Nicholas Burns and Douglas Lute (2nd April, 2019). 'NATO's biggest problem is President Trump'. The Washington Post. Retrieved from: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/natos-biggest-problem-is-president-trump/2019/04/02/6991bc9c-5570-11e9-9136-f8e636f1f6df\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.58b7a68ab24f](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/natos-biggest-problem-is-president-trump/2019/04/02/6991bc9c-5570-11e9-9136-f8e636f1f6df_story.html?utm_term=.58b7a68ab24f)
- Michael Creswell and Victor Gavin (22nd August 2017). 'A History of Vexation: President Trump's bashing of NATO is nothing new'. War on the Rocks, Online Magazine. Retrieved from: <https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/a-history-of-vexation-trumps-bashing-of-nato-is-nothing-new/>
- Various Authors (2nd April 2019). 'Patience Wears Thin with Germany's NATO Spending'. Der Spiegel. Retrieved from: <https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/patience-wears-thin-among-germany-s-nato-allies-a-1260366.html>
- John Dowdy (2017). More tooth, less tail: Getting beyond NATO's 2 percent rule. First published in The World Turned Upside Down: Maintaining American Leadership in a Dangerous Age. Aspen Strategy Group. Excerpt reprinted by McKinsey & Company. Retrieved from: <https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-insights/more-tooth-less-tail-getting-beyond-natos-2-percent-rule>



- <sup>12</sup> James Holmes (19th October 2018). 'Can America and China Avoid the Pull of the Thucydides Trap?'. *The National Interest*. Retrieved from: <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-america-and-china-avoid-pull-thucydides-trap-33912>
- <sup>13</sup> Thucydides. *The Peloponnesian War*. New York: Random House, 1951. Page 331. The second and more famous part of this sentence is "... while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."
- <sup>14</sup> WIN/Gallup Survey: 'WIN/Gallup International's global survey shows three in five willing to fight for their country'. Results published 7 May 2015. Retrieved from: <https://www.gallup-international.bg/en/33483/win-gallup-internationals-global-survey-shows-three-in-five-willing-to-fight-for-their-country/>
- <sup>15</sup> Wayne A. Schroeder (2019). *NATO at Seventy: Filling NATO's Critical Defense-Capability Gaps*. Washington D.C.: Atlantic Council, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. With a Foreword by Air Marshal Sir Chris Harper KBE.
- <sup>16</sup> Mary Beard (2015). *SQPR. A History of Ancient Rome*. London: Profile Books. Page 164.
- <sup>17</sup> NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Summary of the Meeting of the Political Committee. Sunday, 2nd June 2019. 152 PC 19 E, Published on 2nd July 2019, Page 4.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>19</sup> Douglas Lute and Nicholas Burns (2019). *NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis*. Report: Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship. Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Pages 36-37.
- <sup>20</sup> Anders Fogh Rasmussen (16th July 2019). 'Hong Kong showed China is a threat to democracy. Now Europe must defend Taiwan'. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jul/16/hong-kong-china-democracy-europe-taiwan-beijing-eu>
- <sup>21</sup> Gerald E. Connolly. *NATO at 70: Why the Alliance remains indispensable*. Draft Report of the Rapporteur, Political Committee, Subcommittee on Transatlantic Relations (PCTR) of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. 17th April 2017. Page 3.
- <sup>22</sup> Remarks made at the "NATO Talk around the Brandenburger Tor" event organised by the German Atlantic Society. Berlin, 12th November 2018.

## 2<sup>nd</sup> Prize: 600 EUR, Velislava-Mihaela Krachunova

### It is a common saying that history is often doomed to repeat itself.

Wars broke out then eventually peace was achieved. These two periods kept taking turns. States and alliances could be created overnight and then be suddenly destroyed. This never-ending cycle kept repeating and, for this reason, we can say that a lot of truth lies in the proverb that "History helps us understand the present and predict the future."

70 years ago NATO was founded with the main purpose to deter Soviet expansionism, stop nationalist militarism in Europe by creating a strong bond between the countries from the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean, and encourage European political integration. The founding members could hardly imagine that around 40 years later the Soviet Union would not exist anymore and that 50 years later Article 5 of North Atlantic Treaty would be triggered for the first time in the Alliance's history not to protect one of the small states in Eastern Europe, but one of its main pillars – the USA, against terrorism after one of the deadliest attacks in history on 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001.

During the Cold War, NATO focused on collective defence and the protection of its members from potential threats emanating from the Soviet

Union. However, after its end the question regarding the necessity of NATO was raised. What purpose would NATO serve after history again repeated itself and the Soviet Union followed the destiny of a lot of unions from the past and dissolved? The Berlin Wall was torn down. The Iron Curtain fell. The end of this historical play, which lasted almost half a century, was put. But ten years later after the 9/11 attacks and the beginning of the war in Afghanistan in 2001, it became obvious that the challenges to security have changed and that NATO is still more important than ever. The answer to the question "Has NATO lost its purpose?" was to be found in the past, present and the future. And it was one and the same – "No, it has not. It still must continue to exist to maintain peace and uphold human rights in the new international environment, full of challenges to global security.

NATO now focuses on countering various threats by utilizing collective defence, managing crisis situations and encouraging cooperative security, as outlined in the 2010 Strategic Concept.<sup>1</sup> The Alliance strives to secure a lasting peace in Europe, based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.<sup>2</sup> However, these values can only exist in the presence of security.

There is no generally accepted definition of what international security is. According to one of the most famous thinkers of the neoliberal theory in International Relations Joseph Nye: "Security is like oxygen—you tend not to notice it until you begin to lose it, but once that occurs there is nothing else that you think about."

Most scholars emphasize that the absence of an armed conflict is not the only condition that should be present in order for security on an international and global level to be achieved. Other important conditions include compliance with international law, ability to predict other actors' actions in international relations, cooperation between states, the effectiveness of peace-keeping operations, arms reduction and complete disarmament, respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Now, in 21st century security must be assessed on various levels – individual, societal, national, regional, international and global. In order to contribute to the effective maintenance of peace and human rights protection on all these levels, NATO must take up effective measures to deal with all risks, which are of various kinds and are all interconnected. What, I believe, must be pointed out first and foremost, is that what connects all these threats is that Member States must focus on the Alliance's unity in order to be able to tackle the challenges efficiently, so that NATO can continue to be the bulwark of peace and freedom in the world.

It has been stated numerous times that NATO is the Alliance of friendship. It is hard to imagine an alliance or union to be successful if its Member States do not support and understand each other. Understanding, reliability, cooperation and friendship, this is what has made and will keep making NATO successful. Therefore, in order to contribute effectively to peace and freedom in the future, NATO should work towards enhancing the ability of the Member States to compromise and understand each other, as well as towards tackling the political issues between them, thus building mutual trust and improving the Alliance's unity.

The first issue that needs to be solved in this regard is the one of burden-sharing, especially considering the USA's position on this matter. To this moment, only 7 member states spend over 2 % from their GDP on defence. However, it should be highlighted that 2 % was never designed to be the sole measure of value. The Wales Defence Investment Pledge is broader, committing allies to 20 % of defense spending for major new equipment and research and development of new capabilities with more than half of allies have made the 20 % target.<sup>3</sup>

Another internal threat is related to the state of democracy in some of the member states. It should not be forgotten that NATO is not only a military Alliance but also an Alliance of Democracies. NATO cannot fulfill its fundamental purpose of achieving peace and democracy, if human rights, freedom of expression and rule of law are not respected within its own borders.

Third, NATO should work towards the improvement of its partnership with the European Union. The EU is NATO's most natural partner not only because they both have 22 Member States in common, but also because they share the same values and cooperate on issues of common interest and work side by side in crisis management, capability development and political consultations, as well as face the same challenges. On 10 July 2018, in a joint declaration, the two organisations agreed to focus on swift progress in the areas of military mobility, counter-terrorism and strengthening resilience to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear-related risks as well as promoting the women, peace and security agenda.<sup>4</sup>

Apart from internal challenges, NATO also faces external ones. Russia has abrogated the INF Treaty, annexed Crimea from Ukraine and occupied provinces of Georgia, it has also been modernizing its nuclear arsenal over a long period of time.<sup>5</sup> Its actions constitute a threat to the peace and security in the region and the way NATO should respond is again by staying united and presenting a common position. This is what NATO has done and has to keep doing. For the first time in NATO's history, there are combat-ready troops in the eastern part of the alliance — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. Moreover, NATO has made the Black Sea a priority in order to ensure the safety of its allies and partners and to send a countersignal to Russian aggression. NATO should keep its focus on increased training, visits, and information sharing.<sup>6</sup>

Member States must always have a common position against Russian aggression if they want to ensure peace and security in the region for the years to come. Moreover, dialogue is fundamental to deterrence, as Russia must clearly understand NATO's intent and the consequences of aggression. Thus, the NATO-Russia Council should continue to meet regularly to address risk reduction measures, provide transparency on military exercises and exchange views on priority political issues, including the conflict in Ukraine.<sup>7</sup>

Another challenge which requires a stronger common NATO position comes from China. Despite the fact it does not present a military threat to NATO Allies, its global power has increased enormously in the political and economic field and will keep increasing in the future. Other threats to the position of NATO as a bulwark of peace are the intense hybrid threats, which include disinformation, cyber attacks, economic pressure and many more. Being prepared to prevent, counter and respond to hybrid attacks, whether by state or non-state actors, must be a top priority for NATO.<sup>8</sup> NATO must also focus on gender inequality and the impact conflict has on women and girls, and work towards women's empowerment and participation in peace processes.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, the Alliance should not lose focus on its purpose to reduce the environmental effects of military activities and to respond to security challenges emanating from the environment.<sup>10</sup>

In order to achieve peace and respect for human rights the Alliance must also work towards enlargement. "If NATO's neighbors are more stable, NATO is more secure." This statement is at the heart of NATO's Concept on Projecting Stability adopted by Allied leaders at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in 2016. The vision of Europe "whole, free and at peace", introduced in 1989 should be embraced to the fullest. Pursuant to Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty."

NATO has successfully incorporated the northern Mediterranean coast and secured its south-eastern flank after the accession of Slovenia, Croatia, Albania and Montenegro. After the historic Prespa Agreement between Greece and North Macedonia, the latter is expected to become the Alliance's 30th Member. In comparison, its neighbor Serbia has no intention to join NATO. However, the country is part of Partnership for Peace and signed an Individual Partnership Action Plan in 2015. Moreover, NATO has been present in Kosovo for 20 years with the KFOR international peacekeeping forces, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995.<sup>11</sup> Further-

more, it is NATO's interest to hold open the possibility of membership of Ukraine and Georgia in the long term.<sup>12</sup> NATO should not allow "a veil of indifference" to cover the perspectives of future enlargement. However, it must be taken into consideration that expansion should develop hand in hand with cohesion between the current member states.

In conclusion, challenges will always exist. Even if the above-mentioned ones are solved, new ones will occur. This will give NATO new priorities and goals to achieve and the member states will gain new opportunities to find a way for better problem-solving mechanism and stronger capabilities. What is certain is that the unity and understanding between NATO Member States must never cease to exist. Because this is what NATO is about – an Alliance of friends, as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg pointed out in his speech at the Aspen Security Forum in 2019 – "It is extremely good to have friends and allies. You are privileged to have 28 friends and allies who are together with you. Every time."

It is true that there are differences and disagreements between the Member States, which may multiply when new members join the Alliance in the future. Nevertheless, such problems can always be tackled, if the Member States do not lose focus on NATO's fundamental values, i.e. maintaining peace and security, as well as respect for democracy and human rights, and stay united in their devotion to achieve these goals. As the Foreign Minister of Iceland Bjarni Benediktsson stated during speech at the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 "It is a fact (...) that we are unlike each other in many respects, but there are many things which bind us solidly together... We all believe in friendly cooperation among nations. We all want peace for all the world and well-being for mankind."

#### References:

- <sup>1</sup> NATO's purpose, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 18 April 2018, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_68144.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68144.htm) (Last accessed on 01. 08. 2019)
- <sup>2</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>3</sup> Burns, N., Lute, D., "NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis", Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, February 2019, available at: <https://www.belfercenter.org/NATO70>, (Last accessed on 03.08.2019)
- <sup>4</sup> Relations with the European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 18 July 2019, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_49217.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm) (Last accessed on 01.08.2019)
- <sup>5</sup> Garamone, J., "Secretary General Cites NATO Unity as Alliance's Best Deterrent", U.S. Department of Defence, July 18 2019, available at: <https://www.defense.gov/explore/story/Article/1909715/secretary-general-cites-nato-unity-as-alliances-best-deterrent/> (Last accessed on 01.08.2019)

- <sup>6</sup> Gocek, N., "NATO in the Black Sea", NATO Association of Canada, June 11, 2019, available at: <http://natoassociation.ca/nato-in-the-black-sea/> (Last accessed on 01.08.2019)
- <sup>7</sup> Burns, N., Lute, D., "NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis", Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, February 2019, available at: <https://www.belfercenter.org/NATO70> (Last accessed on 03.08.2019)
- <sup>8</sup> NATO's response to hybrid threats, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, July 17 2018, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_156338.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_156338.htm) (Last accessed on 01.08.2019)
- <sup>9</sup> Johnson-Freese, J., Goldstein, A., "How the Pentagon Can Build on NATO's Success With Women, Peace & Security", RealClear Defense, May 13 2019, available at: [https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/05/13/how\\_the\\_pentagon\\_can\\_build\\_on\\_natos\\_success\\_with\\_women\\_peace\\_security\\_114418.html](https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/05/13/how_the_pentagon_can_build_on_natos_success_with_women_peace_security_114418.html) (Last accessed on 01.08.2019)
- <sup>10</sup> Environment – NATO's stake, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, December 9 2014, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_91048.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_91048.htm) (Last accessed on 01.08.2019)
- <sup>11</sup> Delic, G., "Security Matters to The Western Balkans", The German Marshall Fund of the United States, April 1, 2019, available at: <http://www.gmfus.org/publications/security-matters-western-balkans> (Last accessed on: 02.08.2019)
- <sup>12</sup> Burns, N., Lute, D., "NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis", Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, February 2019, available at: <https://www.belfercenter.org/NATO70>, (Last accessed on 03.08.2019)

### 3<sup>rd</sup> Prize: 400 EUR, Pierre Dugué Sciences Po, Paris School of International Affairs

NATO at 70 is as relevant as NATO at 40. The security environment is different, the international landscape has drastically evolved and yet the organization has proven to be extremely resilient in the face of emerging challenges. NATO has shifted from being a mighty military block whose chief purpose was deterrence and, should need arise, large-scale conflict; to a rather multi-faceted organisation, and this is where its strength lies. Engaged in peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan, counter-piracy in the Horn of Africa, assistance and deterrence in North America and Europe; strengthened by a growing network of partnerships and alliances in every continent, NATO has successfully demonstrated it is a force for peace and freedom all around the world.

NATO continuously seeks to innovate and anticipate. This is precisely what it should carry on doing, considering the wide array of challenges it currently faces. The most important ones are arguably 1) the doubts expressed by NATO publics and leaders with regards to the organisation's relevancy; 2) the renewed challenges in NATO's traditional areas of interest (Europe and Asia); and 3) the increasing complexity of warfare in uncharted domains and regions (space, cyber, Arctic). As such, I believe there are some steps that, if undertaken, would strongly contribute to making NATO set and ready for today's challenges. These holistic measures include a major public relations campaign, organisational efforts, and structural reforms.

### Engaging the public to foster NATO-civil relationships

Public support to NATO has hardly ever been as volatile as today. Few NATO heads of States have even publicly expressed concerns regarding the organisation's relevancy, sowing doubts amongst NATO publics. Revisionist news outlets do brand NATO as a force for evil and destruction, acting against the principles of international law and world peace. Emerging nationalist leaders argue NATO is incompatible with State sovereignty and thus advocate for its dissolution. These opinions may be misguided, but one can hardly ignore the pull they exert on NATO audiences.

This is where NATO should step up and engage the public in a major public relations campaign to ensure NATO-civil relationships remain healthy. Should such an endeavour not be undertaken, one could witness the Alliance's legitimacy and credibility drastically decrease.

**All measures should have for objective to enhance public understanding of NATO's history, organisation and current challenges to bring about support.** NATO HQ is currently doing a satisfactory work in public relations with academia (organising panels, offering grants to fund NATO-related events etc.) and on social media. What it could do further includes:

- The opening of two NATO museums located in Brussels and Washington so as to inform tourists, military enthusiasts but most of all the general public about NATO's role in the Cold War and beyond. The museum could host special exhibitions, display military artefacts and historical pictures. The museum would trace NATO's origins, development, major operations and current challenges. It may cooperate with other military museums to organise temporary exhibitions all throughout Europe and North America.
- The adoption by the Parliamentary Assembly of a motion requesting the displaying of the NATO flag in front of defence ministry buildings and behind the head of States when addressing their respective nations (much like the EU flag is being displayed)

- The adoption by the Parliamentary Assembly of a motion requesting the presence of a NATO multinational contingent at national military parades (France's Bastille Day parade for instance).
- An effort to foster relations with top European universities to organise conferences and war-games with NATO senior leaders.

It remains that more specific public relations efforts may be too intrusive and overstep State legitimacy. This is precisely why national governments, and not the Alliance per se, should undertake measures. NATO would have a role to play in talking member States into adopting measures that could include:

- The revision of history programs for secondary and high schools to better reflect the geopolitical dynamics of the Cold War in Europe; the threat of nuclear war, the importance of NORAD, NATO war plans and deterrence efforts
- The adoption of a nation-wide "NATO day" celebration on April 4th every year to mark the creation of the Alliance.
- A special reference to NATO on national memorials commemorating the fallen soldiers who were operating under a NATO framework.

### **Undertaking structural reforms to further foster diplomatic relations, promote peace and enhance deterrence in Europe and Asia.**

NATO faces a dual challenge. On the one hand, it is seeking to adapt to the international pivot to Asia which has extensively drawn in NATO member States (United States, France and Great Britain mostly) but also partners (Japan, South Korea and Australia). On the other hand, NATO ought to maintain a highly deterrent position in an increasingly contested Europe; the Alliance faces geostrategic and political constraints which may limit its ability to preserve peace and freedom on the old continent. These new and old challenges arguably demand structural reforms to make sure the Alliance as an organisation can effectively cope with them.

In NATO's traditional area of operations, Europe, the steady integration of new member States has widened the scope of the Alliance. Yet, NATO still has not implemented institutional reforms to

fully integrate these new member States. Structural efforts may be undertaken to further foster relations with new member States, ensure military readiness over a wide geographical area and enhance overall cohesion and resilience. One may recommend decentralising some of the Alliance and more specifically:

- Moving some headquarters further East like Enhanced Forward Presence – based in Brunssum, Netherlands – to the Baltics or Poland; and parts of Maritime Command (UK) to Deveselu Airbase, Romania – home to NATO's missile defence systems in the region.
- Creating new headquarters in Eastern Europe. A Black Sea command in Timisoara, Romania headed by a 3-star general could, for example, contribute to better reflecting geostrategic priorities in the Black Sea.

Elsewhere, Asia reveals itself as a new area of interest to NATO. The presence of key partners there and even of member States requires the Alliance to anticipate potential needs in this region. Efforts to foster relations with regional partners and signal resolve at defending member States in the Pacific may necessitate the following steps to be undertaken:

- The establishment of an official liaison office in Melbourne, Australia – at the crossroads between the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and the Pacific – would facilitate the coordination of policies with regional partners.
- The appointment of a NATO special envoy to the Pacific would further signal the Alliance's consideration of the region as a major theatre of operation.
- The creation of a diplomatic project that would entail the sailing of NATO warships to pay visits to regional partners. Ultimately, NATO could operate permanently from bases in New Caledonia, France or Guam, United States through a newly created Pacific Fleet Command.

### **Creating an organisational apparatus tailored to the increasing complexity of warfare.**

NATO is a military organisation that shifted from an Alliance solely focused on conventional warfare against the Warsaw Pact, to a more balanced force capable of undertaking full-spectrum operations. There still remain military

challenges that the Alliance is seemingly ill-prepared to face. Any supra-national apparatus tends to be slow to adapt to the fast-paced environment of military technology; supersonic warheads, sixth-generation fighter jets, military drones, cyber weapons etc. Likewise, these organisations struggle to adapt to the increasing military importance of new domains - cyber, electronic and space, and new methods of war - non-contact, hybrid, information etc.

In the European theatre, there is a concern that unconventional Russian actions in the Baltics may not be detected, or interpreted incorrectly. In order to effectively bypass disinformation and overcome the blur of war, there is a need for a more efficient decision-making structure at the political level. At the moment, the Atlantic Council solely respects the rule of consensus – every nation gets a veto. However, in the case of a rapid, hybrid military action, the Council may not be able to reach consensus and react in due time to prevent the adversary from making irreversible gains. One could therefore suggest to add an institutional mechanism whereby the Secretary General, upon consultation with SACEUR and the Military Committee, could call up an extraordinary Council meeting where a majority vote of two-thirds would be held to determine whether to militarily engage the Alliance.

Besides, NATO ought to better embrace the increasing military importance of new domains and regions and integrate them into its organisational apparatus. Such efforts may include:

- Appointing under-Secretaries specialised in different military areas to better supervise policy in specific areas and developments in specific domains. For instance, there could be an under-Secretary for Space and Cyber Policy, for Arctic Policy, for Weapons Development and Future Warfare etc.
- Releasing comprehensive white papers on Black Sea, Pacific, Arctic and Space policies to better guide the whole Alliance's thinking about these non-traditional areas of interest to NATO.

## Conclusion

NATO is undoubtedly a force for peace, but currently faces tough challenges on different levels. First of all, NATO has to deal with increasing

revisionist views of the Alliance that facilitate the emergence of a NATO-scepticism. This dynamic requires the undertaking of a major public relations campaign to counter these misguided claims. Museums could be created to better inform the public, specific funds can be allocated to fostering cooperation with prestigious academies; while national programs to better shape the public's perception of NATO can be implemented by member States.

Secondly, NATO ought to adapt to the international pivot to Asia, while maintaining a strong deterrent position in Europe. In the latter, the Alliance could implement an ambitious Atlantic Council reform to enhance political readiness in the face of Russian deniable actions in the East. Besides, the situation in Asia offers a unique opportunity to foster relations with regional partners and set foot into an area that increasingly draws NATO member States.

Thirdly, the Alliance ought to implement institutional reforms to better reflect the geostrategic realities of modern warfare, along with the expansion of military activities in different domains. Such efforts may include restructuring the Alliance's civil structure to dedicate specific bureaus to given domains, to think more effectively about contemporary warfare.

# 2020

## **Schulen | *Schools in Heidelberg/Weinheim***

Thema | *Topic:*

30 Jahre Mauerfall, was ist noch zu tun? ..... 48

## **Litauen Mykolas Romeris Universität | *Lithuania Mykolas Romeris Univerity***

Thema | *Topic:*

In 2020, NATO is facing three major challenges: Great Power rivalry, international terrorism and humanitarian crises. Which priorities should the Alliance set from the perspective of the Baltic states? ..... 57

## **Parlamentarische Versammlung der NATO | *NATO Parliamentary Assembly***

Thema | *Topic:*

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, how can NATO and its member states develop a coherent strategy towards the People's Republic of China? ..... 74

## Thema | Topic:

### 30 Jahre Mauerfall, was ist noch zu tun?

#### 1. Preis: 600 EUR, Klasse 9b des Bergstraßen-Gymnasiums Hemsbach

#### Schriftliche Erzählung mit Hörspielcharakter

#### Bedeutung: Riss durch die Familie

**Feline:** Papa! Ich halt in Geschi eine GFS!  
Mein Thema ist: 30 Jahre Mauerfall – Was ist noch zu tun?

**Vater:** Das ist ja richtig gut! Da kann ich dir ja ganz viel zu erzählen.

**Feline:** Ja bitte! Ich hab' keinen Plan, was ich dazu sagen soll. Ich hasse GFS

**Vater:** Hast du schon irgendetwas? Eine Gliederung oder sonst was?

**Feline:** Ne Papa, ich hab' das Thema heute erst bekommen.

**Vater:** Okay, also du kennst ja eigentlich schon die Geschichte. Die habe ich dir ja schon oft erzählt.

Das war an ,nem Mittwoch, wo ich bei Großvati, also deinem Uropa, auf dem Schoß saß. Da war ich so um die 5 Jahre alt, und wie jedes mal als ich bei ihm war, haben wir immer zuerst das Sandmännchen für mich und die Tagesschau für Großvati geschaut. Das war natürlich riskant. Die Tagesschau war Westfernsehen und es gab immer die Gefahr, dass ein Nachbar oder ein IM uns abhörte und uns dann meldete. Und mein Vater hat das gar nicht gern gesehen.

**Feline:** Was ist ein IM?

**Vater:** „IM“ steht für „inoffizielle Mitarbeiter“. Das waren Spitzel von der Stasi. Einige machten den Job freiwillig, aber manche wurden auch unter Duck gesetzt und dazu gezwungen. Wenn du dich auffällig benommen hast und/oder nicht so gedacht oder gehandelt hast wie ein DDR-Bürger, wurdest du bei der Stasi gemeldet und du wurdest überwacht. Im schlimmsten Fall sind sie bei dir vorbei gekommen und das wurde RICHTIG unangenehm. Du wurdest dann als Volksverräter und Bedrohung gesehen. Und so jemanden will keiner in seinem Land haben.

Aber jedenfalls, dann hat er mir gesagt, dass er in den Westen will. Mich hat das total geschockt. Großvater war eine der vertrautesten Personen in meinem Leben. Er war eine größere Stütze für mich als mein Vater es je gewesen ist. Da mein Vater nie für mich da war, habe ich mit meinem Großvater alles gemacht, was ich eigentlich mit meinem Vater hätte machen sollen. Wir waren zusammen Drachenfliegen als Kind, und er ist immer mit uns in den Urlaub gegangen. Ich war sauer auf ihn, dass er in meinen Augen „einfach weg wollte“, „er wollte uns verlassen“. Viele Tage lang, war ich auf ihn sauer, weil ich es einfach nicht verstanden habe und mir im Stich gelassen vorkam, aber jetzt im Nachhinein kann ich es nachvollziehen. In der DDR kontrollierte der Staat alles, sogar die Wirtschaft wurde vom Staat kontrolliert, was zu Engpässen zum Beispiel auch in der Lebensmittelversorgung geführt hat. Alles war auf Kommunismus ausgerichtet. Klar, die BRD stand vor allem noch am Anfang unter der Kontrolle der Alliierten, aber es war auf Demokratie und Kapitalismus ausgelegt: Man durfte frei wählen, es gab Pressefreiheit und man musste nicht mit der Angst leben, dass am nächsten Morgen die Stasi vor der Tür steht.

Ich meine, Rentner durften ja auch für ein paar Wochen im Jahr raus aus der DDR. Somit hatte Großvati einen positiven Eindruck vom westlichen Leben. Wenn ich das so gesehen hätte als ich noch in der DDR lebte, hätte ich auch sofort versucht endgültig zu gehen.

Also, im Herbst ist er dann umgezogen. Wir wissen alle nicht so genau wie er dann so schnell eine Ausreiseerlaubnis bekommen hat. Wahrscheinlich hat mein Vater ihm eine besorgt. Zwischen den beiden war das Verhältnis nie so gut. Da kann ich verstehen, dass mein Vater ihn weg haben wollte.

Mein Großvater hat mir mal gesagt: **„Die Grenze wird nie weggehen.** Die Köpfe der Menschen werden sich daran gewöhnen, dass Deutschland getrennt ist. Das System wird nicht für immer halten, Jens, das ist klar, egal was dein Vater denkt oder erzählt. **Eines Tages wird Deutschland wieder als eine Einheit existieren. Aber die Grenze wird den Menschen immer im Kopf bleiben.“**



So verließ mein Großvater uns im Herbst. Danach habe ich nichts mehr von ihm gehört. Vati ist in der DDR richtig aufgeblüht. Er wurde befördert und es gab keinen westlichen Einfluss mehr aus unserer Familie. Für meinen Vater war alles perfekt. Mutti hat zwar gearbeitet aber trotzdem hat sich um uns drei Kinder gekümmert. Ich glaube Mutti war nie richtig überzeugt von der DDR aber wir blieben da. Was für eine Wahl hatten wir denn auch? Hätten wir versucht zu fliehen, wären wir wahrscheinlich nirgendwo mehr hingegangen. Und mein Vater hätte eh versucht uns mit allen möglichen Mitteln in der DDR festzuhalten. Das wäre für ihn ein Kinderspiel gewesen, denn er war ein hochangesehener SED-Funktionär und hat noch irgendwie bei der Stasi mitgemischt.

Eines Abends bin ich in unserem Haus in die Küche gelaufen und da lag ein Brief auf dem Küchentisch. An sich war das nichts besonderes, sonst lagen auch immer Briefe auf dem Tisch aber der war aus dem Westen! Und er war offen.

Ich glaube ich habe den Brief noch irgendwo in einer Kiste aufgehoben. Erinner dich daran ihn zu suchen, Feline. Dann kannst du ihn als Textquelle benutzen.

Es war ein Brief von Großvati. Endlich hatte er sich mal gemeldet. Ich habe mich so gefreut, weil ich nie verstanden habe warum er sich solange nicht gemeldet hat. In dem Brief erkundigte er sich nach unserem Wohlergehen, vor allem von uns Enkelkindern. Er behauptete, dass wir uns nie bei ihm gemeldet hätten. Anscheinend waren seine Briefe nie bei uns angekommen und daher, dass wir „nie“ Briefe bekommen haben, haben wir ihm natürlich auch nie welche geschickt. Später fand ich heraus, dass mein Vater dafür verantwortlich war, dass Großvaters Briefe nie ankamen: Er hatte sie nämlich vor uns versteckt. Er wollte nicht, dass wir Kontakt zu einem Republikflüchtigen hatten, vor allem weil Großvater uns in den Briefen aufforderte in die BRD zu kommen Und er in den ganzen Briefen „den Feind in den Himmel lobte“ wie mein Vater immer gesagt hat. Ich war so sauer auf meinen Vater. Wie konnte er mir nur den Kontakt mit meinem Großvater verweigern? Generell gab es zunehmend Stress in unserer Familie, unter anderem auch wegen den unterschiedlichen

politischen Ansichten die in unserer Familie geteilt wurden.

**Feline:** Wie asozial ist das denn bitte?! Äh warte mal, was ist denn eigentlich ein Republikflüchtiger?

**Jens:** Als Republikflüchtiger wurde früher jeder bezeichnet, der versuchte aus der DDR zu fliehen. Man wurde als Volksverräter gesehen. Wenn man bei der Flucht erwischt wurde, wurde man entweder direkt an der Grenze abgeschossen oder man wurde verhaftet.

Zurück zur Geschichte: Für DDR-Verhältnisse ging es uns ziemlich gut: wir hatten Geld und ein Dach über dem Kopf. Das aber auch nur, weil Vati so Staatstreu war. Als ich jedoch älter wurde, fielen mir die Missstände immer heftiger auf: Es gab eine Organisation, die sich FDJ nannte, was „Freie Deutsche Jugend“ bedeutete. Es war praktisch Pflicht Teil der FDJ zu sein, ansonsten war es fast unmöglich einen Studien- oder Arbeitsplatz oder Freunde zu finden, wie sich im Nachhinein herausstellte. Man war ein Außenseiter und natürlich, wie bei allem wurde man vom Staat benachteiligt, wenn man nicht tat was sie von einem wollten. Als ich mit der Schule fertig war, erkrankte mein Vater an Krebs. Er war schon sehr geschwächt. Das traf unsere Familie schwer. Nach zwei qualvollen Monaten starb er. Während wir trauerten, spielten wir des öfteren mit dem Gedanken in den Westen zu fliehen, da wir allein waren und wir unseren Großvater brauchten, denn er hatte unsere Familie immer zusammengehalten und war für uns alle eine große Stütze. Allerdings hielten unsere Freunde uns davon ab, da sie selbst schon Familienmitglieder und Freunde auf diesem Weg verloren hatten. Somit blieben wir also vorerst in der DDR. Als die Trauer einigermaßen überwunden war, setzten wir uns immer aktiver für den Mauerfall ein, vor allem auf Demos, weil Wir Freiheit wollten und wieder eine vereinte Familie sein wollten. Auf Wunsch unserer Mutter traten wir drei Kinder aus der FDJ aus, einige unserer Freunde folgten uns. Der Großteil traute sich jedoch nicht der FDJ abzuschwören; entweder aus sozialistischer Überzeugung oder aus Angst den Studienplatz oder den sozialen Status zu verlieren. Es dauerte nicht lange, bis wir die Folgen spürten: Mein Bruder und Ich bekamen

keinen Platz an einer Uni, unserer Schwester wurde eine Ausbildung verwehrt. Wir gaben jedoch nicht auf und sahen unsere Lage als Ansporn weiterzumachen. Wir fanden auch immer mehr Freunde und Unterstützer auf den Montagsdemonstrationen.

Der Staat ging radikal mit uns um. Viele wurden auf der Straße geschlagen, getreten und verhaftet. Unsere Mutter unterstützte uns wie sie nur konnte. Man kann nur von Glück reden, dass wir nicht erwischt wurden. Viele meiner neuen Freunde wurden verhaftet und beinahe auch dein Onkel. Aber der Protest hat sich gelohnt: die Grenze wurde geöffnet. Und als wir das erfuhren, feierten wir zusammen mit unseren Freunden die ganze Nacht lang und fuhren mit unseren Trabis so schnell es ging nach Berlin. Ein Monat nach dem Mauerfall, zogen wir zu unserem Großvater nach Weinheim.

**Feline:** okay und wie geht die Geschichte weiter?

**Jens:** Wir studierten alle hier, bekamen einen Job und gründeten irgendwann unsere eigenen Familien. Wir konnten zum ersten Mal frei reisen und wählen. Wir durften unsere Meinung frei äußern, ohne diese Angst an die Stasi verraten und abgeführt zu werden. Wir brauchten unsere Zeit um Anschluss zu finden, vor allem weil wir eine andere Erziehung genossen haben, aber wir waren glücklich und frei. Aber Großvater hatte wieder einmal recht gehabt: Die physische Mauer gab es nicht mehr, aber sie war immer noch in der Psyche der Menschen.

**Feline:** Was genau meinst du damit?

Jens: BRD und DDR sind mittlerweile eins und gleichen sich immer mehr an, es gibt aber immer noch wesentliche Unterschiede zwischen dem Westen und dem Osten, vor allem finanziell und sozial:

- Man verdient weniger im Osten
- Der Osten ist wirtschaftlich schwächer, kein einziges DAX-Unternehmen sitzt dort.
- es gibt immer weniger junge Menschen im Osten und das nennt man demographischen Wandel.

Vor allem ländliche Regionen leiden darunter, da dort nichts los ist und die alten Leute mehr oder weniger auf sich allein gestellt sind. Dieses Prob-

lem gibt es schon lange. und das führt zu Fachkräftemangel

- Die Arbeitslosenrate ist im Osten höher als im Westen (September 2018)  
Und es gibt noch viele weitere Dinge, in denen sich Westen und Osten unterscheiden. Du siehst, es gibt noch einiges zu tun bis West und Ost auf Augenhöhe sind.

**Feline:** aber sind die Leute dann nicht richtig unglücklich da? Wieso unternimmt man da nichts?

**Jens:** Natürlich gibt es unzufriedene Menschen. Nicht alle, aber es gibt sie. Was meinst du wieso die rechte Szene im Osten so groß ist? Die Leute dort fühlen sich von der Politik vergessen und sind extrem wütend und unzufrieden. Der perfekte Nährboden für Rechtsextremismus und Populismus. die AfD zum Beispiel verspricht dem Osten wieder Aufbau und dass er wieder groß wird deswegen wird die AfD im Osten auch viel mehr gewählt als hier. Generell neigt der Osten dazu, die Ränder des politischen Spektrums zu wählen, auch die Linke hat hier gute Werte erzielt.

**Feline:** Wieso ist der Osten überhaupt „benachteiligt“? Die Mauer ist doch weg und es ist ein Deutschland die DDR gibt es doch nicht mehr.

**Jens:** Ja, das ist doch klar. Das ganze System der DDR was über Jahre aufgebaut wurde, wurde nach der Wiedervereinigung einfach zugrunde gerichtet. Nach der Währungsreform in der DDR zur D-Mark, konnten marode Industrieanlagen und Fabriken nicht mehr bestehen. Jeder wollte auch dann West-Produkte kaufen und die Ost-Produkte hatten keine Chance mehr. Sowas führt ja auch zu massiven Betriebsschließungen und das zu Arbeitslosigkeit. Du musst dir auch mal denken, was das mit einem psychisch macht. Alle Leute die ihr Leben lang für die DDR gearbeitet haben und Produkte hergestellt haben kriegen jetzt gesagt, dass ihre Produkte und alles wofür sie gelebt haben nichts wert sind. und die ganzen Betriebsschließungen und alles hat zu dem demographischen Wandel geführt.

**Feline:** Und was genau können wir tun?

**Jens:** Man muss die Probleme bei der Wurzel packen. Wenn man krank ist, muss man nicht

nur die Symptome heilen, sondern auch deren Ursache finden und beseitigen, sonst wird man sie nicht los.

**Feline:** Aber bei den Symptomen kann man doch auch schon was machen oder? Also zum Beispiel bei diesem demographischen Wandel. Da kann man doch die Infrastruktur wieder aufbauen und den Osten Deutschlands wieder attraktiv für junge Menschen machen.

**Jens:** Das passiert schon. dafür gibt es extra den Solidaritätszuschlag, der den Lebensstandard in Ostdeutschland ansteigen lässt durch zum Beispiel Sanierungen mancher Städte, Ausbau der Infrastruktur und so weiter. Problem ist aber: dass der Osten wirtschaftlich nicht so stark ist, was auch wieder auf fehlende Jugend und immer noch schlechte Infrastruktur zurückzuführen ist. Es ist ein Teufelskreis, aus dem man nur sehr schwer entkommen kann.

**Feline:** Gibt es nicht noch andere Möglichkeiten sich zu beteiligen? Über politische Ebene dauert sowas immer so lang.

**Jens:** Natürlich gibt es andere Möglichkeiten, vor allem auf sozialer Ebene, aber es ist nicht so, dass politisch gar nichts passiert. Das weißt du nicht, aber es gibt einen Ostbeauftragten. Seine Aufgabe ist es, die Lebensverhältnisse in Ost und West anzugleichen. Und wenn du mit uns Nachrichten schauen würdest, wüsstest du, dass auch schon so etwas wie Renten angepasst werden. Im Moment, für dieses Jahr, 2020 war die Rentenanpassung geplant. Es gibt auch schon Schritte um die Löhne denen im Westen Anzupassen.

**Feline:** Baut nicht Tesla auch irgendeine Fabrik oder so im Osten?

**Jens:** Genau, im Osten erlässt man auch die Steuern um ihn wieder attraktiv für junge Menschen und Unternehmen zu machen.

**Feline:** Aber man kann doch auch noch etwas Soziales machen oder?

**Jens:** Ja genau, überleg doch mal selbst was man für soziale Projekte machen kann.

**Feline:** Ja, man könnte ja irgendwie auch so Schulaustausche machen oder so.

**Vater:** Es gibt verschiedene Projekte für Schüler aus West und Ost, bei denen sie zusammenar-

beiten. Bei den älteren Menschen, die das alles erlebt haben, wird man die Mentalität nicht ändern können; sprich man muss mit der Jugend zusammenarbeiten, denn sie sind die Zukunft und so etwas wie die Teilung Deutschlands darf und sollte nie wieder geschehen.

**Feline:** Ja, klar muss man mit der Jugend arbeiten. Aber ich denke auch für ältere Leute, also so für dich oder so, kann man ja auch so kulturelle Sachen machen oder so. Kulturfahrten zum Beispiel.

**Vater:** Ich finde, man muss etwas auf politischer Ebene und zusätzlich etwas auf sozialer Ebene machen. Man muss die Zusammenarbeit von West und Ost fördern. So verschwinden schonmal die sozialen Minderwertigkeitsgefühle.

Eine weitere Möglichkeit wären Partnerstädte zwischen Ost und West, wie zum Beispiel bei uns in Hemsbach, Mücheln in Sachsen-Anhalt denn sie dienen dazu sich wirtschaftlich und kulturell auszutauschen. du darfst auch nicht vergessen, dass Bildung einer der wichtigsten Aspekte ist.

**Feline:** Ja, Papa. Aber jedenfalls, dann kann man ja da hin dann die ganzen Austausch und mit diesen Partnerstädten auch gemeinsame Projekte machen. Ahh, und Tourismus ist doch auch immer gut oder? Im Osten ist doch Die Ostsee und Berlin, die Mecklenburger Seenplatte, Ostseeinseln, Kirchen und so, da gibts doch auch ganz viel oder?

**Jens:** Stimmt, da hab ich gar nicht dran gedacht. Das Stimmt, der Osten Deutschlands hat echt seine wunderschönen Ecken. Da müssen wir auch mal Urlaub machen. Das sind echt alles richtig gute Ideen. Man muss sich nähern. Diese Ideen werden jetzt nicht sofort die Lösung sein, aber ein Anfang sind sie. Und wenn jeder einzelne einen Schritt macht, kommt man zusammen an das Ziel.

Man muss Kommunizieren. Und Kommunikation bedeutet nicht nur reden von beiden Seiten, sondern auch zuhören.

**Benutzte Quellen:**

<https://www.wisst-ihr-noch.de/80er/11-unterschiede-zwischen-west-und-ost-deutschland-die-auch-nach-knapp-30-jahren-noch-bestehen-91707/>. 23. 5 2020  
<https://krautreporter.de/3191-die-funf-grossten-probleme-des-ostens-und-die-ideen-die-bei-ihrer-losung-helfen-konnten> 23.5.2020  
<https://www.alumniportal-deutschland.org/deutschland/land-leute/infografik-unterschiede-west-ost-deutschland/> (23.05.20)

[https://www.bezreg-muenster.de/de/schuelerwettbewerb/projekte/6\\_forum\\_ost-west/index.html](https://www.bezreg-muenster.de/de/schuelerwettbewerb/projekte/6_forum_ost-west/index.html) (7.7.20)  
<https://www.superillu.de/magazin/reisen/ausflugsziele/ostdeutschland/urlaubsziele-ostdeutschland-1039> (13.7.20)  
[https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sozialistische\\_Einheitspartei\\_Deutschlands#/media/Datei:Sozialistische\\_Einheitspartei\\_Deutschlands\\_Logo.svg](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sozialistische_Einheitspartei_Deutschlands#/media/Datei:Sozialistische_Einheitspartei_Deutschlands_Logo.svg) (15.7.20)  
<https://www.beauftragter-neue-laender.de/BNL/Navigation/DE/Home/home.html> (7.7.20)  
[https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freie\\_Deutsche\\_Jugend#/media/Datei:Freie\\_Deutsche\\_Jugend.svg](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freie_Deutsche_Jugend#/media/Datei:Freie_Deutsche_Jugend.svg) (21.7.20)  
[https://bilder.t-online.de/b/84/45/80/54/id\\_84458054/920/c\\_raw/tid\\_da/plakat-der-afd-die-partei-hat-laut-einer-umfrage-die-cdu-in-ostdeutschland-hinter-sich-gelassen-jpg](https://bilder.t-online.de/b/84/45/80/54/id_84458054/920/c_raw/tid_da/plakat-der-afd-die-partei-hat-laut-einer-umfrage-die-cdu-in-ostdeutschland-hinter-sich-gelassen-jpg) (22.7.20)  
<https://zumpad.zum.de/p/8p6lvp0qKtF2AdDGjR3n> (Link zu der Originalversion des Skriptes)  
 Schulbuch/Unterricht/ Hausaufgaben/unsere Köpfe/Eltern/Erzählungen/ Geschichtslehrer

## 1. Preis: 600 EUR, Klasse 9d des Elisabeth-von-Thadden-Gymnasiums Heidelberg

### Gottesdienstgestaltung zum Thema „Mauern“

#### Predigt – Mauern

Als dieses Thema bei uns für die Andacht vorgeschlagen wurde, waren die Reaktionen eher negativ. Mauern sind doch unpersönlich, wie soll man denn darüber eine Andacht halten? Die Berliner Mauer, Landesgrenzen, 30 Jahre Mauerfall, das sind die Themen, die einem sofort in den Sinn kommen. Man denkt an Trump: „Let's build a wall“ oder an die chinesische Mauer. Mauern? Das betrifft uns doch gar nicht! Die Mauer ist doch schon vor 30 Jahren gefallen! Die Mauer die 28 Jahre Berlin in Ost und West geteilt hat. Die Menschen damals hatten vielleicht ein Problem mit Mauern, heutzutage interessiert das doch keinen mehr. Oder?

Beim näheren Hinsehen stellt sich heraus, dass man im Alltag doch öfter mit Mauern zu tun hat, als man denkt. Wir leben in einer Welt aus Mauern. Das fängt schon bei uns zu Hause an, mit Wänden und Türen, zieht sich über alle Bereiche des öffentlichen und privaten Lebens.

Wir alle wissen, dass Mauern schützen, zumindest haben sie das Potenzial dazu. Aber was, wenn sie zu hoch werden? Wenn die Schutzmauern uns isolieren? Wir sind Meister im Mauerbau und sind definitiv in der Lage uns selbst einzu-mauern. Manche bauen ihre Mauern um sich, um die aufgeladene Schuld zu verstecken und mit der Zeit wird sie höher und dichter. Andere wiederum wollen sich schützen, denn ihnen ist mit der Zeit zu viel Schlimmes widerfahren und ohne Mauer wäre man nackt, schutzlos, ausgeliefert. Vielleicht ist es auch einfach die Angst etwas falsch zu machen, jemanden zu enttäu-

schen oder selbst enttäuscht zu werden, oder es ist die Scham. Man schämt sich für sich selbst, seine Gefühle und Gedanken, man schämt sich dafür, dass man ist wie man ist und nicht anders. Man versucht Idealen zu folgen, die die Gesellschaft aufgebaut hat. Mauern gebaut aus den Normvorstellungen der Menge. Dann ist man mit der Mauer auf der vermeintlich sicheren Seite. Und so wird die Mauer, die wir hochziehen, höher und stärker, und so langsam ist nichts mehr zu sehen von uns. Es würde gar nicht auffallen, wenn man gar nicht mehr da wäre. Man wird sowieso nicht beachtet. Die Mauern sind überall. Zwischen uns und zwischen uns und Gott. Und wenn sich alles häuft, wenn Fragen zu Anfragen werden und Klagen zu Anklagen. Wenn Zweifel zur Verzweiflung wird, dann steht man da wie vor einer Mauer.

Vor allem zwischen Menschen, die sich nicht richtig wahrnehmen, entstehen unsichtbare Mauern. Doch nur, weil man sie nicht sieht, heißt es nicht, dass sie nicht da sind. Erich Kästner hat genau das in seinem Gedicht „Der Blinde an der Mauer“ verdeutlicht.

#### Der Blinde an der Mauer(1931)

Ohne Hoffnung, ohne Trauer  
 Hält er seinen Kopf gesenkt.  
 Müde hockt er auf der Mauer.  
 Müde sitzt er da und denkt:  
 Wunder werden nicht geschehen.  
 Alles bleibt so, wie es war.  
 Wer nichts sieht, wird nicht gesehen.  
 Wer nichts sieht, ist unsichtbar.

Schritte kommen, Schritte gehen.  
 Was das wohl für Menschen sind?  
 Warum bleibt denn niemand stehen?  
 Ich bin blind, und ihr seid blind.  
 Euer Herz schickt keine Grüße  
 aus der Seele ins Gesicht.  
 Hörte ich nicht eure Füße,  
 dächte ich, es gibt euch nicht.

Tretet näher! Lasst euch nieder,  
 bis ihr ahnt was Blindheit ist.  
 Senkt den Kopf, und senkt die Lider,  
 bis ihr, was euch fremd war, wisst.  
 Und nun geht! Ihr habt ja Eile!  
 Tut, als wäre nichts gescheh'n.  
 Aber merkt euch diese Zeile:  
 „Wer nichts sieht, wird nicht geseh'n.“

Anfangs fällt es einem schwer, dieses Gedicht zu deuten. Doch eigentlich veranschaulicht es die Ignoranz und die Stumpfheit unserer Gesellschaft sehr gut.

Der Blinde braucht Hilfe, doch die Menschen laufen einfach an ihm vorbei. Er sieht sie nicht, sie sehen ihn nicht. Dabei sind doch die Menschen, die durch Mauern voneinander getrennt sind diejenigen, die einander am meisten brauchen. Ich zum Beispiel baue Mauern, weil ich selber nicht mit meinen Problemen klarkomme. Ich will eigentlich mich selbst vor mir verstecken, aber Mauern sind unberechenbar. Man bemerkt sie erst, wenn es schon zu spät ist. Wenn man die anderen wegen seiner eigenen Mauer nicht mehr sieht, wird man auch nicht gesehen. Eine Mauer trennt, sie zerreit Freundschaften, nimmt Vertrauen, versteckt Probleme anstatt sie zu lsen. Es ist leicht eine Mauer zu bauen, aber umso schwerer sie wieder abzureien. Denn genau diese Mauer hindert einen daran. Und weil man sich anderen gegenber verschliet, sehen sie meistens noch nicht einmal, dass es einem schlecht geht. Eine Mauer nimmt dir die Sicht, kappt Verbindungen zu anderen. Ich sehe oft Schutz in Mauern, Schutz vor Fragen und Lstereien. Es ist so viel leichter, einfach: „Es geht mir gut.“ zu sagen, als alles zu erklren. Einsamkeit kann auch glcklich machen. Aber nicht auf Dauer. Denn wenn du dich ber lange Zeit bewusst von anderen abschottest, dann gibt es fast keinen Weg mehr zurck. Es bilden sich unsichtbare Kluften zwischen Menschen, zu tief, um sie je wieder ganz zu schlieen. Mauern sind eine kurzfristige Lsung fr ein langfristiges Problem, sie bleiben lnger als erwnscht und hinterlassen tiefe Narben. Aber wie, wie kriegt man es hin, sie zumindest ansatzweise zu berwinden? Auch die Bibel beschftigt sich in mehreren Bereichen mit dem Thema „Mauern“, so heit es zum Beispiel in Psalm 18 Vers 30 „...mit meinem Gott kann ich ber Mauern springen.“ Der Psalm beruht auf einem Erlebnis Davids. Er berichtet, dass er verfolgt wird und unter Todesangst leidet. Gott hilft ihm durch ein Wunder, so dass er seine Feinde besiegen kann. Doch bedeutet das, man muss nur einmal kurz beten und schon tut Gott ein Wunder und reit alle Mauern um dich

ein? Das wrde doch heien, dass man sich einfach darauf ausruhen kann. Solange man an Gott glaubt, ist ja alles gut. Oder?

Doch manchmal scheint selbst der Allmchtige nicht mchtig genug um dir zu helfen. Unsere Lebenserfahrung zeigt es doch viel fter so, dass wir hilflos diesen Mauern gegenberstehen und uns mit unseren Problemen alleingelassen fhlen. Viel zu oft wagt man es nicht mehr zu hoffen, viel zu oft wurde man enttuscht oder verletzt.

Wenn man sich ber lange Zeit von anderen abgeschottet hat, ist es unmglich, sich noch auf andere zu verlassen. Nein, die erste Hilfe kann nur von dir selbst kommen.

Nur du entscheidest, ob deine Mauern dich schtzen oder einmauern. Du musst dir ihre Existenz eingestehen, dir darber bewusst werden was sie dir geben und nehmen.

Du musst dich selbst finden, bevor du nach anderen suchst. Sei du selbst, nicht die Person, die die anderen gern htten. Stehe zu dir, zu deinen Strken und deinen Schwchen. Damit die anderen dich akzeptieren, musst du dich erst selbst

akzeptieren. Liebe dich selbst, um geliebt zu werden. Versteck dich nicht vor deinen Problemen, versuche, sie zu lsen. Denn auch wenn wir viel zu viele Erfahrungen mit Hass, Ausgrenzung und Konflikten machen, gibt es immer Menschen, die uns helfen. Wie im Anspiel gibt es Vter, die einen beruhigen und an einen glauben. Es gibt Freunde, die auch nach Streiten noch zu dir halten. Und immer wieder gibt es dich selbst. Jeder hat schon mal Mauern bezwungen, vielleicht unbewusst, vielleicht unter groen Anstrengungen.

Wichtig ist, dass du eins weit: Du bist nicht allein. Wir alle haben unsere eigenen Mauern und wir alle fhlen uns manchmal mit ihnen allein gelassen. Aber jeder von uns findet Wege, seine Mauern zu berwinden, und jedem wird dabei geholfen. Fr manche kommt diese Hilfe von Gott, andere schreiben sie Freunden oder Familienmitgliedern zu. Sind wir eingemauert? Dass kann man so nicht sagen. Es gibt Mauern die schtzen und Mauern die ausgrenzen. Mauern die isolieren und verstecken.

Wir allein entscheiden, ob unsere Mauern uns einengen oder beschützen. Kannst du deine Mauern überwinden? Es liegt in deiner eigenen Hand.

**3. Preis: 400 EUR, Klasse 8 des Heinrich-Sigmund-Gymnasiums Schriesheim**  
**Textbeitrag und Modell „Mauer vor dem Brandenburger Tor“**  
**30 Jahre Mauerfall – Was ist noch zu tun?**



Bis vor exakt 30 Jahren teilte die berühmte Mauer unser Land in zwei Hälften, nämlich in Ost- und Westdeutschland. Als diese am 10. November 1989 in Berlin fiel, dachte jeder, der Spuk sei vorbei, doch noch immer gibt es viel zu tun. Zuerst wird nun auf den Umgang der Menschen miteinander eingegangen. Hier müssen ganz eindeutig die Gedanken der Menschen bereinigt werden und jeder muss sich auf die neue Situation einstellen. Die Bürger müssen lernen umzudenken, sich an das neue, freie Leben gewöhnen sowie auch ihre Schandtaten verarbeiten. Dies bezieht sich vor allem auf familiäre Kontakte, die nun aufgesucht und gepflegt werden müssen, sodass quasi noch einmal eine ganze Familie entstehen kann, die durch die Mauer aus den Augen verloren wurde. Ebenso kann natürlich der Freundeskreis wieder aufgenommen und alte, vielleicht sogar sehr enge, Freundschaften können wiederaufleben. Die Menschen müssen

nun, auch heutzutage, erst noch lernen, wieder zu vertrauen und sorglos leben zu können, ohne eine Trennung Deutschlands. Misstrauen, Angst, Skepsis sowie Intrigen und negative Gedanken beherrschen die Menschen von damals noch immer. Sie müssen wieder mehr Selbstvertrauen bekommen, positiv denken und das Leben in all seinen Vorzügen genießen und sich nicht mehr missmutig stimmen lassen. Viele müssen sich sicherlich ihr Leben neu aufbauen, vielleicht sogar eine neue Arbeitsstelle suchen, sich daran gewöhnen und sich selbst wieder im Leben und im Alltag zurechtfinden. Es herrscht bis dato ein innerer Konflikt zwischen Ost- und Westdeutschland. Dieser äußert sich nicht durch eine Mauer oder eine sonstige Trennung, sondern dieser innere Konflikt befindet sich in den Menschen selbst. Beispielsweise werden Ostdeutsche bis heute als "Ossis" bezeichnet, wie auch Westdeutsche als "Wessies". Hier müssen sich definitiv die Gedanken in den Köpfen der Menschen ändern und toleranter werden. Jeder sollte jeden nicht nur tolerieren sondern endlich auch akzeptieren, egal woher er kommt. Man sollte sich nicht mit negativen Äußerungen gegenseitig bombardieren, sondern es gilt die Devise "Leben und leben lassen". Die Mauer innerhalb der Köpfe der Menschen zwischen Ost- und Westdeutschland ist bis dato ein heikles und definitiv schwieriges Thema. Dies ist definitiv ernst zu nehmen und jeder sollte daran arbeiten, damit endlich wieder ein friedliches Leben überall möglich ist und die Mauer auch in den Köpfen der Menschen bricht. Hierzu braucht es jedoch Mut und Selbstsicherheit sowie eine tolerante Einstellung eines jeden. Es ist gegenseitiges Vertrauen und gegenseitige Hilfe gefordert, die bis dato andauernden Auswirkungen zu besiegen und zu bereinigen. Im Bereich der Gedanken ist noch viel zu tun, jedoch ist dies machbar. Bis dato läuft auch innerhalb der Politik noch einiges nicht rund. Das ist hauptsächlich anhand der Wahlen 2019 zu sehen, wie zum Beispiel an den Ergebnissen der Landtagswahlen in Thüringen und Sachsen, wo die Partei "AFD" bedeutend hoch abgeschnitten hat – in Thüringen mit 22 Sitzen im Landtag und in Sachsen belaufen sich diese auf 15 Sitze im Landtag. Die Partei der „Linken“ liegt im Osten ebenfalls um einiges weiter vorn, was in Westdeutschland, bis jetzt, noch relativ unwahrscheinlich ist. Hieran ist zu sehen, wie unzufrie-

den die Menschen in Ostdeutschland mit der derzeitigen Politik in Berlin sind. Sie fühlen sich als "Bürger zweiter Klasse" und eben nicht gleichwertig wie die Menschen in Westdeutschland. Es gibt also auch heutzutage im Osten Deutschlands noch einen, nicht unerheblichen Prozentsatz, der noch immer nicht zufrieden ist, auch wenn die Mauer gefallen ist. Der Ostdeutsche möchte mit seiner Stimme angehört, endlich anerkannt und eben nicht weiter von anderen bevormundet werden. Hier sollte wirklich jede Stimme zählen und gehört werden, wodurch letztendlich auch ein besserer Umgang miteinander hervorgebracht werden kann. Auch die westdeutschen Bürger müssen dabei lernen, die Menschen aus Ostdeutschland ernst zu nehmen und sich ihre Gedanken und Strategien anzuhören und in manchen Dingen auch Ratschläge anzunehmen oder Strategien umzusetzen. Doch bei weitem ist dies nicht alles, was getan werden muss. Auch in Sachen Telefonnetz, Straßenbau oder im Allgemeinen die Infrastruktur in Ostdeutschland ist bis heute noch ausbaufähig. Die großen Städte, wie zum Beispiel Magdeburg, sind zwar schon sehr modern gestaltet und besitzen eine tolle Ausstattung, wie zum Beispiel moderne Straßenlaternen etc., jedoch sind die kleineren Bezirke noch nicht annähernd neu aufgebaut worden. Hier fehlen vor allem gute Mobilfunknetze, die einem überall einen guten bis sehr guten Handyempfang garantieren. Viele Menschen, die dort geschäftlich oder privat einreisen, können sich somit nur schwer bei ihren Angehörigen melden, was die ehemalige DDR nicht gerade lukrativ für einen Urlaub oder eine Geschäftsreise macht. Auch Autobahnen müssen dringend erneuert und saniert werden, um unfallfreie Fahrten zu ermöglichen oder Staus zu minimieren.

Im Angesicht der obigen Ausführungen sind diese Punkte auch heutzutage noch aktuell, was auch die Frage "Was ist noch zu tun" beantwortet. Es liegt also, auch 30 Jahre nach dem Mauerfall, noch genügend Arbeit an. Schlussfolgernd kann gesagt werden, dass jeder, egal aus Ostdeutschland oder Westdeutschland, an sich arbeiten muss und seine Einstellung ändern darf, um eben ein friedvolles Miteinander zu ermöglichen. Wir, im Westen, müssen unser Herz und unsere Gedanken öffnen und auch

unseren Kollegen aus Ostdeutschland zuhören und diese akzeptieren, doch ebenso müssen auch die ostdeutschen Bürger unvoreingenommen auf uns zugehen und bereit sein, mit uns zu kommunizieren. Erst wenn dies erreicht ist, wird die Mauer in den Herzen und Köpfen der Menschen gebrochen sein. Vergessen wird dies wohl niemals sein, denn die Erinnerung bleibt, jedoch können die Menschen dann endlich ein neues Leben beginnen. Bis dato wird dies aber noch Jahre dauern und ein steiniger Weg werden.

**4. Preis: 300 EUR, Klasse 9c der Gregor-Mendel-Realschule Heidelberg**  
**Unterschiedliche Lebensverhältnisse in den neuen und alten Bundesländern**  
**30 Jahre Mauerfall – Was ist noch zu tun?**



Ob im Bundestag, in den Haushalten oder in den Städten: Beim Vergleich des ehemaligen DDR-Gebietes und dem einstigen Raum der BRD fallen ständig die Begriffe „alte“ und „neue Bundesländer“. Bei Umfragen wird vermehrt festgestellt, dass besonders Menschen, die im „Osten“ aufgewachsen sind, dafür kein Verständnis haben. Die genannten Begrifflichkeiten werden häufig als ‚abwertend‘ empfunden. Daraus lässt sich u.a. ableiten, dass sich Ostdeutsche häufig als Bundesbürger zweiter Klasse angesehen fühlen. So fällt auf, dass Ostdeutsche die Westdeutschen häufig als arrogant bezeichnen und umgekehrt die Westdeutschen teilweise eine abwertende Haltung gegenüber den Ostdeutschen zeigen.

Laut Studien fehle es zahlreichen Ostdeutschen auch an der Verbundenheit mit der Bundesrepublik als vereintem Staat. Viele fühlen sich eher ihrem unmittelbaren, lokalen Wohnort verbunden. So sind laut der ‚ifo-Studie‘ aus dem Jahr 2017 im Jahr 2015 nur 54,4 % der Bevölkerung im Osten zufrieden mit der funktionierenden

Demokratie, im Westen sind es 71,1 %. Dies spiegelt sich auch im stark unterschiedlichen Wahlverhalten wieder.

Der Stimmenanteil der AfD-Wähler verhält sich im Osten deutlich stärker als im Westen, was laut einer ifo-Studie im Zusammenhang mit dem gefühlten Zusammenhalt, der im Osten geringer zu sein scheint und dem mangelnden Vertrauen in das direkte Einwirken auf die Politik, stehe. Demnach verzeichnet sich ebenso ein Wachstum des Rechtsextremismus im Osten deutlich stärker.

Die Unzufriedenheit im Osten ergibt sich aus dem niedrigeren Stundenverdienst, der 2019 im Osten bei ca. 18,30 €, im Westen bei ca. 28,50 € durchschnittlich lag, sowie den geringeren Renten. Zudem wandern zahlreiche junge, gut ausgebildete Menschen in den Westen ab, da sie dort wesentlich bessere Aufstiegschancen in großen Unternehmen haben. Nicht einmal 40 von den 500 größten Unternehmen befinden sich im Osten. Die Folge davon ist sowohl ein Fachkräftemangel im Osten als auch ein Anstieg des Altersdurchschnitts der Gesellschaft im Osten. Woraus sich voraussichtlich ergeben wird, dass Wohnraum im Osten leer steht, während im Westen Wohnungsknappheit herrscht.

### Also, was gibt es noch zu tun?

Um eine höhere Zufriedenheit und Sesshaftigkeit im Osten herzustellen, wäre ein Angleichen von Löhnen und Gehältern nötig, ein Ansiedeln größerer Betriebe und Unternehmen, um jungen Menschen und Fachkräften bessere Perspektiven zu schaffen.

Durch eine Auseinandersetzung mit der Geschichte und einen Dialog über ein Miteinander im Heute könnten Probleme wie die im Osten häufiger auftretende Ausländerfeindlichkeit oder gar Extremismus sowie die geringe Wahlbeteiligung verbessert werden.

Die sprachliche Hürde ‚alte und neue Bundesländer‘ sowie ‚Osten und Westen‘ könnte dazu beitragen, das Deutschland zusammengehört und nicht bereits sprachlich getrennt bleibt und die Haltung der ‚Ossis‘ und ‚Wessis‘ zueinander respektvoll wird und gleich.

### Quellen

<https://www.ifo.de/publikationen/2017/monographie-autorenschaft/auswirkungen-der-demografischen-entwicklung-auf-den>  
<https://www.ifo.de/publikationen/2018/aufsatz-zeitschrift/wert-statt-geldmangel-afd-triumphiert-im-osten-dort-wo-es>  
<https://www.bpb.de/geschichte/deutsche-einheit/mauerfall/294888/leipzig-gehört-zum-gleichen-deutschland-wie-wuppertal>  
[tagesspiegel.de/politikstudie-zw-unterschiede-zwischen-ost-u-west](https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politikstudie-zw-unterschiede-zwischen-ost-u-west)  
 Projektgruppe: Gregor-Mendel-Realschule Heidelberg, Klasse 9c Judith, Alia, Aron, David, Jenny, Julia, Salomé H.



1. Preis: Bergstraßen-Gymnasium Hemsbach



3. Preis: Heinrich-Sigmund-Gymnasium Schriesheim



4. Preis: Gregor-Mendel-Realschule Heidelberg



**Thema | Topic:**

In 2020, NATO is facing three major challenges: Great Power rivalry, international terrorism and humanitarian crises. Which priorities should the Alliance set from the perspective of the Baltic states?

**1<sup>st</sup> Prize: 1.000 EUR, Kipras Adomaitis (MRU)**

**INTRODUCTION**

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was founded upon the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4<sup>th</sup> April 1949<sup>1</sup>. This led to the creation of the Alliance, with each Member committing to share the risk, responsibilities, and benefits of collective defence<sup>2</sup>. Then, the organisational development of NATO followed, as the structure which would allow the goals of the Alliance to be achieved<sup>3</sup>. Although NATO was first established to focus on potential threats emerging from the Soviet Union, the Alliance continues to transcend time to secure peace in Europe, and globally, “based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law”<sup>4</sup>. Currently, the Alliance stands strong with 30 Member Countries, which includes the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania<sup>5</sup>. NATO has faced many challenges throughout its history, yet it adapts and continues to overcome them. Moving forward in 2020, many of the challenges facing NATO are becoming global, presenting a completely different security environment<sup>6</sup>. Specifically, there are three issues that the Alliance faces: Great Power rivalry; international terrorism; and humanitarian crises<sup>7</sup>. This essay will focus on these challenges and will analyse which priorities the Alliance should consider from the perspective of the Baltic States.

**1. GREAT POWER RIVALRY**

The first major challenge that NATO faces is the “increased competition between great powers, great power competition”<sup>8</sup>. There is no “logically consistent definition of a Great Power”<sup>9</sup> but the term is most used to describe countries that “have a preponderant influence on the processes of international relations”<sup>10</sup>. To have such influence, certain characteristics are usually possessed. Organski and Kugler explain that the nations deemed as Great Powers commonly

have “critical dimensions as population, economic productivity, and military might”<sup>11</sup>. As such, a hypothetical definition of a Great Power is a Sovereign State that possesses military and economic strength, and has the ability to exert influence within the international system. Accordingly, in 2020, “the US, Russia and China remain the planet’s most powerful countries”<sup>12</sup> or so-called Great Powers.

These current three Great Powers have been engaging in various forms of competition and rivalry, causing consequences for the entire international community given the Great Power status they hold. There is the increased competition between the US and China for “global political influence, economic and technological leadership, and military superiority”<sup>13</sup>. There is also this type of rivalry between the US and Russia whose relationship is currently the “worst that is has been since 1985”<sup>14</sup>. Lastly, there even appears to be tension between the two autocratic States of Russia and China. Chinese investment in the Russian far east for the Belt and Road Initiative is “perceived by locals as an expression of China’s de facto territorial expansion”<sup>15</sup>. There are disputes as to the actual threat of such Chinese presence within the Russian territory<sup>16</sup> but nonetheless these are ongoing and evolving circumstances that could cause geopolitical tension between the two nations. Therefore, it seems evident that Great Power rivalry exists, no doubt causing tension within the international system. However, specifically from the perspective of the Baltic States, the Great Power rivalry stemming from Russia appears to be an immediate security concern that requires NATO’s attention.

**1.1 The Baltic States and Russia**

The history of the Baltic States reveals a struggle for independence. After World War I, hesitation from Western States to make regional security agreements for the Baltic States, left these three relatively small, isolated, and military futile independent States vulnerable<sup>17</sup>. With the outbreak of World War II in 1939, this vulnerability was quickly exploited. A secret protocol to a German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact recognised Estonia and Latvia under the sphere of Soviet

influence, and Lithuania under German<sup>18</sup>. Shortly on, another secret GermanSoviet territorial rearrangement, assigned Lithuania also within Soviet control<sup>19</sup>. Soon after, all three Baltic States were pressured to sign pacts of mutual assistance to the Soviet Union, allowing for what became their incorporation into the Soviet Union<sup>20</sup>. This annexation of the Baltic States from Europe lasted for almost 50 years; 1945-1991<sup>21</sup>. However, independence was once again achieved by all three in 1991 with the weakened Soviet Government unable to prevent them<sup>22</sup>. This State sovereignty was recognised by the international community and all three were promptly admitted into the United Nations on 17th September 1991<sup>23</sup>. The Baltic States continued for economic growth and European integration by joining the European Union (EU)<sup>24</sup> and NATO<sup>25</sup> in 2004. As an Alliance for collective defence, NATO remains the most effective guarantee for national security and deterrence against potential aggression within the Baltic States<sup>26</sup>

Relations with Russia have long remained strained, with tensions particularly rising since Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea<sup>27</sup>. This is the first instance in Europe "that one country has taken a part of another country since the end of the Second World War"<sup>28</sup>. In my view, it is a clear example of the security threat that Russia still poses to the Baltic States and the "resurgent imperialistic mood that unfortunately [still] exists in Russia"<sup>29</sup>. Indeed, previous statements from president Putin that Russia has "the right to intervene with military force if necessary to protect Russian speakers abroad"<sup>30</sup>, should be a reminder for the Baltic States (which have considerable Russian-speaking minorities) and NATO, that potential aggression from Russia is "real and present"<sup>31</sup>. The Great Power rivalry is further increasing this tension and security risk by "undermining the rules-based order, the respect for international treaties and obligations"<sup>32</sup>

Most recently, the consequences of Great Power rivalry is demonstrated by the abandonment of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in August 2019<sup>33</sup>. This Treaty was one of the last means of arms control from the Cold War-era that banned all intermediate range weapons including nuclear, conventional, and

land-based<sup>34</sup>. It was a Treaty of great importance regarded as "a cornerstone for arms control for decades"<sup>35</sup>, particularly in Europe. However, both Russia and the US accused each other of violating obligations, seemingly due to the overarching Great Power rivalry ultimately leading to the dissolution of the Treaty<sup>36</sup>. With the INF Treaty gone and Great Power rivalry intensifying, "a new arms race looks likely"<sup>37</sup>. Such has consequences for the entire international community by threatening peace and stability. But this threat is particularly prominent for the Baltic States given the existing historical tension, with an increasingly more assertive Russia<sup>38</sup>. Now with less arms control, Russia could even further build up its already significant military capabilities<sup>39</sup> and it has shown its disregard for the rules-based order in Crimea. Such continues to "put other postSoviet States on high alert"<sup>40</sup>. There are also other examples. For instance, there has been an increasing Russian presence in the Middle East, and conclusive grounds that Russia is meddling and "undermining the trust in democratic institutions in several NATO allied countries"<sup>41</sup>, like interfering in the US 2016 election<sup>42</sup>. In fact, it is feared that Russia may conduct unconventional means of warfare (referred to as hybrid warfare) "aimed at destabilizing the Baltic States"<sup>43</sup>. This could be achieved by creating civil unrest among the ethnic Russian minorities giving grounds for Russia to get involved<sup>44</sup>.

## 1.2 NATO and the Baltic States

Currently, the Baltic States heavily "rely on NATO's enhanced forward presence and air policing missions to deter Russian aggression"<sup>45</sup>. However, this is argued to provide only short-term reassurance<sup>46</sup>. It has been suggested that a more permanent military presence within the Baltic States would considerably enhance the defence and deterrence capability against potential aggression<sup>47</sup>. Lithuania and Estonia have even previously expressed their willingness and readiness to accept more NATO forces<sup>48</sup>. However, this is potentially a counter-intuitive solution. A large deployment of troops in "this sensitive area"<sup>49</sup> could incite reprisals and escalation from Russia in the current intensified international climate because of Great Power rivalry. Certainly, this type of manoeuvre by NATO may be deemed as a threat, providing an invitation for

Russia to retaliate on the basis of 'self-defence'. On the other hand, negotiations, sanctions, and political pressure evidently have little influence on Russia as demonstrated by its cementing of Crimea<sup>50</sup>. Thus, a different type of approach for NATO's collective defence within the Baltics is required.

One potentially balanced way NATO could achieve improved deterrence capabilities is by developing its ability to respond quickly to a conflict<sup>51</sup>. This would require the quick and efficient movement of resources from nearby countries, such as Poland and Germany, to the Baltic States should the need arise<sup>52</sup>. Accordingly, NATO could consider developing forces in Germany and Poland (which should reasonably be regarded outside the 'sensitive area'), and improving infrastructure. This would be particularly important for the quick deployment of forces to the Baltic States in the event of a conflict<sup>53</sup>. The EU must contribute to such infrastructure improvements and show more commitment towards the East<sup>54</sup>. It should be reminded that the Baltic States operate under the Euro, meaning any conflict would impact the EU economy<sup>55</sup>. Furthermore, there is a significant risk of escalation in the case of NATO's intervention and a full-scale Russian attack; this would have serious consequences for the entire global security<sup>56</sup>. Indeed, the current "lack of European investment and interest in the region creates opportunities for Russia to undermine the societies of the three Baltic nations"<sup>57</sup> leading to "the possibility of Russia using the Baltics as a way to test the credibility of the NATO alliance"<sup>58</sup>. Necessarily therefore, NATO with EU's help, must continue to improve its deterrence ability in the long-term. Even though the Baltic States spend heavily on defence, their relatively small size still means they are "dependent on other allies from NATO and the EU"<sup>59</sup>

## 2. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

The second challenge NATO presently faces is international terrorism. This is something that "knows no borders"<sup>60</sup>. It is a constant threat for any of the NATO Allies that "undermines our safety and the very values that underpin and inspire our societies"<sup>61</sup>. No country can be completely secure against terrorist attacks, as unfortunately shown in Europe. In 2017 there were 205 terrorist attacks throughout Europe, and

although this fell to 129 attacks in 2018, the threat remains high as reported by the European police agency Europol<sup>62</sup> NATO diligently acknowledges this prominent threat and continues to combat it with all available means<sup>63</sup>. This is the reason why NATO has been in Afghanistan for many years, to ensure that the country does not become an operating field for international terrorists once again<sup>64</sup>. More recently, NATO launched the Counter-Terrorism Reference Curriculum (CTRC) to support Allies and partner countries in improving their counter-terrorism strategies<sup>65</sup>. The CTRC serves to improve awareness, resilience, and counter-terrorism capacity by providing a comprehensive "overview of terrorist ideologies, motivations and methods, as well as contemporary counter-terrorism practices and potential future projections"<sup>66</sup>. It has been drafted with the cooperation of multiple international organisations such as the United Nations, the European Union, and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), as well as over 100 experts from across the world<sup>67</sup>. The CTRC "reflects NATO's innovative best"<sup>68</sup> in making everyone "stronger in the face of a common threat"<sup>69</sup>.

From the perspective of the Baltic States, the threat of terrorism is considered low but still present, as for all European States. The State Security Department of Lithuania believes that there is a less favourable environment for the development of mass terrorist attacks and extremism within the Baltic territory<sup>70</sup>. However, it reports that there is a high possibility of the country becoming "a transit location for various terrorists"<sup>71</sup>. The Estonian Internal Security Service likewise considers the threat of terrorism in Estonia as low and currently there are no active internal or international terrorist organisations operating within<sup>72</sup>. Latvia also deems the threat as low<sup>73</sup> Therefore, when considering the question as to whether NATO must take priority to tackle international terrorism within the Baltic States, the reasonable conclusion is no. Rather, the risk of aggression from Russia (as analysed above) is specific to the Baltics and therefore requires NATO's attention. Nonetheless, NATO must continue to fight and condemn terrorism as part of the international effort. As an Alliance for collective security, it is vital it persists in this area.

### 3. HUMANITARIAN CRISES

The remaining challenge (or rather challenges) for NATO are humanitarian crises. A humanitarian crisis can take different forms but is generally defined as an event or series of events that pose a serious threat to the life or security of a large number of people over a wide territorial area<sup>74</sup>. These humanitarian crises can be caused by natural disasters, man-made emergencies, or a combination of both<sup>75</sup>. The ramifications of a humanitarian crisis are commonly: extensive violence and loss of life; displaced populations; and widespread damage to societies and economies<sup>76</sup>. There is also a very urgent need for an international response that provides “multi-faceted humanitarian assistance”<sup>77</sup> to mitigate such consequences as much as possible.

One of NATO's core tasks is crisis management and the Alliance has developed substantial capabilities to deal with a variety of emergencies that pose a threat to the territories and populations of its Allies<sup>78</sup>. These crises can be political, military, or humanitarian. When NATO was formed, the Alliance soon realised that its capabilities to protect populations against war could also be used to protect against the effects of disasters<sup>79</sup>. Since then, NATO has broadened its approach to crisis management by aiming to “engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilise post-conflict situations and support reconstruction”<sup>80</sup>. In place, the Alliance has formed an effective framework for co-ordinating multinational crisis responses quickly<sup>81</sup>. For instance, there is the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) which functions as the “principal civil emergency response mechanism in the Euro-Atlantic area”<sup>82</sup>. NATO acknowledges that military measures alone cannot fully resolve a crisis or conflict. Therefore, the Alliance has the ability to use a mix of political and military tools to manage a crisis as deemed appropriate by consensus between the Alliance Members<sup>83</sup>. NATO stays “ready to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management”<sup>84</sup>.

Currently, there is no humanitarian crisis specific to the territories of the Baltic States. There is however a Refugee Crisis that continues to impact Europe as a whole<sup>85</sup>. This is a crisis that is

complex in all the areas of international politics, human rights, and law. The Middle East (which keeps generating some of the largest movements of refugees incoming into Europe<sup>86</sup>) has conditions “riper than at any time in recent memory”<sup>87</sup> for an all-out war. Therefore, this is an ongoing and evolving crisis that undeniably requires the coordinated efforts from the international community. Since 2016, NATO has joined this international effort by assisting Allies in carrying out their duties in Europe's Refugee Crisis<sup>88</sup>. It is important NATO provides this assistance as there is the continuing risk of conflict in the Middle East. The Baltic States must also conform to their responsibilities and international obligations in accepting refugees when required<sup>89</sup>. However, this crisis does not require NATO's intervention in the Baltics, as it is an issue that collectively affects the entire European region. Instead therefore, it could be reasonable to link NATO's crisis management, again, with the challenge discussed in Chapter 1 of this essay, when considering the perspectives of the Baltic States.

As mentioned above, NATO's crisis management aims to “engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises...”<sup>90</sup>. Many humanitarian crises occur in the form of or as a result of military conflicts<sup>91</sup>. The well-founded increasing security risk of Russian aggression in the Baltics, stemming from escalating Great Power rivalry, should be on NATO's agenda from the perspective of preventing a potential humanitarian crisis. Again, the Crimean situation should be an explicit representation of this possibility<sup>92</sup>.

### CONCLUSION

It is apparent that NATO faces increasingly complex challenges in a constantly evolving security environment<sup>93</sup>. The Alliance continues to maintain its functions in collective defence, international terrorism, and humanitarian crises. These are all difficult challenges occurring in a global environment that is more unpredictable and uncertain affecting everyone in one way or another<sup>94</sup>. All these challenges demand strong international cooperation between nations and multinational institutions alike.

From the perspective of the Baltic States, NATO indisputably remains the best form of deter-

rence and defence against potential Russian aggression. The increasing Great Power rivalry is making adjacent Russia a particularly prominent security risk for the Baltic nations. These concerns appear to be rational based on Russia's actions in Crimea and elsewhere in the world, and due to the Great Power rivalry which is leading to the dissolution of important international obligations. The rule-based order is being threatened and consequently, international peace and stability.

International terrorism and humanitarian crises are challenges that are applicable for the entire international community, requiring collective cooperation. These issues are however, not presently confined to the Baltic States. Instead, the security concerns of Russia should take NATO's priority when considering the Baltic State's perspective. The Alliance has confidently stated that it has combat-ready troops in Eastern Europe, "sending a very clear signal that any attempt to do something similar against a NATO member in the Baltic countries... that Russia did against a non-NATO member, Ukraine, will be impossible"<sup>95</sup>. Nonetheless, with a potential arms race looming, disregard for the rules-based order, and Russia's imperialistic views, NATO must continue to improve such deterrence capabilities. Furthermore, it must not disregard the threat of hybrid means of warfare aimed at destabilising the small independent Baltic nations. Only with continued support for deterrence and defence, can NATO decisively guarantee the peace and stability for the Baltic States, and the international community.

**References:**

<sup>1</sup> NATO, "Founding treaty", 30 January 2017, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_67656.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67656.htm) [accessed 1 May 2020]

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> NATO, "NATO's purpose", 18 April 2018, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_68144.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68144.htm) [accessed 1 May 2020]

<sup>5</sup> NATO, "NATO Member Countries", 27 March 2020, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato\\_countries.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm) [accessed 2 May 2020]

<sup>6</sup> Jens Stoltenberg, "Speech at the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University", Wellington, New Zealand, 5 August 2019, available at: <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/168242.htm> [accessed 2 May 2020]

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Jon Rynn, "The Power to Create Wealth: A systems-based theory of the rise and decline of the Great Powers in the 20<sup>th</sup> century", Political Science, The City University of New York, 2001, page. 351, available at: <https://economicreconstruction.org/sites/economicreconstruction.com/static/JonRynn/Chapter11Conclusion.pdf> [accessed 3 May 2020]

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, page. 2.

<sup>11</sup> Organski, A.F.K, and Jacek Kugler, "The War Ledger", 1980, cited in Jon Rynn, "The Power to Create Wealth: A systems-based theory of the rise and decline of the Great Powers in the 20<sup>th</sup> century", Political Science, The City University of

New York, 2001, page. 6, available at: <https://economicreconstruction.org/sites/economicreconstruction.com/static/JonRynn/Chapter11Conclusion.pdf> [accessed 3 May 2020]

<sup>12</sup> Sinead Baker, "the most powerful countries on earth in 2020, ranked", Business Insider, 19 January 2020, available at: <https://www.businessinsider.com/worlds-most-powerful-countries-2020-ranked-us-news-2020-1?r=US&IR=T> [accessed 5 May 2020]

<sup>13</sup> Matthew Kroenig, "The United States Should Not Align with Russia Against China", Foreign Policy, 13 May 2020, available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/united-states-should-not-align-russia-against-chinageopolitical-rivalry-authoritarian-partnership/> [accessed 20 May 2020]

<sup>14</sup> Angela Stent, "Why are US-Russia relations so challenging?", Brookings, 27 April 2020, available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/why-are-us-russia-relations-so-challenging/> [accessed 7 May 2020]

<sup>15</sup> South China Morning Post, "Chinese in the Russian Far East: a geopolitical time bomb?", available at: <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2100228/chinese-russian-far-east-geopolitical-time-bomb> [accessed 7 May 2020]

<sup>16</sup> Xiaochen Su, "The Myth of a Chinese Takeover in the Russian Far East", The Diplomat, 19 June 2019, available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/the-myth-of-a-chinese-takeover-in-the-russian-far-east/> [accessed 8 May 2020]

<sup>17</sup> James Bater and Romuald Misiunas, "Baltic States", Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11 April 2019, available at: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Baltic-states/Independence-and-the-20th-century#ref37262> [accessed 10 May 2020]

<sup>18</sup> Julius Smulkstys, "The Incorporation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union", Lithuanian Quarterly Journal of Arts and Sciences, 14 (2), 1968, available at: [www.lituanus.org/1968/68\\_2\\_02Smulkstys.html](http://www.lituanus.org/1968/68_2_02Smulkstys.html) [accessed 10 May 2020]

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> David Jacobs, "Baltic States- Historical Overview", Hoover Institution Archives, 2003, available at: [https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/library/docs/baltic\\_states\\_guide\\_english-1.pdf](https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/library/docs/baltic_states_guide_english-1.pdf) [accessed 10 May 2020]

<sup>22</sup> Livi Zajedova, "The Baltic States Security and NATO Enlargement", Perspectives, 13, page. 80, 1999, available at: [www.jstor.org/stable/23615944](http://www.jstor.org/stable/23615944) [accessed 11 May 2020]

<sup>23</sup> United Nations, "United Nations Member States", 3 July 2006, available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/org1469.doc.htm> [accessed 11 May 2020]

<sup>24</sup> European Union, "Countries", available at: [https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries\\_en#tab-0-1](https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en#tab-0-1) [accessed 12 May 2020]

<sup>25</sup> NATO, "Seven new members join NATO", 29 March 2004, available at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/03-march/e0329a.htm> [accessed 12 May 2020]

<sup>26</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, "Lithuania's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)", 22 January 2020, available at: <http://urmlt/default/en-foreign-policy/lithuanian-the-region-and-the-world/lithuanias-security-policy/lithuanian-membership-in-nato> [accessed 28 June 2020]; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, "Estonia and NATO", available at: <https://www.vm.ee/en/estonia-andnato> [accessed 28 June 2020]; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, "NATO Enhanced Forward Presence", 19 June 2020, available at: <https://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/security-policy/natoenhanced-forward-presence> [accessed 28 June 2020]

<sup>27</sup> Maria Tsvetkova and Andrius Sytas, "Russia tries to soothe Baltic states over independence review", Reuters, 1 July 2015, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-baltics/russia-tries-to-soothe-baltic-states-over-independence-review-idUSKCN0PB4M520150701> [accessed 14 May 2020]

<sup>28</sup> Jens Stoltenberg, "Speech at the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University", Wellington, New Zealand, 5 August 2019, available at: <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/168242.htm> [accessed 2 May 2020]

<sup>29</sup> Maria Tsvetkova and Andrius Sytas, "Russia tries to soothe Baltic states over independence review", Reuters, 1 July 2015, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-baltics/russia-tries-to-soothe-baltic-states-over-independence-review-idUSKCN0PB4M520150701> [accessed 14 May 2020]

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Jakub Palowski, "British Mod Concerned About the Russian Threat in the Baltic Region", Defence24, 22 February 2015, available at: <https://www.defence24.com/british-mod-concerned-about-the-russian-threat-in-the-baltic-region> [accessed 14 May 2020]

<sup>32</sup> Jens Stoltenberg, "Speech at the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University", Wellington, New Zealand, 5 August 2019, available at: <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/168242.htm> [accessed 2 May 2020]

<sup>33</sup> Chris Miller, "The INF Treaty is Dead, and Russia Is the Biggest Loser", Foreign Policy, 2 August 2019, available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/02/the-inf-treaty-is-dead-and-russia-is-the-biggest-loser/> [accessed 15 May 2020]

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Jens Stoltenberg, "Speech at the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University", Wellington, New Zealand, 5 August 2019, available at: <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/168242.htm> [accessed 2 May 2020]

<sup>36</sup> Chris Miller, "The INF Treaty is Dead, and Russia Is the Biggest Loser", Foreign Policy, 2 August 2019, available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/02/the-inf-treaty-is-dead-and-russia-is-the-biggest-loser/> [accessed 15 May 2020]

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Jens Stoltenberg, "Speech at the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University", Wellington, New Zealand, 5 August 2019, available at: <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/168242.htm> [accessed 2 May 2020]

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Edmund Heaphy, "The Baltic states are NATO's most impassioned supporters, thanks to Russia", Quarterz, available at: <https://qz.com/1326042/the-baltic-states-are-natos-biggest-fans-thanks-to-russia/> [accessed 18 May 2020]

- 41 Jens Stoltenberg, "Speech at the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University", Wellington, New Zealand, 5 August 2019, available at: <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/168242.htm> [accessed 2 May 2020]
- 42 Molly McKew, "Did Russia Affect the 2016 Election? It's Now Undeniable", *Wired*, 16 February 2018, available at: <https://www.wired.com/story/did-russia-affect-the-2016-election-its-now-undeniable/> [accessed 23 May 2020]
- 43 Jakub Palowski, "British Mod Concerned About the Russian Threat in the Baltic Region", *Defence24*, 22 February 2015, available at: <https://www.defence24.com/british-mod-concerned-about-the-russian-threat-in-the-baltic-region> [accessed 14 May 2020]
- 44 Ibid.
- 45 Kevin Blachford, "Can NATO and The EU Really Defend the Baltic States Against Russia", *The National Interest*, 7 February 2020, available at: <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/can-nato-and-eu-really-defend-baltic-states-against-russia-121711> [accessed 19 May 2020]
- 46 Ibid.
- 47 Jakub Palowski, "British Mod Concerned About the Russian Threat in the Baltic Region", *Defence24*, 22 February 2015, available at: <https://www.defence24.com/british-mod-concerned-about-the-russian-threat-in-the-baltic-region> [accessed 14 May 2020]
- 48 Ibid.
- 49 Kevin Blachford, "Can NATO and The EU Really Defend the Baltic States Against Russia", *The National Interest*, 7 February 2020, available at: <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/can-nato-and-eu-really-defend-baltic-states-against-russia-121711> [accessed 19 May 2020]
- 50 Ann M. Simmons, "Russia Cements Ties With Crimea Freezing Conflict With West", *The Wall Street Journal*, 18 March 2020, available at: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-cements-ties-with-crimea-freezing-conflict-with-west-11584523802> [accessed 29 May 2020]
- 51 Kevin Blachford, "Can NATO and The EU Really Defend the Baltic States Against Russia", *The National Interest*, 7 February 2020, available at: <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/can-nato-and-eu-really-defend-baltic-states-against-russia-121711> [accessed 19 May 2020]
- 52 Ibid.
- 53 Ibid.
- 54 Ibid.
- 55 Ibid.
- 56 Jakub Palowski, "British Mod Concerned About the Russian Threat in the Baltic Region", *Defence24*, 22 February 2015, available at: <https://www.defence24.com/british-mod-concerned-about-the-russian-threat-in-the-baltic-region> [accessed 14 May 2020]
- 57 Kevin Blachford, "Can NATO and The EU Really Defend the Baltic States Against Russia", *The National Interest*, 7 February 2020, available at: <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/can-nato-and-eu-really-defend-baltic-states-against-russia-121711> [accessed 19 May 2020]
- 58 Ibid.
- 59 Edmund Heaphy, "The Baltic states are NATO's most impassioned supporters, thanks to Russia", *Quartz*, available at: <https://qz.com/1326042/the-baltic-states-are-natos-biggest-fans-thanks-to-russia/> [accessed 18 May 2020]
- 60 Jens Stoltenberg, "Speech at the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University", Wellington, New Zealand, 5 August 2019, available at: <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/168242.htm> [accessed 2 May 2020]
- 61 NATO, "NATO launches Counter-Terrorism Reference Curriculum", 12 June 2020, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_176304.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_176304.htm) [accessed 19 June 2020]
- 62 Baltic News Network, "Europol: terrorism threat remains high in Europe", *Baltic News Network*, 28 June 2019, available at: <https://bnn-news.com/europol-terrorism-threat-remains-high-in-europe-202328> [accessed 30 May 2020]
- 63 NATO, "NATO launches Counter-Terrorism Reference Curriculum", 12 June 2020, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_176304.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_176304.htm) [accessed 19 June 2020]
- 64 Jens Stoltenberg, "Speech at the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University", Wellington, New Zealand, 5 August 2019, available at: <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/168242.htm> [accessed 2 May 2020]
- 65 NATO, "NATO launches Counter-Terrorism Reference Curriculum", 12 June 2020, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_176304.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_176304.htm) [accessed 19 June 2020]
- 66 Ibid.
- 67 Ibid.
- 68 Ibid.
- 69 Ibid.
- 70 State Security Department of Lithuania, "Threats for the National Security in Lithuania", 24 February 2020, available at: <https://www.vsd.lt/en/threats/threats-national-security-lithuania/> [accessed 1 June 2020]
- 71 Ibid.
- 72 Council of Europe Committee on Counter-Terrorism, "Estonia", October 2019, available at: <https://rm.coe.int/profile-2019-estonia/168098f517> [accessed 1 June 2020]
- 73 Latvian State Security Service, "Counterterrorism", available at: <https://www.vdd.gov.lv/en/areas-of-activity/counterterrorism/> [accessed 1 June 2020]
- 74 Humanitarian Coalition, "What is a Humanitarian Emergency?", available at: <https://www.humanitariancoalition.ca/info-portal/factsheets/what-is-a-humanitarian-crisis> [accessed 2 June 2020]
- 75 Ibid.
- 76 Future Learn, "Characteristics of humanitarian crises", available at: <https://www.futurelearn.com/courses/health-crises/0/steps/22887> [accessed 2 June 2020]
- 77 Ibid.
- 78 NATO, "Crisis management", 23 March 2020, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49192.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm) [accessed 3 June 2020]
- 79 NATO, "NATO's Role in Disaster Assistance", May 2001, available at: <https://www.nato.int/eadrcc/mcdae.pdf> [accessed 3 June 2020]
- 80 NATO, "Crisis management", 23 March 2020, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49192.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm) [accessed 3 June 2020]
- 81 Ibid.
- 82 NATO, "Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre", 2 April 2020, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_52057.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52057.htm) [accessed 4 June 2020]
- 83 NATO, "Crisis management", 23 March 2020, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49192.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm) [accessed 3 June 2020]
- 84 Ibid.
- 85 Tamari Ramishvili, "Baltic Nations and the Continuing EU Refugee Crisis", 4 January 2016, available at: <https://www.fpri.org/2016/01/baltic-nations-and-the-continuing-eu-refugee-crisis/> [accessed 4 June 2020]
- 86 UNHCR, "Most common nationalities of Mediterranean sea and land arrivals from January 2020", available at: [https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/#\\_ga=2.85147929.1061439860.1594212756-124714461.1594212755](https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/#_ga=2.85147929.1061439860.1594212756-124714461.1594212755) [accessed 5 June 2020]
- 87 Robert Malley, "The Unwanted Wars", December 2019, available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2019-10-02/unwanted-wars> [accessed 6 June 2020]
- 88 NATO, "Assistance for the refugee and migrant crisis in the Aegean Sea", 20 June 2019, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_128746.htm#:~:text=The%20current%20refugee%20and%20migrant,in%20dealing%20with%20this%20crisis](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_128746.htm#:~:text=The%20current%20refugee%20and%20migrant,in%20dealing%20with%20this%20crisis) [accessed 7 June 2020]
- 89 Tamari Ramishvili, "Baltic Nations and the Continuing EU Refugee Crisis", 4 January 2016, available at: <https://www.fpri.org/2016/01/baltic-nations-and-the-continuing-eu-refugee-crisis/> [accessed 4 June 2020]
- 90 NATO, "Crisis management", 23 March 2020, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49192.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm) [accessed 3 June 2020]
- 91 Rescue.org, "The top 10 crises the world should be watching in 2020", 7 January 2020, available at: <https://www.rescue.org/article/top-10-crises-world-should-be-watching-2020> [accessed 9 June 2020]
- agenda from the perspective of preventing a potential humanitarian crisis. Again, the Crimean situation should be an explicit representation of this possibility.
- 92 Mary Jane Maxwell, "Eastern Ukraine's accelerating humanitarian crisis", *ShareAmerica*, 10 August 2018, available at: <https://share.america.gov/eastern-ukraines-accelerating-humanitarian-crisis/> [accessed 10 June 2020]
- 93 Jens Stoltenberg, "Speech at the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University", Wellington, New Zealand, 5 August 2019, available at: <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/168242.htm> [accessed 2 May 2020]
- 94 Ibid.
- 95 Ibid.

#### List of Bibliography:

- Baltic News Network, "Europol: terrorism threat remains high in Europe", 28 June 2019, available at: <https://bnn-news.com/europol-terrorism-threat-remains-high-in-europe-202328> [accessed 30 May 2020]
- Bater, James, and Misiunas, Romuald, "Baltic States", *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11 April 2019, available at: <https://www.britannica.com/place/BalticStates/Independence-and-the-20th-century#ref37262> [accessed 10 May 2020]
- BBC, "US-China trade war takes toll on their global competitiveness", 17 June 2020, available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-53060436> [accessed 21 June 2020].
- Council of Europe Committee on Counter-Terrorism, "Estonia", October 2019, available at: <https://rm.coe.int/profile-2019-estonia/168098f517> [accessed 1 June 2020]
- European Union, "Countries", available at: [https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries\\_en#tab-0-1](https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en#tab-0-1) [accessed 12 May 2020]
- Future Learn, "Characteristics of humanitarian crises", available at: <https://www.futurelearn.com/courses/health-crises/0/steps/22887> [accessed 2 June 2020]
- Heaphy, Edmund, "The Baltic states are NATO's most impassioned supporters, thanks to Russia", *Quartz*, available at: <https://qz.com/1326042/the-baltic-states-are-natos-biggest-fans-thanks-to-russia/> [accessed 18 May 2020]
- Humanitarian Coalition, "What is a Humanitarian Emergency?", available at: <https://www.humanitariancoalition.ca/info-portal/factsheets/what-is-a-humanitarian-crisis> [accessed 2 June 2020]
- Jacobs, David, "Baltic States- Historical Overview", Hoover Institution Archives, 2003, available at: [https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/library/docs/baltic\\_states\\_guide\\_english1.pdf](https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/library/docs/baltic_states_guide_english1.pdf) [accessed 10 May 2020]
- Kroenig, Matthew, "The United States Should Not Align with Russia Against China", *Foreign Policy*, 13 May 2020, available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/united-states-should-not-align-russia-against-china-geopolitical-rivalry-authoritarian-partnership/> [accessed 20 May 2020]
- ?????
- Latvian State Security Service, "Counterterrorism", available at: <https://www.vdd.gov.lv/en/areas-of-activity/counterterrorism/> [accessed 1 June 2020]
- Malley, Robert, "The Unwanted Wars", December 2019, available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2019-10-02/unwanted-wars> [accessed 6 June 2020]
- Maxwell, Mary J., "Eastern Ukraine's accelerating humanitarian crisis", *ShareAmerica*, 10 August 2018, available at: <https://share.america.gov/eastern-ukraines-accelerating-humanitarian-crisis/> [accessed 10 June 2020]
- McKew, Molly, "Did Russia Affect the 2016 Election? It's Now Undeniable", *Wired*, 16 February 2018, available at: <https://www.wired.com/story/did-russia-affect-the-2016-election-its-now-undeniable/> [accessed 23 May 2020]

- 15 Miller, Chris, "The INF Treaty is Dead, and Russia Is the Biggest Loser", Foreign Policy, 2 August 2019, available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/02/the-inf-treaty-is-dead-and-russia-is-the-biggest-loser/> [accessed 15 May 2020]
- 16 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, "Estonia and NATO", available at: <https://www.vm.ee/en/estonia-and-nato> [accessed 28 June 2020]
- 17 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, "NATO Enhanced Forward Presence", 19 June 2020, available at: <https://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/securitypolicy/nato-enhanced-forward-presence> [accessed 28 June 2020]
- 18 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, "Lithuania's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)", 22 January 2020, available at: <http://urm.lt/default/en/foreign-policy/lithuania-in-the-region-and-the-world/lithuanias-security-policy/lithuanian-membership-in-nato> [accessed 28 June 2020]
- 19 NATO, "Assistance for the refugee and migrant crisis in the Aegean Sea", 20 June 2019, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_128746.htm#:~:text=The%20current%20refugee%20and%20migrant,in%20dealing%20with%20this%20crisis](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_128746.htm#:~:text=The%20current%20refugee%20and%20migrant,in%20dealing%20with%20this%20crisis) [accessed 7 June 2020]
- 20 NATO, "Crisis management", 23 March 2020, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49192.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm) [accessed 3 June 2020]
- 21 NATO, "Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre", 2 April 2020, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_52057.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52057.htm) [accessed 4 June 2020]
- 22 NATO, "Founding treaty", 30 January 2017, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_67656.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67656.htm) [accessed 1 May 2020]
- 23 NATO, "NATO launches Counter-Terrorism Reference Curriculum", 12 June 2020, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_176304.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_176304.htm) [accessed 19 June 2020] Page | 18
- 24 NATO, "NATO Member Countries", 27 March 2020, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato\\_countries.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm) [accessed 2 May 2020]
- 25 NATO, "NATO's purpose", 18 April 2018, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_68144.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68144.htm) [accessed 1 May 2020]
- 26 NATO, "NATO's Role in Disaster Assistance", May 2001, available at: <https://www.nato.int/eadrcc/mcda-e.pdf> [accessed 3 June 2020]
- 27 Palowski, Jakub, "British Mod Concerned About the Russian Threat in the Baltic Region", Defence24, 22 February 2015, available at: <https://www.defence24.com/british-mod-concerned-about-the-russian-threat-in-the-baltic-region> [accessed 14 May 2020]
- 28 Ramishvii, Tamari, "Baltic Nations and the Continuing EU Refugee Crisis", 4 January 2016, available at: <https://www.fpri.org/2016/01/baltic-nations-and-the-continuing-eu-refugee-crisis/> [accessed 4 June 2020]
- 29 Rescue.org, "The top 10 crises the world should be watching in 2020", 7 January 2020, available at: <https://www.rescue.org/article/top-10-crises-world-should-be-watching-2020> [accessed 9 June 2020]
- 30 Rynn, Jon, "The Power to Create Wealth: A systems-based theory of the rise and decline of the Great Powers in the 20th century", Political Science, The City University of New York, 2001, available at: <https://economicreconstruction.org/sites/economicreconstruction.com/static/JohnRynn/Chapter11Conclusion.pdf> [accessed 3 May 2020]
- 31 Simmons, Ann M., "Russia Cements Ties With Crimea Freezing Conflict With West", The Wall Street Journal, 18 March 2020, available at: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-cements-ties-with-crimea-freezing-conflict-withwest-11584523802> [accessed 29 May 2020]
- 32 Smulkstys, Julius, "The Incorporation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union", Lithuanian Quarterly Journal of Arts and Sciences, 14 (2), 1968, available at: [www.lituanus.org/1968/68\\_2\\_02Smulkstys.html](http://www.lituanus.org/1968/68_2_02Smulkstys.html) [accessed 10 May 2020]
- 33 South China Morning Post, "Chinese in the Russian Far East: a geopolitical time bomb?", available at: <https://www.scmp.com/weekasia/geopolitics/article/2100228/chinese-russian-far-east-geopolitical-time-bomb> [accessed 7 May 2020]
- 34 State Security Department of Lithuania, "Threats for the National Security in Lithuania", 24 February 2020, available at: <https://www.vsd.lt/en/threats/threatsnational-security-lithuania/> [accessed 1 June 2020]
- 35 Stent, Angela, "Why are US-Russia relations so challenging?", Brookings, 27 April 2020, available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/why-are-us-russia-relations-so-challenging/> [accessed 7 May 2020]
- 36 Stoltenberg, Jens, "Speech at the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University", Wellington, New Zealand, 5 August 2019, available at: <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/168242.htm> [accessed 2 May 2020]
- 37 Su, Xiaochen, "The Myth of a Chinese Takeover in the Russian Far East", The Diplomat, 19 June 2019, available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/the-myth-of-a-chinese-takeover-in-the-russian-far-east/> [accessed 8 May 2020]
- 38 Tsvetkova, Maria, and Sytas, Andrius, "Russia tries to soothe Baltic states over independence review", Reuters, 1 July 2015, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-baltics/russia-tries-to-soothe-baltic-states-over-independence-review-idUSKCN0PB4M520150701> [accessed 14 May 2020]
- 39 UNHCR, "Most common nationalities of Mediterranean sea and land arrivals from January 2020", available at: [https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean.#\\_ga=2.85147929.1061439860.1594212756-124714461.1594212755](https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean.#_ga=2.85147929.1061439860.1594212756-124714461.1594212755) [accessed 5 June 2020]
- 40 United Nations, "United Nations Member States", 3 July 2006, available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/org1469.doc.htm> [accessed 11 May 2020]
- 41 Zajedova, Livi, "The Baltic States Security and NATO Enlargement", Perspectives, 13, page. 80, 1999, available at: [www.jstor.org/stable/23615944](http://www.jstor.org/stable/23615944) [accessed 11 May 2020]

## 2<sup>nd</sup> Prize: 600 EUR, Eglė Juozėnaitė (MRU) Third-semester master's degree student of Public Relations Management

The world is changing very fast, and NATO must respond to ongoing geopolitical processes at lightning speed. There is intense competition between the individual countries of the world as they struggle to gain as much power as possible in every area imaginable. Russia's confrontation with the West as far as international politics are concerned encourages Moscow to balance its interests with those of China. The two countries maintain close political and military relations, and coordinate their positions on individual international issues.

### China will become the dominant power

The National Security Threat Assessment of the National Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania for 2020 (hereinafter referred to as the Threat Assessment) states that China is striving for global economic dominance and technological advantage, which will result in changes to the global security environment. The active penetration of Chinese investment abroad poses a risk of loss of control, both in terms of resources or infrastructure, market manipulation and political influence. China's growing economic and political influence will, in the long term, lead to fundamental changes to the security environment in the EU and NATO states and in other regions of the world<sup>1</sup>. In January 2019 a US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report analysed the ongoing developments in Chinese military power and capabilities. The assessment noted that the military budget of the People's Republic of China (PRC) increased by 10 per cent annually between 2010 and 2016, which has produced increased modernisation and addressed earlier capability shortfalls<sup>2</sup>. Statistics indicate that the Chinese defense budget is the second largest in the world in terms of size<sup>3</sup>. US President Donald Trump has been critical of Nato since taking office. He has repeatedly complained that Europe's Nato members are not spending enough on the alliance<sup>4</sup>.

According to Joergen Oerstroem Moeller, over the next decade or two economic power will be shaped by demography, technology and energy<sup>5</sup>.

China seeks to use economic leverage in order to gain the means to exert pressure and to secure the political support of some European countries on issues that are important to the country. In the military sphere, China is actively defending its strategic interests abroad, building overseas military bases and rapidly developing a military industrial complex. In the long run, this will create the preconditions for China to Project its military power all over the globe. China is already going to aim for economic and technological dominance in the strategic sectors important to the West in the nearest future<sup>1</sup>. Authors Michael S. Chase, Cristina L. Garafola and Beauchamp-Mustafaga Nathan states that Chinese analysts view the US military not only as a model for emulation but also as a serious threat given its strengths in high tech weapons and equipment, power projection, and unparalleled ability to conduct information-intensive joint combat operations<sup>6</sup>. Chinese-Russian ties are fueled by the efforts on part of these two countries to reduce the global influence of the West, and the United States in particular<sup>1</sup>.

### Russia's quest to legitimize aggression

Russia's foreign and security policy is determined by the interests of the Kremlin regime, whose main goal is to ensure the regime's stability. According to the Russian political and military elite, the greatest threat to the Kremlin is the West, which is supposedly interested in changing the regime. Retired general of the United States Army Wesley Kanne Clark with others authors says that Russia's strategic aim, which underpins its regime's domestic legitimacy, is focused on restoring Russia's status as a great power with its sphere of privileged interests and domination. Bolstering its military power and using military force has become instrumental in achieving this aim. Furthermore, the regime increasingly uses military adventures abroad in order to deflect attention from Russia's economic troubles and the regime's growing repression, and to raise its domestic popularity<sup>7</sup>.

Russia is constantly trying to weaken the unity of NATO and the EU by reducing the efficiency of Western political and legal institutions and by ensuring a military presence in other states and continents. Russia is able to use military power quickly and effectively to achieve its political

goals, as long as it sees an international situation conducive to such a solution and does not risk incurring unacceptable losses<sup>1</sup>.

Estonian political scientist Viljar Veebel and researcher Illimar Ploom says, in recent decades, the Baltic States have concentrated their efforts on the improvement of their respective national defence models to respond to security threats stemming from Russia's aggressive behaviour in the international arena. The reforms have largely relied on NATO strategies, concepts, requirements, and assessment criteria<sup>8</sup>. The threat report states that Russia's foreign and security policy poses a threat to the security of the Baltic states. In implementing these policies, Russia seeks:

1. To increase its influence in other countries and to reduce their sovereignty.
2. To weaken NATO and the EU, to resist their expansion.
3. To amplify the disagreements between the Members of the Alliance and to spread disintegration.
4. To replace international relations grounded in the rule of law and adherence to agreed rules and regulations with a pragmatic policy based on geopolitical interests and behind-the-scenes arrangements.
5. To strengthen the armed forces, intelligence and security services<sup>1</sup>.

According to V. Veebel, the cornerstone of NATO's collective defence strategy is deterrence. Russia is in a consistent manner testing the credibility of the current international security framework and the principle of deterrence by searching for low-intensive options to destabilize the neighbouring countries<sup>9</sup>.

### Russian propaganda and manipulation

Raimundas Karoblis, the Lithuanian Minister of National Defense, says that an increased influx of messages containing disinformation and propaganda has recently been observed in connection with the COVID situation as well. In effect, this concerns virtually every EU Member State. Russia is using propaganda to discredit legal processes in the Baltic States which it regards as unfavorable. The Kremlin is using Russian information policies directed against foreign states as an instrument of influence. Russia



information policy, which is being coordinated at the highest level, is implemented through the targeted dissemination of propaganda and disinformation. One of the main objectives behind the Russian information policy is to derogate and undermine the statehood of the Baltic states and to discredit any manifestations of the population's resistance to the Soviet regime<sup>10</sup>.

In 2020, the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania adopted a resolution condemning Russia's historical revisionism and attempts at disseminating disinformation, and calling on the European Parliament and Central European politicians to oppose these phenomena together. As of late, Russia has started to spread propaganda that distorts historical truth more intensively.

Linas Linkevičius, the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, says that Russian propaganda intensifies every year as May approaches and so does the anniversary of the Second World War. The Baltic states respect the memory of those who fought against Nazism, but at the same time they condemn Russia for falsely denying the role of the Soviet Union in starting the war and for whitewashing post-war Soviet crimes in Central and Eastern Europe. The end of World War II did not bring freedom to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but, on the contrary, led to a second, Soviet occupation that lasted for five decades, along with brutal crimes against humanity and totalitarian oppression<sup>11</sup>.

A critical approach to any incoming information, reluctance to share sensational news, and ensuring the security of information networks are among the most effective ways to increase resilience to various forms of manipulation<sup>1</sup>.

### **Labai svarbu turėti Aljanso karių Europoje**

Nicholas Ross Smith says that the main reason why Russia could be successful in realizing its aggressive ambitions in the Baltic countries is the tendency among the Baltic countries to think of their security and of deterrence based on rational logic<sup>12</sup>. The increase in Russia's military potential and activity in the Western Military District and the Kaliningrad region, as well as the deepening military integration with Belarus has a particularly negative effect on the security situation in the Baltic States. Russia is consistently strengthening its conventional and nuclear capa-

bilities, developing new weapons, and conducting large-scale military training. Russia's military potential and the Kremlin's rapid and centralized decision-making process result in a significant advantage over the Baltic states and other neighboring countries<sup>1</sup>.

According to R. Karoblis, withdrawing a considerable part of the US army from NATO member states in Europe would not be a good idea. In these countries, a specialized infrastructure has been created for US soldiers, the relevant procedures are in place, and there are opportunities for training and preparation. Should the US military be transferred elsewhere, there would be a risk of a certain division among NATO member states in Europe. D. Trump believes Europe's NATO members are not spending enough to support the alliance, and are relying on the US to shoulder the burden<sup>13</sup>.

The Baltic states are situated in a high-risk area, so it is very important to have as many US troops as possible in Europe, especially in neighboring countries. Poland is one of those key points, and its aspiration to attract the greatest possible number of US troops is highly laudable. The presence of US troops in the region is important for deterrence and creates more opportunities for soldiers from this country to come to the Baltic states<sup>13</sup>.

In the event of a potential military conflict, the growing national capabilities of the Baltic states and the deployment of NATO front-line battalions in the region would reduce Russia's ability to localize such a conflict and finish it in a fast and efficient manner while avoiding wider Alliance involvement. As a result, Russia is less likely to resolve to use military force against the Baltic states<sup>13</sup>. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said that the US presence in Europe is vital to global security<sup>14</sup>. Galina Gribanova and Yuri V. Kosov says that A number of western experts think that in case of a conflict between Russia and the Baltic States there are high chances for the involvement of the Russian-speaking minorities in it that will give Russia an opportunity to use the idea of their rights protection for justifying military intervention<sup>15</sup>.

### International terrorism has not slackened

Threat Assessment states that terrorist attacks in the European Union have been on the decline, but the Islamic State and Al Qaeda still pose a serious terrorist threat to the Community. The change in the leadership of the Islamic State has had little effect on the organization's viability, which continues to disseminate anti-Western propaganda, the internet is used to incite extremists and supporters who could independently organize attacks in Western countries. The threat of terrorist acts by right-wing extremists Europe is growing<sup>1</sup>.

As tensions escalated between the USA and Iran, NATO called on the government in Tehran to exercise extreme restraint. Iran must renounce all violence and escalation. All NATO member states are unanimous that Iran may never be permitted to have a nuclear weapon. In addition, all NATO member states are deeply concerned about the recent destabilizing actions carried out in the region by Iran, such as missile tests and support for terrorist groups. It is important to continue the fight against terrorism, because in actual fact it has not slackened in the region. Every effort must be directed towards diplomatic means and toward the search for a peaceful solution<sup>16</sup>.

In 2019, we made remarkable progress in fighting ISIS. The Global Coalition, of which NATO is a member, liberated all remaining territory from ISIS control. But the fight against terrorism is not over. NATO trains Iraqi forces to help them ensure that ISIS does not return. And in Afghanistan, we train Afghan forces to fight terrorism and create the conditions for peace, written in 2019 Nato annual report<sup>17</sup>.

### The threat of COVID-19 and other viruses

Despite ongoing Russian and Chinese disinformation campaigns claiming Allies are not helping each other in a crisis, J. Stoltenberg said NATO's military has actively been aiding members and partner nations in containing the contagion in Europe. He cited the movement of needed medical equipment and personnel to hotspots and the building and operating of field hospitals as examples of how NATO was helping with the effort<sup>18</sup>.

NATO Defence Ministers decided on a plan to provide support to Allies and partners, and they agreed to establish a stockpile of medical equipment and supplies, as well as a new fund to enable Allies to quickly acquire medical supplies and services<sup>19</sup>.

As the coronavirus crisis hit the world indiscriminately, NATO was fast to react, and used all the instruments in its toolbox to assist Allied countries and partners. European Parliament Policy Analyst Tania Latici said that Armed forces almost everywhere across the EU and NATO have been engaged as governments responded to contain and vanquish the coronavirus. Their efforts include deploying military medics to assist over-run civilian facilities, building field hospitals, airlifting essential medical and protective supplies, evacuating patients and repatriating citizens, but also in distributing food, disinfecting public spaces and providing psychological support to people in distress. The pandemic has seen the largest peacetime military deployment in history<sup>20</sup>.

NATO Spokesperson Oana Lungescu welcomed the ongoing efforts, saying that NATO Allies and partners stand together in solidarity in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. Through NATO, Nations have been helping each other to save lives. The strategic airlift of urgent medical equipment is one of the many capabilities we are deploying to respond to this common challenge<sup>21</sup>.

Fortunately, NATO's responsibilities in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic are unchanged: the cohesion of the Alliance's activities has been maintained, and the Alliance continues to fulfill the functions related to defense, deterrence, and crisis management and to participate in training and stability operations. NATO's leading forces in the Baltic states and Poland and the Baltic Air Policing Mission remain operational<sup>14</sup>.

### The internal unity and solidarity of the Alliance must be increased

Sweitzer C. Brook states that Russia poses a threat to the Baltics and using a hybrid invasion could test NATO's resolve. NATO's very survival depends on deterring and defending against the clear threat Russia poses to the stability of the allies' peoples and governments, particularly with its nonkinetic, insidious, modern information

warfare campaign which is effectively dividing NATO countries. To credibly deter Russia, NATO needs to find its twenty-first-century identity to determine its willingness to fight for its neighbors. Russia refuses to alter its foreign policy, continues to interfere in the affairs of its neighbors and other states, and its behavior has become even more aggressive recently. Russia is demonstrating its power not only in the region, but throughout the world as well. The West cannot rely on a partnership with Russia, because the latter creates conflicts rather than resolving them<sup>1</sup>.

According to the 2019 Nato annual report, 2019 has been a year of rapid adaptation. In response to a complex and unpredictable security environment, Allies continued to strengthen NATO's collective deterrence and defence posture, on land, at sea, in the air, in space and in cyberspace. Together, Allies have increased the responsiveness and readiness of their forces and strengthened the Alliance's ability to rapidly reinforce any Ally that may come under threat. NATO also invested in enhancing its maritime posture, improving capabilities, bolstering resilience and modernising the Alliance, with a new space policy, an adapted command structure, and new tools to counter hybrid and cyber-attacks<sup>17</sup>.

There is a need to deepen the dialogue with the US and to coordinate the response of the Alliance to geopolitical threats. The United States and NATO are the guarantors of European security. Cooperation is indispensable in addressing challenges such as Russia's aggressive actions in the EU-NATO neighborhood and in the outermost regions, such as Syria or Libya, as well as China's growing power, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is important to strengthen the coordination of the Alliance and its engagement with the EU's Eastern Neighborhood countries in order to offset Russia's influence<sup>23</sup>.

It is necessary to increase the unity and solidarity of the Alliance, with a special focus on transatlantic relationships, to expand political consultation and coordination among NATO members, and to strengthen the political role of the Alliance. The Baltic States must strive for the closest

possible ties to the Alliance<sup>23</sup>. J. Stoltenberg said that there have always been differences between NATO allies. But NATO is the most successful alliance in history<sup>17</sup>. Reconciling differences, finding a common ground despite holding divergent views, and being able to agree on a strong position on a range of issues is a sign of NATO's maturity, which ensures the unity of the Alliance<sup>24</sup>. Authors Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis states that NATO needs to plan for all eventualities in the Baltics—otherwise Russia will take advantage of the situation<sup>25</sup>.

#### References:

- 1 Ministry of National Defence. (2019). National Threat Assessment 2020. Retrieved from <https://www.vsd.lt/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/2020-Gresmes-LT-.pdf>
- 2 Gribanova, G. I., & Kosov, Y. V. (2018). NATO Policies in the Baltics: Objectives and Priorities. *Baltic Region*, 10(1), 56-72.
- 3 Coffey, L., & Kochis, D. (2016). The Role of Sweden and Finland in NATO's Defense of the Baltic States. Heritage Foundation.
- 4 Veebel, V. (2018). NATO options and dilemmas for deterring Russia in the Baltic States. *Defence studies*, 18(2), 229-251.
- 5 Clark, W., Luik, J., Ramms, E., & Shirreff, R. (2016). Closing NATO's Baltic Gap. Tallinn: International Centre for Defence and Security.
- 6 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2020). The Secretary General's Annual Report 2019. Retrieved from [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/3/pdf\\_publications/sgar19-en.pdf#page=8](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/3/pdf_publications/sgar19-en.pdf#page=8)
- 7 Chapman, B. (2019). China's military power: Modernising a force to fight and win. Retrieved from <https://theasiadialogue.com/2019/02/25/chinas-military-power-modernising-a-force-to-fight-and-win/>
- 8 Moeller, J. O. (2019). ChinaTalks: Political Economy and Military Power. Transition to a new power structure: From Globalization to regionalization. Retrieved from <https://asiadynamics.ku.dk/english/activities/calendar/political-economy-and-military-power/>
- 9 Karoblis, R. (2019). Karoblis: jaučiamas padidėjęs dezinformacinių šaltinių skaičius, kuris, tikėtina, ir toliau didės. Retrieved from <https://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/2/1192932/karoblis-jauciamas-padidejes-dezinformaciniu-saltiniu-skaicius-kuris-tiketina-ir-toliau-dides>
- 10 Linkevičius, L. (2020). Seimas ragina priešintis Rusijos istoriniam revizionizmui ir dezinformacijai. Retrieved from <https://www.15min.lt/naujiena/aktualu/lietuva/seimas-ragina-priesintis-rusijos-istoriniam-revizionizmui-ir-dezinformacijai-56-1301002>
- 11 Veebel, V., & Ploom, I. (2019). Are the Baltic States and NATO on the right path in deterring Russia in the Baltic?. *Defense & Security Analysis*, 35(4), 406-422.
- 12 Smith, N. R. (2017). What the West Can Learn from Rationalizing Russia's Action in Ukraine. *Orbis*, 61(3), 354-368.
- 13 Karoblis, R. (2020). R. Karoblis: Lietuva pozityviai žiūrėtų į gausesnės JAV karių pajėgas Lenkijoje. Retrieved from <https://www.15min.lt/naujiena/aktualu/lietuva/r-karoblis-lietuva-pozityviai-ziuretu-i-gausesnės-jav-kariu-pajegas-lenkijoje-56-1337948>
- 14 Chase, M. S., Garafola, C. L., & Beauchamp-Mustafaga, N. (2018). Chinese Perceptions of and Responses to US Conventional Military Power. *Asian Security*, 14(2), 136-154.
- 15 BBC News. (2020). Trump: What does the US contribute to Nato in Europe?. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074>
- 16 Stoltenberg, J. (2019) "NATO Engages: Innovating the Alliance conference. Retrieved from [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_171550.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_171550.htm?selectedLocale=en)
- 17 Grady, J. (2020). COVID-19 Pandemic Changing How NATO Thinks of Global Security. Retrieved from <https://news.usni.org/2020/06/09/covid-19-pandemic-changing-how-nato-thinks-of-global-security>
- 18 Stoltenberg, J. (2019). Stoltenberg: US presence in Europe is important for NATO. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/stoltenberg-us-presence-in-europe-is-important-for-nato/a-53918183>
- 19 BBC News. (2020). What is defence alliance Nato?. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18023383>
- 20 Lungescu, O. (2020). Coronavirus response: essential supplies airlifted to Poland. Retrieved from [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_175599.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_175599.htm)
- 21 Sweitzer, B. C. (2018). Russia vs NATO: Baltic States Testing Ground. Naval War College Newport United States.
- 22 Latic, T. (2020). NATO's response in the fight against coronavirus. Retrieved from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2020/651955/EPRS\\_ATA\(2020\)651955\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2020/651955/EPRS_ATA(2020)651955_EN.pdf)

**3<sup>rd</sup> Prize: 400 EUR, Rimvydas Pekauskas (MRU)**



**Mykolas Romeris  
universitetas**

### **Mykolas Romeris Law School European and international business law**

September 25, 2019. 74<sup>th</sup> United Nations General Assembly. Its participants and listeners are the top executives and their representatives of all 193 Member States. There is a special Security Council Ministerial debate going on. It is the turn of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, to express his views. In his strong language fashion, he declares to the assembled excellencies, including the Baltic region and the world: „The new frontier is cyberterrorism“ (UN India Hindi, 2019). This is the end of the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. War on the new front.

A lyrical deviation that reveals the moods of the widest international arena. Still, this is not NATO. The number of members, along with the objectives, varies between the two organizations. Do these sentiments coincide with those of the Baltic States and NATO itself? The question is not so easy to answer, and all the more difficult to reconcile within the organization itself. However, how important is this statement by the Secretary-General to the Baltic States and the formulation (refinement) of their priorities in another international organization? The relationship sought, along with the importance of NATO's priorities, will be revealed using the interrogative principle – three specific supporting questions are raised:

- Why choose only one priority item?
- What direct importance does each of the priority issues have?
- Which priority is most relevant to the family of the Baltic States?

The choice of such a principle helps to formulate a sequence of coherent thoughts and specific arguments – the system defines the quantitative and qualitative element of the subject's priorities.

Why choose only one priority item? The answer consists of two elements – relevance and system. Let's start with relevance first. The three sensitive issues facing NATO are clearly clarified by the authors who formulated the subject. However, not all 29 NATO member states are directly concerned by them due to their political and geographical location. One possible example is Norway. The country ranks (according to the CATO Institute) 17<sup>th</sup> in the world (6<sup>th</sup> in terms of individual and 32<sup>nd</sup> in terms of creating an economic freedom environment) (Vasquez & Porčnik, 2019, p. 8). This assessment is also supported by the UN's annual Report (HDR), which places Norway at the top of the world (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2019, p. 300). Based on these findings, it is safe to say that this country is one of the most advanced members of the NATO bloc. The question is, is such a country affected by a humanitarian crisis? Such a disaster should, in the very abstract sense, be understood as a set of factors that jeopardize the physical, social or economic well-being of a particular community. Norway is not directly exposed to this risk due to its stable political and legal order, together with its geographical location. This situation is comparable to typhoid fever, which is now a concern in Asian, Latin American and African countries, but in the old continent this seed has already been mined. However, potential interventions are known and, in the event of an illness, they are prepared to respond with the use of specialized medication. So for Norway, the humanitarian crisis is tantamount to typhoid fever – it exists somewhere, quite far away, but not within its borders. This case of Norway proves that in order to properly answer the question raised, it is necessary to assess the political and geographical situation of a particular region (on these terms the Baltic), since not every problem of an organization is closely related to all its members directly.

The system. NATO is quite proud of the fact that, since 1949, all decisions within it have been made by the general approval of all members, following a consensus process of preliminary peaceful talks to hear and reconcile the divergence of views among all members. In one case, this achieves the full approval of the members to enforce the decision, in other words, avoids the

possibility of a party acting on a 'bite the bullet' basis, which promotes a negative aura within the organization. However, it is necessary to look at the efficiency and speed of such a process. In practice, the initiator must convince each member individually of the correctness of the facts and arguments of his interest. The resulting clumsiness is embodied in the confrontation between Lithuania and Turkey in 2019 over the renewal of the Baltic and Polish defense plans, promoted by the President of the Republic of Lithuania Gitanas Nausėda and representatives of Poland, Estonia and Latvia. The proposal has repeatedly been publicly vetoed by Turkish state officials over certain incompatible states' positions, citing news portal: „until the alliance offers Ankara more political support for its fight against Kurdish YPG militia in northern Syria“ (Emmot, 2019). This meant blocking such a ruling for legal effect and Baltics became hostage to Ankara. The more priority issues are raised, the more consensus must be overcome, with concrete evidence and compromise solutions for all sides. Participants, such as Turkey, may have fundamental provisions on other issues, the harmonization of which does not facilitate the situation. Such a process is automatically delayed and it is in the interest of member states to concentrate only on the substantive problematic provisions at the same time in order to achieve consistent objectives and international approval. It is true that diplomacy between countries is also hampered by the political weight of a member in NATO. It has to be acknowledged that the political weight on the international scene is not uniform, although international organizations try to eliminate it by various programs or procedural means, such as the introduction of a special membership of the Council of the European Union, independent of the population of a member state. Summarizing the scientific work on the theory of states' political forces, it should be stated that influence depends on the geographic size and position of the state, the strength of the economy, its relationship with neighboring countries or other partners, the positioning of military power and resources (Long, 2017, p. 185-205). The European Union can again be used as an example – in the public sphere, the speeches of leaders such as Angela Merkel

(Germany) or Emmanuel Macron (France) (e.g. „European Renaissance“ by Emmanuel Macron) are now commonly seen, presented and debated in the media. Thus, the political weight of the Baltic States should be noted. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania together have about 6 million inhabitants, which in the context of the population of all NATO member states is only 0.7 %. If these countries were treated separately, the coefficient would be even lower. At the same time, no state can boast of vast resources, military power. Such figures lead to the necessity of raising the idea of community among the Baltic States as one of the elements of how small states in the international arena can achieve their goals: coordination, coherence and a strong focus on specific issues that are consistently confronted by other NATO members. “Luckily enough, from the viewpoint of small states, exercise of power is more complicated than the mere ability of the strong to get what they want” (Rostoks, 2010, p. 88).

What direct importance does each of the priority issues have? The example of Norway has already been mentioned, and it must be acknowledged that the situation of the Baltic States in a humanitarian crisis is similar. All three countries do not have a humanitarian problem directly on their territory, the peaceful national communities, and the region is not rich in natural or other disasters. According to the aforementioned CATO Institute study (2019), Estonia ranks 15<sup>th</sup> in the overall table of countries, Latvia – 23<sup>rd</sup> and ranks 30<sup>th</sup>, Latvia – 39<sup>th</sup>, Lithuania – 34<sup>th</sup> (UNDP, p. 301). In this context, it is worth highlighting Germany, Greece and Turkey, which are being assisted by NATO in the face of an influx of refugees from the Mediterranean threatening the borders of NATO states with disturbances such as increased crime rates. An example of such assistance is the naval forces of NATO members deployed in the Aegean Sea to control the unsafe and illegal transportation of people to Greece and Turkey. So it is these three members who initiate a broader debate on this topic. Of course, these reasons do not allow the Baltic States to ignore this issue and not contribute to its resolution, but this is not a priority problem for these three Baltic family members.

Another possible priority is the race between the major global economic and political giants for the title of the strongest state (superpower), the threat that such events pose to the region. Admittedly, this problem is much more relevant. Although the Baltic States are not the ones competing in these battles, due to their geopolitical position they fall into an area that is important for demonstrating such strength to race participants. Unlike the Cold War, the involvement of the United States, Russia and China in this fight should be distinguished. The confrontation between the US and Russia has never disappeared, and the growing economy of communist China is trying to overtake the US and take over the leadership, using the principle of 'pre-war first in the economy'. These events are reflected in the slogan used by Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential election year, 'Make America great again' or just MAGA, which was publicly and actively escalated only in 1980 by another former US president, Ronald Reagan. Donald Trump has repeatedly called for the concentration of the American economy, both in the election campaign and during the presidency, to return profits to the state. Meanwhile, communist China, with its enormous human and land resources, is trying to create the most favorable business environment for its and foreign investors by attracting their investments inside the country. China is famous for its abundance of manufactories and mechanized factories. Such centralization and China's industrial importance itself are now clearly visible in the wake of the coronavirus disaster – according to media, global companies such as Google, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, Starbucks, General Motors, Toyota, PSA, Tencent, UBS, Nikkei and others temporarily shut down factories, laid off their employees or extended their vacations (BBC News, 2020). This led to the suspension of production and the supply of products and other raw materials to the world, while the share prices of companies fell. The outbreak of the disease is already having an economic impact not only on China but also on investors from other countries. Third, Russia demonstrated its aggressive expansionist policies in 2014, when the Crimean territory, which had until then been legally owned by Ukraine, had been annexed. To this day, the territory of Crimea is administered by Russia, and the bor-

der between the two states has become a principled zone of tension that has claimed the lives of several soldiers. At the NATO Summit in December 2019, the Lithuanian delegation, led by the Head of State Gitanas Nausėda, sought to state in a declaration that Russia would be considered a threat. It is also worth noting the ethnic composition of the states, although it has been mentioned above that the ethnic communities of the states are now relatively peaceful. Based on the data, Russians make up over 25 % of the population in Latvia, with nearly 25 % in Estonia, compared to only 5 % in Lithuania (europa.eu, 2020). Such a population was determined by the Soviet regime, which for a long time (with intervals of about 50 years) included the three Baltic states. For these reasons, states do not exclude various cases and pretexts that may be exercised and encroached in some way on their legal sovereignty. Such geopolitical, historical ties with Russia, nationalist policies pursued by the US, and China's growing economic dependence distinguish the struggle for the title of the strongest state as having a direct relationship with the Baltic States, and more specifically, the states may suffer as a result. Of course, no international competition that promotes aggressive international politics is justified, and the world, and NATO members, want to avoid the Second Cold War.

International terrorism must also be kept in mind. It is true that the concept (violence to pursue political change) is quite broad, since different historical events have led to different cases/types of terrorism such as:

- terrorism used by the state, e.g. during the French Revolution, the Jacobin dictatorship was called 'Red Terror' or 'terrorism' used by Prussian Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck against Prussia itself, using the state army to consolidate state unity with iron and steel;
- later more widespread – non-state terrorism, exemplified by communists who embraced 'terrorism' as a means of class struggle or the well-known 1946 bombing at the Jerusalem's King David Hotel. (Saul, 2007, p. 1-7)

From these two main groups later other types of terrorist methods emerged: religious, ideological, sexual, atomic, cyber, and etc. However, the vast majority of the population, no matter what type

of terrorism they have in mind, is currently referring to this concept with negative emotional expression, stigma of tragedy and pain. It is worth noting the unforgettable events that have occurred to NATO members, such as:

- the tragedy of September 11, 2001, when the Islamic Al-Qaeda group hijacked 4 passenger planes and targeted them at US infrastructure or government buildings;
- attack on Boston, USA in 2013. During the marathon, several explosive charges were placed and detonated in an organized manner;
- the case of the 2015 attack on the French city of Paris, in which 3 suicide terrorists exploded or carried out shootings in public places in an organized manner;
- London attack on bridge over Thames in November 2019. A terrorist injured five people with a knife. Of these individuals, 2 young UK citizens died in hospital;
- in January 2020, a knife attack on a group of people in Paris, France, claimed the life of one man.

The abundance of events reveals the loss of peaceful citizens of NATO members. Already in 2002, NATO adopted the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism by providing engagement assistance and information sharing among member states. It has to be admitted that there is currently no record or knowledge of such physical terrorist attacks in the Baltic region. The risk of such attacks due to the relatively low level of international influence or confrontation with certain radicalist communities is poor. However, attacks in other countries are threatening to lead to disaster for citizens of one of the countries due to open border policies and mass free migration of people. It must therefore be stressed that the importance of international terrorism cannot be reduced to the national territorial level. Although it has been actively fought at NATO level since 2002, after 18 years, attacks are still ongoing

Which priority is most relevant to the family of the Baltic States? In the second part, it was recognized that the humanitarian crisis did not directly affect the subjects, and that the power struggle and international terrorism posed a

direct threat to the citizens of the Baltic States or to their sovereignty. Is it possible to combine the two into one single principle? This is where the phrase „The new frontier is cyber-terrorism“, used by the United Nations Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, reveals the importance. This concept of cyber-terrorism should be under enabling, disruptive, and destructive militant operations in cyberspace to create and exploit fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change“(Brickey, 2012, p. 6). Cyber capabilities can take the form “of tools such as computer viruses, worms, Trojans, and zombies”(Janczewski & Colarik, 2008). There is no need to go far in finding a practical case: the Estonian government was hit by hackers in 2007, when the infrastructure for state digital accounts and servers was completely disrupted for a week. Massive amounts of automated online requests (spams) plugged servers, which were sent by botnets. One of the features of such attacks is that it can be implemented from anywhere in the world from behind a computer with a masked Internet Protocol (IP) address. This is one of the aforementioned types of international terrorism.

However, the concept of cyber-terrorism should not be limited to active attacks. There is also cyber-terrorism, which can be implemented by passive means, for example: traffic analysis and eavesdropping (Sari, 2015, p. 79). Here, attention must be paid to both. Traffic analysis, which in practice means (on the downside) that the information transmitted or positioned by the device is evaluated, and such data flow forms an information base about a particular device or its user. It is misappropriated or obtained legally, but used for purposes other than those for which it was given consent. Meanwhile, eavesdropping is associated with the collection of real-time various digital information, the importance of which is evaluated and used without the knowledge of the user and service provider. Simply put, obtaining or collecting illegal or unauthorized access to personal or government data, server traffic information and the use of such information for terrorist purposes in the future may also be considered terrorism. It is a rather complicated and profound branch of terrorism, but it is nevertheless important when it comes to the

race for the top of the great powers. One of the tools to fulfill one's ambition is to gather information about other surrounding entities – such a connection to passive terrorism (or more precisely its tools) can be used by a hostile superpower to assert its political strength by collecting sensitive, personal information from another sovereign state or citizen (in practice this is called cyber espionage, cyber spying or the whole process – cyber operations). In the 2019 latest report “National Security Threat Assessment 2019” was stated, that:

Western countries detected and exposed aggressive measures employed by Russia: attempts to interfere with domestic processes of the Western countries, use of chemical weapon against the former Russian intelligence officer, aggressive cyber operations conducted both from Russia and on European soil. (The State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania (VSD), 2019, p. 4)

Already in 2010, a group of experts in their analysis and recommendation for NATO foresaw the threat of war that became one of its preventive goals:

NATO must accelerate efforts to respond to the danger of cyber-attacks by protecting its own communications and command systems, helping Allies to improve their ability to prevent and recover from attacks, and developing an array of cyber defence capabilities aimed at effective detection and deterrence. (Albright & Veer, 2010, p. 11)

One of the common features of both cyber operations and cyber-terrorism is that it affects not only the Baltic States, not only NATO members, but the whole world from the same cyber medium in quite similar ways. This situation makes it easier to communicate and await acceptance of measures against various types of cyber-attacks, alleviates the aforementioned procedural burden of the NATO consensus. The relevance of the possible use of passive cyber tools can also be demonstrated by practical examples. In 2018, it was announced in the media that a company providing transportation services in all Baltic States („Yandex. Taxi“) sends personal information received from applet used by its clients to Russia and does not disclose for what purpose

such information is collected there; another case is the appearance in 2019 of a possible collaboration between Chinese telecommunications technology giant Huawei and the Chinese military, which has led to strife between US and Chinese leaders. The US is currently blaming China for Huawei's ability to see sensitive device user's personal information and its possible misuse. Such incidents concern the protection of personal data, but the link between it, cyber operations and cyberterrorism cannot be excluded, as cyber-attacks can also be based on the illegal use of personal information. In this way, making cyber-attacks a priority issue for the Baltic states 'kills two bunnies at once': counteracting active and passive terrorism, and blocking major powers from using cyberspace to conduct their own silent warfare by gathering information and conducting cyber intelligence. When there is no physical war, cyber warfare must be guarded against.

The Baltic States are a tiny part of NATO. However, the procedural burden of proof on such a land is not an insurmountable task. Coordinated action by the Baltic States, proper and thoughtful prioritization, allows the small three fish to achieve their goals in large organizations 8 among the very large whales. The geographical position and the more aggressive nationalist policies of the great powers prevent breathing. Terrorist attacks also always pose a risk to citizens. The priority provision on cyber-attacks (terrorism and operations) helps to combat both of these issues, not only for the Baltic family itself, but also for other NATO members who face the same or similar threats from the surrounding world. If Winston Churchill were currently representing the Baltic States in the NATO Assembly, he would probably say: we shall fight on the beaches, seas and oceans, on the landing grounds, in the air, the fields and in the streets. And most importantly – we shall fight in this unknown, dark and endless cyber dimension. NATO and Baltic States neither in real or virtual reality will never surrender!



**Reference list**

Albright A.K., Veer, J.V.D. & others. (2010). NATO 2020: Assured security; Dynamic engagement. Analysis and recommendations of the group of experts on a new strategic concept for NATO. Access through internet. <https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf>;

Brickley, J. (2012). Defining Cyberterrorism: Capturing a Broad Range of Activities in Cyberspace. CTC Sentinel, August 2012 Issue, Volume 5, Issue 8. (p. 4-6). Access through internet <https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2012/08/CTCSentinel-Vol5Iss81.pdf>;

Coronavirus: Companies tell workers 'stay at home'. (2020). In BBC News. [Checked 2020-02-14]. Access through internet <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51260149>;

Coronavirus: Technology giants join China shutdown. (2020). In BBC News. [Checked 2020-02-14]. Access through internet <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51276322>;

Emmot, R., (2019). Exclusive: Turkey holds up NATO military plans over Syria dispute – sources. [Checked 2020-02-14]. Access through internet <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summitturkey-exclusive/exclusive-turkey-holds-up-nato-military-plans-over-syria-dispute-sourcesidUSKBN1Y01W0>;

Estonia. In Europa.eu (Eurydice program). [Checked 2020-02-14]. Access through internet [https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/index\\_en.php\\_en](https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/index_en.php_en);

Janczewski, L., & Colarik, A. (2008). Cyber Warfare and Cyber Terrorism. Hershey, Pennsylvania: IGI Global;

Latvia. In Europa.eu (Eurydice program). [Checked 2020-02-14]. Access through internet [https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/index\\_en.php\\_en](https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/index_en.php_en);

Lithuania. In Europa.eu (Eurydice program). [Checked 2020-02-14]. Access through internet [https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/index\\_en.php\\_en](https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/index_en.php_en);

Long, T. (2017). Small States, Great Power? Gaining Influence Through Intrinsic, Derivative, and Collective Power. International Studies Review, Volume 19, Issue 2 (p. 185-205). Access through internet <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viw040>;

Rostoks, T. (2010). Small States, Power, International Change and the Impact of

Uncertainty. In R. Steinmetz, A. Wivel, Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities (p. 87-101). Farnham: Ashgate;

Sari, A. (2015). Security Issues in Mobile Wireless Ad Hoc Networks: A Comparative Survey of Methods and Techniques to Provide Security in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. In M. Dawson, M. Omar, New Threats and Countermeasures in Digital Crime and Cyber Terrorism (p. 66-94). Hershey, Pennsylvania: IGI Global;

Saul, B. (2007). Defining Terrorism in International Law, Human Rights Law Review, Volume 7, Issue 3, 2007, (p. 643-648). Access (DOI) <https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngm019>;

State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania & Second Investigation Department under the Ministry of national Defence. (2019). National threat assessment 2019. Vilnius. Access through internet <https://www.vsd.lt/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/2019-Gresmes-internetuiEN.pdf>;

UN India Hindi. (2019). Secretary-General: Cyberterrorism Using Social Media, Dark Web, 'New Frontier'. Access through internet <https://in.one.un.org/un-press-release/secretary-generalcyberterrorism-using-social-media-dark-web-new-frontier/>;

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2019). Human Development Report 2019. Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today: Inequalities in human development in the 21st century. Access through internet <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019.pdf>;

Vasquez, I. & Poržnik, T. (2019). The Human Freedom Index 2019. Global Measurement of Personal, Civil, and Economic Freedom. Access through internet <https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/human-freedom-index-files/2019-human-freedom-index-update-2.pdf>



From left to right: Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers  
Winners: Kipras Adomaitis, Eglė Juozėnaitė,  
Rimvydas Pekauskas



From left to right: Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers, Rector (MRU)  
Prof. Dr. Inga Žalėnienė, Prof. Virgis Valentinavičius,  
**1st prize winner:** Kipras Adomaitis



**2nd prize winner:** MRU Eglė Juozėnaitė



**3rd prize winner:** MRU Rimvydas Pekauskas

## Thema | Topic:

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, how can NATO and its member states develop a coherent strategy towards the People's Republic of China?

### 1<sup>st</sup> Prize: 1.000 EUR, Velislava-Mihaela Krachunova

The word strategy comes from the Greek *"strategia"* and means "art of a general". It is true that in the past, strategy was mostly related to building up tactics in time of war. Without any intention to romanticize war, it is impossible not to notice the similarity between strategists and artists, as the deployment of military forces on a territory is like having a blank canvas that needs to be filled in.

Nowadays, the definition of strategy has expanded. According to Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, in the modern era, it is much more accurate and descriptive to consider strategy a complex decision-making process that connects the ends sought (national objectives) with the ways and means of achieving those ends.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, strategy consists of more aspects than just the military one. It encompasses also political, economic, technological, geographical, societal and cultural factors that need to be taken into consideration in order for a strategy to be successfully applied to a concrete international environment that can and does change.<sup>2</sup> Despite the fact that strategy is often linked to creating an action plan for future initiatives, the COVID-19 pandemic proved that a strategy often has to be developed with a lot of imponderables and within a short period of time.

Strategy's expanded scope might seem confusing and even scary. However, it is the result of the normal course of events and the change of the nature of threats in International Relations. States and international organizations now have to deal not only with military threats, but also terrorism, hybrid threats, disinformation, cybercrimes, etc. They also have to act in different operating environments – land, sea, air, space and cyberspace. States are also often inclined to join unions and alliances, and establish international organizations, as no state is able to deal with all challenges on its own.

NATO is a prime example. 71 years after its establishment with a total of 30 member states, it has proven itself to be the most successful military Alliance in history. The Alliance has noted the various threats coming from both state and non-state actors and has turned these observations into strategies in order to address the challenges coherently without neglecting its main objectives, i.e. securing a lasting peace in Europe, based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, contributing to peace and stability through crisis management operations and partnerships, stabilizing post-conflict situations and supporting reconstruction.<sup>3</sup>

Bulgarian foreign policy professor Georgi Stefanov illustrates the decision-making process in international relations as consisting of a necessity, interest and objective.<sup>4</sup> Interests appear when the actors become aware that their necessities need to be fulfilled. Taking into consideration NATO's London Declaration adopted in 2019, it can be acknowledged that NATO has become aware of its necessity to *"recognise that China's growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance."*<sup>5</sup> Thus, China's actions are of concern to NATO and it is in its interest to approach them. This brings us to the last part of the process, i.e. the objective and how to achieve it. In this regard, the questions that need to be addressed next are 1) in which aspects does the Alliance need to act in order to create a coherent strategy and 2) what will make this strategy successful.

First, it is crucial to point out that the Alliance does not consider China a rival. As Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has stated *"China is not an adversary to NATO. But we must fully understand what its rise means for us – and for our security."*<sup>6</sup> A lot of political scientists draw a parallel between the threat coming from China and the one that the USSR posed during the Cold War. It is important to make this comparison so as to understand what role China is playing, as it is different to what NATO has been used to.

China's impressive rise is distorting the post-2014 force field between the US and Russia.<sup>7</sup>

Economy- and technology-wise, China is much bigger and advanced than the Soviet Union ever was. China's GDP is, in purchasing terms, already bigger than the US economy. And, unlike the Soviet Union or modern Russia, China is an investor in Europe.<sup>8</sup> In this regard, it must be highlighted that NATO's strategy towards China should be developed without prejudice to the policy of defending against and deterring Russia.

China will soon be the largest economy in the world.<sup>9</sup> This is the outcome of the new market-authoritarian model, invented by Beijing, where western freedoms, including the possibility of political plurality or opposition, are absent. China's modernization has demonstrated that economic liberalization is possible without political one. Its success assists with building alliance relationships, for example, with states in economic crisis, such as Angola, Cambodia, Chad, Iran, Myanmar, Sudan, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela, and provides them with an alternative to institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.<sup>10</sup> Nonetheless, developing countries are not the only ones facing the security implications of China's global rise. There's a growing economic reliance on Beijing in the Western Balkans when it comes to the construction of infrastructure roads and ports, made through China's Belt and Road Initiative, which later ensures that China can influence the entire development process of the country<sup>11</sup>. China has not only turned out to be one of the biggest investors in the region, it is also trying to gain more influence in politics, academia, culture and civil society.<sup>12</sup>

When it comes to the military aspect, it is visible that even though China might not pose a direct military threat to the Alliance, it is investing heavily in new, modern military capabilities, including hypersonic weapons. China has the second largest defence budget in the world<sup>13</sup>, and therefore, according to NATO Secretary General, as a rising global military power, Beijing has global responsibility to be part of global arms control.<sup>14</sup>

While China's conventional military threat in the Indo-Pacific is far from NATO's borders, its hybrid activities are happening in the alliance's own backyard. These include cyber-espionage, intel-

lectual property theft, debt manipulation, and disinformation.<sup>15</sup> A fine example is the COVID-19 pandemic, during which Beijing started a disinformation campaign regarding the origins of the virus to avoid criticism over its initial handling of the outbreak. The aid that China later provided was dismissed as a stunt and was identified as "*a struggle for influence*" by Josep Borrell, the European Union's foreign policy chief. Doubts were also raised regarding potential China-backed cyberhacking of Western laboratories working on a vaccine,<sup>16</sup> as well as about the quality of masks, vaccines and ventilators, sent by Beijing.<sup>17</sup>

However, China's most important gains toward global leadership<sup>18</sup> in the past couple of years have not been on the trade, economic or military fronts, but in the country's effort to lead the next generation technologies by combining political control with innovation and development.<sup>19</sup> NATO Secretary General pointed to 5G, facial recognition and quantum computing as three areas where China has emerged as a global "leader," and where the alliance must keep pace.<sup>20</sup> From a NATO perspective 5G technology poses challenges for espionage reasons. Member states need to ensure that they have a clean network of communications and that China would not have an ability to disrupt them.<sup>21</sup>

Another aspect that needs to be taken into consideration is the issue regarding the protection of human rights in China. The growth of Chinese power is inextricably linked to an ideology that does not share NATO's concern for individual freedoms, human rights, democracy and rule of law, and thus is a major normative challenge to the West.<sup>22</sup> NATO should address China's violations of these principles and its propaganda efforts to cover them up. These include, among others, human rights abuses against ethnic Uighurs in Xinjiang and violations of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea in the South China Sea.<sup>23</sup>

It is obvious that NATO's strategy has to include all those different aspects. But an all-encompassing strategy does not necessarily make it coherent and successful. In order for the strategy to succeed and for the objectives to be achieved, there are also other factors that the Alliance needs to remember.

The Alliance needs to work closely with its partners in the Asia-Pacific region – Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia and New Zealand. This cooperation can serve as important counterweights to Chinese influence in the region. As the Secretary General has pointed out *“the Pacific may literally be on the other side of the world from NATO Headquarters in Brussels. But that doesn't mean we are not affected by what happens here. In fact, two NATO Allies are Pacific Nations. We also have close partners in the region whose security matters to us, and with whom we share strategic interests.”*<sup>24</sup>

NATO should also work closely with the European Union. In 2019 the EU acknowledged China as its cooperation and negotiating partner, with whom it needs to find a balance of interests. However, it also described it as an economic competitor in pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival, promoting alternative models of governance.<sup>25</sup> Both alliances share the same 22 Members, values and security environment. Meaningful NATO-EU cooperation will be as important as ever in the coming years.<sup>26</sup> In this regard, the EU coordinated risk assessment of the cybersecurity of 5G networks issued in October 2019 is an important contribution to further work, including in the NATO environment.<sup>27</sup>

Last but not least, NATO needs to work towards solving its own internal problems. The aftermath of the upcoming presidential elections in the USA will surely have an impact on the relationship between the Alliance and the USA. However, it is important to highlight that despite Trump's current rhetoric regarding multilateralism, the overall US defence commitment to Europe has increased, as in this new era of Sino-American strategic competition, NATO is once again crucial to US interests and values.<sup>28</sup> Other internal questions that need to be solved are linked to burden-sharing, the state of democracy in some of the member states, tackling recurring bilateral issues, and keeping a close eye on some members' dependence on Russia.

Moreover, when it comes to building up a coherent strategy towards China, it seems reasonable for the Alliance to create a consultative body to scrutinise all aspects of China policy, and even

include EU institutions in the meetings, as it is in their competence to carry the interactions on trade and competition policy with China.<sup>29</sup> The Allies need to forge a shared understanding of the risks Beijing poses through reinforced information exchange and dialogue.<sup>30</sup>

Although NATO has announced that it does not consider China an enemy, the rise of the most populated country in the world not only in the economic, but also in the military and technological aspects, cannot go unnoticed. The Alliance has acknowledged China's new role and the challenges that it poses to NATO, its partner countries in the Pacific, as well as in the Balkans, Africa and the Arctic. Thus, the strategy that NATO has to build must be multidimensional, so that it can tackle the different aspects of the possible threats. However, developing a strong, ambitious and detailed strategy does not mean that NATO's objectives will be achieved. The Alliance needs to make sure that the strategy is coherent and pursued by all Member States. NATO's response will be strong enough only when the Alliance works closely with its partners and when there is a consensus between the Member States regarding what the strategy needs to be, i.e. when *the interest for common actions is understood and acknowledged by all of them*. The main reason that would make the strategy successful is simple and it is contained in the unity and cooperation within the Alliance itself. As stated in the London Declaration *“the challenges need to be addressed together as an Alliance” because “as long as North America and Europe stand together, we are safe and we are secure.”*<sup>31</sup>

Only in this way, the *“art of a general”* could create an unimpeachable **masterPEACE**

#### References

- Drew, D. M., Snow, D. M., “Making Twenty-First Century Strategy: An Introduction to Modern National Security Processes and Problems”, Air University Press, 2006, p. 14
- Ibid., p.xiv
- NATO's purpose, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 18 April 2018, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_68144.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68144.htm) (Last accessed on 29.07.2020)
- Stefanov, G. “Foreign Policy Theory”, Sofia University Press, 2007
- London Declaration, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 4 December 2019, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_171584.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm) (Last accessed on 29.07.2020)
- The Geopolitical Implications of COVID – 19, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 30 June 2020, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_176983.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_176983.htm?selectedLocale=en) (Last accessed on 28.07.2020)
- François Heisbourg (2020) NATO 4.0: The Atlantic Alliance and the Rise of China, *Survival*, 62:2, 83-102, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2020.1739950, p.91

- 8 Mehta, A. "NATO struggles with its China conundrum", Defense News, 3 December 2019, available at: <https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nato-2020-defined/2019/12/03/nato-struggles-with-its-china-conundrum/> (Last accessed on 25.07.2020)
- 9 The Geopolitical Implications of COVID – 19, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 30 June 2020, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_176983.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_176983.htm?selectedLocale=en) (Last accessed on 28.07.2020)
- 10 Bechna, Z., Thayer, B. A., "NATO's New Role: The Alliance's Response to a Rising China", Naval War College Review, Volume 69, Number 3 Summer, Article 6, 2016, p.8
- 11 Smith-Windsor, B., "NATO 2020: Dealing with Trump, Preparing for China", Macdonald-Laurier Institute Publication, June 2020, p.31
- 12 Shopov, V. "Five mounting challenges for China in the Western Balkans", European Council on Foreign Relations, 17 June 2020, available at: [https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary\\_five\\_mounting\\_challenges\\_for\\_china\\_in\\_the\\_western\\_balkans](https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_five_mounting_challenges_for_china_in_the_western_balkans) (Last accessed on 29.07.2020)
- 13 The Geopolitical Implications of COVID – 19, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 30 June 2020, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_176983.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_176983.htm?selectedLocale=en) (Last accessed on 28.07.2020)
- 14 Ibid
- 15 Speranza, L. "China Is NATO's New Problem", Foreign Policy, 8 July 2020, available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/08/china-nato-hybrid-threats-europe-cyber/> (Last accessed on 28.07.2020)
- 16 Smith-Windsor, B., "NATO 2020: Dealing with Trump, Preparing for China", Macdonald-Laurier Institute Publication, June 2020, p.5
- 17 Dettmer, J. "China's Planned 'Year of Europe' Left in Tatters", Voice of America, 2 May 2020, available at: <https://www.voanews.com/covid-19-pandemic/chinas-planned-year-europe-left-tatters> (Last accessed on 28.07.2020)
- 18 Kempe, F. "China is making a global power play, and the US response is coming up short", CNBC, 27 April 2019, available at: <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/26/china-is-making-a-global-power-play-and-the-us-response-is-coming-up-short.html> (Last accessed on 26.07.2020)
- 19 Kempe, F. "Managing China is NATO's biggest challenge yet", CNBC, 7 December 2019, available at: <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/07/managing-china-is-natos-biggest-challenge-yet.html> (Last accessed on 26.07.2020)
- 20 Mehta, A. "NATO struggles with its China conundrum", Defense News, December 2019, available at: <https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nato-2020-defined/2019/12/03/nato-struggles-with-its-china-conundrum/> (Last accessed on 25.07.2020)
- 21 Woody, C. "NATO is finally talking about China, and there are 3 big problems it has to address", Business Insider, 5 December 2019, available at: <https://www.businessinsider.com/china-poses-3-problems-in-europe-for-nato-2019-12> (Last accessed on 29.07.2020)
- 22 Bechna, Z., Thayer, B. A., "NATO's New Role: The Alliance's Response to a Rising China", Naval War College Review, Volume 69, Number 3 Summer, Article 6, 2016, p.10
- 23 Speranza, L. "China Is NATO's New Problem", Foreign Policy, 8 July 2020, available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/08/china-nato-hybrid-threats-europe-cyber/> (Last accessed on 28.07.2020)
- 24 Smith-Windsor, B., "NATO 2020: Dealing with Trump, Preparing for China", Macdonald-Laurier Institute Publication, June 2020, p.23
- 25 Commission reviews relations with China, proposes 10 actions, An official website of the European Union, 12 March 2019, available at: [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_19\\_1605](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_1605) (Last accessed on 28.07.2020)
- 26 NATO-EU cooperation in light of EU defence initiatives by Camille GRAND, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment, NATO, EDA Annual Conference, 28 November 2019, available at: <https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/speech-by-nato-asg-camille-grand240eb33fa4d264cfa776ff00087ef0f.pdf> (Last accessed on 28.07.2020)
- 27 Ibid.
- 28 Smith-Windsor, B., "NATO 2020: Dealing with Trump, Preparing for China", Macdonald-Laurier Institute Publication, June 2020, p.4
- 29 François Heisbourg (2020) NATO 4.0: The Atlantic Alliance and the Rise of China, Survival, 62:2, 83-102, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2020.1739950, p.96
- 30 Speranza, L. "China Is NATO's New Problem", Foreign Policy, 8 July 2020, available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/08/china-nato-hybrid-threats-europe-cyber/> (Last accessed on 28.07.2020)
- 31 Turak, N. "NATO chief sees no 'imminent threat' against allies in face of China, Russia tensions", CNBC, 18 June 2020, available at: <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/18/no-imminent-threat-against-nato-allies-stoltenberg-on-russia-china.html> (Last accessed on: 25.07.2020)


## Sources

### Publications

- 1 Bechna, Z., Thayer, B. A., "NATO's New Role: The Alliance's Response to a Rising China", Naval War College Review, Volume 69, Number 3 Summer, Article 6, 2016
- 2 Drew, D. M., Snow, D. M., "Making Twenty-First Century Strategy: An Introduction to Modern National Security Processes and Problems", Air University Press, 2006
- 3 François Heisbourg (2020) NATO 4.0: The Atlantic Alliance and the Rise of China
- 4 Smith-Windsor, B., "NATO 2020: Dealing with Trump, Preparing for China", Macdonald-Laurier Institute Publication, June 2020
- 5 Stefanov, G., "Foreign Policy Theory", Sofia University Press, 2007

## Articles

- 1 Commission reviews relations with China, proposes 10 actions, An official website of the European Union, 12 March 2019, available at: [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_19\\_1605](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_1605)
- 2 Dettmer, J. "China's Planned 'Year of Europe' Left in Tatters", Voice of America, 2 May 2020, available at: <https://www.voanews.com/covid-19-pandemic/chinas-planned-year-europe-left-tatters>
- 3 Kempe, F. "China is making a global power play, and the US response is coming up short", CNBC, 27 April 2019, available at: <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/26/china-is-making-a-global-power-play-and-the-us-response-is-coming-up-short.html>
- 4 Kempe, F. "Managing China is NATO's biggest challenge yet", CNBC, 7 December 2019, available at: <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/07/managing-china-is-natos-biggest-challenge-yet.html>
- 5 London Declaration, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 4 December 2019, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_171584.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm)
- 6 Mehta, A. "NATO struggles with its China conundrum", Defense News, 3 December 2019, available at: <https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nato-2020-defined/2019/12/03/nato-struggles-with-its-china-conundrum/>
- 7 NATO-EU cooperation in light of EU defence initiatives by Camille GRAND, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment, NATO, EDA Annual Conference, 28 November 2019, available at: <https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/speech-by-nato-asg-camille-grand240eb33fa4d-264cfa776ff00087ef0f.pdf>
- 8 NATO's purpose, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 18 April 2018, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_68144.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68144.htm)
- 9 Shopov, V. "Five mounting challenges for China in the Western Balkans", European Council on Foreign Relations, 17 June 2020, available at: [https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary\\_five\\_mounting\\_challenges\\_for\\_china\\_in\\_the\\_western\\_balkans](https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_five_mounting_challenges_for_china_in_the_western_balkans)
- 10 Speranza, L. "China Is NATO's New Problem", Foreign Policy, 8 July 2020, available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/08/china-nato-hybrid-threats-europe-cyber/>
- 11 The Geopolitical Implications of COVID – 19, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 30 June 2020, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_176983.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_176983.htm?selectedLocale=en)
- 12 Turak, N. "NATO chief sees no 'imminent threat' against allies in face of China, Russia tensions", CNBC, 18 June 2020, available at: <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/18/no-imminent-threat-against-nato-allies-stoltenberg-on-russia-china.html>
- 13 Woody, C. "NATO is finally talking about China, and there are 3 big problems it has to address", Business Insider, 5 December 2019, available at: <https://www.businessinsider.com/china-poses-3-problems-in-europe-for-nato-2019-12>

**2<sup>nd</sup> Prize: 600 EUR, Tim B. Lienemann**
**In the 21st century, how can NATO and its member states develop a coherent strategy towards the People's Republic of China?**
**Dr. Karl A. Lamers Peare-Prize 2020**

Tim B. Lienemann  
July 2020

At the dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, only few would have seen China as a major threat to Western economic and security interests. After all, it was only a decade earlier when some had already proclaimed the *end of history* – a world in which the Western ideas of democracy, human rights, and free-markets were unanimously accepted and in which it would only be a matter of time until the last challengers to those ideas would be defeated. It was at that time, that *normalizing* economic relations with China seemed the only possible right thing to do – finalizing the construction of that great Sino-Western bridge of realism that foreign policy architects of the past century, such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, had started to build. Only few realized that Western leaders had a drastically different idea of what *normal* relations with China would look like, then the government in Beijing.

In 1991, Chinese imports accounted for only 1 % of all imports into the United States – the largest economy within NATO. A quarter of a century later, that share has ten folded. China was changing from the “world’s factory” to a global economic player with its own highly-competitive firms and a growing middle class. Now, it dawned on people that China viewed its *normal* role in the global economy as being *the* economic superpower – surpassing the United States like they have passed the United Kingdom or Germany a century earlier. The security implications of China’s emergence as a global economic player were, however, ignored by most leaders in NATO countries. And yet, even today – in times of a populist, isolationist President in the White

House – there seems to be a wall of separation between economic and security policy. Defense spending is largely untouched by economic developments and economists rarely think about pressing issues around national security. Professors with glasses and suits seem to belong in classrooms and uniformed Generals ought to think about the national defense. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, with China as a rising global power, this will be a fatal mistake. It is important – from both an economic and a security standpoint – to consider who owns critical infrastructure, technology, and data. It is not a mere matter of competition within a free-market who develops the standards for Artificial Intelligence, 5G, data protection, Internet of Things, and whatever follows – it is a global fight for military supremacy. As it turns out, 1989 was not the *end of history*, just the end of the chapter – followed by a new one.

What will that chapter entail? What will a coherent NATO strategy towards China look like? Those are the questions that are asked more and more in the Alliance’s capitals. What does China want? How should we counteract its ambitions? There have been many impressive proposals by, for instance, Ian Brzezinski, son of one of the aforementioned foreign policy architects, who suggests the establishment of a NATO-China Council, deepened engagement with the Alliance’s Pacific partners, and the establishment of a small military headquarters element in the Indo-Pacific region. Interesting ideas, whose merit and practicality are a great subject for a podium discussion on NATO’s strategy in the coming years. It cannot and will not, however, be a comprehensive strategy for the entire 21<sup>st</sup> century.

To assess what a comprehensive and long-term NATO strategy towards China might look like, there needs to be a reckoning of what NATO really is. What is its purpose – its *raison d’être*? Looking at the preamble of the Alliance’s foundational document, the *North Atlantic Treaty*, one reads:

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democ-

racy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

If NATO wants to address the threats to the freedom, common heritage, rule of law, stability, and well-being of its member states, it has to stop thinking of itself as a mere *military* alliance. That does not mean, that a comprehensive military strategy is not needed, it is. The challenges to the common goals, laid out in the preamble are, however, more complex. There are three fields where this becomes abundantly dear: the threats to the Alliance's social fabric, its technological supremacy, and its infrastructure.

The first might seem like the least obvious security challenge. And yet, it is one of the most consequential developments that could threaten NATO to its core. Common values, mutual trust, and the belief in a shared destiny form a country's social fabric. It is what holds societies together and makes them strong. The ground-breaking work of economists David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, shows – perhaps for the first time – how the emergence of China as a major exporter to the West has changed much more than just the *Made in America* label on certain products. It started to erode the country's social fabric. In their series of papers discussing the 'China shock', they find that, in the United States, some local labor markets were hit much harder than others by growing Chinese import competition. What is remarkable, when looking at the map of those communities most hard-hit, is that it makes a pretty good match with another map: the electoral districts that Donald Trump carried in his 2016 election. The disruption of the stability and well-being of those communities, henceforth, disrupted the stability and well-being of the United States at large by promoting an isolationist, anti-multilateralist to the highest office in the land. All of a sudden, what seemed to be a mere economic matter has called into question the very strength of the North Atlantic Alliance and therefore posed a challenge to the security of NATO member states. Today, trade conflicts have started to drive a wedge between the Alliance's members.

Another threat to the social fabric of NATO member states is China's growing threat to, what the preamble summarizes as *the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law*. Recent reports that China is intensifying the repression of its Uighur minority should be a clear indication that a clash of an authoritarian superpower with NATO will also be a challenge to liberal democracies across the world. Beijing has used its economic power, and the growing dependency of many Western firms on the Chinese market, to also increase its political agenda. Increasingly, the government threatened companies with boycotts, leveraged its debt policies against poor nations and bought up critical infrastructure – the last point, I will address later on. An authoritarian government that spreads false information or suppresses critics attacks the very core of what NATO committed to protect – its democratic institutions. It does so, however, not by hacking the vote machines but by hacking its people's minds. Combined with the economic changes described earlier this might sow division between the states that make up the Alliance. Tech giants are already making deals, trading censorship for market access. *Deep fake* videos, virtual reality, and an increasingly connected world will require governments to think more about how they plan to control the narrative whilst protecting freedom of speech. Only then, will the Alliance be able to pursue and defend its strategic interests.

The second key challenge China poses to NATO is its threat to the Alliance's technological supremacy. And yet again, this threat is too often defined in too narrow terms. It is not only the technologies of new weapon systems that are of concern but rather the developments in 5G and Artificial Intelligence. In both of those cases, there is a tremendous *first-mover advantage* – that is, the country that will develop the technology first, will, subsequently, also have an advantage in all the various applications that follow. The *first-mover* will not just influence how fast a machine can make decisions but also set standards for what decisions they do make. This gives a country a great strategic advantage over others that lag behind. For NATO member states, this cannot be an issue that is resolved only at the

national stage. There needs to be extensive coordination within NATO to counter that strategic threat.

The third field in which NATO's strategic interests are challenged is in the Chinese approach to build and buy up critical infrastructure in NATO's hemisphere, through, for instance, the *Belt and Road Initiative* including its *Digital Silk Road* which includes the laying of undersea internet cables and the delivery of advanced IT infrastructure, including broadband networks, smart cities, and e-commerce hubs. And again, the threat is not a mere military threat. If you want to hurt a country's readiness, why would you bomb its port if you could just buy it? After all, those who destroy a port are met with anger and fear from the local population, buying the port just makes one a witty investor. This might be a pointing – or even cynical – description, there is, however, a real threat of such a scenario. In fact, it has already started to happen. It will greatly affect a country's defense readiness if its major cities are *smart cities* run on Chinese software and infrastructure. Disintegrating (or *decoupling*) those networks and supply chains is a much harder task than setting them up. NATO must, therefore, see it as a realistic threat to its security interest – even if it is supposed private companies, rather than governments, setting it up.

But what are the implications of all of this for NATO's strategy for the 21<sup>st</sup> century? I believe, that there needs to be a reckoning to expand NATO's current role. That means, there needs to be a *deepening* and *expansion*. A *deepening* of the cooperation from a mere military alliance towards a broader organization that facilitates cooperation also in matters concerning the regulation of trade, foreign investments, and markets. For this, there must be an *Economic Security Planning Group*, where key issues are discussed and strategic agreements are to be reached. Common standards for Chinese companies that want to enter into markets of NATO countries and for domestic companies that want to do business in China. Moreover, there needs to be common standards and efforts in the development and application of technology such as Artificial Intelligence and 5G. It is, hence, crucial that NATO builds up and coordinates capacities in the field of *economic diplomacy* – not as a substi-

tute to the diplomatic corps, but rather an addition to them. This must be accompanied by further *expansion* of NATO into the Indo-Pacific region by increasing co-operation with its countries on all levels. When NATO was set up, the strategic interests of its member states were mainly threatened in Europe. In the future, this line of conflict might shift to the Indo-Pacific region. In this case, defending North Atlantic interests must include a strong alliance with Indo-Pacific states.

"The lion cannot protect himself from traps, and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves," Niccolò Machiavelli writes in *The Prince*, "One must, therefore, be a fox to recognize traps, and a lion to frighten wolves." That, in conclusion, must be the goal of every coherent NATO strategy which calls for a strong military alliance that extensively cooperates on the economic, social, and technological front – so the lion won't walk into a trap.



**Tim B. Lienemann,  
Germany**

Graduate Student of  
International Economic Policy  
at Sciences Po Paris

Tim B. Lienemann is a graduate student of International Economic Policy at the Paris School of International Affairs at Sciences Po Paris, where his focus is on international trade and European policy. He grew up near Stuttgart, Germany, and has since then lived and studied in Austria, France and the United States. He holds a B.Sc. in Business, Economics and Social Sciences from the Vienna University of Economics and Business (WU) and spent a semester at Northeastern University in Boston, Massachusetts. His interest in the fields of economic diplomacy and international security stems from his work experience at the U.S. Department of State's Mission to the OSCE, the German embassy in Washington, D.C., as well as the German parliament. For his thesis, he is researching the effects of Chinese import-competition on local labor markets throughout the developed world.



**3<sup>rd</sup> Prize: 400 EUR, Stephan Gräfe**  
**Weaving a Net - The Network of New Security Strategies in the Face of China**

It cannot be denied that Beijing wants to become a world power and does not shy away from military conflict with nuclear powers. In the face of this emerging state of crisis in Chinese politics, the West must react if it does not want to endanger its interests. And in this course, NATO must also react, otherwise it will become obsolete.

In his diplomatically reserved manner, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has expressed this challenge: "This is not about moving NATO into the South China Sea," he stated, "but it's about taking into account that China is coming closer to us in the Arctic, in Africa, investing heavily in our infrastructure in Europe, in cyberspace." He could have also said: China is becoming a military and economic challenge that calls into question the role of NATO and the West as a leading global alliance, which can be seen not least in the fact that China is currently expanding its fleet, as did the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s.

So far, the country has rejected all nuclear disarmament agreements and has instead hinted that it wants to increase the number of warheads to 1,000, although this number need not remain the final quantitative target. Beijing is arming at a pace that leaves no one in any doubt as to where it wants to go. By the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic in 29 years at the latest, China is to be a world power – perhaps even more powerful than all the other states put together.

The consequences for NATO cannot be overlooked. For some time to come, China will be involved in almost every conflict on earth through its own military bases and its global economic investments. At the same time, because of Hong Kong and Taiwan, it finds itself in a similar foreign policy situation to Russia because of the Crimea, eastern Ukraine, Transnistria and Abkhazia – in its view, it has unresolved territorial problems which must be resolved by force if necessary. China also appears to be a technological challenge for the West. It is a leader in 5G communications, hypersonic weapons, quantum computers and artificial intelligence. It has

repeatedly demonstrated that it is willing to use these capabilities against the interests and security of the West. China's cyber-espionage and disinformation campaigns have become commonplace for all NATO allies – both their governments and private companies.

All of this makes the Alliance's engagement with China one of its most pressing tasks. As in the case of Russia, NATO's unity is a prerequisite for engaging in dialogue with the other side. Illusions about China are out of place, but so are illusions about what will happen if the Alliance remains silent on this global political challenge. This task seems all the more difficult as the Chinese leadership seems to enjoy its role as an ideological challenge to the West and its practice of liberal democracy. China is using its economic, technological and military power to promote its form of national authoritarianism around the world, with Beijing recently even suggesting that its political model is the most adept and agile response to today's coronavirus epidemic. So how should NATO respond to China's growing global assertiveness and what might be a NATO strategy to do so?

The Alliance's long-standing relations with the key democracies of the Indo-Pacific region are likely to be of particular relevance to the engagement with China. NATO has established global partnerships with Korea, New Zealand and Mongolia since 2012, Australia since 2013 and Japan in 2014. While these relationships are predominantly consultative, most of these Partners have contributed to NATO missions, including in Afghanistan.

As a further expression of this interest, NATO could establish liaison offices in Japan, Australia or South Korea. NATO can also help to develop and disseminate a transatlantic security strategy and a transatlantic security posture towards China. In any case, the objectives of this strategy should include developing cooperative relations with China and deterring China from undermining the interests of the transatlantic community. The latter would define the appropriate role and means by which the Alliance can contribute to deter and, if necessary, defend against Chinese aggression that threatens those interests.

In this context, NATO's civil and military capabilities should ideally be used to facilitate the defence and security component of a Western strategy towards China, including in the context of engagement, deterrence and defence tasks. 2 Similar to the NATO-Russia Council, whose roots go back to 1997, the Alliance should consider establishing a NATO-China Council. Its establishment could recognise and respond appropriately to China's growing influence and reach. This forum could also spur Allies to address the challenges posed by China in a more serious and comprehensive coordinated manner. It would demonstrate that this dimension of great-power competition is not a binary one that exists separately between China and the United States, but rather between China and the transatlantic community, which is linked across territories by shared values, interests and history. This forum could be useful in identifying and promoting opportunities for constructive cooperation with China, such as anti-piracy operations.

The launching and implementation of these initiatives will be an enduring effort and some Allies will no doubt be reluctant to add additional missions to NATO and their own forces when their own resources are already strained. The notion that a future NATO will consider combating threats in the Asia-Pacific region as one of its core tasks may seem unrealistic to many Allies today. Most European countries are currently struggling to build sufficient national and Alliance defence capabilities and show little willingness to adapt to new threats. However, it has already become clear in the past how quickly an international situation can change and how quickly NATO must be able to respond. In the 1990s, no one in Europe could have imagined that one day it would be possible to defend its own security interests in Afghanistan, 5500 kilometres away. This is exactly what happened literally overnight when the catastrophe of 11 September 2001 fundamentally changed the world situation. China's political movements are taking place more slowly, there is still time to react. Moreover, the initiatives mentioned above will have comparatively low overall costs and can build on the already common military operations of Europe, the United States and Canada in the Pacific region.

In any case, something must be done now, and pressure is growing - from the population as well.

The European attitude towards China alone has hardened considerably in recent times. Only eighteen months ago, many Europeans were content to regard China, despite its authoritarian political system and aggressive behaviour in the Pacific, as an economic partner that does not take the rules too seriously. They were prepared to turn a blind eye. 3 That has changed since then, as Europe has increasingly seen Beijing's diplomatic and economic readiness to go to war with those who criticise its actions and policies. In March 2019, the European Union formally described China as a "strategic competitor", "an economic competitor" and "a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance". And Beijing's belligerent behaviour in the wake of the current coronavirus pandemic has only strengthened this new European perspective.

However a NATO strategy for China alone will not be a sufficient solution to the increasingly tense relationship between the West and Beijing. A coherent and effective transatlantic strategy for China will have to be comprehensive, i.e. a strategy that uses the totality of diplomatic, economic, technological, social and military capabilities and dynamics that define geopolitical power. In order to achieve maximum success, it must create a new identity cohesion, combine the capacities of both Europe and North America and be further strengthened through cooperation with the Community's democratic partners in the Indo-Pacific region. These individual points must be carefully and closely interlinked in order to form a truly draught-proof network.

As the institution that has effectively pooled the military capabilities of the transatlantic community and built relationships with the Indo-Pacific leaders, NATO is well placed to foster this cooperation. Such a NATO engagement would help to underscore that Beijing's belligerence risks provoking a geopolitically costly response from a vibrant and united global coalition of democracies. NATO's potential role in a transatlantic strategy towards China should therefore not be underestimated; in a sense, it is its foundation.

Stephan Gräfe

# 2021

## **Schulen | *Schools in Heidelberg/Weinheim***

Thema | *Topic:*

Zusammenhalt in der Gesellschaft –  
gerade auch in schwierigen Zeiten ..... 84

## **Litauen Mykolas Romeris Universität | *Lithuania Mykolas Romeris University***

Thema | *Topic:*

NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg refers to 2021 as a year of opportunity to re-energize transatlantic relations and to strengthen the bond between Europe and North America. What significance would this have for the Baltic States and how can Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia contribute to strengthen the transatlantic partnership? ..... 95

## **Parlamentarische Versammlung der NATO | *NATO Parliamentary Assembly***

Thema | *Topic:*

What role do you see for NATO as an alliance of democracies in these efforts? How can NATO play its part in defending and promoting democracy and democratic values? ..... 109

## Thema | Topic:

### Zusammenhalt in der Gesellschaft – gerade auch in schwierigen Zeiten

**1. Preis: 600 EUR, Maya Seitz des Bunsen-Gymnasiums Heidelberg, Jahrgangsstufe 1  
Dr. Karl A. Lamers Friedens-Preis**

#### „Zusammenhalt innerhalb der Gesellschaft – gerade auch in schwierigen Zeiten“ Was ist überhaupt gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt?

Seien wir doch mal ganz ehrlich.  
So ganz wissen wir es nicht...

Es gibt zig verschiedene Definitionen von dem Begriff gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt. Die eine komplizierter als die andere. Die dritte mit mehr Studien belegt, als die vierte. Und nach einer anderthalbstündigen Recherche weiß ich letztendlich immer noch nicht, was es jetzt wirklich bedeutet...

#### Also probiere ich es einfach mal so:

Zusammenhalt innerhalb der Gesellschaft ist deshalb so schwer zu definieren, da er sehr vielfältig ist, von jedem unterschiedlich wahrgenommen sowie definiert wird und nicht sichtbar ist. Er ist etwas sehr subtiles, fragiles und leicht zu übersehen, wenn man nicht richtig hinschaut. Es geht dabei um ein Miteinander, Aufmerksamkeit, um Achtsamkeit, Erkenntnis, Verständnis und auch um Akzeptanz gegenüber gesellschaftlicher Vielfalt. Zuletzt ist er ausschlaggebend für den Erhalt einer freien und solidarischen Gesellschaft und das Verbundenheitsgefühl zu der Gesellschaft spielt hierbei eine große Rolle.

Wie sehr haben Sie sich bei der WM 2014 gefreut, als Mario Götze in der 113. Minute das entscheidende Tor geschossen hat? Wie hoch sind Sie gesprungen? Wie laut haben Sie gejubelt? Wie vielen sind Sie in den Arm gefallen? Und wie sehr haben Sie sich zu diesem Zeitpunkt mit anderen verbunden gefühlt und den Zusammenhalt förmlich gespürt?

Ich kann nur für mich sprechen, aber immer, wenn ein großes Fußballerevent bevorstand und ich durch die Stadt gefahren bin, habe ich mindestens doppelt so viele Menschen angelächelt, oder mitgefiebert, wenn irgendjemand mal wieder „let's go Deutschland!“ geschrien hat. In dem Buch „Fußball und Nationalstolz in Deutschland:

Eine repräsentative Panelstudie rund um die EM 2016“ von Michael Mutz und Markus Gerke wurde dargelegt, dass sich „eine bestimmte Facette der nationalen Identifikation mit der Nation besonders stark im Verlauf des Turniers [Fußball-EM2012] veränderte, nämlich das Verbundenheitsgefühl zu den Menschen des eigenen Landes“. Warum, frage ich mich? Und wo geht dieses Verbundenheitsgefühl bzw. der Zusammenhalt nach solch einem Event hin?

#### Verloren?

Ich glaube nicht, ich glaube, die Gesellschaft hat nach einem solchen Event nur keinen Grund mehr diesen Zusammenhalt so offensichtlich zu zeigen. Warum auch, wenn wir in einer Gesellschaft leben, in der die meisten nur auf sich selbst achten? Einen stressigen Alltag und besonders in Krisenzeit anderes um die Ohren haben?

Wenn man sich dessen jedoch bewusst ist, dass der Zusammenhalt nie ganz weg ist, sondern nur leicht zu übersehen ist, man dafür ein Verständnis entwickelt, kann man achtsamer und aufmerksamer auf den Zusammenhalt und dessen Gefährdung in Krisenzeiten blicken.

Denn so subtil, wie der Zusammenhalt ist: Wird er auch durch Kleinigkeiten gestärkt und erhalten. So konnten wir durch die Corona-Pandemie zwar aufgrund der räumlichen Trennung zu anderen Menschen kaum oder keinen aktiven Zusammenhalt zeigen, allerdings konnten wir uns passiv über diesen informieren und uns sensibilisieren. Gerade über Rassismus, Antisemitismus, Homophobie, Ausländerfeindlichkeit, der Generationskonflikt, die sozialen Ungleichheiten, fehlende Gleichberechtigung, Vorurteile, all die alt bekannten Probleme, die den gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt schwächen, konnten wir tiefgründiger nachdenken und versuchen diese zu verstehen oder Lösungen zu finden. Die Corona-Pandemie hat uns beispielsweise durchaus mehr für die Lebensweisen anderer innerhalb der Gesellschaft sensibilisiert. Dies zeigen auch Studien, wie die der Organisation More in Common. Deren Umfragen ergaben, dass 74% der befragten Deutschen finden, dass die Corona-Pandemie „uns daran erinnert, dass wir unabhängig von unserer Herkunft als Menschen im Grunde alle gleich sind“. Ein wichtiger Punkt.

Denn wenn man erkannt hat, dass wir alle gleich sind, dann fällt es einem auch leichter, Gemeinsamkeiten zu finden und sich mit egal wem verbunden zu fühlen.

Auch eine Art des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhaltes ist die Unterstützung lokaler Händler\*innen. So analysierte das IFH KÖLN anlässlich der Corona-Krise, im Rahmen des „Corona Consumer Check“, bevölkerungsrepräsentativ das Stimmungsbild zum Konsumverhalten in Deutschland. Hierbei kam heraus, dass rund ein Drittel der Befragten vermehrt lokale Händler\*innen unterstützen.

Und auch die Hilfe nach den aktuellen Hochwasser- und Fluten-Katastrophen im Juli 2021 zeigt einen deutlichen gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt. Nicht nur in Form von Spenden gab es eine sehr große Unterstützung; beispielsweise über die Sat.1- Spendengala, bei der 31.155.430 Euro Spenden für Betroffene der Unwetterkatastrophe eingegangen sind oder die ARD-Benefizgala, welche unter dem Motto „Wir halten zusammen!“ mehr als 6,5 Millionen Euro sammelte. Aber auch von freiwilligen Helfer\*innen. Nach Angaben des Bundesinnenministeriums sind in den Hochwassergebieten in Rheinland-Pfalz und NordrheinWestfalen täglich mehr als 2.500 Helferinnen und Helfer des Technischen Hilfswerks im Einsatz und tausende freiwillige Helfer\*innen.

Zusammenfassend ist also die Erinnerung an Momente, wie die WM 2014, in denen wir uns besonders stark mit unseren Mitmenschen verbunden gefühlt haben und wie viel Vertrauen wir uns innerhalb der Gesellschaft gegenseitig schenken, sehr wichtig, um den Zusammenhalt innerhalb einer Gesellschaft zu gewährleisten. Genauso wichtig ist ebenfalls das sowohl aktive, als auch passive soziale Engagement von allen Mitbürger\*innen, das alltägliche Handeln und das Achten auf die Kleinigkeiten. Sich beispielsweise in Kontakt mit Nachbar\*innen zu treten oder im Umkreis über Portale, wie nebenan.de, uns gegenseitig zu unterstützen, ist bereits gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt, der wichtig ist.

Schlussendlich muss jedoch auch noch der Wille gegeben sein, einen starken Zusammenhalt in der Gesellschaft beizubehalten bzw. zu erreichen, denn wie so oft zählt: Wo kein Wille ist, ist auch kein Weg. Sondern nur eine Menge guter Ausreden.

#### Quellen:

[https://www.moreincommon.de/media/gu2h03pc/more-in-common\\_studie-coronazusammenhalt.pdf](https://www.moreincommon.de/media/gu2h03pc/more-in-common_studie-coronazusammenhalt.pdf), 11.1.21, 9:00 Uhr  
<https://sozialministerium.badenwuerttemberg.de/de/service/presse/pressemitteilung/pid/gesellschaftlicherzusammenhalt-in-baden-wuerttemberg-stark-und-stabil/> 11.1.21, 9:33  
<https://www.dieandereteilung.de/>, 12.1.21, 9:10  
[https://www.hvbayern.de/media/downloads/newsletter/TopNews/2021/07/Lokal\\_IFH.pdf](https://www.hvbayern.de/media/downloads/newsletter/TopNews/2021/07/Lokal_IFH.pdf) 25.07.21, 16:34  
[https://www.swr.de/swraktuell/rheinland-pfalz/live-blog-hochwasser-rlp100-detailPage-1\\_dc56264c3eed6f7453c3f263012a8308a11ab691.html](https://www.swr.de/swraktuell/rheinland-pfalz/live-blog-hochwasser-rlp100-detailPage-1_dc56264c3eed6f7453c3f263012a8308a11ab691.html) 25.07.21, 17:11  
[https://www.swr.de/swraktuell/rheinland-pfalz/live-blog-hochwasser-bis-20072021-rlp100-detailPage-3\\_0a9443d768a41f91273d6f15857d941e2563f4e4.html](https://www.swr.de/swraktuell/rheinland-pfalz/live-blog-hochwasser-bis-20072021-rlp100-detailPage-3_0a9443d768a41f91273d6f15857d941e2563f4e4.html) 25.7.21, 17:44  
<https://www1.wdr.de/nachrichten/hochwasser-helfer-logistik-100.html> 25.07.21, 17:50 • <https://nebenan.de/> 25.07.21, 18:00

## 2. Preis: 500 EUR, Annika Portuné des Dietrich-Bonhoeffer-Gymnasiums Weinheim, Klasse 12

### Zusammenhalt in schwersten Zeiten – in Zeiten des Abschiednehmens – des Todes.

Annika Portuné

Dietrich-Bonhoeffer-Gymnasium Weinheim

Dr. Karl A. Lamers Friedens- Stiftung

Wettbewerbsaufruf Schuljahr 2020/2021

Thema: „Zusammenhalt in der Gesellschaft – gerade auch in schwierigen Zeiten“

Alle paar Jahre geschieht es, dass kluge Menschen sich fragen: „Was können wir tun, um den Zusammenhalt in der Gesellschaft zu wahren?“ Betretenes Schweigen ist die Folge, manch einer stiehlt sich aus dem Raum, oder streicht sich verlegen mit dem Finger über den genähten Saum.

Von denen, die bleiben, lachen einige höhnisch, betrachten den Fragesteller ziemlich argwöhnisch, andere behaupten, das sei unmöglich, wieder andere flüstern, die Idee an sich sei loblich.

Die größte Gruppe bringt nichts als ein müdes Lächeln zustande, sagt, sie wolle eine Sache hinzufügen, nur so ganz am Rande: Alleine könne man nichts erreichen, das müsse man verstehen und die Idee des „Zusammenhalt Wahrens“ mit einem dicken Geht nicht! quer versehen.

Mich fragt leider niemand, bin kein Mensch und zähle nichts ins Ganze, hallo, hier bin ich, die vertrocknete Topfpflanze.

Niemand hört mir zu, fragt nach meiner Meinung, fordert mich auf: „Berichte!“, aber ich weiß, du, du hörst mir zu, deshalb erzähle ich die folgende Geschichte.

Ein Setzling noch war ich, reichlich grün hinter den Ohren, ward aber dennoch zu einem besonderen Stehplatz auserkoren. Stand auf einem Tisch in der Intensivstation, wenn du das Wort nicht kennst: Man könnte sagen, da kommt es zur menschlichen Desertifikation.

Doch genug der heitren Worte, denn mein Platz hatte zu eigen, dass ich täglich Situationen erlebte, bei denen sie in Filmen zu spielen anfangen mit den Geigen.

Von einer würde ich dir gerne berichten und mich dabei weiter versuchen am Dichten.

Margarete hieß sie, war alt und blickte zurück auf ein glückliches Leben, mit genug Zeit, ihre Geschichte mit den Liebsten zu verweben. Sie hatte keine Angst, bis auf eine, die sie bis zum Ende hielt geheim, es war die Angst, eines Tages sterben zu müssen und das ganz allein.

Aber genauso kam es, warum, lass mich dir erklären, es gab ein Virus, genannt Corona, das konnte Margarete ihren Wunsch verwehren.

Ihre Familie wollte zu ihr, doch sie wurde nicht gelassen, Margarete war alleine und vollkommen verlassen. Abgeschlossen lag sie hinter tausend weißen Gängen, was es ziemlich weit nach oben schafft, in denen der Traurigkeit zugehörigen Rängen.

Um es kurz zu machen: Zwischen ihr und ihren Liebsten lag ein einziges Wort, mit Namen Quarantäne, wenn du es nicht kennst, schau´ s nach, im Buch der seltsamen Phänomene.

Während die alte Dame also starb, war niemand bei ihr, den sie liebte. Es ist also eine Lüge, dachte sie traurig, dass Liebe am Ende angeblich immer siegte.

Margarete schloss die Augen, um diese Leere nicht zu ertragen, bis sie eine Hand in ihrer spürt, und beschließt, das Sehen ein letztes Mal noch zu wagen.

Es ist nicht ihre Tochter, die hier sitzt und ihre Hand hält, doch jemand ist da und das bedeutet der alten Dame die Welt.

Es ist Anna, die Krankenschwester, die ihr zulächelt und ihre Hand ganz sanft drückt, obwohl sie gar nicht dürfte, aber sie tut es, denn sie weiß, die Regeln machen verrückt.

Leise flüstert sie, sie sei Margarete dankbar, so lange durchgehalten zu haben, und für diese Welt dagewesen zu sein, an guten, wie an schlechten Tagen. Bei alledem hier müsse sie nicht traurig sein oder sich grämen, schließlich vermag der Tod nur den Körper uns zu nehmen.

So starb die alte Dame, mit einem Lächeln und ganz ohne Angst ich bin mir ziemlich sicher, dass sie da oben schon wieder tanzt.

Was also ist so anders an Anna, warum ist sie ein Held? denn da sind wir uns doch einig: Leute wie sie braucht die Welt!

Meine Deutung des Ganzen ist, wenn man das einer Topfpflanze denn erlaubt, das Besondere an Anna ist, dass sie an ihre Macht auf dieser Erde glaubt. Es geht nicht darum, die Welt zu retten und im Meer der unendlichen Möglichkeiten nach einer ultimativen Lösung zu tauchen, sondern darum, heute für die Menschen da zu sein, die uns mehr als alles andere brauchen.

Denn Margaretes letzte Worte waren: „Wenn nur mehr Menschen wären wie du“, die sie ganz leise haucht

und das bringt mich dazu, zu vermuten, dass das der Zusammenhalt in der Gesellschaft ist, den man am Allermeisten braucht

### **3. Preis: 400 EUR, Tansania AG des Elisabeth-von-Thadden-Gymnasiums Heidelberg Partnerschaftsprojekt mit Schülern aus Tansania**

#### **„Zusammenhalt in der Gesellschaft – gerade auch in schwierigen Zeiten“**

Seit fünf Jahren besteht nun schon eine lebendige, gelebte Partnerschaft zwischen der Elisabeth-von-Thadden Schule und der Iambi Secondary School in Tansania. Die Tansania-Partnerschaft wird an der Schule durch eine ganzjährige, stufenübergreifende, freiwillige AG getragen, die schülerverantwortlich geleitet wird und eine Gemeinschaft aus Schülerinnen und Schülern der 5. Klasse bis zur K2 (12. Klasse) umfasst.

Grundlage unseres Partnerschaftskonzepts bilden wechselseitige Begegnungsreisen! Wir besuchen einander und werden Teil von Alltag, Familie, Schule und gesellschaftlichem Leben im Land der Partner. Einmal im Jahr reisen wir mit circa 10 Schülern (aus der AG) nach Tansania, im Jahr darauf kommt dann eine entsprechende Gruppe aus Tansania zu uns. Wir (alle) wohnen auf dem Gelände der Boarding School in den Schlafsälen und teilen hautnah den Alltag in allen Facetten. Tagsüber nehmen wir am Unterricht teil, nachmittags arbeiten wir gemeinsam an global learning Projekten.

In den schwierigen Zeiten der Pandemie haben wir unsere Begegnung und unseren Austausch auf digitale Plattformen verlegen müssen und versuchen nun so, Zusammenhalt, Freundschaft, Anteilnahme und Auseinandersetzung fortzuführen. Derzeit läuft ein Kurzfilm-Interview-Projekt auf beiden Seiten, um einen Querschnitt durch die gesellschaftliche Corona-Befindlichkeit in unseren Ländern zu erheben und darüber ins Gespräch zu kommen.

Die schülerverantwortliche Arbeit wird von einem Erwachsenenteam begleitet. Dabei sind uns die Reflexion des eigenen Standpunkts und Wahrnehmung des anderen sowie achtsame Kommunikation wichtig.

Unsere Begegnungsreisen (sowohl bedingt die eigene als auch die der Partner) finanzieren wir durch eigene Fundraising Projekte (Weihnachtsmarkt, Fundraisinglauf...), die über das Jahr von der AG organisiert werden. Auch hier mussten wir uns in Zeiten von social distancing neu erfinden.

Wir haben es geschafft, im vergangenen Schuljahr trotz social distancing stufenübergreifende Gruppen zu verbinden und Freundschaften durch gemeinsame Arbeit an Projekten zu stärken. Ein großer Bestandteil unserer Partnerschaft zu der Schule in Tansania ist die Begegnung, die vor allem über Reisen und gemeinsames Erleben von Alltagskultur, Schule, Familie und der gemeinsamen Auseinandersetzung mit gesellschaftlichen Fragen.

Um diese Begegnungsreisen möglich zu machen, veranstalten wir über das Jahr hinweg unterschiedlichste Fundraising Projekte, so einen

Weihnachtsmarkt mit hochwertigen selbstgestalteten Produkten, (z B genähten Produkten aus tansanischen Stoffen, etc.). Dieser findet unter normalen Umständen auf dem Weihnachtsmarkt des Stadtteils in Wieblingen statt. Innovativ denken und sich neu erfinden war gefragt und so kam es, dass wir den Weihnachtsmarkt auf das Schulgelände verlegt haben und eine Woche lang die Schulgemeinschaft mit dem wohl einzigen Weihnachtsmarkt der Stadt beglückten. Nicht nur die AG hat sich daran beteiligt, der Musik LK spielte live Musik und viele Eltern kauften über ihre Kinder gebastelte goodies, von denen man einen Snack pack durch einen von Schülern eingerichteten online Katalog bekommen hatte. Es war eine gelungene Aktion, bei der sowohl LehrerInnen als auch SchülerInnen kurzzeitig den Alltagscoronastress vergessen durften und heitere Gemeinschaft und gemeinsame Verantwortung erleben durften.

Ein weiteres Projekt ist der alljährliche Sponsorenlauf, den wir im Rahmen des Heidelberger Halbmarathons veranstalten. Durch die frühe Absage der Stadt hatten wir viel Zeit, um neue Ideen zu entwickeln. Ein Projekt, in dem die ganze Schule involviert ist, während keiner sich live treffen darf! Dieses Jahr starteten wir am ursprünglich geplanten Tag des Heidelberger Henkellaufs und liefen als Schulgemeinschaft "nach Tansania"! Die Challenge war es, durch die individuellen Laufbeiträge in Summe als Gemeinschaft zusammen die 10.400 km Entfernung nach Tansania in einem Zeitraum von acht Wochen zu bewältigen. Das ehrgeizige Laufprojekt endete am 20. Juni 2021. Wir rannten mit der technischen Unterstützung des start up Unternehmens TeamFit, deren App es uns möglich machte, verschiedene Teams zu haben und Updates zu bekommen, wie weit wir es tatsächlich schon geschafft haben. Rund um Heidelberg haben wir ein QR-CodeNetz aufgebaut, deren Strecken auch der Heidelberger Bevölkerung zugänglich waren und auf einer running map nachvollzogen werden konnten und zur Bewegung anreizte, in Zeiten von Homeoffice und Homeschooling. Auf diesen Codes war neben den Laufstrecken eine von Schülern designte Partnerschaftsseite verlinkt, die nicht nur über unser Partnerschaftsprojekt informierte, sondern außerdem unserem langjährigen Sponso-

ring-Partner Engelhorn in den für die Textilbranche besonders schwierigen Zeit der Geschäftsschließung eine Werbeplattform bot. Engelhorn hat uns als AG jahrelang mit Laufhirs ausgestattet und unsere Partnerschaft sichtbar in die Welt getragen. Partnerschaft ist etwas Gegenseitiges, wo man Verantwortung übernimmt und die Interessen der Partner im Blick hat. So kamen wir auf die Idee, dass gerade in Corona Zeiten, in denen Modehäuser um ihre Existenz kämpfen, wir als Partner gefordert sind, die Unterstützung zurückzugeben. Die Geschäftsführung von Engelhorn ließ sich erfreut auf unser Konzept ein!

Auch unsere globalen Partner in Tansania hat das Lauffieber gepackt: unter dem Segen des stellvertretenden Bischofs haben auch sie sich auf den Weg Richtung Deutschland gemacht. So rannten nicht nur wir „gemeinsam“ nach Tansania, sondern auch eine Delegation von Tansaniern rannte Richtung Deutschland - getragen von der Hoffnung, durch die gesponserten Kilometer der nächsten Begegnung näher gekommen zu sein. Das verbindet!



So öffnete Corona neue Chancen, wo zunächst das Scheitern aller geplanten Events unausweichlich war. Es entstand Begegnung auf neuen Ebenen. Auch unsere Global Learning Projektarbeit haben wir umstellen müssen: wo sonst gemeinsames Lernen vor Ort üblich war, mussten wir auf digitale Medien umstellen. Das ist, besonders im Hinblick auf die technischen Möglichkeiten unserer Partner, eine riesige Herausforderung. Aufgabe war es nun für die Tansanier und für uns ein Kurzclip über die Corona-Befindlichkeit in der Bevölkerung des eigenen Landes zu machen. Wir interviewten unterschiedlichste Menschen aus verschiedenen sozialen Bereichen und Arbeitsfeldern und kamen so in kleinen digitalen Teams in Gespräch, Austausch, Reflexion und Begegnung, trotz aller Einschränkungen. Es öffnete uns den Blick, dass unsere Perspektive als SchülerInnen im Homeschooling nicht die einzige auf die Wirklichkeit in der Pandemie in unserem eigenen Land ist, wie polarisierend die Einschränkungen unserer Freiheit von verschiedenen Blickwinkeln in der Gesellschaft wahrgenommen werden, wie wichtig Diskurs und gesellschaftsverantwortliches Denken und Handeln gerade in Krisenzeiten ist und wie schnell Not und Unzufriedenheit den inneren und äußeren Frieden in der Welt bedrohen können.



Zugleich eröffnete uns das Projekt einen „Weltblick“, indem wir begannen wahrzunehmen, dass die Pandemie in Afrika nur eine Krankheit neben vielen ist und ihr ein ganz anderer Stellenwert beigemessen wird und dass zugleich solche globalen Krisen nur „weltsolidarisch“ begegnet werden kann. Wir erlebten wieder neu, wie viele Blickwinkel und Umgehensweisen es auf die gleichen Grundgegebenheiten eigentlich gibt, lernen zuzuhören, zu verstehen statt zu bewerten. Wir trafen uns online und waren trotzdem verbunden, äußerlich durch das gemeinsame Thema und die Neugierde, in die Wahrnehmung des anderen einzutauchen, innerlich durch die Verbundenheit der Begegnung der vergangenen Jahre und die Hoffnung, uns bald wieder zu sehen.



Hier finden Sie den Link zu den Impressionen des Weihnachtsmarktes:

<https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/16UvpxvaUiCEeGKb-DklBpgSGlr5X2sqr?usp=sharing> Den Laufspaß der Tansanier zu Beginn des Laufes: (YouTube-Tansania AG Thadden)

Und ein Beispiel Interview zu der Corona-Befindlichkeit in Deutschland: <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wycGTiZpL36RddyqsZA8xpN456bFC99v/view?ts=60f75d46>

#### 4. Preis: 300 EUR, Carlotta Ritzhaupt des Bunsen-Gymnasiums Heidelberg, Jahrgangsstufe 1

##### Zusammenhalt in der Gesellschaft – gerade in schwierigen Zeiten. Wie lässt sich gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt fördern?

Wie lässt sich gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt fördern? Gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt ist ein Wert, der zeigt, ob ein Gemeinwesen intakt und solidarisch ist. Menschen helfen einander und setzen sich für das Gemeinwesen ein. Des Weiteren macht ein starker gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt eine Gesellschaft lebenswerter und zukunftsfähiger. Häufig wird gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt auch als Ressource betrachtet, welche die Voraussetzung für volkswirtschaftlichen Erfolg sowie das Funktionieren einer Demokratie ist. Alles in allem bringt gesellschaftliche Teilhabe viele Vorteile für den Einzelnen. Zusammenhalten und sich gegenseitig zu unterstützen macht eine Gesellschaft stärker und hilft den Mitgliedern der Gesellschaft, ein zufriedenes und erfülltes Leben zu führen. Das Ausschließen einzelner beziehungsweise ganzer Gruppen birgt hingegen große Gefahren. Gerade in schwierigen Zeiten, wie während der Flüchtlingskrise 2015, in Zeiten der Digitalisierung, des Klimawandels und einer Pandemie ist gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt besonders wichtig, aber auch gefährdet. Es gilt ihn zu fördern. Doch wie steht es um den gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt in Deutschland und wie genau lässt sich dieser, vor allem in Krisenzeiten, fördern?

Zunächst ist es hilfreich sich mit einigen Statistiken zu beschäftigen. Die Bertelsmann Stiftung hat einige Studien zu diesem Thema durchgeführt. Anhand von 36 Indikatoren wird der Zusammenhalt auf einer Skala von 0 (niedrig) bis 100 (hoch) bewertet. Die Werte haben sich in den letzten drei Jahren kaum verändert: In Ostdeutschland einschließlich Berlin blieb der Wert 2017 im Vergleich mit dem Jahr 2020 gleich - bei 58. In Westdeutschland stieg er hingegen von einem Wert von 60 im Jahr 2017 auf einen Wert von 62 für das Jahr 2020. Dies führte dazu, dass der Wert trotz Pandemie im Gesamtindex um einen Punkt zugenommen hatte und auf einem Wert von 61 stand.

Im Februar und März 2020 wurden in einer weiteren Studie der Bertelsmann Stiftung 3010 Personen repräsentativ befragt, 1000 von ihnen ein weiteres Mal in den Monaten Mai und Juni 2020. Im Februar verspürten 46% einen gefährdeten Zusammenhalt in Deutschland. Doch durch die andauernde Pandemie sank dieser Wert auf 40% im März und 36% im Mai/Juni. Des Weiteren hatten 41% noch im Februar das Gefühl die Menschen würden sich nicht um ihre Mitmenschen kümmern. Im März lag dieser Wert schon nur noch bei 31% und im Mai/Juni hatte er sich im Vergleich zum Anfang schon fast halbiert auf 21%. Doch woran liegt es, dass die Menschen trotz einer Krise einen starken Zusammenhalt der Gesellschaft verspüren? Gerade am Anfang der Pandemie war die Angst der Menschen groß, da niemand so genau wusste, was da auf sie zukam. Während der ersten Welle wurde daher viel zu den Politikern und Forschern geschaut und auf ihre Anweisungen geachtet. Die Menschen fingen an mehr aufeinander zu achten und waren solidarisch mit den Menschen, die von der Krankheit besonders betroffen waren, wie Infizierte, Angehörige von Infizierten aber auch besonders mit Menschen, die in systemrelevanten Berufen arbeiteten, wie Krankenschwestern. Nachdem die erste Welle überstanden war - circa im Mai 2020 - waren viele Menschen erleichtert und dankbar, da das Schlimmste als überstanden galt. Dies könnte die Zahlen der Befragung erklären. Doch die Pandemie war leider noch nicht zu Ende. Mit dem zweiten Lockdown Richtung Jahresende sank die Bewertung des Zusammenhalts von dem Wert, der sich ursprünglich Anfang des Jahres positiver als im Vorgängerjahr entwickelt hatte, wieder auf den ursprünglichen Wert. Junge Menschen unter 30, bei denen die Unterstützung der Corona-Maßnahmen am Größten ist, äußerten dann große Zukunftssorgen und 71% der Befragten fühlten sich einsam. Viele von ihnen klagten neben zunehmenden psychischen Problemen und Vereinsamung darüber, dass sie sich von der Politik im Stich gelassen fühlten. All diese Aspekte können zu einer Schwächung des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhaltes führen. Wenn man in die USA schaut, so sieht man, was es bedeutet ein, wenn ein Land gespalten ist und was für eine Mammutaufgabe es für die neue Regierung unter Präsident Biden ist, diese

Gesellschaft wieder zu vereinen. Denkt man konkret an die Erstürmung des Kapitols, so bemerkt man, dass eine gespaltene Gesellschaft auch konkret eine Gefahr für die Demokratie bilden kann. Eine Vielzahl von Maßnahmen ist also auf der anderen Seite des Atlantiks nötig, um die amerikanische Gesellschaft wieder mehr zusammenzubringen.

Die deutsche Bundesregierung hat nicht nur durch das Beispiel der USA diese Problematik erkannt und 2020 das „Forschungsinstitut Gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt“ (FGZ) gegründet. Das FGZ soll die Auswirkungen der Herausforderungen vor denen wir stehen, wie Digitalisierung, die Corona-Krise oder auch den Klimawandel untersuchen, um herauszufinden, was unsere Gesellschaft zusammenhält und wie der Zusammenhalt gestärkt werden kann. Dafür sollen in den nächsten vier Jahren über 70 Projekte durchgeführt werden, wobei thematisch beispielsweise Aspekte wie Medien, Konfliktkulturen, Polarisierung und Populismus abgedeckt werden. Das Ziel aller Untersuchungen ist es am Ende Handlungsempfehlungen an die Politik zu geben wobei die Interessen der Bevölkerung berücksichtigt und Politik und die Öffentlichkeit stark in die Forschung einbezogen werden.

Ein weiterer Aspekt um den Zusammenhalt unserer Gesellschaft zu stärken ist politische Bildung. Es gilt das Bewusstsein der Gesellschaft für unsere Demokratie und die Grundrechte zu schärfen. So kommt es zu mehr mündigen, engagierten und informierten Bürgern, die von ihren Freiheiten Gebrauch machen und Verantwortung für die Gesellschaft übernehmen. Wenn Menschen Wissen und Kompetenzen erlangen, so können sie sich besser ein eigenes Urteil bilden. Generell gilt, dass man dort in der Gesellschaft ansetzen muss, wo der Zusammenhalt der Gesellschaft in der freiheitlichen Demokratie gefährdet ist. Deshalb ist es gut, dass es die Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung gibt. Sie schafft Verständnis für Sachverhalte, demokratisches Bewusstsein und fördert die politische Mitarbeit. All diese Aspekte helfen dem Zusammenhalt in der Gesellschaft.

Förderprogramme, welche Respekt und Toleranz stärken können, helfen Menschen mehr zusammenzubringen. Beispielsweise existiert schon

das Programm „Zusammenhalt durch Teilhabe“. Es fördert konkret Projekte, die sich für die demokratische Teilhabe und gegen Extremismus in ländlichen oder strukturschwachen Regionen einsetzen. Ehrenamtliche führen zum Beispiel Coachings oder Vernetzungsangebote durch. Vereine und Initiativen, die schon existieren, werden weiter auf- und ausgebaut oder es werden Methoden entwickelt, um Menschen dauerhaft für ehrenamtliche Arbeit zu begeistern. Besonders Vereine und ehrenamtliches Engagement sind wichtige Säulen, die dabei helfen den gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt zu stärken. Sportvereine, die Freiwillige Feuerwehr oder auch das Technische Hilfswerk bringen Menschen aus den unterschiedlichsten Schichten zusammen, wodurch das gegenseitige Verständnis gesteigert werden kann und so der Zusammenhalt gestärkt wird. Auch öffentliche Orte wie Parks können zu einem Zusammentreffen der Menschen beitragen. Oder auch die Kirche, durch die die Menschen wegen ihres ähnlichen Glaubens verbunden sind. Egal aus welcher Schicht sie stammen, kann das für eine Zusammenführung und so für einen besseren Zusammenhalt sorgen. Bei all diesen Orten und Angeboten kommt es am meisten darauf an, dass die Menschen miteinander reden. Deshalb sind kommunikative Maßnahmen wichtig, denn stärken auch Respekt und Toleranz.

Ein letzter Aspekt ist die Sozialpolitik. Besonders Politiker sollten versuchen den Gegensatz zwischen Arm und Reich zu verringern und Kinderarmut zu bekämpfen. Denn Kinder sind die Erwachsenen der Zukunft und wenn sie Chancen haben beispielsweise eine gute Bildung zu erlangen, so werden sie auch besser verstehen, warum gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt wichtig ist und ihn stärken. Die Arbeit, die die Regierung in die nachfolgenden Generationen steckt wird sich irgendwann in dem Verhalten der Menschen widerspiegeln und sie werden der Gesellschaft im besten Fall wieder etwas zurückgeben. Ein negatives Beispiel für starken gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt ist allerdings das Dritte Reich, denn damals basierte er auf der Aufrechterhaltung von Unterdrückungsverhältnissen: Unterschiedliche Gruppen von Menschen wurden systematisch ausgeschlossen. Heute basiert gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt auf freiheitlich

demokratischen Werten und Normen, weshalb man prinzipiell davon ausgehen kann, dass sich eine derartig negative Entwicklung nicht wiederholt.

Zusammenfassend ist festzuhalten, dass gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt ein Merkmal des Gemeinwesens und nicht des Individuums ist. Es ist wichtig für unsere Gesellschaft ihn aufrecht zu erhalten und es gibt viele Möglichkeiten dies zu tun. Dies ist die gemeinsame Aufgabe des Staates aber auch der Gesellschaft. Denn um Herausforderungen gut zu bewältigen, gilt es eine selbstbewusste und robuste Zivilgesellschaft zu haben, die zusammenhält und dem Staat hilft. Jeder Bürger und jede Bürgerin ist aufgefordert mitzuhelfen, um den gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt zu stärken und zu fördern.

#### Quellensammlung:

[https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/institut-zusammenhalt-1756244\(02.07.2021\)](https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/institut-zusammenhalt-1756244(02.07.2021))  
[https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/de/themen/aktuelle-meldungen/2020/august/gesellschaftlicher-zusammenhalt-verbessert-sich-in-der-corona-krise\(02.07.2021\)](https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/de/themen/aktuelle-meldungen/2020/august/gesellschaftlicher-zusammenhalt-verbessert-sich-in-der-corona-krise(02.07.2021))  
[https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/de/unsere-projekte/gesellschaftlicher-zusammenhalt/projektbeschreibung\(02.07.2021\)](https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/de/unsere-projekte/gesellschaftlicher-zusammenhalt/projektbeschreibung(02.07.2021))  
[https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/de/unsere-projekte/gesellschaftlicher-zusammenhalt/projektnachrichten/zusammenhalt-in-zeiten-von-corona-die-stabile-basis-droht-zu-broeckeln\(02.07.2021\)](https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/de/unsere-projekte/gesellschaftlicher-zusammenhalt/projektnachrichten/zusammenhalt-in-zeiten-von-corona-die-stabile-basis-droht-zu-broeckeln(02.07.2021))  
[https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/de/themen/aktuelle-meldungen/2021/maerz/jugendliche-fuehlen-sich-durch-corona-stark-belastet-und-zu-wenig-gehört\(02.07.2021\)](https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/de/themen/aktuelle-meldungen/2021/maerz/jugendliche-fuehlen-sich-durch-corona-stark-belastet-und-zu-wenig-gehört(02.07.2021))  
[https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/heimat-integration/gesellschaftlicher-zusammenhalt/politische-bildung/politische-bildung-node.html\(02.07.2021\)](https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/heimat-integration/gesellschaftlicher-zusammenhalt/politische-bildung/politische-bildung-node.html(02.07.2021))  
[https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/heimat-integration/gesellschaftlicher-zusammenhalt/zusammenhalt-teilhabe/zusammenhalt-teilhabe-node.html;jsessionid=99DA14F13E26D19F408EF2636EEE549D.1\\_cid295\(02.07.2021\)](https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/heimat-integration/gesellschaftlicher-zusammenhalt/zusammenhalt-teilhabe/zusammenhalt-teilhabe-node.html;jsessionid=99DA14F13E26D19F408EF2636EEE549D.1_cid295(02.07.2021))  
[https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/heimat-integration/gesellschaftlicher-zusammenhalt/gesellschaftlicher-zusammenhalt-node.html\(02.07.2021\)](https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/heimat-integration/gesellschaftlicher-zusammenhalt/gesellschaftlicher-zusammenhalt-node.html(02.07.2021))  
[https://www.bpb.de/apuz/im-dienst-der-gesellschaft-2021/329324/zivilgesellschaft-und-gesellschaftlicher-zusammenhalt\(02.07.2021\)](https://www.bpb.de/apuz/im-dienst-der-gesellschaft-2021/329324/zivilgesellschaft-und-gesellschaftlicher-zusammenhalt(02.07.2021))  
[https://www.zeit.de/zeit-magazin/leben/2021-06/forschungsinstitut-gesellschaftlicher-zusammenhalt-matthias-middel-nicole-deitelhoff-corona/komplettansicht\(02.07.2021\)](https://www.zeit.de/zeit-magazin/leben/2021-06/forschungsinstitut-gesellschaftlicher-zusammenhalt-matthias-middel-nicole-deitelhoff-corona/komplettansicht(02.07.2021))

### **5. Preis: 200 EUR, Faizrou Tchagbele, Katrin Arndt, Caitlin Follo des Bergstraßen-Gymnasiums Hemsbach, Klasse 10b Ist das Zusammenhalt?**

#### **Gedicht und ein Videobeitrag zur Frage „Ist das Zusammenhalt?“**

#### **Ein Gedicht von Faizrou Tchagbele, Katrin Arndt und Caitlin Follo**

Im Kindergarten wurde uns Zusammenhalt gelehrt, aber was ist er heute schon noch wert? Zusammen spielen und Dinge teilen - dieses Konzept sollte in unsren Köpfen verweilen. Alle sollen in Frieden miteinander leben, es ist ein Nehmen und Geben.

Corona hat uns einiges gelehrt,  
da es schon so lange unter uns währt.  
Der Mensch ist vom Egoismus getrieben.  
Aufgestellte Regeln wurden umgeschmissen, im  
Hinterkopf mit dem Wissen, dass es andere ver-  
letzt, ja sogar auf die Intensivstation treibt kann  
mir jemand erklären, warum will sich jeder gegen  
die Maßnahmen wehren?  
Sind andere Menschen so wenig wert?  
die Pfleger, die Ärzte, die Oma und der Opa!  
Jeder macht was er will, selbst die Politik ist  
sich nicht einig – der Weg zur Besserung  
ist sehr steinig.  
Jetzt sieht man einen Funken in der Dunkelheit.  
Eine mögliche Rettung, ein Ende des Leids.  
Doch guckt man sich die Gesellschaft an: ruft  
einer hier: „Impfung her!“, ruft einer da: „Imp-  
fung? Nicht mit mir.“  
Aber wie sollen wir den Kampf gewinnen, wenn  
sich manche nicht eines besseren besinnen?  
Das ist Ignoranz und Unwissenheit, die unter  
den Menschen weilt.  
Ist das Zusammenhalt?  
Vereinen wir uns und lasst uns kämpfen!  
Das Gegeneinander überwinden und miteinan-  
der unsere Kräfte verbinden.  
Wir müssen uns zusammenreißen, mit uns rin-  
gen, sonst werden wir weiter von Lockdown zu  
Lockdown springen  
Wenn jeder mitzieht und niemand seiner Verant-  
wortung entflieht. Kann man sagen:  
Es gibt Hoffnung am Ende der Straße,  
Möge sie sich verbreiten im großen Ausmaße.

Verschwörungstheorien cruisen auf Telegram,  
Instagram und Twitter.  
das fehlende Denken und die Ignoranz sind  
bemitleidenswert und bitter  
Doch nun lasst uns reden über unsere Welt, wel-  
che gerade auseinanderfällt.  
Was passiert mit unserem Planeten, der Erde,  
der Welt?  
Die Großen da oben, die wüten und toben.  
Achtet da jemand auf Andere?  
Achtet da jemand auf die, die nach ihnen kom-  
men?  
Nene, da oben da ist nur Geld der Held.  
Vorhanden ist eine Jugend, die sich engagiert  
Aber Uns wird keine sichere Zukunft garantiert.  
Was kann den Klimawandel noch aufhalten,  
wenn man nicht auf uns hört?

Die Politiker sagen: „Überlasst das den Profis“  
die Alten sagen: „Ihr dürft nicht mitmachen“  
aber vergessen, dass sie über unsere Zukunft  
wachen.

Ist das Zusammenhalt?

Die Jugend versucht die Politik aufzuwecken,  
mit Demonstrationen und Protesten wollen sie das  
bezeichnen.

Über das Internet haben wir uns gefunden  
innerhalb von wenigen Sekunden.

Die Jugend hält schon fest zusammen, jetzt wol-  
len wir mit den Alten zusammenhalten

Wir kämpfen nicht nur fürs jetzt, sondern auch  
für morgen und übermorgen es ist an der Zeit,  
dass den Worten Taten folgen

Jung und alt brauchen Zusammenhalt, so bleibt  
das Leben auf der Erde noch ein schöner Auf-  
enthalt.

Es gibt Hoffnung am Ende der Straße möge sie  
sich verbreiten im großen Ausmaße.

Geprägt ist die Vergangenheit von Rassismus  
und Dingen wie Rassenkunde, zu nichts hat sie  
geführt, außer einer entzündeten Wunde.

Dunkel oder hell, als würd's was ändern, wir alle  
kommen aus verschiedenen Ländern.

Sind wir nicht alle Menschen und damit gleich  
viel wert?

doch Geschichte und Gegenwart haben uns  
anderes gelehrt.

Gleichheit ist noch immer nicht vorhanden, die  
Prüfung und der Weg dahin noch lang' nicht  
bestanden.

Niemand darf wegen seiner Abstammung, Reli-  
gion oder politischen Ansichten benachteiligt  
oder bevorzugt werden, aber ist das hier so auf  
Erden?

Ist das Zusammenhalt?

Letztes Jahr waren wir weltweit auf der Straße,  
aber war ein Hype der Grund für diese globalen  
Ausmaße?

Rassismus ist ein alltäglicher Kampf und kein  
Trend, dem man für kurze Zeit hinterherrennt.

War Black Lives Matter der Auftakt zum Anfang?  
Der Anfang zur Besserung? Ist den Leuten end-  
lich mal was klar geworden?

Nicht nur in schwierigen Zeiten müssen wir uns  
finden, nein weg müssen die Augenbinden!

es gibt Hoffnung auf Veränderung am Ende der  
Straße möge sie sich verbreiten im großen Aus-  
maße.

Wir leben heute in schwierigen Zeiten, das Ende nicht in Sicht, doch vergesst nicht, dass Ende erreichen wir nur durch Zusammenhalt. Die Menschheitsgeschichte ist geprägt von Krisen, Verlust und Krieg, aber dieser soll enden als ein Sieg.

„Unser diesjähriger Beitrag ist ein selbstgeschriebenes Gedicht in Kombination mit einem Video. Hier ist der zugehörige Link: <https://youtu.be/AozD3YauEeo>. Das Video ist auf privat gestellt, d. h. nur mit diesem Link können Sie darauf zugreifen. Das Gedicht an sich inklusive Quellenangabe ist ebenfalls angehängt. Wir sind aus der Klasse 10b vom Bergstraßen-Gymnasium in Hemsbach und haben unser Ergebnis zu dritt erarbeitet.

### **Faizrou Tchagbele, Katrin Arndt, Caitlin Follo“**

#### **Quellenverzeichnis:**

-<https://unsplash.com/photos/gS4EYZuLdlg>  
-[https://bilder.t-online.de/b/89/80/63/86/id\\_89806386/610/tid\\_da/-querdenker-demonstrieren-in-stuttgart-am-karsamstag-nun-wurde-die-naechste-demo-angekuendigt-.jpg](https://bilder.t-online.de/b/89/80/63/86/id_89806386/610/tid_da/-querdenker-demonstrieren-in-stuttgart-am-karsamstag-nun-wurde-die-naechste-demo-angekuendigt-.jpg)  
-<https://cdn1.stuttgarter-zeitung.de/media/media.3c4ba86e-39b1-4993-a97a-5287bc8804fb.original1024.jpg>  
<https://unsplash.com/photos/J12RfFH-2ZE>  
<https://flic.kr/p/2eaeDQM>  
<https://www.pexels.com/photo/patient-with-iv-line-3845126>  
<https://www.pexels.com/video/a-doctor-talking-with-her-patient-6011431>  
<https://www.pexels.com/video/group-of-people-in-a-medical-field-inside-an-operating-room-3197638>  
<https://www.dw.com/de/g%C3%B6rlach-global-verschw%C3%B6rungstheorien-in-der-corona-krise-im-aufwind/a-53404288#>  
<https://www.pexels.com/video/elderly-people-taking-a-groupie-photo-6831185>  
[https://cdn.pixabay.com/photo/2014/06/14/21/34/bundestag-369049\\_1280.jpg](https://cdn.pixabay.com/photo/2014/06/14/21/34/bundestag-369049_1280.jpg)  
[https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/bilder/sendungsbild-668693-\\_v-grossgalerie16x9.jpg](https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/bilder/sendungsbild-668693-_v-grossgalerie16x9.jpg)  
<https://www.pexels.com/video/a-doctor-injecting-a-patient-6067664>  
<https://www.pexels.com/video/maska-covid-19-4132826>  
<https://www.pexels.com/video/man-holding-man-covid-sample-4260501>  
<https://www.pexels.com/video/crowd-of-protesters-walking-on-a-bridge-4553801>  
[https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/bilder/sendungsbild-728979-\\_v-grossgalerie16x9.jpg](https://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/bilder/sendungsbild-728979-_v-grossgalerie16x9.jpg)  
[https://www.swr.de/swr2/leben-und-gesellschaft/1596407696925,studie-aus-trier-verschwoerungstheorien-festigen-ablehnung-von-corona-bekaempfung-102-\\_v-16x9@2dXL\\_-77ed5d09baf4e3cf6a5a0264e5e16ea35f14925.jpg?im-width=850](https://www.swr.de/swr2/leben-und-gesellschaft/1596407696925,studie-aus-trier-verschwoerungstheorien-festigen-ablehnung-von-corona-bekaempfung-102-_v-16x9@2dXL_-77ed5d09baf4e3cf6a5a0264e5e16ea35f14925.jpg?im-width=850)  
<https://www.domradio.de/sites/default/files/styles/domradio-title/public/der-aluhut-als-symbol-fuer-verschwoerungsglaube.jpg?itok=zqNbcX8M>  
<https://www.tvmovie.de/bilder/638/2020/11/30/79991-michael-wendler-telegram.png?itok=vtPIOLbw>  
[https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/media/thumbs/6/6cde59044bc0bf79a79ada9bcfe4cd92v1\\_max\\_755\\_x425\\_b3535db83dc50e27c1bb1392364c95a2.jpg?key=1f16a5](https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/media/thumbs/6/6cde59044bc0bf79a79ada9bcfe4cd92v1_max_755_x425_b3535db83dc50e27c1bb1392364c95a2.jpg?key=1f16a5)  
[https://www.wn.de/var/storage/images/wn/startseite/welt/thema/3585560-un-klimakonferenz-in-kattowitz-neue-klimaschutz-regeln-stehen-kritik-von-umweltschuetzern/102121270-10-ger-DE/UN-Klimakonferenz-in-Kattowitz-Neue-Klimaschutz-Regeln-stehen-Kritik-von-Umweltschuetzern\\_image\\_1024\\_width.jpg](https://www.wn.de/var/storage/images/wn/startseite/welt/thema/3585560-un-klimakonferenz-in-kattowitz-neue-klimaschutz-regeln-stehen-kritik-von-umweltschuetzern/102121270-10-ger-DE/UN-Klimakonferenz-in-Kattowitz-Neue-Klimaschutz-Regeln-stehen-Kritik-von-Umweltschuetzern_image_1024_width.jpg)  
[https://cdn77.pressenza.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Friday\\_for\\_Future-720x440.png](https://cdn77.pressenza.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Friday_for_Future-720x440.png)  
<https://www.pexels.com/photo/climate-road-landscape-people-2990650>  
<https://www.pexels.com/video/climate-change-climate-activist-fridays-for-future-4277514>  
<https://www.thebestsocial.media/de/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2019/03/Lindner-Klima-FBWP.png>  
[https://www.bo.de/sites/default/files/styles/688x384/public/field/image/2021/04/dcx\\_file7fa2v0h96eb1iw9r5au2\\_0.jpg?itok=J5bn53-9&c=d5c762b61c41d41483f1c3d7e4a23004](https://www.bo.de/sites/default/files/styles/688x384/public/field/image/2021/04/dcx_file7fa2v0h96eb1iw9r5au2_0.jpg?itok=J5bn53-9&c=d5c762b61c41d41483f1c3d7e4a23004)  
<https://www.pexels.com/photo/crowd-of-people-marching-on-a-rally-2975498>  
<https://www.pexels.com/video/black-lives-matter-protestor-on-the-street-4655837>

<https://www.pexels.com/photo/crowd-of-protesters-holding-signs-4614165>  
<https://www.pexels.com/video/woman-holding-up-a-protest-placards-4655839>  
<https://www.pexels.com/photo/woman-in-blue-jacket-holding-white-and-black-i-am-happy-to-be-happy-print-paper-2559749>  
<https://www.pexels.com/photo/people-walking-on-street-2990647>  
<https://assets.catawiki.nl/assets/2018/11/10/6/9/9/69996906-ec1f-44fa-8821-57563990207b.jpg>  
<https://www.pexels.com/video/city-people-rooftop-summer-4880458>  
<https://www.pexels.com/photo/brown-cardboard-box-with-i-m-a-little-heart-i-m-un-k-i-m-un-k-i-2990643>  
<https://www.dw.com/de/s%C3%BCdafrika-und-das-ende-der-apartheid/a-5201740#>  
<https://youtu.be/FRsAwsytPjg>  
[https://www.bmu.de/themen/klima-energie/klimaschutz/nationale-klimapolitik/klimaschutzplan-2050/GG\\_93](https://www.bmu.de/themen/klima-energie/klimaschutz/nationale-klimapolitik/klimaschutzplan-2050/GG_93)



**1. und 4. Preis:** von links nach rechts: Maya Seitz, Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers, Carlotta Ritzhaupt



**2. Preis:** von links nach rechts: Frau Volz, Annika Portuné, Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers, Frau Brand, Deutschlehrerin



**5. Preis:** vorne von links nach rechts: Kathrin Arndt, Caitlin Folli, Faizrou Tchagebele, Hinten von links nach rechts: Schulleiterin Isabelle Ferrari, Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers, Stefan Weber



**3. Preis:** Tansania AG, Elisabeth-von-Thadden-Gymnasium, Heidelberg

**Thema | Topic:**

NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg refers to 2021 as a year of opportunity to re-energize transatlantic relations and to strengthen the bond between Europe and North America. What significance would this have for the Baltic States and how can Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia contribute to strengthen the transatlantic partnership?

**1st Prize: 1.000 EUR, Veronika Horchakova (MRU)**

With the change of power in the United States following the degradation of four years of NATO - US relationship degradation, the rhetoric in the White House has changed. Even before his presidency, Joe Biden has reaffirmed his strong commitment to the North Atlantic Alliance and underlined the importance of reinforcing the US-EU ties. But what does "strengthening the transatlantic partnership" actually mean? We should consider that NATO served its purpose marvellously during the cold war, and its contribution to peace is enormously appreciated. However, it seems that NATO needs an entire reorganisation in terms of cyber warfare, global repositioning, and reconsideration of new member states, as well as the challenges that NATO may face nowadays. Although Asia, particularly China, and other emerging markets are rising in significance, the relationship between Europe and America remains strong. Billions worth of trade every day, lots of shared interest, shared values, and most importantly, a shared leap in democracy unite the states.

When we talk about the importance of reinforcing the transatlantic bonds, we must highlight the Baltic region. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, as the most pro-US countries in Europe, the leaders of democracy among post-Soviet states and the frontline warriors of the NATO community, are at the centre of those changes. Since its accession, Baltic states have constantly represented their affection for economic freedom, liberal democracy, and human rights. But there are challenges for NATO to ensure the Baltic allies are safe from Russian aggression in the region.

The upcoming plan on deepening the partnership is valuable for Baltic countries since there are peculiarities in their status quo. The reasons for this are as follows.

To begin with, the geographical location makes Baltics more vulnerable in the sense of invasion. The only NATO ally there is Poland, neighbouring Lithuania. Russia surrounds almost every corner and continues its opportunistic or imperialistic behaviour. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the Russian Federation increased provocation actions, involving both air and land activities close to the European borders. Since 2015, the Russian air activity close to European air-space has increased by 70 % (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2016, p. 16). And most importantly, we should note that Russia does not look at Baltic countries as a separate target but as a part of NATO (Estonian Foreign Intelligence, 2019, p. 6). From this perspective, an eventual Russian attack on the Baltic states would not arise because of Russian interest in these countries but rather the need to shift the Balticsearegion's power balance during a larger-scale conflict with the West.

And, when discussing the response of the Baltic states to Russian aggression, three levels can be considered: national, NATO, and the EU (European Army Interoperability Center, 2019, p. 16). Since the moment of accession, the Baltic countries have demanded an extensive involvement of NATO in their territories. Investment grew mainly in land forces at the national level, including mechanisation, artillery, anti-tank, air-defence, and territorial defence. Also the instability of the EU's Southern border, coupled with the increasing threats coming from the East, has pushed the EU to develop renewed initiatives for cooperation. However, as countries with relatively small populations, their armed forces remain relatively small and limited in military capabilities. Consequently, the Baltic states' defence planning relies heavily on their NATO membership (Congressional Research Service, 2020, p. 12).

Moreover, Baltic states took a position to operate separately from each other. The core military security problem for the Baltic States is the lack

of cooperation and coordination between these states. The three countries have three different models of the military. Not all Baltic States have military attachments in one another's capitals. Intra-regional cooperation on arms procurement is yet to show success. Illustratively, the Baltic States failed to agree to purchase air defense systems jointly and ended up fielding three separate systems (Tabuns, 2019, p. 1). Furthermore, the lack of their own fighter aircraft forces the Baltic states to rely on their NATO allies to police and defend Baltic airspace. NATO launched the Baltic Air Policing mission in 2004. The mission originally consisted of rotating four-month deployments of four aircraft. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014, deployments increased from 8 to 12 aircraft at a time. The Baltic states contribute to mission costs, including by providing ground services for the aircraft and supplying aviation fuel (Congressional Research Service, 2020, p. 15).

For the honest review, we should talk about the successful cooperation in the region. Moving back to history, the three states have a good record of coordinating policy positions, for example, Baltic Air Policing, or in their approach to the NATO Wales and Warsaw summits. However, aside from the flagship initiatives of the 1990s (BALBAT, BALTNET, BALTRON and BALT-DEFCOL), when outside pressure and assistance heavily encouraged cooperation, the three states have achieved little together when it comes to concrete projects. The problem was that the three states have apparently been unable to generate sufficient political will to work together and overcome the challenges that inevitably arise in multinational defence cooperation (Nikers, 2019a, p. 9). There is also a need for review in terms of the legal aspects of defence partnership. For example, the military cooperation between the three Baltic States is legally possible within the framework of institutional cooperation, joint procurement, common maritime and air defence patrolling operations, and cross-border civilian cooperation, which are not the most effective and quick ways during possible aggression. Baltic states should get rid of extra bureaucracy (Miluna and Poga, 2019, p. 53). Instead, for example, it is essential to form a common Baltic defence strategy by

standardizing the crisis management policies, procedures, processes and laws across all three states. Even the defence terminology demands synchronization. Also, countries should try their best to raise their awareness of Baltic national and intra-regional capabilities and limits.

The other less tangible, measurable types of threats can be grouped under the definition of non-military threats. Including societal, economic and environmental actions carried with the use of the information and cyber attacks, often using the supply chain and infrastructure as leverage means. For example, in 2020, Russia was the first trading partner to Lithuania, the second to Estonia, and the fourth to Latvia. Before 2014 all the three Baltic countries imported 100 % of their natural gas directly from Russia. After the Ukrainian dramatic event, some steps had been taken to diversify the import. Today Lithuania imports 58 % of its natural gas from Russia, although Estonia and Latvia continue to depend on Russian natural gas (Congressional Research Service, 2020, pp. 17-18). If the political influence in the Baltic region has gradually faded, the economic one is still under question (Bergmane, 2020, p. 484). So, states should look for other sources, moreover, the need is dramatically increased by the economic sanctions, so it is better to minimize the dependence on the Russian economy.

The other non-military threat for the Baltic region is Moscow's use of the Russophone minority as political instruments against the West. Because of the Soviet period, historical and economic factors, 25.2 % of Latvian citizens and 24.8 % of Estonian inhabitants are of Russian descent. Lithuania is more homogenous, with 16 %. For example, there were signs of warfare, where the Russian speaking inhabitants in Vilnius received the brochures with disinformation on the economic situation in Lithuania and a call to participate in the resettlement of ethnic Russians from Lithuania to Russia (Nikers, 2019b, p. 96). That sort of propaganda was also used in Ukraine to disrupt the loyalty to the state. Baltic countries need to create a "defensive shield" to fight against Russia's disinformation and propaganda. Moscow's primary goal is to form a positive opinion on Russia between local inhabitants by creating dissatisfaction with the relevant gov-



ernments, shaping and misrepresenting historical facts and exploiting the vulnerabilities of the Baltic's political systems, economy, and society. Here the Lithuanian case can serve as a guide for the other two Baltic states and NATO's members, too. The roots of the anti-Russian propaganda and disinformation campaign originated in 2016 when Lithuania introduced temporary bans on Russian media outlets that breached preexisting media laws (THE BALTIC TIMES, 2016). Shortly after the Lithuanian parliament had adopted an ordinance restricting Russian media production content on Lithuanian TV. In 2018, the Lithuanian parliament adopted new amendments to the Public Information Law. TV channels in Lithuania must translate TV programs into Lithuanian "if these programs are produced in Russian or other non-EU languages and broadcast for longer than one hour and a half" (Thomas, 2020).

As for cyber security, Baltic states have done successful work in combating cyber attacks. According to the International Telecommunication Union's Global Cybersecurity Index 2020, among 194 countries, Estonia is the third after the US and the UK. Followed by the Russian Federation, Lithuania is the sixth cyber protected country. Latvia completes the list of the top 15 (International Telecommunication, 2020). The ranking is based on five pillars- legal, technical, organizational, capacity building and cooperation measurements related to cybersecurity. Since 2019, these countries have had Cyber Security Strategies. But we have to consider that rankings are not always reliable, and sometimes they do not represent reality in all its shapes. Despite establishing the NATO cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in 2008 (hosted by Estonia), several commentators have criticized the real cyber warfare capabilities of NATO. In a 2019 interview the former supreme allied commander of NATO Adm. James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), warned that "in cyber, and cybersecurity, we have the greatest mismatch between the level of threat and level of preparation" (Ackerman, 2019). New asymmetric or technological threats require extensive cooperation not only within but also outside of the Alliance. The security and defence sectors in the Baltic States need to build partnerships with the private and academic sec-

tors, all of which will need to cooperate with each other to maintain situational awareness and a technological edge (The Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2020, p. 159).

It is clear that in reality, the ongoing conflict between western countries and Russia does not take place inside tanks or submarines but behind a computer. Russia has massively increased its cyber warfare capabilities and is particularly strong in social manipulation and other cyber attacks. In this context, there are signs of significant commitment over time to enable Baltic countries to develop their national defence further. For example, the Baltic states have already signed a five-year roadmap of defence cooperation at the Pentagon (U.S. Department of Defense, 2019), meaning that by 2024 the capability development and defence-related aid, training exercises, and cyber defence will be exercised with the US service. Officials emphasized the benefits of the program and said they look forward to its further development. And activated transatlantic relationships are the perfect opportunity for all - Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, to generate new partnership programs, agreements and projects against the Russian soft power.

Although Russia, China and other authoritarian countries do not represent a direct military threat to any country that is part of NATO, the traditional threats posed by them are not going to disappear. Concluding, we can mention, the lack of unity within the European Union and NATO is the biggest threat to their respective existence. It is obvious that a wrong move by Russia and the perception that the EU or NATO must confront an external enemy will immediately reunite their respective members. For example, wars with Georgia and especially with Ukraine, made Baltic societies antagonize Russian influence, moreover, NATO troops came to defend. Therefore Russia will continue to play its role behind the curtains or better behind a computer which so far has proven to be a far more effective tool than missiles and rifles (Nato Cyber Report, 2021, p. 32).

Baltics's productive and beneficial cooperation with NATO is not limited by the army alone, as both NATO and the Baltic states have other

essential values and platforms to collaborate. Spending more than 2 % of GDP on military purposes, the Baltic states should actively invest in human security assets such as healthcare and environmental protection. As Adam Smith identifies (Smith, 2007, p. 539), the defence of society is one of the primary functions of government, but the whole concept of “sufficient” is up for debate in any democracy. Baltic states should not take an image of “the West Berlin” (Bergmane, 2021), and they must avoid building their whole foreign policy rhetoric around Russian aggression. Keeping in mind that there were no substantial changes in the US-Baltic relations during the Trump administration, we should consider that we do not need a reconstruction of dramatically degraded ties, what we have seen in terms of EU-US relationships. For Baltics, the worst possible outcome has been making a choice between supporting major European allies or advocating for the US. For instance, should the Baltics be supportive of US troop withdrawal from Germany in order to relocate some of these armed forces to Poland or not (Kojala, 2020).

Warmed transatlantic relationships is a chance to develop existing bonds and to establish new roads and frameworks for further cooperation, for example, climate change. Lithuania’s experience linking energy security with the transition to clean energy is a valuable lesson for its neighbours and the international community (International Energy Agency, 2021). Thus, Lithuania can share its experience and best approaches for green ecology with the US. However, in this context, the EU also cooperates with China. The latter is still seen as a partner to fight climate change (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). And for the US, it is an impulse to take action and try to attract the EU by boosting the existing ways of cooperation.

Continuing the non-military cooperation, we should highlight that with the USSR’s dissolution, the Baltic society’s values quickly reoriented to pro-European standards. Nevertheless, it is still an issue with some fields of socio-economic lifestyles. The region continues to rely on the US and the EU to support. For example, after Poland, Latvia is the second-worst country in the EU in terms of LGBTQ+ inclusive legislation, while

Lithuania and Estonia rank 22 and 17 out of (The European Region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association, 2020). The Baltic states, especially Latvia and Lithuania, which currently do not have a gender-neutral civil partnership law, should welcome the existing norms in the transatlantic space and provide a safe environment for their LGBTQ+ communities. Otherwise, it can be seen as a problem to fit the EU and US social policy.

The Baltic states are likely to remain strong US allies and important US security partners in Europe. Analysts believe close cooperation between the United States and the Baltic states will continue for the foreseeable future in areas such as efforts to deter potential Russian aggression, the future of NATO, energy security, and socioeconomic issues. The Baltic states will likely continue to rely on the United States for leadership on foreign policy and security issues. In conclusion, US commitment to the Baltic security is a part of the US commitment to European security, and the former would not and cannot exist without the latter. Thus, strengthening the transatlantic ties is about building the partnership, reinforcing the power and preventing the threats. This attitude appears to be beneficial for both sides.

#### Reference list:

- Ackerman, R.K. (2019). Stavridis Warns of Russia and China Cyber Attacks. SIGNAL. [online] Available at: <https://www.afcea.org/content/stavridis-warns-russia-and-china-cyber-attacks> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].
- Bergmane, U. (2020). Fading Russian Influence in the Baltic States. *Orbis*, [online] 64(3), p.484. Available at: <https://www.sciencedirect.com/sdfe/reader/pii/S0030438720300302/pdf> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].
- Bergmane, U. (2021). The Reset of U.S.-EU Relations and the Baltic States. Foreign Policy Research Institute. [online] Available at: <https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/06/the-reset-of-the-us-eu-relations-and-the-baltic-states/> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].
- Congressional Research Service (2020). Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania: Background and U.S. - Baltic Relations. [online] Available at: <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R46139.pdf> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].
- Estonian Foreign Intelligence (2019). INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ESTONIA. [online] p.6. Available at: <https://www.valisluureamet.ee/doc/raport/2019-en.pdf> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].
- European Army Interoperability Center (2019). The Baltics response to Russia’s Threat. [online] p.16. Available at: <http://finabel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/The-Baltic%E2%80%99s-response-to-Russia%E2%80%99s-Threat-W.pdf> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].
- European Council on Foreign Relations (2020). Climate Superpowers: How the EU and China Can Compete and Cooperate for a Green Future. [online] p.2. Available at: <https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/Climate-superpowers-How-the-EU-and-China-can-compete-and-cooperate-for-a-green-future.pdf> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].
- International Energy Agency (2021). Lithuania 2021 Energy Policy Review. [online] p.83. Available at: [https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/4d014034-0f94-409d-bb8f-193e17a81d77/Lithuania\\_2021\\_Energy\\_Policy\\_Review.pdf](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/4d014034-0f94-409d-bb8f-193e17a81d77/Lithuania_2021_Energy_Policy_Review.pdf) [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].
- International Telecommunication (2020). Global Cybersecurity Index 2020. [online] p.25. Available at: <https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Pages/global-cybersecurity-index.aspx> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].
- Kojala, L. (2020). For Biden, Four Points on the Baltic Agenda. Foreign Policy Research Institute. [online] Available at: <https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/12/for-biden-four-points-on-the-baltic-agenda/> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].

Miluna, I. and Poga, E. (2019). Legal Aspects of Defense Cooperation. In: BALTIC SECURITY STRATEGY REPORT: WHAT THE BALTICS CAN OFFER FOR A STRONGER ALLIANCE. [online] Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, p.53. Available at: <https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Baltic-Security-Strategy-Report-2019.pdf?x76553> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].

NATO Parliamentary Assembly (2016). Deterring to defend : delivering on NATO's promise. [online] p.16. Available at: <https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?-filename=/sites/default/files/documents/DETECTING%20TO%20DEFEND%20DELIVERING%20ON%20NATO%27S%20PROMISE%20-%20%20TURNER%202016.pdf> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].

Nikers, O. (2019a). Chapter one: DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE. In: BALTIC SECURITY STRATEGY REPORT: WHAT THE BALTICS CAN OFFER FOR A STRONGER ALLIANCE. [online] Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, p.9. Available at: <https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Baltic-Security-Strategy-Report-2019.pdf?x76553> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].

Nikers, O. (2019b). Chapter two: SOCIETAL SECURITY AND RESILIENCE. In: BALTIC SECURITY STRATEGY REPORT: WHAT THE BALTICS CAN OFFER FOR A STRONGER ALLIANCE. [online] Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, p.96. Available at: <https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Baltic-Security-Strategy-Report-2019.pdf?x76553> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].

Russia questions Latvia's ban on Rossiya RTR channel. (2016). THE BALTIC TIMES. [online] Available at: [https://www.baltictimes.com/russia\\_questions\\_latvia\\_s\\_ban\\_on\\_rossiya\\_rtr\\_channel/](https://www.baltictimes.com/russia_questions_latvia_s_ban_on_rossiya_rtr_channel/) [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].

Smith, A. (2007). On the Expenses of Sovereign or Commonwealth. In: An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. [online] p.539. Available at: [https://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA\\_WealthNations\\_p.pdf](https://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA_WealthNations_p.pdf) [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].

Tabuns, O. (2019). Chapter one: DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE. In: BALTIC SECURITY STRATEGY REPORT: WHAT THE BALTICS CAN OFFER FOR A STRONGER ALLIANCE. [online] Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, p.1. Available at: <https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Baltic-Security-Strategy-Report-2019.pdf?x76553> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].

The European Region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (2020). Country Ranking. [online] Available at: <https://rainbow-europe.org/country-ranking#eu> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].

The Latvian Institute of International Affairs (2020). Towards #NATO2030, The Regional Perspective Of The Baltic States And Poland. [online] p.159. Available at: [https://liia.lv/en/publications/towards-nato2030-the-regional-perspective-of-the-baltic-states-and-poland-896?get\\_file=1](https://liia.lv/en/publications/towards-nato2030-the-regional-perspective-of-the-baltic-states-and-poland-896?get_file=1) [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].

Thomas, M. (2020). Defeating Disinformation Threats. Foreign Policy Research Institute. [online] Available at: <https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/02/defeating-disinformation-threats/> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].

U.S. Department of Defense (2019). U.S., Lithuania Detail Roadmap for Cooperation Through 2024. [online] Available at: <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1803578/us-lithuania-detail-roadmap-for-cooperation-through-2024/> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].



From left to right: Rector (MRU) Prof. Dr. Inga Žalėnienė, Veronika Horchakova, Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers, Prof. Virgis Valentinavičius

## 2<sup>nd</sup> Prize: 600 EUR, Oles Sahan (MRU)

**Background** Today, looking from the perspective of the last months of 2021 we can assert that this year has not been flawless in terms of transatlantic relations. Nevertheless, the Western world has, at least partially, used its opportunity to reunite and to re-energise its internal ties. But before analysing these developments, future prospects and the role of the Baltic states in them, it is reasonable to have a look at the very essence of today's world order and reasons which induced NATO Secretary General to say the words he has said.

Donald Trump's presidency in the United States abetted the erosion of transatlantic relations almost in all possible terms: ideological, economic, political, ecological, etc. He called the European Union a "foe" (Contiguglia, 2018) and celebrated Brexit, neglected Angela Merkel's attempt to shake hands both literally and figuratively. His actions on withdrawing the US troops from Germany marked some weakening of ties in military regard as well. In contrast, current president of the US Joe Biden calls Europe "the cornerstone of the US engagement with the rest of the world and ... the catalyst for global cooperation" (Beardsley, 2013). An interesting thing here is that amid the whole turmoil caused by Trump's administration the Baltic States and the US were able to preserve the status quo of their relations at least to some extent. This is to be proven by the fact that "U.S. President Donald Trump remained committed to Europe's eastern flank despite ... Pentagon cut to European defence projects" (Syta, 2019).

After Biden's becoming president and quite a few actions taken in the direction of reconciliation it turns out that "rumours of the death of the transatlantic relationship appear greatly exaggerated" (Brattberg, 2021). However, today the rise of a new, this time external threat to the Alliance is becoming more obvious. The growth of communist ideology and totalitarian regimes on such a great scale as today exposes the impossibility of a comparatively cloudless future predicted by Francis Fukuyama in his essay "The End of History?" (Fukuyama, 1998, pp.114–124) with Western liberalism as the only way of countries' political development. He found nationalism the most hazardous threat to Western liber-

alism, but nowadays, although radical nationalism does engender some minor issues, we observe that Fukuyama was looking for possible threats on the wrong part of the political spectrum: Russia and Belarus worship USSR values, and Chinese Communist Party endeavours to penetrate Europe with its 16+1 (by virtue of Lithuania not 17+1) strategy. In addition, Russia's aggression towards Ukraine and annexation of Crimea obliterated the image of Europe as a flank from which the Alliance cannot expect any threat.

### The real role the Baltic States play

Now, having a basic understanding of what is happening in contemporary world, we can proceed to analysing the place of the Baltic States in all these developments. It is common to perceive these three countries as a burden for NATO due to their comparatively weak military potential, but such an approach is not right in essence. The abovementioned status quo maintained by the US and the Baltic States is an indicator of the highest importance of the latter to the whole system of transatlantic partnership. The United States and the European Union did have some controversies, but there has always been a context of Russia and China becoming a larger threat for the Western world in all possible dimensions: economic, military, energy etc. The immutable support to the Baltic states has been a manifestation of the highest importance of this bigger picture rather than of intraorganisational misunderstandings.

Although today's developments are far from 20th century Cold War, currently "the world is bipolar with the United States and China vying for dominance" (Tunsjø, 2018). Simultaneously, Sino-Russian bilateral cooperation is gaining momentum in a number of areas and due to an array of reasons: from countering the spread of democratic values to opposing U.S. defence policies in space and cyberspace.

Thus, it is obvious that penetration into Europe by either Russia or China or both in any form is highly disadvantageous for the United States. And here Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia come to the (Kerstin: hier soll der Text weiter gehen, habe es aber nicht geschafft) fore. Considering only military perspective, we can assert that as long

as the United States is interested in the European Union's security (and therefore deterring Russia in this regard), the Baltic States remain the number one priority for the US administration. The transatlantic bond is highly reliant on these three states as on the ones staying on the external border of the EU and directly countering a threat shared on either side of the Atlantic Ocean. This is to be proven, for instance, by \$3.7 million contribution from the US to activate a new special operation site in Riga (Vandiver, 2020) and the US 8th Cavalry Regiment with its heavy weaponry, including Abrams tanks, deployed in Lithuania (MND, 2020).

However, it is not a one-sided phenomenon, as the Baltic States are dependent on sustainable transatlantic relations just as these relations are dependent on the Baltic States. Politically, any transatlantic clashes are not desirable for the three states, as "the worst possible outcome is to be pushed to make a choice between supporting major European allies or advocating for the US" (Kojala, 2020). In terms of defence and security, the role of stability of transatlantic relations is obvious, as any perturbations in this regard may in the long run entail disinterest of the US in Europe as in the strategic ally as a whole and in Baltic States in particular. Hence, the value of the Alliance and strong transatlantic bonds for Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia was reiterated by the joint statement made by the Baltic States' Prime Ministers on the eve of the NATO Summit, which took place in June 2021. "Affirm our commitment to a strong NATO-EU strategic partnership" are the key words here (www.mk.gov.lv, 2021). Apart from that, much attention in this statement was paid to Russian Federation, which "seeks to destabilize NATO and undermine the security of NATO Allies and partners", and the necessity to "adapt NATO's response", which will be the next topic covered by this essay.

### **Addressing Russian threat**

200 thousands of troops, 80 planes and helicopters, 290 tanks – Zapad-2021 military exercises of Russian and Belorussian armed forces in numbers. This large-scale theatre, which took place in September 2021, is the latest manifestation of intensified tensions and Russia's military muscle flexing alongside NATO's eastern flank. 1708 kilometres of land boundary between the Baltic

States and Russia and Belarus makes Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia extremely important actors for the EU and NATO. With Russian leadership's chronic desire to revitalise geopolitical influence of the USSR, the three Baltic states, which used to be occupied by the Soviet Union, are presumably objects of further full-scale hybrid aggression following Ukraine, which has already commenced in the form of cyber-attacks and illegal migration

What does all of this have in common with transatlantic reenergising? Any threat usually causes consolidation – a sociological phenomenon, which, as I believe, sometimes can be extrapolated on international relations. Security of the Baltic States as of the eastern stronghold of democracy and the rule of law is a consolidation factor here. Russia (backed by China in many respects) is a power that has to be counterbalanced not only by the Baltic States themselves or their European partners, but by an organisation such as NATO with the United States and Canada still playing their role. The key principle here is deterrence and not reactive, but proactive actions. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty presupposes "taking ... such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force" in the event of "an armed attack against one or more" of the Member States (NATO, 1949). This is the factor of strengthening of the transatlantic ties. Constant need and interest of both the EU and North America states in keeping the Baltics safe and therefore deterring Russia is an integral aspect of transatlantic relations' becoming stronger.

However, the role of the Baltic States is not passive in this regard, and they contribute not only by the very fact of their location at the border with the Russian Federation and not only in the military dimension. First of all, defence strategies of the Baltic States are not limited to relying on the US support. The abovementioned Prime Ministers' statement includes their commitment "to full implementation of the Defence Investment Pledge" (www.mk.gov.lv, 2021). Furthermore, Estonia's,

Latvia's and Lithuania's defence expenditures are among the highest within the whole Alliance (as a share of national GDP): 2.28 %, 2.27 %, 2.03 % respectively (<https://www.nato.int/>, 2021).

Apart from this, the Baltic States' strategic importance is not confined to military deterrence. Russian policies had been jeopardising European political and economic stability by means of information warfare and energy pressure even before Ukrainian territory was occupied in 2014, which made the threat of direct aggression clear. Currently, one of the most striking examples of a sophisticated character of Russian-Western relations is anticipated launching of the Nord Stream-2 gas line, which did not only engender intra-EU disputes, but also exposed a lack of coordination in the transatlantic relations. "Purchasing Russian gas at a time when the EU is targeting Russia with political and economic sanctions" (De Maio, 2019) shows a high measure of ambivalence and primacy of financial interests over political. Germany's and other countries' support to and direct participation in this project will make these countries far more dependent on the Russian Federation, which is definitely not within the field of interests of the USA. Republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, however, together with five other EU member states have been articulating their opposition (Sytas, 2016) to the Nord Stream-2 project, which has been in unison with the American stance. With Biden's presidency we observe somehow mitigated attitude of his administration towards this issue (waived sanctions on a company building the pipeline, lowered the general tone of the rhetoric compared to Biden's predecessor). Such developments can be explained by anything (understanding of inevitability of launching of the project, desire for predictable relations with Russia) but not by the absence of concern regarding the EU's energy independence. This is to be substantiated by the joint statement on the Nord Stream-2 made by the chairpersons of the parliamentary foreign affairs committees of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Poland, Ireland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States in July 2021. It is directly declared there that "the pipeline will strengthen the impact of Russian gas in the European energy mix, endanger the national security of EU member states and the United

States" (Parliamentary Committees, n.d.). The Baltic States are among the minority in the EU, which openly opposes the project, and this is a manifestation of the transatlantic ties being maintained by these three countries. As we see, there are not so many EU members having the audacity to express such a view together with the United States, and that is why Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are pivotal in maintaining a satisfactory level of EU-US relations concerning this crisis.

### Responding to Chinese penetration

China and its ruling Communist Party has become a matter of rising concern of the Western world and North America in particular. We observe Sino-Western relations becoming deeper, tighter and more intensive at the same time, including Chinese penetration into political-business elite of Canada (Clive Hamilton, 2021, pp.41–49) and their being able to influence senior US politicians (Clive Hamilton, 2021, pp.41–49). Although global system is again getting bipolar, we cannot call it a new Cold War as the number of factors influencing these relations is much larger than the number of factors that influenced American-Russian relations at that time. Nowadays the world is much more open and globalised, so apart from arms race and a few possible flashpoints around the globe, now we observe a lot of attempts to penetrate each other economically, politically and ideologically. It is not strange that the EU has become the main-object of Chinese economic expansion. Such a state of affairs poses one more threat to the stability of the transatlantic relations and this is where the Baltic States again come to the fore in mitigating possible EU-US crisis.

Over the past few years China has made a lot to engage Europe in its economic cooperative network (17+1 initiative, an investment deal nearly signed). While the EU is trying to employ all the benefits of Chinese generosity, "by winning over Europe, the CCP hopes to convince the world that China is the 'champion of multilateralism' and a much-needed counterweight to US hegemony and unilateralism" (Clive Hamilton, 2021, pp.41–49). This is why such a penetration into Europe is not acceptable for the United States and can be harmful for transatlantic relations. At the same time, the Baltic States remain

quite reluctant to accept Chinese proposals just as other EU member states do it.

This is to be explained by Russian threat proximity, strengthened Sino-Russian ties and unwillingness to have any kind of misunderstandings with the USA.

The Baltic States were the smallest receivers of China's foreign direct investments among the EU member States from 2000 to 2019 (Siow, 2021). Initial independence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia from Chinese money opens a lot of ways for these countries, one of which is to fully abandon cooperation pattern imposed by the PRC, as Lithuania did. Rising concerns regarding threats related to Chinese penetration are constantly being sounded by the Baltic States. Notably, Lithuanian intelligence services believe that "China increases its geopolitical influence and creates preconditions for vulnerability of the states involved in its economic projects" (SSD, 2020). These concerns were also practically manifested when Lithuania did not allow China to get the controlling stake in Klaipėda seaport, which has a strategic importance for the whole NATO in terms of ensuring military security for the three Baltic States.

Undoubtedly, the US is highly concerned with the Sino-European approach. At the same time, the Baltic States contribute to strengthening transatlantic relations by showing a harsh stance towards China. For example, Lithuania's plans to open a trade office in Taiwan and donating Covid-19 vaccines to that country is one more indicator of convergence of Baltic and American positions concerning a question of much importance to Sino-Western relations. Direct proximity to a real threat induces the Baltic States to make more reasonable and calculated decisions in terms of political, military and ideological factors, which contributes to their security and usually is advantageous for the US in terms of deterring China.

### **Other implications for the Baltic States and conclusions**

The Baltic States today are at the intersection of interests of numerous global actors both geographically and politically. Transatlantic reconciliation is of a great significance for the Baltic States' stability. Furthermore, it entails an array

of opportunities to be used by the Republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia for their security, economic and political sustainability.

Firstly, according to the Brussels Summit (took place in June 2021) Communiqué, NATO members have pledged to "improve the enhanced Forward Presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland" (NATO, 2021), which is quite natural under today's circumstances. This outcome document can be perceived as a roadmap for the reenergised transatlantic cooperation due to the date when the summit took place. Much attention in it was paid to the necessity to protect and build up critical infrastructure. That is why further strengthening of bond between the EU and North America may entail addressing the most critical for the Baltic States issue – lack of transportation infrastructure. The Baltics' geography makes the three countries isolated from the rest of the Alliance with a very problematic and easily blocked by Russia Suwałki Gap as the only connecting link. In crisis scenario, this factor would be crucial, as lack of highways and railways would simply cause NATO's inability to deploy its forces quickly. That is why "the United States, the EU, and NATO allies should continue to support the Baltic states' efforts to chip away at their relative isolation and integrate more fully with continental Europe" (Matthew, 2020).

Secondly, transatlantic rapprochement presupposes a less degree of ambivalence for the Baltic States. This means that EU-US cohesion will allow them to avoid unnecessary fluctuations of whether to express transatlantic solidarity or to remain loyal to the European Union. A need of such a choice engenders unfavourable outcomes whatever is chosen, and the Baltic States had to face it constantly. For example, should they back the US Embassy relocated to Jerusalem in contrast to the majority of the EU Member States, what position should they take in US-Germany clash etc. Misunderstandings between North America and the EU cannot be eliminated completely, but at least the main lines of policies should be as compatible as possible. The transatlantic relations have not reached that level of cohesion (to be exemplified by the abovementioned difference in attitudes towards China), but the overall level of tensions has definitely been diminished.

Thirdly, the stronger transatlantic relations are, the quicker the Baltic States grow away from their Soviet legacy. Ties with the United States after the dissolution of the USSR have been indispensable for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Economic and political transformation in these three countries have been extensively funded by the United States (U.S. Embassy in Lithuania, n.d.). The Baltics have undergone a huge way of democratisation and that is why shared values are not just words, but an instrument of development of these states. Getting closer ideologically is an integral prerequisite of an effective military cooperation as well. Opinion poll conducted in 2017 shows that 52 % of US citizens think that the US should send troops to defend the Baltic States in the event of a Russian invasion. In 2014 and 2015 the respective numbers were 44 % and 45 % (ERR, 2017). Definitely, strengthening of EU-US relations will favourably influence these variables, which will presuppose a better response to security challenge.

#### Reference list:

- Beardsley, S. (2013). Biden calls Europe "the cornerstone" of US foreign policy. [online] Stars and Stripes. Available at: <https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/biden-calls-europe-the-cornerstone-of-us-foreign-policy-1.206239> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].
- Brattberg, E. (2021). Transatlantic Relations After Biden's First 100 Days. [online] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/05/06/transatlantic-relations-after-biden-s-first-100-days-pub-84472>.
- Chairpersons of the Foreign Affairs Committees Statement on Nord Stream 2. [online] Available at: <https://static.lsm.lv/documents/1/bt.pdf> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].
- Clive Hamilton (2021). HIDDEN HAND : exposing how the chinese communist party is reshaping the world.S.L.: Oneworld Publications, pp.41-49
- Contiguglia, C. (2018). Trump: EU is one of United States' biggest foes. [online] POLITICO. Available at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-putin-russia-europe-one-of-united-states-biggest-foes/>.
- De Maio, G. (2019). Nord Stream 2: A Failed Test for EU Unity and Transatlantic Coordination. [online] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. Available at: <https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/online-edition/2019/4/20/nord-stream-2-a-failed-test-for-eu-unity-and-transatlantic-coordination> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].
- ERR (2017). Survey: Over half of Americans think US should defend Baltics from Russia. [online] ERR. Available at: <https://news.err.ee/611781/survey-over-half-of-americans-think-us-should-defend-baltics-from-russia> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].
- Fukuyama, F. (1998). The geopolitics reader. London ; New York: Routledge, pp.114-124. <https://www.nato.int/>. (2021). Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2021). [online] Available at: [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/6/pdf/210611-pr-2021-094-en.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/6/pdf/210611-pr-2021-094-en.pdf) [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].
- Kojala, L. (2020). For Biden, Four Points on the Baltic Agenda -Foreign Policy Research Institute. [online] www.fpri.org. Available at: <https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/12/for-biden-four-points-on-the-baltic-agenda/>.
- Matthew, T. (2020). The Current Status of Transportation Infrastructure in the Baltics -Foreign Policy Research Institute. [online] www.fpri.org. Available at: <https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/04/the-current-status-of-transportation-infrastructure-in-the-baltics/>.
- MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA. (2020). New U.S. rotation deployed in Lithuania with heavy equipment. [online] Available at: [https://kam.lt/en/news\\_1098/current\\_issues/new\\_u.s.\\_rotation\\_deployed\\_in\\_lithuania\\_with\\_heavy\\_equipment.html](https://kam.lt/en/news_1098/current_issues/new_u.s._rotation_deployed_in_lithuania_with_heavy_equipment.html) [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].
- NATO (1949). The North Atlantic Treaty. [online] NATO. Available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm).
- NATO (2021). Brussels Summit Communiqué issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021. [online] NATO. Available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_185000.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm).
- Siow, M. (2021). "Nothing to lose": Europe's Baltic states brushing off China. [online] South China Morning Post. Available at: <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3141373/why-europes-baltic-states-can-brush-china>.

STATE SECURITY DEPARTMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA. (2020). [online] Available at: <https://www.vsd.lt/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/2020-Gresmes-En.pdf>.

Sytas, A. (2016). EU leaders sign letter objecting to Nord Stream-2 gas link. Reuters. [online] 16 Mar. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-energy-nordstream/eu-leaders-sign-letter-objecting-to-nord-stream-2-gas-link-idUKKCN0W11YV>.

Sytas, A. (2019). U.S. to deploy 500 troops to Lithuania in fresh signal to Russia. Reuters. [online] 25 Sep. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-russia-lithuania-idUSL5N26G2VC> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].

Tunnsjø, Ø. (2018). The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics: China, the United States, and Geostuctural Realism.

U.S. Embassy in Lithuania. (n.d.).History of the U.S. and Lithuania. [online] Available at: <https://lt.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/io/> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].

Vandiver, J. (2020). New US special operations site activated in heart of the Baltics. [online] Stars and Stripes. Available at: <https://www.stripes.com/new-us-special-operations-site-activated-in-heart-of-the-baltics-1.654032> [Accessed 31 Oct. 2021].

www.mk.gov.lv. (2021). JOINT STATEMENT ON THE UPCOMING NATO SUMMIT 2021 | Ministru kabinets. [online] Available at: <https://www.mk.gov.lv/en/article/joint-statement-upcoming-nato-summit-2021>

### 3<sup>rd</sup> Prize: 400 EUR, Arnoldas Rutkauskas (MRU)

#### MYKOLAS ROMERIS UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN UNION LAW SPECIALIZATION IN LAW, FIRST SEMESTER OF THE FIRST YEAR OF MASTER STUDIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

#### ESSAY FOR DR. KARL A. LAMERS PEACE-PRIZE

#### INTRODUCTION

The topic of this essay is the influence of NATO as a cross-border international organization on the future social, legal and political life of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and the influence of the reloading of relationships between Europe and North America as the latter is the main NATO bastion on Europe with the Baltic States.

The problem of this essay is how and in what way Lithuania and other Baltic states can contribute to the strengthening of transatlantic cooperation.

The main thesis of the essay is that the Baltic States must work together and allocate as much financial, material and human resources and capital as possible to protect not only themselves but also the entire NATO bloc from threats from adverse anti-democratic forces, especially in such a dangerous pandemic, disinformation and sensitive pandemic context.



## THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RE-ENERGIZING TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AND STRONGER COOPERATION BETWEEN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA

Aleksander Kwaśniewski, the former President of Poland and one of NATO's best friends in the political arena, who brought his country to this prestigious alliance guaranteeing security and the triumph of democracy, has said: "And I think to be in NATO for the countries of our region, it means more guarantees for us, it means more responsibility for our common security, but it means fulfillment of all standards of civilized world, like protection of human rights and democratic mechanisms." This quote from a highly respected politician may seem a little pompous and ceremonial at first glance, but it hides NATO's immense purpose and quintessence as a guarantor of security for all of us - to preserve our homes, to preserve democracy, to protect us from ourselves. From the imbalance of our human circumstances, the fever, the manifestation of evil, which, uninhibited, can turn into the most terrible tendencies leading to self-destruction.

This quote can also be closely linked to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg's ambition to strengthen cooperation between NATO members in 2021 and the peculiar regeneration of relations between North America and Europe in the Alliance itself<sup>1</sup>. The Secretary General of NATO, in expressing his position on enhanced security cooperation, firstly by allocating<sup>2</sup> percent of GDP to defense and secondly to protect the entire Alliance from terrorist threats, not only expressed the importance of a formal self-defense instinct in his invitation, but also clearly emphasized the threats posed by hybrid war around the world today, especially in the context of today's pandemic and economic pressures.

As noted by the Defense and Security Committee of NATO in the Special Report on NATO's Essential Role In The COVID-19 Pandemic, China and Russia have a particularly important role to play in the context of pandemic management.

and the dissemination of fake news<sup>2</sup>. Also, as emphasized in analytical sources, the Baltic States have faced a particularly strong wave of disinformation from the Kremlin concerning vaccination processes, resulting in relatively slow vaccination rates in the Baltic States and serious challenges in overcoming the global pandemic. There is also a high risk that these countries have recently emerged from the yoke of Soviet oppression and that their societies are not sufficiently resilient to hostile propaganda aimed primarily at public skepticism about vaccines being developed by Western countries, particularly the United States<sup>3</sup>.

Regrettably, the dissemination of such misinformation is often compounded by certain national policies, often misled by various unreliable sources of information operating in Europe and controlled by Eastern Bloc countries. Encountering misinformation is always painful for a fair section of society that is supportive of Western policies. This section of society is suffering undeservedly not only financially, but even at the expense of their health. Given the goal set by the NATO Secretary General to bring Europe and North America closer together in the field of defense, the area of disinformation is of paramount importance and emerges as one of the main defensive fortifications to protect Europe from the escalating hybrid war. It is therefore particularly important that the Baltic States, as they are at high risk of facing threats from the East, make their own more effective commitments to their Western partners, especially the United States.

In order to fulfill NATO Secretary General's ambition to strengthen Alliance bonds, Europe, including the Baltic States, should intensify its humanitarian assistance to the countries most vulnerable to propaganda in the East, i.e. supplying them with vaccines, disseminating information on the benefits of vaccination, and highlighting the West's enormous contribution in the context of pandemic management. Achieving

this goal is especially closely related to the dissemination of an effective pro-Western vaccination and other pandemic management prevention campaign on social networks and media channels. By providing human resources and expertise, and encouraging other European nations to resist propaganda and disinformation, the Baltic States can show NATO partners the importance of the Alliance's security ambition and commitment to work together if such internationalization of hybrid warfare ever becomes a potential armed threat.

Russia, China, and other hostile states primarily seek to undermine public confidence in the effective functioning of Western cooperation strategy, and for them this tactic of hybrid warfare becomes a great pretext to oppose Western states. Expressing a strong pro-Western stance and a commitment to work together can be a wonderful step in proving to NATO partners, and above all, North America as the Alliance's main base, that Europe, as well as the Baltic States, are ready to act together in all its security and democracy guaranteeing factors.

As current world events have shown, it is vital that the ranks of democracies are as broad as possible and that as few anti-democratic, authoritarian regimes as possible remain. In this case, the example of Lithuania can become an inspiring impetus for other European states not to be afraid and to express their strong position in the process of implementing the principle of realization of the aspiration for freedom and independence of nations. Lithuania, recognizing the Taiwanese government and not supporting and opposing China's aggressive policy on realizing the nation's freedom of self-determination, has clearly demonstrated to the Alliance that it is committed to democratic principles and to implementing President Kwaśniewski's ideas as purposefully as possible. Although Taiwan is still moving towards its dreamed independence and

is difficult and persistent in defending it, Lithuania's political and diplomatic steps not only draw the attention of other countries of the European Union and the continent, but also prove to North America as a pillar of the Alliance its determination to stick together and goals of the Alliance and to protect the security of all of us from the grips of aggression and despotism.

The fact that such actions of Lithuania are not left unanswered is also evidenced by the international recognition at the highest level, proving the importance of supporting and promoting democratic forces in the context of international security. Former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has expressed his support for Lithuania's policy towards Taiwan and has described Lithuania's actions as a 'courageous decision'<sup>4</sup>. Although Lithuania's determination to develop relations with Taiwan by opening a diplomatic mission in Vilnius is not directly related to NATO's membership program, such a bold statement of position and determination to expand democracy around the world only proves once again the importance of its influence on Allies. Western countries, especially Canada, and the United States, are increasingly aware of the importance of the contribution of all members of the Alliance in seeing such actions, and are even more committed to defending the right of others, the weaker ones, to live freely.

Democracy-building policies promoted by pro-Western states not only enhance the state's reputation in the international arena per se, but also draw the attention of the strongest Allies and foster mutual trust, which is vital to guard against increasingly mindless anti-democratic movements that carry only useless resistance and destruction. Thus, the closest and widest possible co-operation between the Baltic States and especially the Eastern Partnership countries in the field of open democracy promotion can be a starting point for the re-energizing of relations between Europe and North America in the context of NATO.

Although the countries of the Baltic region are making great efforts to promote the emergence of democratic forces and to prevent the emergence of hostile forces, they also face a myriad of challenges due to their geopolitical situation. Especially in Latvia, where there is a large number of Russian-speakers and people of Soviet identity, there is a need for a special focus in the information and military spheres. Leadership and a domestic and foreign policy based on trust and joint action are needed to achieve the NATO Secretary General's goal of reloading relations between European and North American NATO nations.

Lithuania has already reduced the number of programs shown on national television channels and is reaching the minimum threshold. Over time, we must completely abandon the dissemination of at least some nascent ideology through a wide variety of media channels. This is especially important for countries like Latvia or Poland, where Soviet nostalgia is still strong. Its eradication would be a major step in discouraging Eastern aggression and persuading Western partners to invest their time and capabilities in the Baltic States.

On the other hand, help cannot be expected from the strongest and most reliable Allies if you are not going to put capital into a common pot yourself. The famous French soldier Napoleon Bonaparte once stated that he who does not feed his army feeds a foreign one. According to 2021 data, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland spend more than 2 percent of the Alliance's total defense on the country's GDP<sup>5</sup>. Such funding must be maintained and further and gradually increased. Only by increasing funding for defense and security policy will it be possible to deter countries such as Russia, China or, a fortiori, Belarus, which is currently based on an undemocratic regime. NATO, as an organization guaranteeing international security and peace, has noted in the above-mentioned reports and reports that the contribution of the Baltic States to the promotion of civil society and the development of the human rights protection system is vital.

By increasing funding for foreign and domestic defense and security, the Baltic States can demonstrate to foreign partners in the NATO Partnership that they are ready to cooperate even more strongly and closely, thus contributing to the security of nations and increasing not only their individual but also their membership the respectability of NATO as a whole and its image in the international arena as a cooperative structure.

The application of economic sanctions and other soft law measures to authoritarian states, such as Russia, China or Belarus, and their constant review guarantee the security of the entire bloc. The application of such measures deters hostile states from expanding their influence in the sphere of NATO's partnership, so the Baltic States, as one of the most vulnerable groups of states, must continue to pursue a consistent deterrent policy. Promoting such a policy increases the involvement of Partner countries in strengthening the pan-European security system and enables NATO to rely more in corpore on its small members, who do their utmost to contribute to global defense.

NATO's involvement in this area is extremely important. This organization has already contributed to the de-escalation of the so-called migrant crisis on the Lithuanian-Belarusian border and continues to increase its forces in the fight against hybrid warfare<sup>6</sup>.

The Baltic states cannot give up and focus only on their internal problems arising from the aggressive hand policies of foreign states. Only measures such as ever-increasing funding, the promotion of civil society, limiting the spread of disinformation in the Eastern European region, which is currently the most vulnerable, and the promotion of a democratic society can focus on the common goal of transnational security and sustainable unity.

## CONCLUSION

The goal of the NATO Secretary General in 2021 to focus on a policy of regeneration between Europe and North America and the strengthening of interconnections cannot be taken for granted without requiring any internal effort on the part of the member states.

In today's pandemic, post-truth world, we cannot focus on ourselves and ignore the common good. And we can only achieve this good by making a contribution - by sharing common resources, preventing the spread of propaganda and fake news, increasing funding and showing our strongest Partners that we are committed to the common good of strengthening the Alliance.

By supporting the emergence of democratic movements, by setting up their representations in our countries, by providing asylum to political prisoners, by making a growing financial contribution of not less than 2%, by clearing our public space of misinformation, we will show our commitment to security and peace. And the rewards will be huge: overloading relations between NATO's largest partners and small members will allow for even greater trust in each other, no matter what global crisis may occur.

### Remarks:

- 1 Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the joint press point with Alexander Dobrindt, Chairman of the CSU Parliamentary Group, NATO, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_180644.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_180644.htm)
- 2 "NATO's Essential Role In The COVID-19 Pandemic", Special Report of Defence and Security Committee of NATO.
- 3 "How did the Nordic-Baltic countries handle the first wave of COVID-19. A strategic communications analysis", NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 82-84, <https://stratcomcoe.org/pdfs/?file=/publications/download/Nato-Covid19-Nordic-Baltic-d6933.pdf?zoom=page-fit>
- 4 Anders Fogh Rasmussen post on Twitter, <https://twitter.com/AndersFoghR/status/1432778388104699908>
- 5 "NATO summit: What does the US contribute?", BBC, 14 June of 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074>
- 6 Milda Seputyte, John Follain, "NATO to Send Team to Address Migrant Influx Stoked by Belarus", Bloomberg, 25 August of 2021, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-25/nato-will-send-team-to-counter-migrant-threat-posed-by-belarus>

### References:

- 1 Anders Fogh Rasmussen post on Twitter, <https://twitter.com/AndersFoghR/status/1432778388104699908>
- 2 "How did the Nordic-Baltic countries handle the first wave of COVID-19. A strategic communications analysis". NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. <https://stratcomcoe.org/pdfs/?file=/publications/download/Nato-Covid19-Nordic-Baltic-d6933.pdf?zoom=page-fit>
- 3 "NATO summit: What does the US contribute?". BBC. 14 June of 2021. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074>
- 4 "NATO's Essential Role In The COVID-19 Pandemic", Special Report of Defence and Security Committee of NATO.
- 5 Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the joint press point with Alexander Dobrindt, Chairman of the CSU Parliamentary Group. NATO. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_180644.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_180644.htm)
- 6 Seputyte Milda, John Follain. "NATO to Send Team to Address Migrant Influx Stoked by Belarus". Bloomberg. 25 August of 2021. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-25/nato-will-send-team-to-counter-migrant-threat-posed-by-belarus>

## Thema | Topic:

What role do you see for NATO as an alliance of democracies in these efforts? How can NATO play its part in defending and promoting democracy and democratic values?

### 1<sup>st</sup> Prize: 1.000 EUR, Peer K. Braak From Brain-death to heart-attack?

How NATO 2030 should incorporate the normative foundation of the alliance

Normative principles lie at the heart of NATO's grand strategy. However, the values of rules-based conduct, democracy and even human rights no appear longer to be seemingly self-evident forces of history. For NATO's cohesion and security, three sub-dynamics of this global trend are especially threatening. Firstly, the value-consensus within NATO has become increasingly precarious. Political tendencies in some member states revive memories of authoritarianism and even raise doubts about the internal value of friendly relations, a trend which other member states are increasingly unwilling to tolerate. Secondly, foreign adversaries are both undermining the democratic decision-making in NATO member states and seek to directly gain leverage over their respective governments. Lastly, the strategic legitimization of authoritarian governance models and erosion of global norms outside of NATO's borders will inevitably erode cooperativeness, thereby multiplying existing dangers to the Euro-Atlantic security in the long run.

Faced with a threat aimed at its heart from these three angles, NATO must approach normative principles as both a vital asset and a strategic imperative. Here, the current effort to align NATO member states' divergent threat perceptions into a common strategy for 2030, a remedy for a symptom once famously summarized as "brain-death", provides a valuable opportunity to simultaneously forestall a potential cardiac arrest. A proactive therapy would be to first ensure coherence in NATO's grand strategy by finding a more precise consensus on its shared values, clearly separating what they entail and what not. The next step would be to factor these guidelines stronger into NATO's internal func-

tioning, to incorporate them into its defensive stance across all concerned domains, as well as to pursue more proactive diplomatic engagements with like-minded partners outside the treaty area.

### Internal democratic erosion: strategic coherence through more precise definitions

As a first priority, NATO should set its own house in order. NATO's values are both a vital asset and a strategic end in themselves. Posing as a greater good that excels special interests of individual member states, these ethical principles are the sine qua non that hold the alliance together when geostrategic or material interests temporarily diverge. It has to a considerable degree been due to this normative cohesion that NATO survived the collapse of its main strategic threat in 1991 and is today still able to reconcile the increasingly diverging threat-perceptions of its member states. But the current handling of this value canon on the political level of NATO does not do this justice.

The Brussels Communiqué mentioned the desirable values of "individual liberty, human rights, democracy", adding "human rights" versus the undesirable challenges to the "rules-based international order". But what are the definitions of these loaded terms and where are the red lines that cannot be crossed? Notably, the imprecision of its principles is not a recent problem in NATO history. The preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty already offered language about democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. Nevertheless, that did not stop states with then clearly undemocratic polities from joining NATO more than half a century ago.

In an alliance where the standardization of military procedures and organizational structures is everyday business, the tedious diplomatic work of specifying political terms is often being avoided. Of course, it would be naïve to hope for an exact definition of the word "democracy" in an alliance of states whose historical paths to democratic governance were so strikingly different. But could a member state still claim the moral high ground of defending the rule of law or democracy against foreign adversaries while it undermines its own citizens' basic human rights

or abolishes its independent judiciary at home? And what would be a principled position once a NATO-ally begins to officially question the territorial sovereignty or territorial waters of another member state? And even more important: Would the populations of other NATO member states still be willing to commit their lives to the protection of that supposed ally against external threats?

Just as with other strategic goals, an imprecise definition of the objectives brings about incoherent policies, which in turn becomes extremely problematic once matters of principle are concerned. Recognizing values as an integral factor of NATO's strategy would therefore necessitate not only the already promised political emphasis on them but also their more precise definition. The first step to better integrating values into NATO 2030 would therefore require delineating as precisely as politically possible what NATO's values necessarily entail and what not, potentially even including basic structural and procedural operationalizations. Additionally, this would allow the member states to draw a clear line in the sand how far one of their own can deviate from the consensus. Reading specific instruments to safeguard its values internally, the policy recommendations by the NATO Reflection Group include a voluntary pledge of good conduct as well as a Centre for Excellence of Democratic Resilience. But would these voluntary measures seriously tempt the same political elites that profit politically and economically of the democratic backsliding in their home constituencies to change course? The non-bindingness of these recommendations highlights the limitations of NATO's toolkit to address this vital threat internally. The key problem is that the collective of NATO finds itself with barely any carrots and virtually no sticks when it comes to preventing individual members from veering too far off the agreed normative agenda. Although more bold ideas to solve this problem exist, including the introduction of a minus-one rule for major decisions, most appear unfeasible for now, given the fact that they would likely be vetoed down by the very unanimous decision-making mechanisms

which they seek to amend. Thus, NATO member states interested in protecting the value consensus should first aim to create an impartial supervisory mechanism or position and then supply it with the necessary carrots, maybe adding even some realistic yet effective punitive measures. The escalating measure of this principled approach would then be to set up an "emergency brake" in NATO's decision-making bodies. For this measure, countries that are unwilling to let their core values be undermined by their allies should consider making votes on NATO's infrastructure investments, locations of facility placements, exercise opportunities and leadership positions for other allies dependent on their adherence to NATO's basic normative principles.

### **Eternal threats: How to safeguard NATO's principles against authoritarian meddling**

Simultaneously, NATO must prepare its defensive stance against adversaries with authoritarian motivations. The latter are increasingly sidestepping physical barriers of defense by using the trends of digitization and economic globalization to target the soft ideological underbelly of democracies. Such adversarial behavior includes either a democratic government being pressured through substantial leverage to pursue policies which are against the will of its people, or the easier tasks of influencing electoral processes and political communication to skew the expression of this will. Concerning the first threat, the tools not only include corruption but also a significant influence on supply chains or strategically placed foreign direct investments in politically connected firms. And with the requirement of unanimous decisions in NATO, influencing a single member state would suffice to paralyze the alliance. Hence, the potential sources of leverage an adversary could have over the political elites or government of a member state must be analyzed and reviewed internally. Subsequently, a first countermeasure would be the creation of binding screening guidelines for the trade of military and dual-use goods and for foreign investments in strategically vital infrastructure and key technologies, preferably in cooperation with the EU.

Regarding weaknesses of electoral and communicative processes associated to democratic opinionforming, NATO should first substantially improve its defensive capabilities in the information- and cyberspace. Aside from increased financial contributions and more attractive schemes to avoid losing skilled personnel, this measure should also include a detailed cooperation program between member states, private enterprises, and academia to detect possible weaknesses in the cyber-infrastructure of NATO member states. The aim would be to increase the resilience against cyber-attacks and to set shared minimum-standards for cyber-security, not only for democratic institutions and parties, but also to secure the software supply chains and network infrastructure on which the general population also depends. Threats to, for example, commercial satellites or telecommunication structures could easily undermine the most basic criteria for democratic decision-making: the ability to communicate with each other. Instead of making smaller countries feel like pawns in technological rivalry between two superpowers, as it has been the case in the discussion over global G5-infrastructure, this process should be as inclusive as possible to smaller and technologically not as advanced member states. Another measure should be strengthening inter-institutional cooperation with the EU to counter these hybrid threats and to more efficiently coordinate multilateral sanctions against foreign electioninterference.

### **Beyond NATO's borders: From internal norm synchronization to global norm-setting**

Finally, it should be the third priority to aid and stabilize states abroad that adhere to democratic norms and international laws. Of course, a regional defensive alliance is less suited for spreading norms globally than forums like the G7 and NATO can also not serve as a replacement for specific concepts such as "Alliance for Multilateralism". But, in a world where security threats are neither only kinetic nor limited in reach by physics, global non-military cooperation in selected policy-areas with likeminded partners is a must for NATO. Even the combined might of

its member states will require additional diplomatic and political weight to sufficiently influence global standards in crucial policy fields such as cyber-security, communication infrastructure and space. The opportunity to use NATO for synchronizing member states' policies internally could be leveraged as a force-multiplier to engage like-minded countries and international institutions for global norm-setting. Two particularly acute sub-problems will be the question of the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in military systems and digital surveillance. As any reduction of the human "in the loop" will inevitably risk weakening democratic control of and executive accountability for military actions, the increasing automation of warfare is both directly linked to NATO policy and its core values. Meanwhile, the still developing Pegasusscandal has shown the volatility of even key political figures in member states to mere commercial actors operating from a NATO partner country, highlighting the need for collective regulation.

However, if NATO members truly want to pursue a multilateral and rules-based world order, the need for reform of many other international structures cannot be ignored. A global order grossly underrepresenting many regions outside the Euro-Atlantic in the shared structures of global governance is itself already undemocratic and unjust. Such an order cannot be a viable long-term strategy for global cooperation, despite the benefits it might render to those currently favored by it in the short term. Openly addressing this imbalance in many international organizations both as individual member states and as a collective would also give greater credibility to NATO's policy of reaching out to other democratic states like, for example India, which has viable arguments to claim its underrepresentation in the United Nations.

In conclusion, the gravest fear of the alliance should not be the internal disagreement on the question against which threat to unite against, but rather the decay of the shared agreement why they decided to unite in the first place. For a collective of genuinely democratic and peaceful states, defining its own strategic goals cannot

depend solely on the indifferent calculation of how to maximize power at home and abroad. In a democracy, as the “government of the people, by the people, for the people”, that very people’s collectively shared ideals and norms inevitably must be a pivotal factor in deciding what security policies its government pursues. The same is true for the strategy of NATO as it represents the shared pursuit of 30 countries not just for their individual survival but also a safer, rules-based, and freer world. Without a shared strategic vision on the threat landscape and common security objectives, NATO might appear brain-dead and paralyzed. But without a shared set of norms and a coherent strategy to safeguard them, NATO will become heartless. The alliance must not risk either of those two defects.

## 2<sup>nd</sup> Prize: 600 EUR, Velislava-Mihaela Krachunova

“Since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 the international situation has changed significantly and the political tasks of the Alliance have assumed a new dimension.”<sup>1</sup>

These words are reiterated every year, at every NATO Summit. As new challenges to the security environment, posed by state and non-state actors, are emerging regularly, the Alliance is propelled to build new ambidextrous strategies in order to tackle them, and is pushed to enhance not only its military aspect and capabilities, but also strengthen its political dimension, democratic response, and the cohesion between the Allies.

Facing the recurring challenge not only to deal with new dangers, but also to balance between military and political aspects, is not unfamiliar to the Alliance. Actually, the aforementioned quote can be found in the “Report of the Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance” (also known as the ‘Harmel Report’) from 1967, which was initiated by the Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel at a time when the topic of NATO’s obsolescence was raised. Pointing out that the international environment did not resemble the one of 1949 anymore, the Report reaffirmed the aims and purpose of the Alliance and advocated the adoption of a **dual-track policy for NATO**: deterrence and détente, i.e., maintaining adequate

defence while promoting political relaxation and dialogue. It was clear that in order not to become obsolete, NATO had to cease to be exclusively a military alliance, and **aim for a political cohesion**.<sup>2</sup> Broadening the areas of cooperation beyond the military per se and the encouragement of regular political consultation among member countries began even earlier, in 1956, when the Committee on Non-Military Cooperation (also known as the Committee of Three) agreed that the two aspects of security – civil and military – were no longer separate, and that the needs and objectives of NATO had changed.<sup>3</sup>

Now, more than 60 years later, the Alliance is once again engaged in a process of reflection regarding its role and objectives in the 21st century, its level of military and political preparation for the new security challenges, and its significance as a stanchion of democracy, democratic values and rules-based international order in order to **“secure an uncertain future”**.<sup>4</sup>

NATO’s longevity and success have been rooted in its ability to adapt to changing strategic circumstances<sup>5</sup> and whereas the nature of current threats is completely different from when NATO was founded, there is one necessity that remains the same – the Alliance should **focus not only on the military aspect**, but also try to **reinforce the political dimension of its actions**. This is the route to maintaining its purpose, stipulated in the preamble of the Washington Treaty, i.e. **“to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law” and preserve peace and security**. Only by unity, dialogue, and adherence to these principles, can NATO remain the **bedrock of democracy** and rules-based international order.

## Is the Alliance prepared to accomplish this? And if not NATO, then who?

The first step in order to build a coherent, competitive and multifaceted strategy for defence, deterrence and protection of democratic values is to devise a **new Strategic Concept**. The development of a new Strategic Concept is an opportunity to name the new challenges, establish clear priorities, solidify cohesion by leading



the Alliance to confront new strategic realities<sup>6</sup>, and to reiterate the support for the three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. Unlike the Cold War, the Alliance currently faces two systemic rivals – Russia and its aggressive actions which constitute a threat to Euro-Atlantic security, as well as China and its growing military and economic influence. Other external threats, to which the Alliance has to respond properly and which must include in the new Strategic Concept, come from all strategic directions and include: the COVID-19 pandemic and its major impact, climate change, terrorism, cyber, hybrid, and other asymmetric threats, disinformation, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the erosion of the arms control architecture.<sup>7</sup> The internal challenges lie in the lack of unity and consensus, which sometimes occur between the Allies, as well as in democratic backsliding among some Member States, which might lead to undermining the citizens' trust in the Alliance as a whole.

Concerning external threats, for the first time, in its Communiqué from June 2021, NATO singled out China as a threat to the “rules-based international order”, with its expanding nuclear arsenal, lack of transparency, use of disinformation and the largest armed forces in the world posing “systemic challenges” to the established order.<sup>8</sup> In comparison, in NATO's London Declaration adopted in 2019, NATO only briefly mentioned **“China's growing influence and international policies which present both opportunities and challenges that need to be addressed together as an Alliance.”**<sup>9</sup> Pursuant to this year's Communiqué<sup>10</sup> the Alliance calls on China to uphold its international commitments and to act responsibly in the international system, including in the space, cyber, and maritime domains, and in keeping with its role as a major power. The growth of Chinese power is inextricably linked to an ideology that is a major normative challenge to NATO as an Alliance of democracies, since it does not share NATO's concern for individual freedoms, human rights and the rule of law.<sup>11</sup> In order to continue upholding its leading role in the democratic world, NATO should address China's violations of these principles and its propaganda efforts to cover them up. These include,

among others, human rights abuses against ethnic Uighurs in Xinjiang and violations of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea in the South China Sea.<sup>12</sup>

In the newly-adopted Communiqué important emphasis has once again been put on another persistent NATO rival – Russia, its military activities, hybrid actions, the diversification of its nuclear arsenal, development of new, unregulated technologies, the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine and the breach of human rights, values, principles, trust, and commitments outlined in agreed documents that underpin the NATO-Russia relationship. There can be no return to “business as usual” until Russia demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities.<sup>13</sup>

Redeclaring a common position concerning Russia and China was of utmost significance to NATO and the strength of its military and political response. It is vital to highlight that in the spirit of the Harmel Report, the Alliance has also stated its readiness for cooperation and dialogue with both its strategic rivals.

### **Advancing democratic resilience – NATO's fourth core task**

From its outset in 1949, NATO has not only defended against external threats coming from state and non-state actors, it has also advanced the principles of liberal democratic governance. Although its cohesion initially rested on the common threat of the Soviet Union, NATO was more unified than most multilateral organizations thanks **to the common character of its members**, and it being an alliance of democracies with elected governments that were accountable to their citizens, bound by the rule of law, and dedicated to upholding political and civil rights.<sup>14</sup>

Democracy implies the presence of diversity of opinions and the liberty to state one's views. However, different ideas and estimations and the way which Allies assess different threats, have sometimes led to periods of tension and lack of harmony. Despite being the guardian of democracy and democratic values for almost a century now, the Alliance and its Member States, in particular, are also not immune to democratic

backsliding, and phenomena such as decreasing popular confidence in political institutions, disenchantment with mainstream parties, lack of media freedom. All of these can jeopardise the trust among the Allies.<sup>15</sup>

An opportunity to deal with this internal threat and to uphold democracy and democratic values lies in the development of a Center for Democratic Resilience.

The idea for creating such a Center has been proposed by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly President Gerald E. Connolly, who has placed safeguarding the Alliance's shared democratic values at the heart of his presidency. The idea is to coordinate Allied efforts to strengthen democratic resilience, as democratic values have been pivotal in maintaining Alliance cohesion for seven decades and they remain the strongest weapons Allies possess to effectively counter external threats. In Mr. Connolly's words: ***"democracy, while resilient, is also fragile. Allies must constantly work to protect it, expand it, and strengthen their ability to resist and counter attempts to undermine it – both from within and without."*** Establishing an institutional structure affiliated with NATO, dedicated to democratic resilience, would send a powerful signal of the Alliance's commitment to the democratic values underpinning NATO. The purposes of the Center are outlined as monitoring and identifying challenges to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law among member states, on one hand, and facilitating democracy and governance assistance to member states, when requested, on the other.<sup>16</sup>

Building such a Centre is vital to NATO as an Alliance of democracies, since democratic values are constantly being challenged from external and internal threats. Countries with weak protections for democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law are vulnerable to subversion, corruption, and mis- and dis-information. This might lead to some Members' decision to prioritize unilateral national decisions over collective Alliance interests, or to use their position to block joint activities as a way to gain leverage in bilateral disputes or even threats. Some Allies are occasionally unable to provide adequate human rights protection to all societal groups living on

their territory, or fail to adhere to the rule-of-law based order. These obstacles lead to disunity which could be used by strategic competitors to destabilize individual allies or NATO as a whole.<sup>17</sup>

### **"There is no way forward without unity and cooperation"**

In the 2021 Communiqué the Member States reaffirmed the Alliance's shared democratic principles as well as their commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty, consultations reinforcement when the security or stability of an Ally is threatened or when their fundamental values and principles are at risk, as well as to the enhancement of NATO's ability to contribute to preserve and shape the rules-based international order in areas that are important to Allied security. In order to strengthen their unity, Member States have highlighted their unwavering commitment to all aspects of the Defence Investment Pledge agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit, as ***"Fair burden sharing underpins the Alliance's cohesion, solidarity, credibility, and ability to fulfil our fundamental Article 3 and Article 5 commitments."***

Nonetheless, it is important to note that in this challenging security environment, building military or democratic resilience only between Member States will not be enough. The Alliance should start working more actively with the European Union, which remains a unique and essential partner for NATO. Enhanced NATO-EU cooperation offers a means to leverage the combined resources of both organizations in common cause. NATO and the EU already work closely on resilience issues related to critical infrastructure protection. However, they should extend that cooperation to issues of democratic, shared, and forward resilience.<sup>18</sup>

Moreover, in NATO Parliamentary Assembly's Resolution 454 it is stated that in order to continue its success as cornerstone of transatlantic security and democracy, the Alliance needs to reaffirm commitment to NATO's Open Door policy as a tool to spread the zone of stability and democratic standards in Europe, to support the Euro-Atlantic integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine, foster the implementation of NATO's Women, Peace, and Security agenda, to identify and counter disinformation.<sup>19</sup>

In the Communiqué from June 2021 it has been reiterated that NATO's door should also remain open to all European democracies which share the values of the Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, which are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty, and whose inclusion can contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.<sup>20</sup> The strong commitment to the security and stability of the Western Balkans and to supporting the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the countries in the region has also been repeated.

The Alliance is used to tackling internal and external challenges while keeping the balance between militarism and politics, and embracing the difficult role of being the main protector of democratic values and rules-based order. As stated in the Committee of Three Report back in 1956: ***“From the very beginning of NATO it was recognised that while defence cooperation was the first and most urgent requirement, this was not enough. It has also become increasingly realised since the Treaty was signed that security is today far more than a military matter. The strengthening of political consultation and economic cooperation, the development of resources, progress in education and public understanding, all these can be as important, or even more important, for the protection of the security of a nation, or an alliance, as the building of a battle-ship or the equipping of an army.”***<sup>21</sup> The peace that most of Europe has enjoyed for the last seven decades is a historical exception. Despite the various challenges, NATO, as an Alliance that constantly adapts and modernizes, remains the guardian of that precious asset.<sup>22</sup> Despite the turbulences that might occur, NATO continues to be the most successful security organisation because it has been credible and that credibility is based on NATO's military capabilities and a common unity of purpose.<sup>23</sup> As NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg reminded Allies in his launch of the NATO 2030 process in February, ***NATO's values “are not abstract notions. They are at the very core of who we are.”***<sup>24</sup>

#### References:

- 1 The Future Tasks of the Alliance, Report of the Council – “The Harmel Report”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 13 – 14 December 1967, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_26700.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_26700.htm) (Last accessed on 27.07.2021)
- 2 1967: De Gaulle pulls France out of NATO's integrated military structure: Video lecture by Dr. Jamie Shea, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 3 March 2009, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_139272.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_139272.htm) (Last accessed: 27.07.2021)
- 3 Report of the Committee of Three, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Last updated: 5 October 2017, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_65237.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_65237.htm) (Last accessed: 27.07.2021)
- 4 NATO 2030: <https://www.nato.int/nato2030/> (Last accessed: 27.07.2021)
- 5 NATO 2030: United for a New Era, Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General, p.7, 25 November 2020
- 6 Ibid., p. 12
- 7 Brussels Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 14 June 2021, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_185000.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm) (Last accessed on 27.07.2021)
- 8 Szekeres, E., “China and Russia seeking to divide EU and NATO, US Diplomat says”, BalkanInsight, 28 June 2021, available at: <https://balkaninsight.com/2021/06/28/china-and-russia-seeking-to-divide-eu-and-nato-us-diplomat-says/> (Last accessed on 27.07.2021)
- 9 London Declaration, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 4 December 2019, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_171584.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm) (Last accessed on 29.07.2020)
- 10 Brussels Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 14 June 2021, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_185000.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm)
- 11 Bechna, Z., Thayer, B. A., “NATO's New Role: The Alliance's Response to a Rising China”, Naval War College Review, Volume 69, Number 3 Summer, Article 6, 2016, p.10
- 12 Speranza, L. “China Is NATO's New Problem”, Foreign Policy, 8 July 2020, available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/08/china-nato-hybrid-threats-europe-cyber/> (Last accessed on 28.07.2020)
- 13 Brussels Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 14 June 2021, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_185000.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm)
- 14 Wallander, C., “NATO's Enemies Within: How Democratic Decline Could Destroy the Alliance”, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2018, available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-06-14/natos-enemies-within> (Last accessed on: 27.07.2021)
- 15 Resolution 454 on Reaffirming Commitment to NATO's Founding Principles and Values, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, presented on 14 October 2019
- 16 Recommitting to NATO's Democratic Foundations: The Case for a Center for Democratic Resilience in NATO, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, available at: <https://nato-pa.foleon.com/coordination-centre-on-democracy-resilience/the-case-for-a-center-for-democratic-resilience-in-nato/introduction/> (Last accessed on 28 July 2021)
- 17 Hamilton, D.S., “Democratic Resilience is Foundational to the Alliance”, Testimony before the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, May 2021
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 Resolution 454 on Reaffirming Commitment to NATO's Founding Principles and Values, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, presented on 14 October 2019, p.2
- 20 Brussels Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 14 June 2021, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_185000.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm) (Last accessed on 27.07.2021)
- 21 Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 13 December 1956, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_17481.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17481.htm), (Last accessed on: 27.07.2021)
- 22 NATO 2030: United for a New Era, Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General, p.65, 25 November 2020
- 23 Resolution 457 on NATO @ 70: Celebrating 70 Years of Peace and Security through Unity”, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, presented on 14 October 2019
- 24 Ellehuus, R. Testimony: NATO Political Cohesion, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 25 May 2021

#### Sources

##### Official Documents:

- 1 1967: De Gaulle pulls France out of NATO's integrated military structure: Video lecture by Dr. Jamie Shea, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 3 March 2009, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_139272.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_139272.htm)
- 2 Brussels Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 14 June 2021, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_185000.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm)
- 3 London Declaration, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 4 December 2019, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_171584.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm)
- 4 NATO 2030: United for a New Era, Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General, p.7, 25 November 2020

- 5 The Future Tasks of the Alliance, Report of the Council – “The Harmel Report”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 13 – 14 December 1967, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_26700.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_26700.htm)
- 6 Recommitting to NATO's Democratic Foundations: The Case for a Center for Democratic Resilience in NATO, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, available at: <https://nato-pa.foleon.com/coordination-centre-on-democracy-resilience/the-case-for-a-center-for-democratic-resilience-in-nato/introduction/>
- 7 Report of the Committee of Three, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Last updated: 5 October 2017, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_65237.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_65237.htm)
- 8 Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 13 December 1956, available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_17481.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17481.htm)
- 9 Resolution 454 on Reaffirming Commitment to NATO's Founding Principles and Values, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, presented on 14 October 2019
- 10 Resolution 457 on NATO @ 70: Celebrating 70 Years of Peace and Security through Unity”, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, presented on 14 October 2019

#### Articles

- 1 Bechna, Z., Thayer, B. A., “NATO's New Role: The Alliance's Response to a Rising China”, *Naval War College Review*, Volume 69, Number 3 Summer, Article 6, 2016, p.10
- 2 Ellehuus, R. Testimony: NATO Political Cohesion, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 25 May 2021
- 3 Hamilton, D.S., “Democratic Resilience is Foundational to the Alliance”, Testimony before the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, May 2021
- 4 Speranza, L. “China Is NATO's New Problem”, *Foreign Policy*, 8 July 2020, available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/08/china-nato-hybrid-threats-europe-cyber/>
- 5 Szekeres, E., “China and Russia seeking to divide EU and NATO, US Diplomat says”, *BalkanInsight*, 28 June 2021, available at: <https://balkaninsight.com/2021/06/28/china-and-russia-seeking-to-divide-eu-and-nato-us-diplomat-says/>
- 6 Wallander, C., “NATO's Enemies Within: How Democratic Decline Could Destroy the Alliance”, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2018, available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-06-14/natos-enemies-within>

### 3rd Prize: 400 EUR, Alexander Weber

#### Essay – NATO: maintaining a strategic advantage through cooperative innovation

In most of NATO's member states, a generation is now becoming parents who did not experience the Cold War. Many of them grew up in the early two-thousands, when the Washington Treaty seemed almost obsolete – at least within NATO's heartland. Democracy, individual freedom, and the rule of law had become self-evident facts of life. Why protect something that seemingly could not be challenged?

The recent resurgence of the Taliban, among other examples, shows, that the conflicts which the allies logically focused their resources on still exist, but the situation at home has changed. NATO's founding values are now being challenged noticeably, not only from within societies and through ecological developments but also by revisionism and/or the increasingly affirmative behavior of authoritarian states. The superiority of liberal democracies is being contested for the first time in the lives of some, albeit mostly young people, by systemic rivals.

This change in the perception of its own security puts enormous pressure on the ability of societies to be challenged – a cornerstone of liberal democracy. Without this ability, tensions in the

societal architecture can lead to rifts. The arrival of populism in the heart of Europe and North America is one of the most visible examples, nationalism following shortly thereafter.

Just as the perception of security has changed, so has the reality of the global security outlook. NATO now faces two great powers. Russia continues to try to bring its sphere of influence closer to NATO territory through its actions in Ukraine and the Caucasus. China has established itself in a position of economic strength and sees itself as a dominant player in the Indo-Pacific region as well as on the world stage. The impact of external factors on security has also become increasingly evident. Climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic act as both causes and accelerators of social and economic polarisation, drastically changing the geopolitical calculus of all actors – whether or not they are part of NATO.

As these external factors affect all countries, states can only address problems such as climate change and its consequences through continuous dialogue. Even if they are not external factors, human rights issues, migration, and trade must also remain on the common agenda. To give due priority to individual freedoms and responsibilities in the necessary common approach, those countries that are willing to do so need a strong negotiating position. We need to counter arguments backed by military and economic strength. Even if diplomatic and peaceful solutions are the only way forward, we need a strategic advantage over authoritarian approaches if we are to have a say in where the global community is heading.

There are two main components that may contribute to a strategic advantage: deterrence and resilience. NATO is committed to maintaining and strengthening arms control, notably through its continued support for the INF Treaty. Nevertheless, given developments in the global security environment, it seems highly unlikely that the world will be free of nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. While Allies may aspire to a future in which nuclear power is limited to civilian use only, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist<sup>1</sup>.

Even though allies might face a set increase in nuclear weapons capabilities, we cannot significantly increase our own capabilities while maintaining our credibility in the necessary arms control negotiations. To completely rewrite the course of a potential conflict, it could be *prima facie* sufficient for a single warhead to overcome missile defenses. Thereafter, it would no longer matter how many nuclear weapons a state still possessed. No matter what one's own position is, this line of argument is logical enough to largely influence public opinion against any expansion of nuclear capabilities. Even if not every decision depends solely on public opinion – in countries committed to upholding democracy as a founding value of their alliance, any decision that disregards public opinion altogether would be questionable at best. It should be noted, however, that conversely the same reasoning works in favour of further strengthening NATO's Air and Missile Defense (AIMD). As Nuclear deterrence will remain the mainstay of NATO's deterrence posture, allies took a further step in the right direction through strengthening the readiness and responsiveness of NATO IAMD forces, especially through the establishment of the new NATO IAMD centre of excellence in Greece.

Credible deterrence requires resilience. Recent natural disasters in the Alliance area, namely the floods in Germany and the forest fires in Canada, have shown the risk that would be posed by a potential attack during such a disaster. If we are not able to respond quickly in the event of similar emergencies, our deterrence position will be severely compromised. Allies need to work with the mostly nationally organised rescue and crisis response units, as well as with infrastructure providers and the private sector, to ensure that the seven NATO baseline requirements for resilience<sup>2</sup> are met. The framework established by NATO through the NATO Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC) and the NATO Civil Protection Group (CPG) already allows for dialogue on how Allies can enable this cooperation in practice. In this area, the approaches of non-member partners, such as Sweden and Finland, could serve as an adaptable model for implementing a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to resilience. Closer cooperation with these geographically important

partners could also improve the exchange and compatibility of NATO and EU resilience efforts. Sweden and Finland could act as a link between the EU and, for example, Norway, with which they already cooperate in various bodies such as NORDEFECO and the Nordic Council.

Resilience and deterrence are both goals that can only be achieved through a common path: Innovation. Successfully finding the most humane and effective solutions to multi-faceted security challenges would not only be the best way to prove the superiority of liberal, rights-based democracies, but may also be the only way to achieve strategic advantage. Allies therefore need creative solutions to technological problems arising from emerging and disruptive technologies (EDT). They also require comprehensive ways to address the political and administrative challenges involved in finding these solutions. NATO could provide sufficient incentives for developing new solutions or leveraging the strategic potential of already developed technologies. At the same time, NATO must ensure that the benefits of innovation can be shared in solidarity for the strategic benefit of all Allies.

While liberal democracies rely on innovation to maintain their strategic advantage, innovation can also be their greatest strength. Unlike authoritarian regimes, the freedom of thought required for creative solutions poses no threat to liberal democracies. Examples such as the "space race"<sup>3</sup> show that when states set clear goals and allocate sufficient resources to achieve them, solutions can be found to seemingly insolvable problems. When President John F. Kennedy announced that the U.S. would aim for a manned return flight to the moon in 1961, the U.S. government had tremendous ground to make up. But by dividing the challenge into sub-goals and ticking them off in a coordinated but not restrictive manner, Edwin Aldrin put the U.S. flag on the lunar soil just eight years later in 1969.

The technological challenges today are much more complex and diverse. For example, increasingly harsh climatic conditions require much more resilient infrastructure, the artificial intelligence capabilities of potential adversaries necessitate new developments in, e.g. precision

long range targeting, and the advent of quantum computing requires ground-breaking new encryption methods – these are just some of the possible consequences of technological developments NATO sums up under EDT<sup>4</sup>. Individual nations may not have the resources to achieve the necessary excellence in all these important areas.

NATO is the only forum that brings together a large number of countries that are both major centres of innovation and can provide conventional and nuclear deterrence, all based on the same core values. Most of the key epicentres for EDTs are spread transatlantically. The majority of influential semiconductor technology is now developed in North America, while some of today's most important biotechnology breakthroughs are made in European laboratories. Through its Centres of Excellence (COE), NATO is already doing influential conceptual work in providing basic research to allies and partners in areas with innovation potential, such as civil-military cooperation in The Hague, strategic communications in Berlin or resilience in Bucharest. The joint findings of these centres could be used more widely to provide the necessary background for policymakers setting coherent innovation targets.

The Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), which is expected to be operational in 2023, could provide an incentive for the private sector to get involved<sup>5</sup>. Modelled on the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), it is intended to give its proven concept a broader reach. A capital market will provide start-ups with trusted investments while ensuring that intellectual property remains protected. The structure will also allow companies without previous ties to the defence sector to explore the strategic potential of their ideas.

Allowing willing countries to count research investments towards meeting the two per cent commitment, if the strategic benefits of the research can be used to the strategic advantage of the Alliance, could provide much-needed political motivation to overcome resistance to cooperation on EDTs.

NATO needs to take care of both sides- of defence, resilience, and deterrence. But the most important goal is to focus on what matters most: preserving its core values by maintaining a strategic advantage over systemic rivals. Nuclear and conventional deterrence will inevitably remain important components of our security architecture. As the challenges in an interdependent society become ever greater, security cannot be achieved without resilience in all its forms. However, not only do these challenges require innovative solutions, but innovation is also central to maintaining a credible deterrence posture. Until 2030, NATO does not have to be a technological innovator itself, but it should provide an innovative and comprehensive framework that enables Allies to use their innovative potential to defend and strengthen the Alliance's strategic advantage.

#### References:

- <sup>1</sup> Cox, J., Director of Nuclear Policy, NATO, 2021. Retrieved from [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_50068.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm) on July 31st 2021
- <sup>2</sup> assured continuity of government and critical government services; resilient energy supplies; ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people; resilient food and water resources; ability to deal with mass casualties; resilient civil communications systems; resilient civil transportation systems.
- <sup>3</sup> NATO's Innovation Challenge; Aronhime, L.; Cocron, A.; NATO Review, July 19th 2021
- <sup>4</sup> Emerging and Disruptive Technologies, June 18th 2021. Retrieved from [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_184303.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_184303.htm) on July 31st 2021
- <sup>5</sup> NATO hopes to launch new defense tech accelerator by 2023; Marchi, V.; Defense News, June 22nd 2021

# 2022

## **Schulen | Schools in Heidelberg/Weinheim**

Thema | *Topic:*

Die Krisen in der Welt bekämpfen –  
im Kleinen beginnen ..... 120

## **Litauen Mykolas Romeris Universität | Lithuania Mykolas Romeris University**

Thema | *Topic:*

NATO and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict:  
What is at stake for the Baltic countries? ..... 125

## **Parlamentarische Versammlung der NATO | NATO Parliamentary Assembly**

Thema | *Topic:*

What are two key lessons learned for  
NATO from Russia's invasion of Ukraine? ..... 139

## **Universität Heidelberg | Heidelberg University**

Thema | *Topic:*

Proxys im staatlichen Cyberkonfliktaustrag:  
Eine vergleichende Analyse der VR China,  
Russlands, der USA und Israels ..... 148

## Thema | Topic:

### Die Krisen in der Welt bekämpfen – im Kleinen beginnen

#### 1. Preis: 600 EUR, Joshua Kumbartzki des Bunsen-Gymnasiums Heidelberg, Stufe 11

Ob Corona-Krise, Klimakrise oder Demokratiekrise, man kann dem Begriff Krise heutzutage nicht mehr entkommen. Krisen dominieren die Nachrichten, sie sind allgegenwärtig. Es stellt sich die Frage: Wie soll man diese Krisen bekämpfen? Können wir als einfache Bürger unseren Teil dazu beitragen?

Vorerst möchte ich den Krisenbegriff definieren: Krise kommt aus dem Griechischen und bedeutet „Meinung/Einschätzung“, später dann „Zuspitzung“. Krisen sind also per se nicht negativ konnotiert, man kann sie auch als Herausforderungen sehen, welche gemeistert werden können. Doch diese Herausforderungen erscheinen oftmals überwältigend, denn Krisen wirken meistens selbstverstärkend oder lösen weitere Krisen aus. So führt die Klimakrise beispielsweise zu Klimaflüchtlingen, welche von Teilen der Gesellschaft abgelehnt werden, was zu Populismus führt, welcher eine Demokratiekrise auslöst. Außerdem priorisieren populistische Parteien selten den Klimaschutz, das heißt es findet eine positive Rückkopplung statt. Dieses Phänomen ist bekannt als „Multiple Krise“, also dass einzelne Krisen eng verwoben sind und zusammenhängen. Doch so ausweglos dieser Teufelskreis erscheinen mag, er liefert selbst die Lösung: Man muss Krisen nicht ausschließlich im Großen bekämpfen, um etwas zu verändern, auch die kleinsten Krisen die überwunden werden, helfen den Weg zu ebenen und haben Einfluss auf größere Krisen. Dabei kann jeder bei sich selbst beginnen. Ob Wassersparen, Vegan essen, Geld spenden oder Maskentragen und Impfen aus Solidarität, jede Maßnahme hilft. Dabei vergisst man oft, wie viel man als Kollektiv verändern kann. So fand zum Beispiel die Protestaktion „Fridays For Future“ der Schwedin Greta Thunberg Gehör, nachdem sich Hunderttausende von Schülern und Schülerinnen ihr anschlossen. Veränderungen aller Art beginnen immer im Kleinen. Es muss sich nur jemand finden, der beginnt und dem sich Weitere anschließen.

Dabei ist es natürlich immer einfacher, mit dem Finger auf andere zu zeigen und keinen Sinn darin zu sehen, selbst

#### KRISEN

etwas zu verändern, solange andere es nicht auch tun. Doch wenn Individuen sich mehr auf sich selbst fokussieren und ihr Bestes tun, um Krisen zu bekämpfen, entwickeln wir uns als Gesellschaft positiv weiter. Denn wenn jeder seinen Teil beiträgt, lassen sich auch die größten Krisen meistern.

Wichtig ist jedoch, dass die Politik dabei nicht ihre Verantwortung vergisst, Krisen auch im Großen zu bekämpfen. Denn ein Appell an die bürgerliche Solidarität scheint hypokritisch, wenn sich nicht auch die Regierung aktiv für die Krisenbekämpfung in Form von eingehaltenen Klimazielen, klaren Corona-Maßnahmen, etc. einsetzt. Politik und Bürger müssen somit Hand in Hand arbeiten, um die Krisen im Großen, sowie im Kleinen erfolgreich zu bekämpfen.

#### Quellen:

<https://www.eea.europa.eu/de/articles/leben-in-einer-zeit-der>  
[https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiple\\_Krise](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiple_Krise)  
[https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/multiple\\_krisen\\_u\\_brand\\_1.pdf](https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/multiple_krisen_u_brand_1.pdf)  
<https://www.diss-duisburg.de/2012/09/multiple-krisen-im-kapitalismus/>  
<https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/individuum-und-gesellschaft-warum-es-in-derdemokratie-auf-100.htm>

#### 2. Preis: 500 EUR, Akshita Gudla und Sonja Exmann des Heidelberger Privatschulcentrums HPC, Klasse 11, BiG 8, Bilinguales Gymnasium

##### Besseres Leben für Kinder

##### Bildung:

Viele Kinder in armen Länder wie zum Beispiel in Liberia, haben eine schlechte beziehungsweise keine Bildung, was viele Folgen haben kann.

Dafür gibt es viele Gründe. In diesen Ländern ist ein großer Mangel an ausgebildeten Lehrern/-innen genauso wie wenige Schulen die noch dazu oft sehr weit von dem zu Hause der Kinder entfernt sind. Deswegen verzichten viele Eltern auf die eigentlich nützliche Bildung ihrer Kinder. Außerdem können sich die meisten Familien, die öfters sehr viele Kinder haben, nicht leisten, die Schulgebühren zu bezahlen. Da diese Kinder nicht in die Schule gehen können, entscheiden



sich die Eltern öfters für Kinderarbeit um Geld zu bekommen anstatt es auszugeben. Ein anderer Grund ist die Benachteiligung der Mädchen. Bei vielen Frauen/ Mädchen kommt hinzu, dass sie sich gleichzeitig um Familie und Haushalt kümmern müssen.

Daraus folgen viele Probleme für die zukünftigen Erwachsenen. Da sie kein beziehungsweise wenig Wissen haben, haben sie weniger Chancen für eine gut-bezahlte Arbeit, um ihre zukünftige Familie mit Nahrung, Bildung, Kleidung und einem Dach über dem Kopf zu versorgen. Deswegen wachsen die Zahlen von Obdachlosen in diese Länder. Wegen den fehlenden Bildung, gibt es wenige Ärzte/-innen und wenig Medizin (falls jemand krank wird), dementsprechend eine geringere Lebenserwartung der Bevölkerung.

Wir würden vorschlagen ausgebildeten Lehrer/-innen von verschiedenen Ländern anzubieten, für einen guten Preis zu diesen armen Ländern zu reisen und die Kinder dort zu unterrichten. Dieses Geld kann aus einer für dieses Problem gegründeten Hilfsorganisationen kommen damit es für die Schüler kostenlos ist/ wenig kostet. Mit dieser Ausbildung können die Kinder später ihrem Land helfen, da sie Wirtschaft und Politik unterrichtet bekommen haben. Sie können dann das Problem verstehen und es besteht eine höhere Chance das Problem zu lösen. Man könnte auch eine Partnerschule öffnen und sie finanziell unterstützen oder auch mit ihnen Projekte machen.

### **3. Preis: 400 EUR, Nea Brunn des Dietrich-Bonhoeffer-Gymnasiums Weinheim, Klasse 11**

Kira erwacht nun am Morgen immer schon vor dem Wecker. Das ist etwas, was sie sich nie hätte träumen lassen, doch seit vor drei Monaten die Nachrichtensprecher von Bomben über der Ukraine gesprochen haben, steht sie ununterbrochen unter Strom. Noch bevor sie den ersten Kaffee getrunken hat, hat sie sämtliche Gruppen nach Neuigkeiten durchkämmt, hat herausgefunden, wo sie heute gebraucht, und was benötigt wird, sei es medizinische Versorgung, Lebensmittel, Sprachassistenten. Die Bedürfnisse sind zahlreich. Kaum vorstellbar, dass sie sich vor noch gar nicht allzu langer Zeit den Kopf darüber

zerbrach, ob sie ihren Job als Eventmanagerin aufgeben sollte, um Vollzeit Geflüchtete zu unterstützen. Heute würde sie sich diese Frage kein zweites Mal stellen.

Der Krankenhausalltag hält Alex den ganzen Vormittag über in Atem und sie findet keinen freien Moment, um das gähnende Loch in ihrem Bauch behelfsmäßig mit einer Brezel zu stopfen. Heute Abend wird sie wie zerschlagen sein, doch das wird sie nicht davon abhalten, Selma zu der Feier zu begleiten, mit dem sie ihren Sieg vor Gericht begehen werden. Wenn Leute ihre Anerkennung ob ihrer Hingabe für ihren Beruf ausdrücken, winkt Alex ab und wenn Politiker\*innen im Fernsehen von Systemrelevanz sprechen, schaltet sie weg. Es ist ihr Job. Sie tut ihn, weil er ihr am Herzen liegt und weil ihn sonst niemand macht und weil sie gebraucht wird. Wenn ihr applaudiert wird, dann stellt sich bei Alex die unangenehme Gewissheit ein, das es aus der Erleichterung heraus geschieht, nicht in ihrer Haut zu stecken. Doch sie ist stolz darauf.

Als der Engel, der sie ist, bringt Kira Emilia wie versprochen Permanentmarker vorbei, als sie gegen Vormittag in der zeitweisen Geflüchtetenunterkunft hereinschneit, um rundum Hallo zu sagen und jedermanns Wohlbefinden sicherzustellen. „Heute Demo?“, erkundigt sie sich bei Emilia mit einem Blick auf die gerade entstehenden Transparente.

Schon zu Hause hat Emilia jeden Freitag für Klimaschutz demonstriert und sie sieht nicht ein, wieso ein wahnsinniger Diktator auch noch ihren Kampf für den Fortbestand ihrer größeren, permanenteren Heimat sabotieren sollte. Also klemmt sie sich die selbstgestalteten Plakate unter den Arm und macht sich auf den Weg, Ceyda an ihrem üblichen Treffpunkt abzuholen. Durch die Deutschnachhilfe, die Ceyda ihr gibt sind sie beste Freundinnen geworden und Komplizinnen geworden.

„Du gehst heute Abend mit auf die Party meiner Anne“, sagt Ceyda anstatt einer Begrüßung. „Sie ist supernervös, so als wäre eine kleine Siegesfeier das große Ding, nicht eine Gesetzesänderung zur Co-Mutterschaft zu erkämpfen wie eine lesbische Superheldin.“

„Sie ist großartig“, bestätigt Emilia. Ceydas Eltern, Selma und Alex, sind die nettesten Menschen überhaupt, die ihr Alltagsheldintum mit überschäumender Liebe für jeden verbinden, der ihren Weg in Frieden kreuzt.

Das ist etwas, was Emilia gelernt hat: Der erste Funke einer Revolution entspringt aus Liebe. Der Rest ist Geschichte.

#### **4. Preis: 300 EUR, Iga Ciereszko und Hannah Sauer des Heidelberger Privatschulcentrums HPC, BiG 8, Bilinguales Gymnasium**

##### **Das Schicksal ukrainischer Waisenkinder**

Am 24. Februar 2022 hat sich das Leben aller Menschen in der Ukraine tragisch verändert.

Die Ukraine wurde mit dem Fall der ersten Bomben, an der Grenze zu Kiew, von den russischen Truppen zum Kriegsgebiet erklärt. Durch den Einmarsch der Truppen ist der Konflikt zwischen der Ukraine und Russland dramatisch eskaliert. Die sorglose Kindheit der ukrainischen Kinder wurde gewaltsam beendet. Bomben sind gefallen. Immer mehr Menschen sind auf der Flucht vor der Gewalt der russischen Truppen.

Denn diese marschieren immer weiter in die Ukraine ein und wollen keine Gnade zeigen. In vielen Städten des Landes müssen sich die Bewohner\*innen in Kellern, Bunkern oder U-Bahnstationen vor den Angriffen in Sicherheit bringen. Viele Mitgliedsstaaten der NATO versuchen bestmöglich die Ukraine mit Waffen und Hilfsgütern zu versorgen.

Tausende überqueren tagtäglich die polnisch-ukrainische Grenze, um sich und ihre Familie vor der Gewalt dieser in Sicherheit zu bringen. Flüchtende werden auf ihrem Weg zahlreich unterstützt und in den Nachbarländern aufgenommen. Viele Menschen sind während des Krieges gestorben. Unter diesen Opfern waren auch Eltern mit Kinder, die sich nun nicht mehr, um diese kümmern können. Diese Waisen sind nun auf die dringende Hilfe von uns allen angewiesen. Viele Menschen insbesondere Kinder haben große Angst. Für sie bricht eine Welt zusammen. Es werden viele Spenden in Form von Klamotten und allen möglichen anderen Sachen für die vom Krieg betroffenen Kinder gesammelt, doch was kann man noch dazu beitragen, um das

Leben dieser Kinder weitestgehend zu erleichtern. Ein leichter Weg, um dies zu erreichen sind beispielsweise Organisationen, die Spenden annehmen.

SOS Kinderdörfer ist eine weltweite Hilfsorganisation, die den Kindern ohne Eltern mit allen wichtigen Lebensgrundlagen aushelfen. Seit Mitte Mai sind bereits 3,5 Millionen Ukrainer in deren Nachbarland Polen geflüchtet, wo auch derzeit die meisten Flüchtlinge aufgenommen werden konnten. Nach UNHCR sind bereits, insgesamt um die 5 Millionen Menschen aus den Kriegsgebieten und außerhalb davon geflüchtet. Es mussten zudem tausende Waisenkinder ohne elterliche Fürsorge in der Ukraine zurückgelassen. In diesen Zeiten ist es wichtig, diesen Kindern viel Aufmerksamkeit zu schenken und sie durch diese schwere Zeit zu begleiten und unterstützen. Selbst kleine Spenden sind von Bedeutung und können im Großen Ganzen das Leben dieser Kinder zumindest etwas erleichtern, denn die Kinder, die inner- oder außerhalb der Kriegsgebiete flüchten konnten, haben mit vielem gleichzeitig zu kämpfen. Sie müssen sich nicht nur in einer komplett neuen Umgebung zurechtfinden, sondern haben in diesen Zeiten viel mit sich selbst zu kämpfen. Sie sind in einem neuen Land und verstehen zudem auch meist die Sprache nicht. Viele von ihnen teilen traumatisierende Ereignisse. Ihr Heimatland wird zerstört und ihnen wird jeder Halt genommen. Viele von ihnen sind psychisch geschädigt.

In diesen Zeiten ist es wichtig, dass wir zusammenhalten, diesen Kindern viel Aufmerksamkeit schenken, sie unterstützen und sicherstellen, dass ihnen eine Hand gereicht wird.

#### **5. Preis: 200 EUR, Johannes Kuhr des Bunsen-Gymnasiums Heidelberg, Stufe 2**

##### **Der Zweieinhalb-Fronten Krieg**

Der Zweieinhalb-Fronten-Krieg Mittlerweile sollte jeder mitgekriegt haben, in welchem Zustand sich die Erde befindet. Die Leute jedoch, die wirklich etwas in der Politik zu sagen haben, scheinen sich der Wahrheit dann aber doch noch nicht so ganz angenommen zu haben. So zumindest schien es den Schülern und Studenten, die 2018 das in die Hand nahmen, wofür die staatlichen Repräsentanten ganz Europas nicht

fähig waren. Dem musste die Politik natürlich etwas entgegensetzen. Heute sehen wir uns in einem Streit zwischen schwänzenden Schülern und überkorrekten Abgeordneten – und, nicht zu vergessen, den Medien, die uns mit ihrem Halbwissen bereichern. Dieser Zweieinhalb-Fronten-Krieg stellt nun jeden vor die Wahl: Schule oder Planet?

Fridays for Future. Eine Klimabewegung, bestehend aus Jugendlichen, die seit einigen Jahren regelmäßig den Freitag Mittag statt in der Schule auf Demonstrationen verbringen. Für das Pariser Abkommen. Gegen fossile Brennstoffe, für erneuerbare Energien und den Ausbau der Mittel des öffentlichen Nahverkehrs. Ausgehend von der schwedischen Initiatorin Greta Thunberg verbreitete es sich in wenigen Wochen auf der ganzen Welt.

Die Medien sind außer sich. Jugendliche, die sich engagieren? Ja, und das weit mehr als die meisten von ihnen; erwachsenen Menschen, die nichts dazu beizutragen haben, als dem Ganzen ungläubig zuzusehen, um es letztendlich als „adoleszenten Hang zur Dramatik“<sup>1</sup> abzutun. So ein kurzfristiger Ausbruch aus der Vernunft hunderttausender Menschen, geschuldet der Pubertät, scheint jedoch eher unwahrscheinlich. Ein anderes Gedankenspiel: Die Jugend wird von Interessenverbänden instrumentalisiert. Wer hätte der Grauen Koalition eine solche Kreativität zugetraut. Möglicherweise liegt es auch daran, dass es um ihre Zukunft geht, mutmaßen andere. Korrekt, denn die Gesetze, die heute erlassen werden – oder auch nicht – zeigen ihre nicht gerade güldenen Konsequenzen erst Jahrzehnte später. Mit denen werden sie wohl oder übel leben müssen. Aber das würde dann ja heißen, dass die Entscheidungsträger verantwortungslos und ignorant sind. Dann wohl lieber doch nicht.

Wie der ein oder andere Politiker oder auch der Journalist Jasper von Altenbockum erkannt haben, verstößt das Schwänzen der Schule gegen die Schulpflicht.<sup>2</sup> Für den Protest könne doch ebenso das Wochenende genutzt werden. In ihrer Kritik haben sie die zwei folgenden Punkte außer Acht gelassen: Reizt man das System nicht, indem man gegen die Regeln verstößt, erweckt man seine Aufmerksamkeit nicht. Nur so

zieht man Interesse auf sich, nur so kann man etwas bewirken. Zweitens soll Fridays for Future einen Streik, eine „Niederlegung der Arbeit“ darstellen: keine Beschlüsse, keine Schule. Das hat ein Streik so an sich. Welche Arbeit will ein Schüler am Wochenende niederlegen? Das aufreißende Fernsehen? Die Politiker würden wahrhaft mit den Zähnen knirschen. Auch nach der ehemaligen britischen Premierministerin Theresa May seien die versäumten Stunden wichtig für die spätere Kompetenz der Jugendlichen, den Klimawandel mittels Wissenschaft oder Ingenieurskunst entgegenzustehen.<sup>3</sup> Wie aber eine Doppelstunde in der Woche weniger eine möglichen beruflichen Laufbahn unwiederbringlich durchkreuzen soll, ist zu hinterfragen. Neben Klassikern wie die Missachtung der Schulpflicht missbilligt man vor allem die Beweggründe einiger Demonstranten. Schließlich seien sie nur vor Ort, da ein Protest für den Klimaschutz in Anbetracht des parallel laufenden Unterrichts das kleinere Übel sei. Stimmt. Und mit einem Einwegbecher von Starbucks oder des Erwerbs chinesischer Handys wirkten sie doch genau dem entgegen, wofür sie so ambitioniert protestieren.<sup>4</sup> Stimmt auch. Dadurch aber erklärt man das Anliegen der Schüler und Studenten als entwertet, und das ist der Fehler. Hier wird ganz einfach die Lage verkannt. Es geht nicht darum, dass die Teilnehmer der Demonstration alle moralisch rein und aus unwiderlegbar rechten Gründen handeln. Es geht darum, dass unser Planet gerettet werden muss, und dabei können wir jeden gebrauchen, der der Legislative ihre Fehler aufzeigt. Und wenn die niederträchtigen Gepflogenheiten der 15-jährigen geradezu doppelgagentartige Ausmaße annehmen, dann ist das verkraftbar, solange es Wirkung zeigt. Es darf nicht sein, dass die Relevanz des Unterfangens nur aufgrund der Unzurechnungsfähigkeit von Kindern herabgestuft wird, zumal es alle anderen Menschen der Welt genauso angeht. Hier wird sich die Freiheit genommen, der Klimakrise und dem europaweiten Streik dagegen die Bedeutung abzusprechen, weil sich wieder jemand zu lange nicht über die geistig-moralisch verkümmerte Jugend beschwert hat. Mit den Einwegbechern und den Handys hat er natürlich grundsätzlich recht. Das ist aber ein generelles Problem.

Es gibt allerdings auch Leute, die dem Protest etwas Positives abgewinnen können, und das ist der richtige Ansatz. Wie oft versammeln sich tausende Teenager in hunderten Städten, um für etwas tatsächlich Lobenswertes einzutreten? Allzu häufig hat die Welt etwas derartiges noch nicht gesehen. Wobei die Verantwortlichen versagen, zeigt die Jugend Einsatz. Dass die Generation Z jemals Verstand, ja sogar mehr davon zeigen würde als unsere honorierten Akademiker und Experten in der Politik, hätte niemand gedacht, zumindest nicht unsere Akademiker und Experten. Zudem prägt sich der Sinn für Gemeinschaft und Verantwortung bei Beteiligten aus, zwei wirklich förderliche Eigenschaften in Hinblick auf unsere Zukunft. Dass mit der Aktion die Schulpflicht verletzt wird, ist bekannt – ob man es glaubt oder nicht, auch den Schülern selbst. Nur waren diese nicht zu bequem, die Relevanz der gegenüberstehenden Möglichkeiten abzuwägen, anstatt sich der unantastbaren Schulordnung ohne Hinterfragung zu beugen. Was nützen gute Noten, wenn man keine Zukunft hat? Eine legitime Frage. Diejenigen aber, die sich dem Protest nur um des Schwänzens Willen anschließen, werden dem Staat aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach so oder so keinen allzu bemerkenswerten Aufschwung geben. In dem Sinne: keine Sorge, Frau May.

Es gibt so einige, die sich an den Mitgliedern von Fridays for Future ein Beispiel nehmen können. Sie tun auf ihrem Weg sehr viel Richtiges. Umgeben von gesetzgebenden Schreibtischtieren, von denen sich einige die Realität zu begreifen nicht erbarmen können, ergreifen sie die Initiative. Und das sollte jeder tun. Ob nun durch Engagement in der Politik oder ganz einfach die Reduktion von Abfall und Konsum oder häufigeres 3May, Theresa: Thousands of children stage school walk out to protest climate change 4Wais, Rudi: Kontra: „Fridays for Future“ ist eine große Inszenierung Fahrradfahren. Es ist nicht allzu schwer. Gebt unserem Planeten eine Chance, damit er euch eine gibt. Dann müssen auch die vermaledeiten Schulschwänzer eure hochgeschätzte Doppelstunde Kunst nicht verpassen.

#### Literaturverzeichnis

- <sup>1</sup> TRAUTSCH, MATTHIAS: Protest am Zeugnistag. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung [01.02.2019]
- <sup>2</sup> VON ALTENBOCKUM, JASPER: Warum nur freitags? In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung [28.02.2019]
- <sup>3</sup> MAY, THERESA: Thousands of children stage school walk out to protest climate change. In: The Telegraph [15.02.2019]
- <sup>4</sup> WAIS, RUDI: Kontra: „Fridays for Future“ ist eine große Inszenierung. In: Augsburg Allgemeine [24.01.2019]



**1. Preis:** von links nach rechts: Schulleiter Volker Nürk, Joshua Kumbartzki, Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers, Bunsen-Gymnasium Heidelberg



**2. und 4. Preis:** von links nach rechts: Schulleiterin Gina Rossi-Kaufmann, Iga Cieresko, Akshita Gudla, Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers, Heidelberger Privatschulzentrum, Bilinguales Gymnasium



**3. Preis:** von links nach rechts: Schulleiterin Frau Üstünel-Hartbauer, Frau Schallott (Deutschlehrerin), Nea Brunn, Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers, Dietrich Bonhoeffer-Gymnasium Weinheim

**Thema | Topic:**

NATO and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: What is at stake for the Baltic countries?

**1<sup>st</sup> Prize: 1.000 EUR, Ivanna Horaichuk (MRU)**



**Mykolo Romerio universitetas**

**Tables of Contents**

- I. Introduction
- II. NATO and the russian-Ukrainian conflict
  - 1. Is Ukraine the price for restoring European security?
  - 2. What is at Stake for the Baltic countries
    - a) Strengthening the Security of the Baltic States
    - b) Inflation
- III. Conclusion
- IV. Bibliography I.

**I. Introduction**

The foundation for European security should be mutual security, not unilateral military advantage standing guard over spheres of influence.

**Robert Legvold**

Never again the war! The lessons from World War II had been learned, and the world doesn't want catastrophic history to be repeated.<sup>1</sup> Some theorists even suggested that war had become obsolete. However, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we are observing the biggest security crisis in Europe and the most savage and devastating war since 1945.

What are the reasons for the huge security crisis? Why do we have a real War in the heart of Europe in 2022, and is it only Ukraine's concern? NATO and russian invasion of Ukraine: can russia move further and are there any threats to NATO countries? What is at Stake for the Baltic countries specifically? What can the West do to restore European security in the nearest future?

All these questions are crucial but difficult to answer. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked a dramatic escalation of the eight-year-old conflict and a historic turning point for

the European defense system. The war has dramatically changed the way countries think about their security and will likely test Europeans' readiness to defend the European security order and democratic values. That is why stopping the War in Ukraine now is the first bullet point on the world's agenda.

**II. NATO and the russian-Ukrainian conflict**

The confrontation between russia and the collective West was and is likely to be one of the main features of the international agenda in the coming decades, and Ukraine's role here is unique. However, this crisis did not start in February 2022. Russia has been undermining the European security order for years and what is happening now is a part of the story of how eastern European countries rebuilt their nation-states after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This war is also about the role successive versions of the European Union's neighborhood policy played in this state-building process and how russia responded. Russia's attack on Ukraine is also an attack on the idea of European integration and its democratic values, which is why it is of high importance nowadays.<sup>2</sup>

Like Ukraine, the three Baltic states — Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia — unfortunately, were once part of the Soviet Union. As the war in Ukraine stretches into more than five months, things are getting more precarious for other former Soviet republics as well.

**1. Is Ukraine the price for restoring European security?**

For Ukraine, russian imperial rule ended in 1991 when 92 percent of Ukrainians voted in a national referendum to secede from the decaying Soviet Union. However, during all these years, putin never stopped trying to destroy and seize Ukraine again.

Ukraine was always responding to all the russian threats to its sovereignty by debating moves toward the EU and NATO. During the early 2000s, Ukraine was trying to integrate more within the European community and strengthen cooperation with all the EU countries, while, unfortunately, still being very dependent on russia in its foreign policy.

The debate between the Russian and the European model of state-building unfolded especially since Ukraine's Orange Revolution in 2004. Following the successful experience of the Baltics, most Ukrainians decided that they wanted to follow the course of other European countries towards democracy rather than the Russian model of autocratic control.<sup>3</sup>

In 2004 NATO has since expanded to 14 countries that had been part of the Soviet bloc. This number includes three former Soviet republics: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, all of which border Russia which escalates the Russia-West relationship. Following this enlargement, Russia wanted to keep Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova as well as Finland from joining NATO, and American medium-range missiles from Europe, in revenge for its sense of humiliation in the post-Cold War era, when a weakened Russia was forced to join the US and its European allies' agenda. It is no coincidence that after the revolutions in Georgia in 2003 and in Ukraine in 2004, Putin began to call NATO enlargement a "threat to Russia".<sup>4</sup>

In NATO Summit in Bucharest (2008) was proclaimed the following: "NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO".<sup>5</sup> The statement was a clear message to Moscow that it may not determine which governments enter NATO. At that time, Putin said to US President George W. Bush that "Ukraine is not even a state." He wrongfully considered Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic course to be the result of Western intervention, not a reflection of the true preferences of Ukrainians. The summit ended on 8 April 2008. The Russian invasion of Georgia was in August. Six years later Russia invaded Ukraine too.

A theory, which became very popular these days, about neutral Ukraine acting as a buffer zone between Russia and the European Union was described by John Mearsheimer who also claimed that the taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement.<sup>6</sup>

However, was it all only about the NATO or the EU enlargement that frightened Putin?

It is more likely was the fact that Ukrainians

sought a living democracy and closer integration with the European community, as well as Baltic states did in 2004. NATO's enlargement ("danger") for Russia was used only as a convenient excuse when the real fear was the emergence of successful, democratic, Western-oriented countries along Russia's borders.<sup>7</sup>

For all these years Putin continued to interfere in Ukrainian domestic politics. In 2013, Yanukovich, a pro-Russian puppet, refused to sign the Association Agreement which led to the "Euromaidan movement" to fight his regime. In Putin's mind, Euromaidan was a Western-sponsored plot to overthrow a Kremlin ally, part of a broader plan to undermine Russia itself that included NATO's post-Cold War expansions to the east.<sup>8</sup>

To maintain its influence in Ukraine, in 2014 Russia illegally occupied part of the Donbas region and annexed Crimea. It was a huge alert and threat to the whole West and European security itself.

Unfortunately, in 2014 Europe was afraid and not ready to stand firm for Ukraine and help it with its accession to NATO and the EU, delaying this process in every possible way. Lack of proper rebuff of the West helped Russia to continue its military aggression and led to the most devastating conflict since World War II.

On February 21, 2022, Putin signed decrees recognizing the "independence" of the so-called LPR and the DPR, marking the failure of Western diplomatic efforts to deter Russian aggression, Russia's destruction of the Minsk agreements, and a significant escalation of Western-Moscow tensions and new threats to Ukraine and the whole Europe. Starting February 24, 2022, the real war in Ukraine began and Ukraine became not the price for European security, but the only chance to keep it for all the Europeans with European values.

As for now, the occupiers have been in Ukraine for 5 months. The whole world was observing what was happening in Bucha, Irpin, Borodyanka, Kharkiv, Kramatorsk, Mariupol, Vinnytsia, and many other peaceful Ukrainian cities.

Today, as a result of Russia's actions, the most heinous war crimes of all time since the end of World War II are being committed. Russian

troops deliberately destroy Ukrainian cities with artillery and air strikes. The democratic values, such as respect for life, human rights, inviolability of borders, and freedom are nothing to Russia and its soldiers. Nowadays, if not brave Ukrainian people, fighting for their freedom all the awful, cruel atrocities might be held in each European city.

## 2. What is at Stake for the Baltic countries

Since February 2022 Ukraine's greatest partners are the Baltic countries. Moreover, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are giving significant support not only because of the obvious threats to be "next", but mostly because all these countries have so much in common. Like Ukraine, they all share a border with Russia, Latvia and Lithuania border Russia's close ally in this war – Belarus. We all experienced Russian autocracy for ages in ways that few other countries did. This horrific experience shows that we do not take security and liberty for granted and we know the price for independence and sovereignty. Ukraine and the Baltics share the same democratic values Ukraine is fighting for now, which helps to stand firm in the face of the Russian threat.

The Soviet Union first invaded and occupied the Baltic states in 1940. It was pushed out by Nazi Germany for several years but returned to occupy all three countries from 1944 to 1991.<sup>9</sup>

Since 1991 the situation in these countries was unstable and unpredictable with Moscow implementing both direct and indirect military, political, and economic pressure. In this environment, the Baltic States were striving to establish a national defense system to exercise full sovereignty over their territory.<sup>10</sup>

It took more than 10 years for Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to achieve their goal and become members of two important organizations – NATO and the EU in 2004. Membership in the EU represents a clear indication that Baltic states successfully implemented reforms necessary to become Western-style, while membership in NATO also signifies that the Baltics succeeded in their efforts to build their Armed Forces and provide capabilities to the Alliance.

The Baltic region is also one of the most complex regions that the Alliance is obligated to defend.

While small in size and population, the Baltic states represent something much bigger geopolitically: they are staunch defenders of economic freedom, liberal democracy, and human rights.<sup>11</sup>

Many analysts perceive Putin's invasion of Ukraine as an attempt to rebuild Russia's lost Soviet empire, the destruction of which Putin once described as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century."<sup>12</sup> Grounded in the tragic historical experience, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has obviously raised security concerns in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia as their geographic location makes them vulnerable.

The most controversial issue nowadays is the Suwałki Gap - a diminutive stretch of NATO territory, barely 100-kilometer-long, separating a Russian ally Belarus from the Russian exclave Kaliningrad. Despite its size, the "gap" came into global focus when Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea ramped up geopolitical tensions in Europe. It's been called NATO's "soft underbelly," and the "most dangerous place on Earth."<sup>13</sup>

Now, it's receiving renewed attention after Lithuania followed through on the bloc's sanctions imposed in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and barred the rail transit of some Russian goods to Kaliningrad. The move did not go over well in Moscow. Paralyzing bomb threats and a cyberattack directed at Lithuania followed. So did elevated fears of a seizure of the Suwałki Gap that could sever that country, Latvia, and Estonia from their NATO allies and trigger a cascading conflict.

The scrutiny of this small area points to a big question about the sanctions aimed at Russia for what it's doing in Ukraine: can the EU stick together on applying them long enough to achieve their intended impact?

Another concern is that today, it's estimated that a million ethnic Russians still live in the Baltics. Consequently, it is a worry for the region, as Putin's pretext for an invasion of Ukraine was the "protecting" of ethnic Russians in the country's east — a justification widely questioned.

However, nowadays, the Baltics are in a fundamentally different situation than Ukraine which renders them secure from Russian aggression.

Membership in NATO provides Baltics with the protection of the alliance's mutual defense guarantee under Article 5 which means collective defense of their countries by NATO forces in the face of Russian aggression.

Despite the protection, given by NATO and the EU membership, all three states have condemned Russia's aggression and taken concrete steps to support Ukraine's sovereignty: they have advocated for punitive sanctions against Russia and Belarus, sent military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine and urged NATO to adopt measures to ensure the security of its member states, particularly those that border Russia.

Baltic elites voiced, and continue to voice, apprehension over Putin's invasion of Ukraine. Lithuania's Foreign Minister, Gabrielius Landsbergis, has argued that "the battle for Ukraine is a battle for Europe," and warned that "if Putin is not stopped there, he will go further."

The state secretary of Latvia's Defence Ministry, Janis Garisons, issued a similar warning: "Russia always measures the military might but also the will of countries to fight... Once they see a weakness, they will exploit that weakness."<sup>14</sup>

### **a) Strengthening the Security of the Baltic States**

The NATO reinforcements come after years in which Baltic officials say their fears were dismissed by much of Europe as paranoia or some kind of post-Soviet stress disorder. Even after Russia launched the first state-on-state cyberattack in 2007, a digital assault on Estonia over its decision to relocate a Soviet-era monument, NATO's military planners moved slowly, drawing up detailed defense plans for the region only after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014.<sup>15</sup>

Nowadays, while an overt Russian attack against the Baltic states is highly unlikely, there are still reasons for concern. Baltic states urge allies to ramp up their defense in face of the Russian threat. They believe expanding NATO's military presence, including by increasing the size of NATO's multinational forces in the region and establishing division-sized command structures, is the best way to ward off any plans by Putin to lunge for more territory beyond Ukraine.<sup>16</sup>

The 2022 NATO Madrid summit declared Russia "a direct threat" to Euro-Atlantic security. At the summit, NATO leaders agreed to dramatically scale up military force along the alliance's eastern flank, where countries from Romania to the Baltic states worry about Russia's future plans. It announced plans to increase almost eightfold the size of the alliance's rapid reaction force to 300,000 troops by next year. The troops will be based in their home nations but dedicated to specific countries in the east, where the alliance plans to build up stocks of equipment and ammunition.<sup>17</sup>

Already in recent months, new NATO and U.S. forces have been dispatched to the region. In Estonia, a British-led force of some 2,500 NATO troops conducts training and exercises with local forces. Additional NATO forces are there for the Baltic air policing mission, which now includes American F-35s and British and U.S. F-16s. There are also American F-35s in Lithuania. Such forces provide valuable reassurance for a country like Estonia, which has an active-duty force of 4,000 troops, and no combat aircraft.

Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda issued a stark warning saying that Putin "will not stop in Ukraine. Russia's reckless aggression against Ukraine once again proves that it is a long-term threat to the European security, the security of the entire alliance, no matter how and when the war in Ukraine ends," he said, according to a State Department transcript. "This is a very good opportunity to rethink ... the alliance response".<sup>18</sup>

### **b) Inflation**

Then there is inflation, already a problem for many countries as high food and fuel prices begin to bite. The war in Ukraine has amplified economic forces already shaping the global recovery from the pandemic, increased commodity prices and intensified supply disruptions, adding to inflation.

Due to researches, the most vulnerable countries in Central and Eastern Europe are the three Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – all expected to see double-digit inflation this year as a result of higher oil and natural gas prices.

It is true that the world will pay a very high price in the nearest future. But it is nothing compared



to the price that Ukraine is paying now. Ukrainians will pay with their own lives, destroyed cities and families. This is the price of freedom.<sup>19</sup>

### III. Conclusion

Now stopping the War in Ukraine is the first bullet point on the world's agenda. The war now is affecting not only the internal unity of states but also provokes huge security, humanitarian and economic crises. This will certainly end in large-scale political chaos in countries where stability is a key factor of domestic and world security.

For Europe to be more successful in the long run, Ukraine must survive in the short term, and more than ever, it needs political, military, economic support, and solidarity from the West.

It is now a matter of honor for Ukraine and the whole world to move toward giving a legal qualification and interpretation of military atrocities in peaceful cities of Ukraine as a war crime and insisting on the corresponding reparations to be paid by Russia to Ukraine. Russia also needs to be recognised as state sponsor of terrorism!

Ukraine and its sovereignty will never be the price for restoring European security and as it is the only chance to stop Russian aggression and don't let them move further to the Baltics, Moldova, Poland etc. Ukraine is the only border that prevents Russia from further expansion and the establishment of its domination and brutal regime in Europe.

Without Ukraine's security, there is no security in Europe. When tyranny loses the war against Ukraine, it will be one of the greatest contributions to Europe's security in decades.

"The misery that is now upon us is but the passing of greed - the bitterness of men who fear the way of human progress. The hate of men will pass, and dictators die, and the power they took from the people will return to the people. And so long as men die, liberty will never perish..."<sup>20</sup>

#### References:

- 1 François Diaz-Maurin - Russia's invasion of Ukraine invalidates key international relations assumptions (February 27, 2022).
- 2 Nehring H. - A short history of Ukraine's relationship with the European Union (10.03.2022).
- 3 Nehring H. - A short history of Ukraine's relationship with the European Union (10.03.2022)
- 4 Ronald Suny - Ukraine war follows decades of warnings that NATO expansion into Eastern Europe could provoke Russia (28.02.2022)
- 5 18 Summit declaration, op. cit.; interviews with officials from allied governments, April 2008.

- 6 John J. Mearsheimer "Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault", 2014.
- 7 Robert Person and Michael McFaul - "What Putin Fears Most", 22.02.2022
- 8 Zack Beauchamp - 9 big questions about Russia's war in Ukraine (30.03.2022)
- 9 Missy Ryan and Sammy Westfall - Baltic states urge allies to ramp up defense in face of Russian threat (07.03. 2022)
- 10 Vaidotas Urbelis - Defence Policies of the Baltic States: from the Concept of Neutrality towards NATO, 2003
- 11 Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis - NATO Summit 2021: Reinforcing Collective Defense in the Baltics (11.06.2021)
- 12 Gideon Rachman - Understanding Vladimir Putin, the man who fooled the world by Gideon Rachman (09.04. 2022)
- 13 John Letzing - The Suwałki Gap: why this small part of Europe could have global implications (12.07.2022)
- 14 Michele E. Commercio - How NATO guarantees the security of the Baltic states (07.03.2022)
- 15 Missy Ryan, Michael Birnbaum, Paul Sonne and Steve Hendrix - On NATO's vulnerable eastern edge, Baltic nations face high stakes in Ukraine crisis (20.03.2022)
- 16 Robbie Gramer - Baltic States Are Pushing NATO for More Than Just a Tripwire Against Russia (19.03.2022)
- 17 Jill Lawless, Joseph Wilson And Sylvie Corbet - Russia and China slam NATO after alliance raises alarm (30.06.2022)
- 18 Missy Ryan and Sammy Westfall - Baltic states urge allies to ramp up defense in face of Russian threat (07.03.2022)
- 19 Marek Grzegorzczak - Inflation now 'a clear and present danger' with all three Baltic states set for double-digit price growth in 2022 (20.04.2022)
- 20 Transcript of Charlie Chaplin's Final Speech in "The Great Dictator", 1940.

#### IV. Bibliography

- 1 François Diaz-Maurin Russia's invasion of Ukraine invalidates key international relations assumptions (February 27, 2022) - URL: <https://thebulletin.org/2022/02/russias-invasion-of-ukraine-invalidates-key-international-relations-assumptions/>
- 2 Nehring H. - A short history of Ukraine's relationship with the European Union. The Conversation (10.03.2022) - URL: <https://theconversation.com/a-short-history-of-ukraines-relationship-with-the-european-union-178350>
- 3 Ronald Suny - Ukraine war follows decades of warnings that NATO expansion into Eastern Europe could provoke Russia (28.02.2022) - URL: <https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-follows-decades-of-warnings-that-nato-expansion-into-eastern-europe-could-provoke-russia-177999>
- 4 18 Summit declaration, op. cit.; interviews with officials from allied governments, April 2008. - URL: <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RS22847.pdf>
- 5 John J. Mearsheimer "Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault", 2014 - URL: [www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-ukrainecrisis-is-the-west-fault](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-ukrainecrisis-is-the-west-fault)
- 6 Robert Person and Michael McFaul - "What Putin Fears Most", 22.02.2022, - URL: <https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/what-putin-fears-most/>
- 7 Zack Beauchamp - 9 big questions about Russia's war in Ukraine (30.03. 2022) - URL: <https://www.vox.com/22989379/russia-ukraine-war-putin-zelenskyy-us-nato-explainer-questions>
- 8 Missy Ryan and Sammy Westfall - Baltic states urge allies to ramp up defense in face of Russian threat (07.03. 2022) - URL: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/07/lithuania-baltics-putin-ukraine-blinken/>
- 9 Vaidotas Urbelis - Defence Policies of the Baltic States: from the Concept of Neutrality towards NATO, 2003 - URL: <https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/vaidotas.pdf>
- 10 Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis - NATO Summit 2021: Reinforcing Collective Defense in the Baltics (11.06.2021) - URL: <https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/nato-summit-2021-reinforcing-collective-defense-the-baltics>
- 11 Gideon Rachman - Understanding Vladimir Putin, the man who fooled the world by Gideon Rachman (09.04.2022) - URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/09/understanding-vladimir-putin-the-man-who-fooled-the-world>
- 12 John Letzing - The Suwałki Gap: why this small part of Europe could have global implications (12.07.2022) - URL: <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/07/suwalki-gap-russia-belarus-lithuania-sanctions-ukraine/>
- 13 Michele E. Commercio - How NATO guarantees the security of the Baltic states (07.03.2022) - URL: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/03/07/how-nato-guarantees-the-security-of-the-baltic-states/>
- 14 Missy Ryan, Michael Birnbaum, Paul Sonne and Steve Hendrix - On NATO's vulnerable eastern edge, Baltic nations face high stakes in Ukraine crisis (20.03.2022) - URL: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/03/20/ukraine-baltics-nato-russia/>
- 15 Robbie Gramer - Baltic States Are Pushing NATO for More Than Just a Tripwire Against Russia (19.03.2022) - URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/19/baltic-states-nato-military-presence-russia-more-than-tripwire/>
- 16 Jill Lawless, Joseph Wilson And Sylvie Corbet - Russia and China slam NATO after alliance raises alarm (30.06.2022) - URL: <https://toronto.citynews.ca/2022/06/30/russia-and-china-slam-nato-after-alliance-raises-alarm/>
- 17 Missy Ryan and Sammy Westfall - Baltic states urge allies to ramp up defense in face of Russian threat (07.03.2022) - URL: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/07/lithuania-baltics-putin-ukraine-blinken/>
- 18 Marek Grzegorzczak - Inflation now 'a clear and present danger' with all three Baltic states set for double-digit price growth in 2022 (20.04.2022) - URL: <https://emerging-europe.com/news/inflation-now-a-clear-and-present-danger-with-all-three-baltic-states-set-for-double-digit-price-growth-in-2022/>
- 19 Transcript of Charlie Chaplin's Final Speech in "The Great Dictator", 1940. - URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7JGY1Xg6X20>

## 2<sup>nd</sup> Prize: 600 EUR, Vladimir Komarnickiy (MRU)

### European and International Business Law

The Russian invasion of Ukraine was one of the largest geopolitical events in recent history and the largest war in Europe since World War II. For the first time since 1945, a state of 140 million is waging a full-scale war against a state of 40 million in Europe. Several thousand civilians died, including at least 200 children. Almost 5 million people became refugees forced to leave Ukraine. Military casualties on each side already number in the tens of thousands. Undoubtedly, the war in Ukraine has radically changed the geopolitical situation.

Now the Baltic countries are taking an active part in the events in Ukraine. So these countries supply weapons to Ukraine in the form of Javelins and Stingers. Lithuania, followed by other Baltic countries, became the first states, along with Poland, to refuse Russian gas. In general, it is the Baltic countries that are the most active initiators of sanctions against Putin's Russian Federation.

In addition, the Baltic countries are actively accepting refugees from Ukraine. For example, more than 40 thousand refugees have already arrived in Lithuania. This figure is quite significant considering the small population of Lithuania and the absence of a direct border with Ukraine. The Baltic countries provide social support to these refugees in the form of humanitarian aid in the form of food, medicines, free transportation, and some enterprises pay extra bonuses to Ukrainian workers.

Symbolic actions of solidarity with Ukraine also matter. The cities of all three Baltic states are hung with Ukrainian flags, posters with expressions of support for Ukraine. Numerous anti-war rallies are regularly held in every country. Streets, including those near Russian embassies, are being renamed in honor of Ukraine and its heroes.

Why is such support for Ukraine important? It is, of course, the duty of every person, anywhere on earth, to speak out against a war that kills tens of thousands of people. But for the Baltic countries, Ukraine's support is of practical importance.

In the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the USSR occupied the Baltic countries, incorporating them into its state for a long time. Putin's propaganda is actively talking about Russophobia in the Baltic countries after the collapse of the USSR. Part of the leadership of the Russian Federation is haunted by the very fact that the Baltic states have become independent, just as Putin, in his appeal for the recognition of the DPR and LPR, questioned the fact of Ukraine's statehood. The fact that all the Baltic states are members of NATO is even more worrying for the Russian government. NATO, from Putin's point of view, is a bloc hostile to the Russian Federation. Ukraine's attempt to join NATO was one of the reasons for the invasion. Putin said that the approach of NATO to the borders of the Russian Federation is a threat to national security. So from the border of Estonia to the second largest city of the Russian Federation and Putin's homeland of St. Petersburg, only 100 km. The geographical position of Lithuania allows you to completely cut off the Kaliningrad Region from communication with the rest of the Russian Federation. Thus, in the eyes of Putin, the Baltic countries and their membership in NATO pose a threat to the Russian Federation.

In his ultimatum to NATO, Putin announced the need for NATO to return to the 1997 borders, that is, to withdraw the bloc from Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Baltics. First of all, the emphasis is on the latter, as the only post-Soviet countries that are members of NATO. The need to create a so-called "Baltic corridor" for Kaliningrad makes an invasion of Lithuania very likely. This problem became especially acute in the summer of 2022, due to the conflict between the Russian Federation and Lithuania over transit to the Kaliningrad region. Lithuania fundamentally refuses to allow the transit of sanctioned goods through its territory, while Russia, in response, addresses threats to the Baltic Republic. It must be remembered that World War II began with a similar ultimatum from Hitler to secure a corridor with East Prussia for Germany. Given Putin's invasion of Ukraine, Putin's ultimatums should be taken very seriously.

Now Ukraine is quite worthy of resisting Putin. Putin's offensive was stopped near Kyiv, Kharkov, Chernigov, the Russian troops suffered huge losses. However, the danger cannot be underestimated. At the moment, 20 percent of the territory of Ukraine is occupied by the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation abandoned the blitzkrieg tactics and moved on to a slow but steady seizure of territories in the Donbass. Every week, Russian troops capture a new city. The Russian Federation has an advantage in human resources, weapons, and funding. Therefore, the threat to Ukraine's independence still remains.

Despite assistance to Ukraine from all over the world, this support cannot be exaggerated. The United States sends rather large sums to help Ukraine, but if we take the ratio of these amounts to GDP and the defense budget, then the help from the United States is negligible. Of the \$ 40 billion under the Lend-Lease Law, no more than \$8 billion is intended directly for military support of Ukraine. Moreover, the amount of US military assistance to Ukraine has decreased since the beginning of the war. Also, the amount of military spending on aid to Ukraine is incomparable with US spending on the military campaign in Afghanistan. In this regard, the Baltic countries provide more active support, the greatest assistance to Ukraine, relative to the defense budget as a whole, was provided by Estonia.

The military invasion of Ukraine showed that the Russian Federation is capable of openly using military force against its neighbors in violation of international law. In the aggregate, in the circumstances indicated above, the question of national security and sovereignty of the Baltic countries arises. Over the years, the Baltic countries have been increasing their defense capability. The military budget was increased to almost 3 percent of GDP. Which is even more than the minimum spending required by NATO. Military conscription was re-introduced in Lithuania, and the number of military personnel was increased. Despite the fact that the Baltic countries do not have their own air and tank forces, the armed

forces of these countries are equipped with the latest armored vehicles and artillery. Baltic instructors took part in the training of Ukrainian servicemen who are successfully fighting on their soil. Lithuania hosts one of the world's largest training grounds for urban combat operations. Also in the Baltic countries, there are very successful volunteer formations in the form of a union of shooters, whose members, despite their status as civilians, regularly prepare for the defense of their countries.

However, despite this, there are objective risks for the Baltic States. First of all, the incompatibility of military, human, financial resources with the Russian Federation. The total number of regular troops of all three Baltic republics combined is a little more than 30 thousand people, while the total number of Russian troops is 900 thousand soldiers. Even now, the superiority of Russian artillery over Ukrainian artillery is 10 times. The superiority of Russian artillery over the Baltics will be even higher.

Another circumstance is the geographic factor. Ukraine is the largest country in Europe after the Russian Federation in terms of area. In order to occupy Ukraine, the Russian troops need to overcome many kilometers of space, which allows Ukraine to have time to prepare for defense, mobilize reservists, thereby increasing the size of its army to almost a million people. The Baltic countries are quite small in area. The largest Baltic country, Lithuania, can be traveled by train in 4 hours. There is a threat that countries will not even be able to mobilize reservists. The most dangerous situation is with Vilnius, located at a distance of less than 30 kilometers from the border with Belarus. Such a short distance allows the RF Armed Forces not even to enter the territory of Lithuania, but to shell the city with artillery.

At the moment, military units of NATO countries are located in the Baltic countries. However, the number of troops in each state is approximately 2,000 soldiers, which is objectively not enough to deter possible aggression. The requests of the

leadership of the Baltic republics to increase the number of groups, after the start of the war, were not satisfied.

Too many misinterpret the provisions of the NATO charter on collective defense. There is a widespread point of view that in the event of an attack on one of the member countries of the alliance, the remaining states are obliged to start military operations against the aggressor. This fact is allegedly a deterrent for Putin. However, we need to carefully read Article 5 of the NATO Charter.

#### **Article 5 of the NATO charter states:**

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”

Thus, in Article 5 of the NATO Charter, there is no obligation for a member state to use armed force against an aggressor. Based on this article, they themselves decide what measures to take. These may not necessarily be military measures, they may be of an economic, diplomatic nature. At the same time, the Russian regime has shown that it is not worried about this kind of response.

The situation around the transit of sanctioned goods through Lithuania to the Kaliningrad region is very indicative. The Lithuanian authorities have made it clear that they are not ready to make concessions to the Russian Federation on this issue. However, due to the position of the EU leadership, the transit of sanctioned goods was allowed. These facts show that the West

does not want a conflict with the Russian Federation, which creates the danger that even in the face of aggression against the Baltic countries, the West will avoid conflict.

There is also an opinion that the very fact of the presence of NATO troops in the Baltic countries is a defense against Putin's invasion. In accordance with this statement, the Russian troops will not risk attacking NATO troops because this will lead to an open conflict. However, an invasion of the Baltic countries can be carried out without a direct attack by NATO units. Putin's troops can cordon off key infrastructure, governments and announce the takeover of the territories of the Baltic republics. A similar example already existed in the Crimea, when the territory was occupied without a military clash with the Armed Forces of Ukraine. That is, NATO troops can also be withdrawn from the territory of the occupied Baltic states, just as Ukrainian troops were withdrawn from the territory of the occupied Crimea.

Before Putin's invasion of Ukraine, many did not believe that this was possible, but the war became a reality. Now we need to realize that Putin's invasion of the Baltics is also a possible scenario that could lead to thousands of refugees, dead soldiers and civilians, and a devastated economy. Even if the invasion takes place without bloodshed, like the occupation of Crimea, this will lead to the loss of the Baltic states of its sovereignty, the establishment of pro-Putin dictatorships there, or even joining the Russian Federation.

In order to avoid these scenarios, the following steps should be taken:

- Continue to provide military assistance to Ukraine and even increase it. In addition to the supply of weapons, this can be financial assistance, assistance with instructors, stimulating the sending of volunteers to Ukraine by removing bureaucratic barriers to sending them, coordinating the work of the special services of Ukraine and the Baltic states. This is especially important since Putin's future plans depend on whether Ukraine survives. It will be problematic for him to wage a war on two fronts.

- Tougher sanctions policy, refusal to make concessions to the Kremlin, including in matters of transit of sanctioned goods. Any concession Putin sees as weakness, which in no case should be shown and allowed.
- Do not create unnecessary reasons for the invasion. This may include the manifestation of Russophobia, the infringement of the Russian and Russian languages in the Baltic countries.
- Strengthen the armed forces. This can be expressed in an increase in the number of military exercises, the budget of the armed forces. In addition, it is necessary to introduce conscription in Latvia, to increase the number of persons subject to conscription in Estonia and Lithuania. The latter provision is especially important, since in the event of an invasion by Putin, you will have to act very quickly. Training people in military affairs from scratch may take several months, which the Baltic states may not have. The introduction of conscription will make it possible to train a much larger number of citizens.
- Demand from NATO allies an unequivocal guarantee that in the event of an invasion of the Baltic States, military force will be used against the aggressor. Ideally, it is necessary to seek changes to the NATO Charter, which guarantees the use not of "those means that the parties deem necessary," but of military force against the aggressor. In this way, the risks of an attack from Putin, who is less likely to want to enter into direct conflict with the entire NATO bloc, can be reduced.
- Adoption of a law on the possibility for foreigners to defend the Baltic states. Now in three republics there are thousands of Ukrainians, Russians and Belarusians who fled from the regime of Putin and Lukashenko. Some of them are ready to take part in the defense of the Baltic states, but the laws of the three republics do not provide for the possibility for foreigners to serve in the armed forces. However, it is the refugees who are most motivated to resist a possible invasion.
- Provide for mechanisms of criminal liability for persons evading draft in the army, counteracting the departure of persons of military age from the country during the invasion. This one is also especially important since a lot of people of military age left Ukraine during the war.

In the conditions of a serious superiority of the armed forces of the Russian Federation over the armed forces of the Baltic republics, not a single soldier should be lost.

- Preparation of the transfer of the economy to war footing.
- And one of the most important points.
- Support for the Russian opposition, taking measures to stimulate a change of power in the Russian Federation. This is most important, since in the event of an invasion by the Russian Federation, the main hope for victory, if NATO does not provide support, is a change in the political regime within the Russian Federation.

In my opinion, such steps are necessary and will help increase the combat capability of the Baltic countries, reduce the likelihood of invasion and increase the likelihood of victory in the event of an invasion.

#### List of sources:

- France24 - «Arms for Ukraine: Who has sent what?»: <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220601-arms-for-ukraine-who-has-sent-what>
- LRT - «NATO shows little appetite for thousands more troops in Baltics»: <https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1721348/nato-shows-little-appetite-for-thousands-more-troops-in-baltics#:~:text=Since%202017%2C%20Estonia%2C%20Latvia%2C,called%20the%20Enhanced%20Forward%20Presence.>
- Small wars journal - «TOTAL DEFENSE: HOW THE BALTIC STATES ARE INTEGRATING CITIZENRY INTO THEIR NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES»: <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrn/art/total-defense-how-the-baltic-states-are-integrating-citizenry-into-their-national-security-#:~:text=Currently%2C%20all%20Baltic%20armed%20forces,but%20no%20tanks%20or%20warplanes.>
- NATO official website - «Article 5 of the NATO Charter»: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_110496.htm#:~:text=Article%205%20provides%20that%20if,to%20assist%20the%20Ally%20attacked.](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm#:~:text=Article%205%20provides%20that%20if,to%20assist%20the%20Ally%20attacked.)
- The World Bank - «Armed forces personnel, total - Russian Federation»: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1?locations=RU>
- LRT - «Lithuanian president calls for more German troops to face Russian 'threat'»: <https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1605825/lithuanian-president-calls-for-more-german-troops-to-face-russian-threat-media>
- Volodymyr Dacenko - «Artillery war...»: [https://twitter.com/Volodymyr\\_D\\_/status/1545469544361299968](https://twitter.com/Volodymyr_D_/status/1545469544361299968)
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy - «Who is helping Ukraine? A new database makes international aid comparable»: <https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/media-information/2022/who-is-helping-ukraine-a-new-database-makes-international-aid-comparable/>

### 3<sup>rd</sup> Prize: 400 EUR, Marita Gorgiladze (MRU) European and International Business Law, Master program

Baltic countries are next? After Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, one of the most frequently asked questions went to the top. "Today Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the day after tomorrow- the Baltic states and later, perhaps, time will come for my country, Poland." Said Polish president Lech Kaczynski in 2008, when Russia attacked Georgia and tanks were heading to Tbilisi.<sup>1</sup> Years will pass, and it will turn out that he was right.

There are several important issues that really pose a threat and risk to the Baltic states. It is necessary to start the discussion based on the geography of the Baltic States. All three Baltic countries share a land border with Russia. Lithuania and Latvia also have a land border with Belarus. A country whose territory Russia used to attack Ukraine. This circumstance and fact alone are enough to cause danger for the Baltic countries. Apart from this important circumstance, it is also very important to look at recent history. The Baltic states were part of the Soviet Union. They were able to gain independence only at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This is also one of the reasons for the danger, Russia's present foreign policy demonstrates a desire to restore the Soviet Union and extend its power over former Soviet Union states. However, the Baltic countries' situation is obviously very different from other post-Soviet states because they are NATO members.

Why is NATO membership important for the Baltic states? The founding treaty of NATO is based on the idea of collective defense. It continues to be a distinctive and enduring value that unites its members, pledging them to defend one another and fostering a sense of unity inside the Alliance. Attacks against one ally are treated as attacks against all allies in collective defense. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty entrenched the idea of collective defense. In reaction to the situation in Syria and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, NATO has adopted collective defense actions on a number of occasions. NATO has active standing forces that continuously support the Alliance's efforts at collective defense.<sup>2</sup> Of course, this

does not mean that the situation is perfect in practice. "We must transition to deterrence through denial. A representative from Estonia's foreign ministry told CNBC that the country needs a reliable military structure on its eastern flank that will discourage Putin. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have frequently urged NATO to offer a significant increase in the number of foreign troops stationed in the area. The Baltic nations have pressed for a quick revision of the alliance's so-called "tripwire" strategy.<sup>3</sup> According to Estonia's PM, under current NATO plans, the country will be "wiped from the map." current NATO preparations to protect the nation from any Russian invasion would cause Estonia to vanish from the face of the earth and would level the historic heart of its capital city. Kaja Kallas told reporters that the alliance's current defense strategy for the three Baltic states included letting them be occupied for 180 days before releasing them.<sup>4</sup> Due to the mentioned situation, one of the main issues of the Madrid summit was the defense of the Eastern flank.

The most important and immediate threat to alliance security, according to the new NATO Strategic Concept established at the summit in Madrid, is Russia, albeit an assault against any of the Allies is still a possibility. There won't be any significant changes to NATO's military position on the eastern flank, but the alliance plans to improve its deterrent and defense posture. The agreement made at the summit suggests that the current battlegroups will only get minor reinforcements, and that soldiers stationed mostly in Western Europe will be pre-assigned. With the slight exception of the V Corps Headquarters Forward Command Post, there won't be any modifications to the rotational to permanent US military presence on the eastern flank. The Black Sea region will nonetheless receive a second rotational brigade from Washington. Overall, the eastern flank's security will be boosted in the next years, though not to the degree that NATO countries who border Russia anticipate.<sup>5</sup> There won't be any radical adjustments made to how forces are deployed on NATO's eastern flank, nor will there be a transition from a forward presence to a front defense, as Poland and the Baltic nations preferred, and which would result in a

large expansion of the allied presence. There are a number of causes for this, including the assessment of Russia's relative military weakness and the belief among some NATO members that Moscow is incapable of waging war against NATO following the invasion of Ukraine, as well as the lack of political resolve on the part of some members to make large-scale investments quickly in a military build-up.<sup>6</sup> Of course, this result is not what the Baltic countries wanted. The largest members of NATO, to this day, more than five months after the war in Ukraine, do not express readiness for a radical military strengthening of the Baltic states. This can be explained by various reasons. Maybe big countries themselves lack military resources at this stage, or they still cannot believe that Russia can attack a NATO member country, or they are simply afraid of the complicated economic situation background of Covid and current war. To summarize, whatever the reason for the lack of political will, the fact is that this is also a danger for the Baltic countries. Hopefully the big NATO countries will change their approach and further strengthen the eastern flank.

Apart from the military threat, there are other issues that are very important to focus on in the current situation. The demographic position of the Baltic states is crucial, in addition to the historical and geographical concerns. The ethnic composition of Estonia: 69 % Estonian, 25 % Russian, 2 % Ukrainian, 1 % Belarusians, 0.8 % Finns and 1.6 % other. Due to Stalin's deportations and executions, as well as a Soviet scheme encouraging large immigration of workers from Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, the proportion of ethnic Estonians in the nation fell to barely 61 percent between 1945 and 1989. This was regarded as a national calamity by the 1980s. Large-scale ethnic Russian emigration took place when the country's independence was restored, and the percentage of ethnic Estonians in the population increased to 69 percent.<sup>7</sup> The ethnic composition of Latvia: Native inhabitants of the region, Latvians and Livonians, made up 62 percent of the population in 2011, followed by Russians (26.7 %), Belarusians (3.3 %), Ukrainians (2.2 %), Poles (2.2 %), Lithuanians (1.2 %), Jews (0.2 %), Romani (0.3 %), Germans (0.1 %), Estonians (0.1 %), and other ethnic groups (1.3 percent).

Around 290,000 people who are not nationals of the country make up 14 % of the total population.<sup>8</sup> The ethnic composition of Lithuania: Lithuania is one of the Baltic States with the maximum ethnic homogeneity, with 5/6 of the population being ethnic Lithuanians. According to the 2011 census, ethnic Lithuanians who could speak Lithuanian made up 84 % of the population. Russians accounted up 5.8 % of the population, followed by Belarusians (1.2 %), Ukrainians (6.6 %), and Poles (6.6 %). (0.5 percent).<sup>9</sup> The statistics unambiguously demonstrate how numerous ethnic Russians are in the Baltic states. This amount of population is quite enough for the Russian state today to use as an excuse to attack Baltic countries. Exactly as it is used in Ukraine now, as if protecting the Russian-speaking population from "Nazis".

Another problem can also arise here. Could the war in Ukraine cause the Baltic societies to split apart? How do Russians, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians coexist? How much have people changed after 30 years of freedom? What remnants did the Soviet era leave behind?<sup>10</sup> In the not-so-distant past, Estonia already had a hard experience with this issue. the spring of 2007, the Estonian crisis that at the time of World War II (WWII) The bronze soldier statue, a memorial, is both in and outside of Estonia, remembered. In the Earlier, this was primarily due to two nights of Rioting has occurred in the nation's capital, Tallinn. never before or subsequently observed. West Europe it is connected to the earliest cyberattacks ever. carried out by one nation against another These incidents were among the first to serve as a demand that the West recognize the cooling regarding ties with Russia. In Russia, the concept of deploying Russian speakers who reside abroad as "compatriots" (sootchestvenniki) in the service of the state is not new. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia quickly recognized the opportunities that speaking Russian with others afforded for advancing its foreign policy objectives.<sup>11</sup> It should be noted that there were already tensions, and Russia seized the chance to exploit them. The fundamental social divide that was exploited and reinforced in Estonia was the difference in historical perspectives between Estonians and Russian speakers there. There is a

considerable likelihood that Russia will utilize any opportunity to destabilize a nation it views as an enemy, even NATO members.<sup>12</sup>

Hybrid threats are one more field, which is at stake for the Baltic countries. Hybrid threat is one of the most actively evolving concepts in security research. A hybrid is “anything that is a blend of multiple parts, frequently not matching one another,” according to linguists. Consequently, hybrid actions in military strategy combine symmetrical and asymmetric warfare. Hybrid threats “may range from assaults on crucial information systems, through the interruption of crucial services like energy supply or banking services, to the undermining of the public’s confidence in governmental institutions or the widening of societal rifts.<sup>13</sup> For example: Particularly among politicians, military, and security personnel from the Baltic States, as well as often traveling businesses, tourists who visit Russia, young individuals, and students enrolled in Russian colleges, Russian secret services conduct recruitment activities. It’s doubtful that this tendency will alter. By issuing Russian passports to ethnic Russians in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, Moscow is attempting to increase the number of Russian citizens living in these Baltic states. This move could ultimately work against them by giving ethnic Russians a pretext to defend themselves from alleged repression by the Latvian or Estonian governments.<sup>14</sup>

Cyber-attacks are also an area where the Baltic states should be careful. Russian hackers launched a prolonged cyberattack against the government and public sector websites in Lithuania last month. The assault was a reaction to Lithuania’s application of a set of EU sanctions on commodities going to and coming from Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave sandwiched between Lithuania and Poland. Russian hackers pledged to launch other attacks after accepting responsibility for the initial one. The Baltic republics have long been at the forefront of cyber conflict. Due to the nation’s attitude regarding the relocation of a Soviet-era monument in the nation’s capital Tallinn, the Estonian parliament, various ministries, media outlets, and banks saw a series of serious cyberattacks in 2007. The attack was seen by authorities in the Baltics as a prelude to an offensive that may destroy electrical grids and

render the nation basically ungovernable. Due to the 22-day offensive’s ferocity, Estonia had to put in place safeguards to protect itself from cyberwarfare. The strategy was straightforward: increase cyber security while moving as many government services and systems to private, secure networks.<sup>15</sup> Because of the digital nature of society’s future, combat will also be digital. Rekindled conflicts between Russia and the Baltic nations have turned into crucial testing grounds for determining where the trends in cyber conflict are going. Whatever happens, cyberattacks will define the future of conflict, and the steps taken by the Baltic states to defend against Russian aggression should be watched closely for clues on how that future will play out.<sup>16</sup> The most recent developments in Ukraine demonstrate the importance of being able to protect key physical and electronic infrastructure against cyberattacks. Understanding of and response to cyber risks must constantly change in light of changes to daily lives and the quickly evolving technologies. The Lithuanian National Threat Assessment of 2021 states that because to the changes brought on by the pandemic, the cyber capabilities of Russia and other adversaries most likely become the crucial weapon for information gathering.<sup>17</sup>

Kaliningrad is an issue that has also become a threat to Lithuania. Last month, Lithuania imposed limitations on the transit of commodities subject to sanctions to Kaliningrad. Meanwhile, the ethnic Lithuanians in the Russian exclave on the Baltic coast started to feel endangered. Lithuanians in Kaliningrad frequently face threats as a result of the nation’s policy toward Russia.<sup>18</sup> In its propaganda, the Kremlin refers to the transportation restrictions imposed by Lithuania as a “blockade”. Officials from Lithuania and Europe emphasize that Kaliningrad is not blocked off. Ingrida Šimonytė, the prime minister of Lithuania, has referred to this story as “a lie.” The steel and ferrous metal goods are covered by the EU restrictions that went into effect on June 18. Russian alcohol and cement were added to the list of prohibited items on July 10. Additionally, restrictions on coal and other solid fuels will go into effect on August 10 as part of the penalties. On December 5, sanctions against Russian oil will go into effect. By the end of the year,



sanctions may have an overall impact on up to 50 % of Russian exports to Kaliningrad that pass through Lithuania. However, the transportation of necessary goods like food, medicine, and other goods is not covered by the penalties. Additionally, passenger traffic is unaffected because Russian nationals can still enter Kaliningrad with a reduced transit visa. The “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the EU on passage to the Kaliningrad region,” according to the Russian Foreign Ministry and state media, has been breached by Lithuania. The agreement was reached in 2002, during the negotiations for Lithuania’s membership in the EU. According to Russian propaganda, Moscow “allowed” Lithuania to join the EU in exchange for the EU agreeing to an uninterrupted passage to Kaliningrad. In fact, the paper does not contain any such agreements. The agreement emphasizes the parties’ desire to strengthen business connections between Russia and its exclave. Sanctions for breaking these laws are not specified. Lithuania is a sovereign state, hence any decision about its membership in a union cannot be made by outside parties. Officials from Lithuania claim that by escalating the Kaliningrad dispute, the Kremlin hopes to accomplish a number of objectives. It first seeks to intimidate the EU into relaxing the sanctions somewhat.<sup>19</sup>

People who planned to travel to the Baltic countries, became afraid and lost their sense of security. A lot of information was spread on social networks, a lot of questions were asked about how safe it was to travel to the Baltic countries in the first months of the war. undoubtedly, such a situation puts the country’s economy in a difficult position. Because, apart from individuals, the business sector also loses the sense of stability and potential investors are afraid to invest in such countries. Finally, the situation of the population of the Baltic countries must be analyzed. Which at the beginning of the war was especially under psychological terror, fear, and panic, because they did not know what awaited their countries.

In conclusion, the situation is really challenging and complex. It is highly challenging to predict Russia’s future actions and activities because they frequently lack logic, reason, and consistency. Many experts in the subject, however, believe

that Russia won’t risk attacking a member of NATO since it is aware that it will escalate into the Third World War, which will ultimately result in its total collapse. It is crucial that NATO and the EU now understand how important it is to support Ukraine and that they defend their own countries with this support.

#### Literature:

- 1 Visegrad 24, <https://twitter.com/visegrad24/status/1497604634684362752>
- 2 Collective defence- Article 5, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_110496.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm)
- 3 Russia’s neighbors fear NATO’s defense plans are not fir for purpose and they could be quickly overrun, Sam Meredith, CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/27/russia-ukraine-war-baltic-nations-push-for-change-at-nato-summit.html>
- 4 Estonia’s PM says country would be “wiped from map” under existing NATO plans, Richard Milne, Financial times, <https://www.ft.com/content/a430b191-39c8-4b03-b3fd-8e7e948a5284>
- 5 NATO after Madrid: how much deterrence and defence on the eastern frank? Justyna Gotkowska, Jacek Tarocinski, Center for eastern studies, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2022-07-05/nato-after-madrid-how-much-deterrence-and-defence-eastern>
- 6 NATO after Madrid: how much deterrence and defence on the eastern frank? Justyna Gotkowska, Jacek Tarocinski, Center for eastern studies, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2022-07-05/nato-after-madrid-how-much-deterrence-and-defence-eastern>
- 7 Estonian Population 2022, world population review, <https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/estonia-population>
- 8 Latvia population 2022, world population review, <https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/latvia-population>
- 9 Lithuania population 2022, world population review, <https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/lithuania-population>
- 10 Friends or Foes? - Russia and the Baltic states, DW, <https://www.dw.com/en/friends-or-foes-russia-and-the-baltic-states/a-62237410>
- 11 The Bronze Soldier Crisis of 2007, Revisiting an early case of Hybrid conflict, Ivo Juurvee, Mariita Mattiisen, August 2020, International centre for defence and security, Estonia. [https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ICDS\\_Report\\_The\\_Bronze\\_Soldier\\_Crises\\_of\\_2007\\_Juurvee\\_Mattiisen\\_August\\_2020.pdf](https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ICDS_Report_The_Bronze_Soldier_Crises_of_2007_Juurvee_Mattiisen_August_2020.pdf)
- 12 The Bronze Soldier Crisis of 2007, Revisiting an early case of Hybrid conflict, Ivo Juurvee, Mariita Mattiisen, August 2020, International centre for defence and security, Estonia. [https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ICDS\\_Report\\_The\\_Bronze\\_Soldier\\_Crises\\_of\\_2007\\_Juurvee\\_Mattiisen\\_August\\_2020.pdf](https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ICDS_Report_The_Bronze_Soldier_Crises_of_2007_Juurvee_Mattiisen_August_2020.pdf)
- 13 Baltic States Versus Russian Hybrid Threats, Bartosz Fraszka, 2020, Warsaw Institute, <https://warsawinstitute.org/baltic-states-versus-russian-hybrid-threats/>
- 14 Baltic States Versus Russian Hybrid Threats, Bartosz Fraszka, 2020, Warsaw Institute, <https://warsawinstitute.org/baltic-states-versus-russian-hybrid-threats/>
- 15 Russian cyberattacks in the Baltics foreshadow the future of war, Joseph Fana, July 25, 2022, Timesnow, <https://www.timesnownews.com/columns/russian-cyberattacks-in-the-baltics-foreshadow-the-future-of-war-article-93107337>
- 16 Russian cyberattacks in the Baltics foreshadow the future of war, Joseph Fana, July 25, 2022, Timesnow, <https://www.timesnownews.com/columns/russian-cyberattacks-in-the-baltics-foreshadow-the-future-of-war-article-93107337>
- 17 Lithuania hopes NATO’s strategic concept leads to more heavy metal and boots on the ground, Linas Kojala, Justinas kuly, 7 june, 2022, Real instituto Elcano royal institute, <https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/commentaries/lithuania-hopes-natos-strategic-concept-leads-to-more-heavy-metal-and-boots-on-the-ground/>
- 18 Lithuanians in Kaliningrad live in fear. “one advice- leave”, Edvardas Spokas, LRT TV, <https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1734438/lithuanians-in-kaliningrad-live-in-fear-one-advice-leave>
- 19 Russian propaganda targets Lithuania- Kaliningrad “blockade” and “betrayal”, Olegas Golovarenko, Maksimas Omelcenko, Svoboda.fm, LRT, <https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1736701/lrt-facts-russian-propaganda-targets-lithuania-kaliningrad-blockade-and-betrayal>



**1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> prize winners:** Ivanna Horaichuk and Marita Gorgiladze, Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers

## Thema | Topic:

What are two key lessons learned for NATO from Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

### **1<sup>st</sup> Prize: 1.000 EUR, Noah Heinemann** **Preventing the "Baltic Recapture"-Scenario: Lessons for NATO to defend every inch of allied territory**

For the first time since 2010, NATO member states have crafted a new strategic concept for the transatlantic security alliance – with wide-reaching implications. Due to the Russian war of aggression and extermination against Ukraine, nuclear threats directed at the West and hints of Russian ambitions of further expansion, NATO has declared Russia as the “most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area” and has underscored “the need to significantly strengthen (...) deterrence and defence as the backbone of (...) Article 5 commitment”. These strategic shifts in the transatlantic threat perception are concomitant with operational plans to reinforce military forces qualitatively and quantitatively on NATO’s Eastern Flank. NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg announced to “enhance the battlegroups (...) up to a brigade level” and to “increase the number of high readiness forces to well over 300,000” while presenting the outcomes of the highly anticipated NATO summit in Madrid end of June. Additionally, the U.S. revealed plans to increase its military presence in the European theater even further by deploying additional troops to Romania, Poland, the Baltics and even installing an army headquarter in Poland to “defend every inch” of NATO territory.

### **NATO’s collective defence of Eastern Europe: “That would all be wiped off the map, including our people, our nation.”**

The announced changes in the military structure of the Eastern Flank represent and manifest NATO’s reaffirmation of its core task of collective defence and deterrence as well as the perception of Russia as the alliance’s greatest threat. The Russian re-invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 confirmed Western fears of Russian militaristic expansionism which developed after the

annexation of Crimea in 2014. Since then, NATO relied on the tripwire approach through rotating, multi-national battlegroups of the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in the Baltic States and Poland as a stirrup for Article 5. In case of a Russian invasion attempt, smaller contingents of NATO military forces would impede the Russian advance from the East, while substantial military fighting forces would be deployed in the region within short time of notice.

In light of Russia’s presented will to use military force against sovereign states despite all international mediating efforts, the cruelties and war crimes committed by Russian soldiers in Ukraine as well as the Russian strategy of destroying civilian and military infrastructure alike, countries in Eastern and North-Eastern Europe like the Baltics and Poland argued and asked for stronger NATO defence capabilities along the Eastern Flank. A Russian attack on NATO territory, declared highly unrealistic since the end of the Cold War, could not be ruled out anymore, even NATO officials responded.

Consequently, the transatlantic alliance declared a switch in its deterrence approach: Rather than using deterrence by punishment through nuclear deterrence and conventional reinforcements, deterrence by denial through forward deployed defence forces is set to be NATO’s new protection against Russian expansionist ambitions. This shift represents an already performed action in regard to an important lesson from the war against Ukraine: NATO must be able to defend every inch of its territory to prevent destruction, extermination and war crimes.

Because thinking the yet unthinkable and ultimately preparing for unexpected pathways in political and military affairs seems to be one of the most important lessons of the last decade. Besides the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the 2016-Brexit-Referendum in the UK and ultimately the election of Donald Trump in the U.S. in 2018, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine seems to confirm the pattern that hitherto existing paradigms and assumptions in political and security affairs are increasingly contested. For predicting the near-term future and advising policy makers to prepare for

prospective developments, leaving aside rather unrealistic but eventually impactful scenarios seems credulous – a Russian invasion of the Baltics is one of these possible, yet as improbable perceived scenarios.

To that effect, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas revealed lately that the current NATO strategy would allow Russia to capture the Baltics before NATO would liberate Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania after 180 days: “Now everyone sees that this tripwire concept doesn't really work”, the Prime Minister said. “Those of you who have been to Tallinn and know our old town and the centuries of history that's here and centuries of culture that's here – that would all be wiped off the map, including our people, our nation.”

Considering the current military performance of Russia in Ukraine, this scenario may sound unrealistic and far-fetched. But not on a second look: Between 2014 and 2016 and in light of the Russian annexation of Crimea, the RAND Corporation conducted “wargames” in which experts simulated the defense of the Baltics against a Russian invasion – with shocking results: NATO forces, relying on its “deterrence by reemployment”-approach have not been able to defend the region adequately and in multiple runs of the simulation, the Russian Army reached the capitals of Tallin and Riga in less than 60 hours. Additionally, the Suwałki-Gap between the Russian enclave Kaliningrad and its ally Belarus, leaving a small land corridor of a 100km from Poland to Lithuania for NATO ground reinforcements, needs to be perceived as NATO's Achilles heel and strategic vulnerability in a potential Russian invasion of the Baltics.

This strategic challenge would also complicate the planned recapture of the Baltics by NATO forces, possibly accompanied with nuclear saber-rattling by Russia and European societal discussion about appeasing the aggressor – as seen in the current war against Ukraine. To prevent this highly dangerous and resource intensive recapture scenario, NATO needs to reaffirm its task of collective defence with forward-deployed forces along the Eastern Flank, an approach of deterrence by denial and increased training and maneuvers between NATO allies for

improved operability. The New Force Model of the new Strategic Concept is a step in the right direction in respect thereof.

### **Implementing NATO's New Force Model through increased defence spending and joint European procurement**

In reaction to the military developments in Europe and Eastern partners arguing for stronger defence capabilities against Russia, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg used the build-up of the NATO summit in Madrid as the stage for presenting the New Force Model (NFM) as a replacement for NATO's current rapid deployment defence infrastructure, mainly consisting out of the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) and the NATO Response Force (NRF).

After its first ever activation in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the NRF will now be developed into the New Force Model with three different tiers: The first tier consists of 100,000 soldiers with a deployment time of maximum 10 days. Part of the first tier will form the Allied Reaction Force (ARF) with 40,000 highly mobile troops like infantry and paratroopers under direct command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) for very quick military response operations. In up to 30 days, additional 200,000 troops are capable to be deployed, followed by 500,000 multinational soldiers in up to 180 days. In total, 800,000 troops from all NATO member states are scheduled for the defence of allied territory with pre-defined proximal territorial zones.

While Stoltenberg announced a tight time schedule for the implementation of the New Force Model till 2023, NATO experts are unofficially more conservative in forecasting its full implementation - some even estimate not before 2028. Recently, the German Federal Ministry of Defence announced its commitment to support the NFM with 30,000 soldiers and 85 airplanes and warships from 2025 onwards, thereby continuing the existing, smaller deployment for the NRF till 2024. Despite this decelerated starting point for the NFM, the German declaration is perceived as optimistic in adherence to the current, limited capabilities of the Bundeswehr.

But having underfunded armed forces is not a unique feature of Germany, but for all European NATO allies. In a recent analysis from May 2022, the European Union detected “years of defence underspending, which has led to an accumulation of gaps and shortfalls in the collective military inventories as well as reduced industrial production capacity”. To quantify the shortfall of European defence spending, the EU calculated that, assuming all member states followed the decision of the NATO summit in Wales 2014 to assign 2% of their GDP for the defence budget, additional 1,100 billion € would have been invested into military capabilities from 2006 to 2020. A huge amount of money that member states did not perceive as necessary to invest into the defence of the European security order, which heavily relied on the military presence and nuclear umbrella of the United States instead. While the U.S. fortunately continues to support Ukraine, to reinforce troops along the NATO Eastern Flank and to deter Russia from attacking NATO territory, European allies need to strengthen the European pillar in NATO to take up responsibility for their own stability, freedom and peace themselves.

To install the New Force Model and to undergird it with substantial combat forces including forward deployed mechanized brigades, pre-stationed heavy equipment and command posts along the Eastern Flank, European NATO allies need to increase defence spending massively. It seems like most countries have learned this important lessons by observing the Russian aggression against Ukraine, with Germany and its “Zeitenwende” including the 100 billion € strong “Sondervermögen Bundeswehr” as a well-known example.

But to that effect, national militaries should not be equipped with whatsoever is available on the market in a governmental spending spree. With increased defence budgets, European allies should work together to mesh their distinctive procurement processes and strengthen interoperability by developing and procuring joint military systems in a coordinated approach. The already existing projects like the Future Combat Air Systems (FCAS), Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) or the recently announced initiative of Germany to procure a joint European air

defense system in cooperation with multiple partners are foreshadowing the necessary way ahead for European defence matters.

### **Conclusion: Defending the freedom of animus in consulendo liber**

The Russian war of aggression and extermination against Ukraine has caused seismic shifts in the European and international security order, endangering basic principles such as state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and renunciation of offensive violence. To reinforce this security order, which has granted peace, stability, and economic prosperity for Europe since the Second World War and even stronger for Eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War, NATO must prepare for the yet unthinkable: A Russian military attack on the Baltic countries Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania needs to be perceived as possible and imminent. The war of aggression against Ukraine has proven that the Kremlin does not refrain from all-out war against sovereign European states including war crimes and widespread destruction for achieving its expansionist ambitions.

For being able to prevent the “Baltic recapture”-scenario for NATO and in order to defend every inch of allied territory, the transatlantic security alliance needs to update its defence plans and to switch from the current tripwire approach to deterrence by denial. In this regard, European NATO allies need to continue their effort to increase defence spending, to intensify joint European procurement for military systems and to fully equip national militaries so as to fulfill their tasks of collective defence through the New Force Model.

Standing together to be in the position to defend Eastern European partners, the European security order and to maintain the *modus operandi* of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for all its member states – *animus in consulendo liber*.

## 2<sup>nd</sup> Prize: 600 EUR, Aida Lorca Arce

### University of Groningen

Russia's special military operation has been active for almost seven months now. This move by Moscow has put the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies on edge, increasing the number of soldiers on the border of its members with the former Soviet country. After weeks of war in Ukraine and the occasional change of strategy, the Kremlin's military capabilities and tactical strategies have become more apparent than in other conflicts in which Russia has been involved (Nagorno-Karabakh or Syria). In this way, NATO has been able to obtain much valuable information in the face of a potential confrontation with Russia, both from the way the former Soviet republic has acted and from the mistakes that the Allies have committed since the fall of the Soviet Union, endangering the defense of their values and weakening the capabilities of their respective armies. Lessons that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization wanted to reflect in its new Strategic Concept and to promote at the Madrid Summit in June 2022.

### INCREASING DEFENSE BUDGET IS A MUST

The Prague Summit of 2002 brought up for the first time for discussion among the member states of the Atlantic Alliance the establishment of a minimum defense expenditure of 2 % of GDP. However, this requirement was not formalized until the Wales summit in November 2014, only a few months after the Russian occupation of the Crimean peninsula and the subsequent holding of a referendum on self-determination in that territory. Despite all this and after harsh statements by the U.S. government during Donald Trump's term in office (2017 – 2021), the defense budgets of many NATO member countries have hardly varied, let alone reached the established figure.

The anti-militarist movements and the tendency of some European countries may explain this, in addition to the generalized disinterest and misunderstood pacifism among a large part of the Allies, who have mostly lived decades of peace on the continent and never imagined living through a conventional war in Europe (not including civil wars, as was the case in the Balkans). This trend has changed following the invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops. Most

citizens support the defense of the Eastern European country's national sovereignty and defend the need to protect our Western values against aggression from other great powers. This 2% commitment has been discussed again and included in the Strategic Concept approved this year 2022 in Madrid by the heads of state of the thirty member countries, because strong and prepared armies are necessary and need strong investments of money to guarantee the efficiency of the defense of their borders.

### NATO: Past, present & future

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded on April 4, 1949, following the signing of the Treaty of Washington. Of the fourteen articles that make up the agreement, article five stands out, given its commitment and determination for common defense. NATO was created during the beginning of the Cold War, a time of special friction between the main powers of the time – the United States and the Soviet Union – due to their different political, economic and social stance. In the military sphere, these two axes took refuge in NATO and the Warsaw Pact (1955). After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the USSR and the rise of the United States as a hegemonic power, there were many who questioned the need for a political-military organization of the calibre of NATO given the disappearance of a common enemy and that the dissolution of the organization was a matter of time.

After the invasion of Ukraine many conclusions could be drawn in this regard and one of them is that NATO still has a usefulness, as its deterrence capabilities are working. Why is Russia attacking Ukraine? Several experts claim that the main reason is related to the close relationship of Russia's origins with Kiev and the territory that makes up today's Ukraine. However, it should not be overlooked that this Eastern European country is one of the few Soviet republics that shares a border with Moscow and is not a member of the Alliance. Although the Allies are helping Ukraine with weapons, sanitary materials and intelligence assistance, Russia has not made any risky moves with any NATO member, beyond playing on the dependence of European countries such as Germany on Russian gas.

This does not imply that NATO's ability to act in conflicts outside its Allies is certainly limited. The 'common defense policy-guarantee' works for its members, but not for countries applying for membership or partners outside the organization. This limitation is not only a question of legitimacy, but, especially in this case, the role of nuclear bombs. Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the destructive capacity of this arms of mass destruction, leading 190 sovereign states to sign the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968. Especially after the end of the Cold War (1991), the citizens of the world have tended to forget the potential risks of the existence of these devices as they understood that a nuclear war was not a possibility. However, Russian President Vladimir Putin's announcement on February 27, 2022 – just three days after the Russian military's incursion into Ukrainian territory – that he would put Russia deterrent forces, including nuclear bombs, on 'special regime of alert'. Thus, the existence of nuclear weapons should not be overlooked not only because of their danger but also because of their real role as a deterrent arm in times of tension and change in world geopolitics that we are currently experiencing.

## CONCLUSION

The war in Ukraine is the first war in Europe involving aggression by one sovereign state against another since the end of World War II. During these twenty-eight weeks of invasion, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has seen the need for greater commitment among its Allies in terms of defense spending and how its mission has been exalted and revalued after the citizens of its member countries reconsidered the potential risks to their values and the sovereignty of their States. Conventional warfare, supplemented by new means, is possible in Europe, because peace is not assured and 'the geopolitical Europe' was only a matter of time before it became a reality. The change of cycle in world geopolitics has found its stage in European territory. Russia remains a threat, but always with the evidence that it is not an isolated country and that it has its allies.

Europe's dependence on Russian gas and the impact of the war between countries on a global scale in a globalized world have been seen

through inflation or grain supply problems. However, if there is another lesson to be learned from this war, it is the unanimity reached in NATO and its rapid and supportive response to the Ukrainian people. The Alliance has a past, a present and a future. Being a member of the Organization makes you, in part, untouchable for Russia, but it puts at risk those countries of Western tendency that are not part of it. Likewise, nuclear bombs are once again the key to avoiding a global conflict.

The new Strategic Concept approved in Madrid not only shows NATO's priorities and agenda for the coming years, but also corrects the mistakes made in the last decades of Western hegemony. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the shortcomings and irresponsibilities of the Allies. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has to prepare itself for a change of era in which the world is no longer unipolar and where the balance of power has been redistributed.

Finally, the main two lessons NATO has learned from this war is the obligation to increase defense spending to at least 2% of GDP and to demonstrate to member countries and their citizens that the Alliance is an unquestionable deterrent capable of preventing conflict on a global scale.

### 3<sup>rd</sup> Prize: 400 EUR, Kathrin Rief

The Kremlin's invasion of Ukraine likely represents the first major confrontation in an international system that has experienced gradual reactivation and intensification of geopolitical contention. While February 24 rendered many key actors of NATO speechless, today NATO forges ahead, equipped with a new strategy adapted to the changed security reality (Alonso-Trabanco 2022). The following will highlight two lessons learned for NATO from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. First, the necessity for NATO to upgrade its defense and deterrence (infra)structure to be capable of executing its core mission of collective defense, stated in Article 5 of the NATO treaty. Second, the foresight to enhance partnerships with states akin to NATO's core values, including non-military cooperation especially in the Indo-Pacific, to ensure the effectiveness of actions taken by NATO.

#### 1. Building-up effective defense and deterrence capabilities

In the past decades, the mutual dread of unleashed nuclear power and emerging "hybrid/new wars", have created the illusion of conventional warfare being outdated. Conversely, the Russian invasion revives a conventional wisdom, formerly accepted after World War I erupted between the world's leading trade partners: economic interdependence and institutionalization alone do not prevent war. Conventional warfare remains a means, to which states resort for conflict resolution (Nye 2022). Therefore, Article 5 of the NATO treaty defines the organization's core mission: to undertake all action necessary for restoring and maintaining the security of the North Atlantic area. Now faced with the risk of contingency, NATO allies must acknowledge the "years of defense underspending", which have accumulated shortcomings in collective military capabilities and rendered NATO unable to operate full-spectrum and at high intensity (EC 2022: 1). Thus, the foremost lesson learned from Russia's escalation: NATO must capacitate itself to credible retaliation across all security-related dimensions. Russia's nuclear modernization and threats have weakened the taboo of tactical nuclear weapons and dissuaded Western allies from providing troops (though not equipment) to Ukraine. NATO's clipped support demonstrates

that while nuclear deterrence works, it depends on relative stakes. NATO's non-interference might not be the result of superior Russian nuclear capability, but of Putin declaring Ukraine a vital national interest versus the West declaring Ukraine an important, but not vital interest (Nye 2022). Thus, while it's crucial to enhance the credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrent, NATO should focus on three operational priorities to build-up effective defense and deterrence (Fehl/Vieluf/Hach 2022).

First, NATO must close the gaps in military capabilities needed for high-intensity conflicts, including the installment of additional forward force deployments. The Russian invasion has reinforced NATO military leaders e.g., the French, who warned that France could execute all assigned military missions simultaneously, material, and human resources would however be exhausted quickly (France 2021; Pezard/Shurkin/Ochmanek 2021). While operating on different levels in terms of resources and reach, 3 even US military lacks preparation, especially in munitions and supply inventories for high-intensity conflicts such as the Russo-Ukrainian, lasting multiple months. Considering Russian warfare, a replenishment of the most urgent stockpiles should include anti-armor capabilities, man-portable and medium-range air defenses, contributing to on-ground maneuver capability and lethality. Additionally, unmanned aerial vehicles for sensing attack, long-range fires, air defenses and precision-guided munitions for rear areas have shown to be crucial battlefield weapons (Kramer/Pavel 2022).

Second, NATO must modernize its burden-sharing and command structure. Following 1945, the "transatlantic bargain" ensured the US would provide a blanket of security to allow for European recovery (Johnston 2019). With the USA shifting some of their capabilities to the Indo-Pacific, Canadian and European allies must shoulder a substantial portion of the capabilities required for maximizing NATO's defense posture (Kramer 2021). Naturally, achieving the requisite level of capability will require significant defense-budget increases. If other NATO countries remodeled the German budgetary *Zeitenwende* of establishing a special fund meant for military procurement aside its 2%-expenditure pledge, short-



comings could be resolved in 3-4 years (Kramer/Pavel 2022). While NATO has proven its capability to move current level forces swiftly, mobilizing larger forces requires enhancements to mobility and sustainment, including a revision of the current command structure. For instance, SACEUR and NATO military staff should be capacitated to revise military structure by considering members e.g., for NATO's High North, or Black Sea Defense (Nostrant 2022; Kramer/Pavel 2022).

Third, NATO must enhance cybersecurity resilience. Conventional defense will fail without effective cybersecurity capabilities to sustain the functioning of critical infrastructure, crucial for defense mission assurance (Utrecht 2020). The importance of such resilient cybersecurity based on zero-trust architectures is showcased by the effects of Russia's pre-kinetic destructive cyber-operations e.g., leaving computer systems of Ukrainian military, government, and critical infrastructure sectors inoperable (Kramer/Pavel 2022).

## **2. Enhancing strategic partnerships with like-minded states**

Recent actions taken in response to the Russo-Ukrainian indicate NATO's having understood the necessity for capability upgrading. However, the Russo-Ukrainian war is not fought with bullets, air strikes and cyberattacks alone. The growing complexity of today's geopolitical chessboard becomes apparent by the extent, to which conflict parties rely on measures of economic and financial coercion. Thereby two developments clash: a diversification of security threats that can only be addressed supra-regionally and a previous US-led international order, to which fewer and fewer states feel committed – not even those that built it (Menon 2022). Alas, the second key lesson learned for NATO from the invasion is to develop existing and create new partnerships with states akin to NATO's core values, thereby ensuring the effectiveness of its resolutions.

While it's too early to judge the ultimate effectiveness of Western sanctions against Russia, undisputed preconditions are their long-term upkeep and endorsement by the international community. With Russia depending on energy exports and European consumer markets

depending too heavily on Russian gas and oil to cut off trade completely, little power lies in interdependence (Nye 2022). In fact, by importing Russian oil via India, who decided against supporting Western sanctions, Europeans undercut the effectiveness of their own counteractions (Tietz 2022). The Russian invasion is no exception; many of the security issues and its effects, threatening NATO members today, are not confined even to the transatlantic realm. For instance, the acute food crises in many African countries, triggered by war-related supply bottlenecks at Ukrainian port cities, illustrate destabilizing side effects and collateral damages. In our highly interconnected world, such destabilizations inevitably have implications for mission areas, to which NATO is already committed e.g., transnational counterterrorism, populism, and fields, which NATO must now address in its revamped security strategy e.g., the climate crises. To meet the diverse existing and upcoming challenges via its array of political, economic, and military capabilities, NATO must be able to count on the solidarity of the international community towards its "rules-based" order. Yet, Russia is only the most radical of a long line of dissatisfied revisionists, debilitating the previous US-led world order (Menon 2022). Territorial disputes, PRC's increasingly aggressive behavior in maritime Asia, at the China-Indian border, and mostly towards Taiwan, growing US protectionism, pacifist Germany's and Japan's rearmament, India's autocratization etc. indicate a gradual corrosion of the once unipolar US-hegemony to a bi-/multipolar international system. An indicator for current levels of international cohesion can be the votes given during the UN General Assembly's decision on excluding Russia from UNHCR. The 58 abstentions and 24 opposing votes must alert NATO, especially when Russia's invasion is taken for what it is: an attack not merely against border demarcation in Europe, but against the institutionalized way in which conflict resolution, trade and international politics is done per se. The invasion denounces the core values of democracy, liberalism and freedom that are characteristic for, but not exclusive to NATO. While the opposing votes of autocracies may reflect the maturity of a normative-structural counter-concept to the West's democratic order, many abstentions are symptoms of the West's,

therein NATO's, fatal neglect of the Global South. Economically, these countries witness the failure of organizations like UN, World Bank or G20 to address developmental issues consistently, especially the debt crisis, exacerbated by the pandemic and sky-high energy and food prices. Politically, invasions, interventions and regime change attempts not only by Russia, but most major powers, cause the Global South to question the legitimacy and fairness of the "rules-based" order, upheld by NATO (Menon 2022). In many states of the international community decisions are being made right now, as to whose world order to choose. Considering the existing internal rigors of consensual decision making with 30+ members, NATO should remain an organization of collective defense restricted to states within the transatlantic realm. Nevertheless, NATO must utilize the Russian invasion to extend a collegial hand to all likeminded states and win as many partners for its democratic idea as possible.

A special focus should lie on the Indo-Pacific. Since the invasion, many have stressed the similarity between the Russian government's portrayed conflict with Ukraine and CPC's with Taiwan; a country, whose geostrategic significance for retaining the stability of the US-led world order cannot be overstated. Due to deep economic interconnectedness with PRC – for many NATO allies far exceeding interdependence with Russia – national strategies about a future relationship are less compatible. The newly adopted Strategic Concept declares PRC for the first time a challenge for "our interests, security, and values" (NATO 2022). In 2021, the commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command hypothesized a conflict with PRC might erupt within the next six years (Shelbourne 2021). In view of PRC's recent promise to Russia of a friendship with "no limits", NATO must react to the reality that there are now two "major contested theaters": Europe and the Indo-Pacific (Kramer 2021; Wright 2022).

For this, NATO can build on a history of non-military cooperation and partnership politics. Extending on Article 2 of the NATO treaty, strategic papers as early as 1967's Harmel Report elevate dialogue and diplomacy to a co-equal status with military defense and deterrence. NATO's continuous returning to its common values

throughout the decades may even be the key to its successful persistence. As with any organization of comparable size, deviations from the status quo – entrenched by path dependency – take time and occur mostly through internal and external adaptations to external shocks. If all NATO is, was a military alliance built against an external threat, NATO would have ceased to be a key player in international politics when the Soviet Union collapsed. While NATO was created to deter and defend against a common enemy, over time it spread norms, facilitated learning, and changed state preferences, thereby created a transatlantic community of values. In its 73 years of existence, numerous threats have changed NATO's security environment. What remains are NATO's core values and ideals, guiding every strategic (re)action and institutional adaptation (Johnston 2019). The current security crisis in Europe has declared the time for strategically extending and fastening the democratic values-based net, underlying all proceedings in the international order, to be now.

### 3. Conclusion

Should NATO overlook the cataclysmic implications of the Russian invasion, it wouldn't just be a cognitive deficiency, but probable induction of an even greater catastrophe in the foreseeable future (Alonso-Trabanco 2022). Notwithstanding, NATO's recent cohesion in reviving the "transatlantic bargain" demonstrates not only its readiness to acknowledge its changed security reality, but finally its readiness to act accordingly. While the tenth NPT Conference will reveal whether signees understand the Russian breach of the Budapest Memorandum to be a lasting discredit of negative security guarantees and even though economic interdependencies and treaties alone may not prevent war, they do raise its cost (Nye 2022). Alas, as reinforced by the decision to refrain from formally revoking the Russia-NATO Founding Act, despite permanently stationing additional NATO troops alongside NATO's Eastern flank: NATO should not give up its ideal of their rules-based order but align its military capabilities and strategic partnerships to reflect NATO's official maxim: vigilance is the price of liberty.

#### 4. Bibliography

- Alonso-Trabanco, Jose Miguel (2022): A World Remade? Lessons from the Ukraine War. Situation Reports, URL: <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/a-world-remade-lessons-from-the-ukrainewar/>, viewed 26.07.2022.
- European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy: Joint Communication to the European Parliament, European Council, Council, European Economic and Social Committee and Committee of the Regions on the Defense Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (abbreviated: EC), URL: [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:c0a8dcdad7bf-11ec-a95f-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC\\_1&format=PDF](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:c0a8dcdad7bf-11ec-a95f-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF), viewed 26.07.2022.
- Fehl, Caroline/Vieluf, Maren/Hach, Sascha (2022): Europas Kubakrise, URL: <https://www.ipgjournal.de/rubriken/aussen-und-sicherheitspolitik/artikel/ueberpruefungskonferenzerschlagerverzicht-6123/>, viewed 12.08.2022.
- French Ministry of Armed Forces (2021): Strategic Vision of the Chief of Defense Staff (abbreviated: France), URL: [https://www.defense.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/ema/211022\\_EMACOM\\_StrategicVision\\_UK\\_Vdef\\_HQ\\_\(3\).pdf](https://www.defense.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/ema/211022_EMACOM_StrategicVision_UK_Vdef_HQ_(3).pdf), viewed 26.07.2022.
- Johnston, Seth A. (2017): How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Kramer, Franklin D./Pavel, Berry (2022): NATO priorities: Initial lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war, URL: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/nato-prioritiesinitial-lessons-from-the-russia-ukraine-war/>, viewed 26.07.2022.
- Marksteiner, Alexandra (2022): Explainer: The proposed hike in German military spending, URL: <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2022/explainer-proposed-hike-german-militaryspending>, viewed 26.07.2022.
- Menon, Shivshankar (2022): Nobody Wants the Current World Order, URL: [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/nobody-wants-current-worldorder?check\\_logged\\_in=1&utm\\_medium=promo\\_email&utm\\_source=lo\\_flows&utm\\_campaign=registered\\_user\\_welcome&utm\\_term=email\\_1&utm\\_content=20220814](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/nobody-wants-current-worldorder?check_logged_in=1&utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=registered_user_welcome&utm_term=email_1&utm_content=20220814), viewed: 08.08.2022.
- NATO (2022): Strategic Concept, URL: <https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/>, viewed 08.08.2022.
- Nostrant, Rachel (2022): Army activates pre-positioned stocks for first time in wake of Ukraine invasion, URL: <https://www.armytimes.com/flashpoints/2022/03/01/army-activates-prepositionedstocks-for-first-time-in-wake-of-ukraine-invasion/>, viewed 26.07.2022.
- Nye, Joseph S. (2022): Eight Lessons from Ukraine War, URL: <https://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/russia-war-in-ukraine-eight-lessons-by-joseph-s-nye-2022-06>, viewed 26.07.2022.
- 8 Pezard, Stephanie/Shurkin, Michael/Ochmanek, David A. (2021): A Strong Ally Stretched Thin An Overview of France's Defense Capabilities from a Burdensharing Perspective, URL: [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RRA231-1.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA231-1.html), viewed 26.07.2022.
- Shelbourne, Mallory (2021): China Could Try to Take Control of Taiwan In the "Next Six Years", URL: <https://news.usni.org/2021/03/09/davidson-china-could-try-to-take-control-of-taiwan-in-nextsix-years>, viewed 30.07.2022.
- Tietz, Volker (2022): Schlupfloch entdeckt: Indien verkauft russisches Öl in Europa, URL: [https://www.focus.de/finanzen/news/schlupfloch-entdeckt-indien-verkauft-russisches-oel-ineuropa\\_id\\_107990831.html](https://www.focus.de/finanzen/news/schlupfloch-entdeckt-indien-verkauft-russisches-oel-ineuropa_id_107990831.html), viewed 30.07.2022.
- Utrecht, Karen D. (2020): Zero Trust (ZT) Concepts for Federal Government Architectures, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, URL: <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1108910.pdf#page=v>, viewed 30.07.2022.

**Thema | Topic:**

Proxys im staatlichen Cyberkonflikt-austrag: Eine vergleichende Analyse der VR China, Russlands, der USA und Israels

**Preis: 5.000 EUR, Dr. Kerstin Zettl-Schabath, Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften der Universität Heidelberg**

**Dissertation von Kerstin Zettl-Schabath (Abstrakt):**

Cyberangriffe bestimmen nicht erst seit der russischen Invasion der Ukraine im Februar 2022 mittlerweile täglich die Schlagzeilen. Staaten und ihre privaten Stellvertreter bauten ihre Fähigkeiten im Cyberspace in den letzten zwanzig Jahren immer weiter aus. Dennoch existiert nach wie vor kaum Forschung zu Cyberkonflikten, die sich auf eine breitere Datenbasis stützt. Hinzu kommt, dass es für die unterschiedliche Nutzung von nichtstaatlichen Akteuren im Rahmen autoritärer vs. demokratischer Cyberkonfliktstrategien, sog. „Cyber-Proxys“, bislang noch kein

kohärentes Erklärungsmodell gab. Diese Proxys sind jedoch essentiell im staatlichen Cyberkonfliktmanagement: Autokratien nutzen sie als eine Art „Puffer“ gegenüber den von ihnen angegriffenen Demokratien, um für ihre Taten nicht belangt werden zu können. Für Demokratien spielen dagegen technische Berichte privater IT-Unternehmen eine entscheidende Rolle, um politische Verantwortungszuweisungen (Attributionen) und den damit einhergehenden Handlungsdruck regelmäßig vermeiden zu können. Stellvertretend können IT-Unternehmen bestehendes „Täter-Wissen“ dennoch öffentlich kommunizieren. Die Dissertation entwickelt daher ein liberales Erklärungsmodell regimetypenspezifischer Cyber-Proxy-Strategien und wendet es auf vier Fallstudien (China & Russland vs. USA & Israel) an. Basis hierfür ist ein eigens entwickelter Cyberkonfliktdatensatz für den Zeitraum 2000 – 2019, der sog. HD-CY.CON



Von links nach rechts: Rektor der Universität Heidelberg, Prof. Dr. Bernhard Eitel, Dr. Kerstin Zettl-Schabath, Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers

# 2023

## **Schulen | Schools in Heidelberg/Weinheim**

Thema | *Topic:*

Eine Welt ohne Kriege – eine Utopie? .....150

## **Litauen Mykolas Romeris Universität |**

### ***Lithuania Mykolas Romeris University***

Thema | *Topic:*

Russia's war in Ukraine and the "reinvention" of NATO: Is the Alliance doing enough to help Ukraine and to strengthen NATO's own deterrence and defence in Europe? .....163

## **Universität Heidelberg |**

### ***Heidelberg University***

Thema | *Topic:*

Emotional Climates in the Beirut Blast Anniversary Protests (Emotionale Klimata bei den Protesten zum Jahrestag der Explosion in Beirut) .....179

**Thema | Topic:**

## Eine Welt ohne Kriege- eine Utopie ?

**1. Preis: 600 EUR, Lily Carolin Hering des Bunsen-Gymnasiums Heidelberg, Stufe JG 1**

Mehr als eine Millionen Menschen verloren ihr Leben durch die punischen Kriege von 264-146 vor Christus. Zwischen 13 bis 36 Millionen starben durch die An-Lushan-Rebellion im achten Jahrhundert nach Christus, 80 Millionen weltweit im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Bereits über 300.000 Menschen sind durch Russlands Angriff auf die Ukraine gestorben. Seit Beginn der menschlichen Geschichte fordern Kriege, definiert als mit Waffen ausgetragene Konflikte zwischen Staaten oder sozialen Gruppen, Menschenleben.

Aber wieso bekämpfen wir uns? Hobbes schrieb 1642, der Mensch sei dem Menschen ein Wolf. Tatsächlich tun Menschen einander Schreckliches an. Sind wir so sehr von Gier und Selbstsucht geprägt, dass eine Welt ohne Kriege unmöglich ist?

„Utopie“ (griech.: nicht Ort) beschreibt eine in der Zukunft liegende, ideale Gesellschaft. Viele würden eine Welt ohne Kriege so nennen. Ist eine Welt ohne Kriege also unerreichbar? Hobbes schrieb schließlich auch, der Mensch sei dem Menschen ein Gott.

Bei all den Grausamkeiten in der Welt übersieht man leicht, wie viele Menschen an den Weltfrieden glauben und dafür kämpfen. Die UN, 1945 mit dem Ziel gegründet, Frieden zu sichern und Menschenrechte zu wahren, ist Beweis für den Wunsch der Menschen sich von den endlosen Kriegen loszureißen. Wann in der Geschichte der Menschheit gab es so viele Menschenrechtsorganisationen, so viel zwischenstaatliche humanitäre Hilfe und so viel Kooperation wie in den letzten 100 Jahren? Die EU sichert den Frieden zwischen ihren Mitgliedsstaaten seit über 70 Jahren, obwohl Frieden in Europa einst unerreichbar schien. Russlands Angriff auf die Ukraine ist ein Rückschlag, die Solidarität vieler europäischer Länder gegen diesen Krieg ist jedoch ein Zeichen der Hoffnung.

Kriege wird es noch lange geben. Aber solange der Wunsch nach Frieden existiert, ist Frieden erreichbar. Denn die prägendste Eigenschaft der Menschheit ist nicht Gier, sondern Hoffnung.

Hobbes fürchtete, der Mensch sei von Natur aus böse und der Naturzustand der Menschen wäre ‚Krieg aller gegen alle‘. Dagegen glaubte Rousseau, der Mensch sei von Natur aus gut und erst die Gesellschaft mit Eigentum und Rangordnung rufe das Schlechte im Menschen hervor. US-Psychologe Jean Decety wies in einer Studie mit Kindern nach, dass Empathie angeboren ist.

Wenn Menschen einander aufgrund von Unterschieden wie Nationalität oder Religion als Feind ansehen, entsteht Krieg. Wenn wenige Machtgierige regieren, entsteht Krieg. Wenn soziale Ungerechtigkeit eine Gesellschaft prägt, entsteht Krieg. Erst wenn Menschen sich nicht mehr durch andere Menschengruppen bedroht fühlen, Macht besser verteilt ist und wir lernen Empathie über Selbstsucht zu stellen, können wir eine Welt ohne Krieg erreichen. Globale Krisen wie den Klimawandel werden wir nicht als Feinde bewältigen, sondern nur gemeinsam.

Es ist verständlich, dass viele heute eine Welt ohne Kriege für eine ferne Utopie halten. Dennoch sollten wir uns für dieses Ziel einsetzen. Nur weil etwas heute unerreichbar scheint, heißt das nicht, dass es für immer unerreichbar sein wird. Einst war eine Gesellschaft, in der Frauen die gleichen Rechte haben wie Männer, unvorstellbar. Dennoch haben viele Frauen dafür gekämpft und tun es heute noch. So ist es auch mit dem Weltfrieden. Nach jedem Fortschritt scheint ein Rückschritt zu folgen. Diese Rückschritte dürfen den Wunsch nach einer von Kriegen befreiten Welt aber nicht erdrücken. Frieden muss unser Ziel sein und bleiben.

**Quellen:**

<https://studflix.de/allgemeinwissen/jean-jacques-rousseau-5817/rousseau-menschenbild>  
<https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/politiklexikon/18386/utopie/>  
<https://www.thomas-hobbes.de/deutsch/menschenbild.html>  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_wars\\_by\\_death\\_toll](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wars_by_death_toll)  
<https://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/geborene-gutmenschen-a-7708d914-0002-0001-0000-000058138753>

## 2. Preis: 500 EUR, Atakan Cakir des Bunsen-Gymnasiums Heidelberg, Stufe 12

### Eine Welt ohne Kriege – eine Utopie ?

Die Menschheitsgeschichte ist gebrandmarkt durch etwaige Kriege und Auseinandersetzungen. Immanuel Kant hat mit seiner philosophischen Schrift „Zum ewigen Frieden“ (1795) Bedingungen formuliert, die den weltweiten Frieden sichern könnten.

Welche Mittel laut Kant nötig seien, um den ewigen Frieden zu erreichen und inwiefern eine Welt ohne Kriege realistisch ist, wird im folgenden Essay analysiert und erörtert.

Zuallererst sollte man jedoch verstehen, welche Dynamiken dafür verantwortlich sind, dass Kriege überhaupt zustande kommen.

Hierfür eignen sich Kenneth Waltz' Erklärungsebenen „Man“, „the State“ und „War“, welche die Gründe für Krieg zwischen drei sogenannten „Images“ differenziert.

Das erste Image heißt „Man“ und lokalisiert die Ursachen für Krieg in der Natur des Menschen.

Die innerstaatliche Ebene wird durch das zweite Image „the State“ aufgegriffen. Laut Waltz Sorge die Beschaffenheit der Innenpolitik der Staaten für Konflikte mit anderen Staaten.

Das letzte Image bezieht sich auf die zwischenstaatliche Ebene und heißt „War“. Hierbei ist entscheidend, dass es laut Waltz zwangsläufig zu Spannungen im internationalen System komme, da es keine übergeordnete Macht über den Staaten gäbe.

Bei der Differenzierung der Ursachen für Krieg auf diesen drei Ebenen lässt sich wieder zurück auf die Ideen Immanuel Kants bezüglich des weltweiten Friedens verweisen. In seiner Schrift „Zum ewigen Frieden“ postuliert Kant hierfür Bedingungen. Die entscheidenden Bedingungen formuliert Kant in Form von drei sogenannten Definitivartikeln.

Der erste Definitivartikel fordert, dass die Verfassung der Staaten republikanisch sein müsse, da Demokratien prinzipiell friedlich seien. Dies würde dahingegen den Frieden bewahren, dass das Volk selber die Konsequenzen des Kriegs tragen müsse und somit gegen Krieg stimmen würde. Bezüglich Kenneth Waltz' Images könnte man

dadurch Kriege, die durch das zweite Image „the State“ verursacht wurden, abwenden.

Des Weiteren könne man die Rechte zwischen den Staaten sichern und das gegenseitige Misstrauen abwenden, indem diese in einen zwischenstaatlichen Rechtszustand in Form eines Völkerbunds übergehen würden. Dieses Postulat steckt wesentlich im zweiten Definitivartikel und wäre eine Lösung für das dritte Image „War“.

Der dritte und letzte Definitivartikel soll den Frieden zwischen den Menschen absichern, indem jeder das Recht auf Gastfreundschaft genießen solle. Dies würde jedoch nur bedingt Kriege abwenden, die auf die Ursachen des ersten Images „Man“ basieren.

Bei all den theoretischen Ansätzen, muss man anschließend Rückschlüsse auf die Realität ziehen, denn auch Kant würde heute vermutlich darüber nachdenken, ob die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit eines ewigen Friedens in der modernen Welt überhaupt gegeben oder herstellbar sind. Hierbei liegt jedoch genau die Problematik, denn die aktuelle geopolitische Situation ist maßgeblich von Systemrivalitäten und Misstrauen geprägt. Staaten wie Russland oder China sind weit davon entfernt, einem Völkerbund im kantischen Sinne beizutreten oder im Sinne des ersten Definitivartikels eine demokratische Verfassung zu implementieren.

Und auch wenn Immanuel Kant ein überzeugendes und schlüssiges Konzept im „Zum ewigen Frieden“ postuliert, sieht die Realität so aus, dass man sich in den absolut grundlegendsten Werten nicht einig ist und somit niemals zum ewigen Frieden finden wird.

## 2. Preis 500 EUR, Lamija Salkic des Bunsen-Gymnasiums Heidelberg, Stufe 12

### Eine Welt ohne Kriege – eine Utopie?

Der russische Überfall auf die Ukraine im Februar 2022 löste weltweit eine Sphäre der Sorge aus. Zurecht erweckt dies in der Gesellschaft den Wunsch, wenn nicht gar eine Vision einer Welt, in der Gewalt und Ungerechtigkeit der Vergangenheit angehören. Der Weltfrieden ist hierbei aber viel mehr als nur das Fehlen von Krieg, er ist ein Zustand, in dem Menschen in Gleichberechtigung und Harmonie zusammenleben können. In diesem Zusammenhang stellt sich die Frage, inwiefern eine Welt ohne Krieg möglich ist und ob dieser Gedanke sich nicht etwa auf eine Utopie beschränkt. Als utopisch werden Sachverhalte beschrieben, die nur in den Köpfen der Menschen existieren, jedoch nicht in der Wirklichkeit selbst. Um diese Frage zu beantworten gilt es zunächst die Ursachen von Kriegen zu verdeutlichen. Der amerikanische Politikwissenschaftler Kenneth Waltz unterscheidet drei theoretische Strömungen, die sogenannten „3 Images“, die die Ursachen von Kriegen auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen erklären. Die erste Ebene (Image 1) „man“ stellt die Ebene des einzelnen Menschen dar. Laut dieser bewirkt die Natur des Menschen, dass dieser immer wieder Konflikte und Kriege anfängt. Ein gleichermaßen negatives Menschenbild vertritt auch Thomas Hobbes. Dieser besagt, dass alle Menschen von Natur aus gleich sind, jedoch angetrieben von der Selbsterhaltung misstrauisch und hinterhältig agieren. Statistisch gesehen ist es durchaus auffällig, dass Länder mit einer starken Spaltung zwischen Arm und Reich sowie Defiziten in Gleichberechtigung höhere Kriminalitätsquoten aufweisen, als Länder, die von Gleichberechtigung und Wohlstand geprägt sind. Diese Problematik kann mit zunehmender Bildung gemindert werden. Bessere Bildungschancen insbesondere für die ärmere Bevölkerung sorgen für eine bessere Integration in den Arbeitsmarkt wodurch Armut und die damit verbundene Kriminalität sinkt. Man erkennt, dass der Mensch nicht von Natur aus Konflikte sucht, sondern diese aus Not und dem Drang nach Selbsterhaltung entstehen. An dieser Stelle kann angemerkt werden, dass Krieg für die Gesellschaft unvorstellbare Gewalt mitbringt, die im Voraus kaum absehbar ist. Am Beispiel des

zweiten Weltkriegs lässt sich zweifellos erkennen mit welchen Gräueltaten die Menschheit belastet wurde. Man kann schließen, dass Kriege und Konflikte nicht im allgemeinen Interesse des Menschen sind, da Leid und Schrecken keine erstrebenswerten Erlebnisse sind. Die zweite Ebene (Image 2) „the state“ erklärt Kriege anhand der innerstaatlichen Ebene. Somit sorgt die Beschaffenheit der Innenpolitik des Staates für Konflikte mit anderen Staaten. Beispielsweise fängt eine Demokratie einen Krieg mit einem anderen Staat an um Menschenrechte zu schützen, während ein Diktator dasselbe tut um zum Beispiel von eigenen innenpolitischen Versagen abzulenken. Auch ideologische Unterschiede können zu Misstrauen und Spannungen führen, die den Frieden gefährden. Hier werden oft Religionen als Vorwand für Kriege genannt um Machtstrukturen zu sichern. Um diese Konflikte zu vermeiden, helfen Bildung und Aufklärung der Gesellschaft. Wer sich in Andere hineinversetzen kann, dem fällt es leichter Vorurteile abzubauen und seine Mitmenschen besser zu verstehen. Auch hiermit können Kriege basierend auf mangelnder Toleranz und Rücksicht vermieden werden. Die letzte Stufe (Image 3) „war“ begründet die Entstehung von Kriegen auf zwischenstaatlicher Ebene. Hierbei sorgt die Beschaffenheit des internationalen Systems zwangsläufig für Spannungen. Da es keine übergeordnete Macht über den Staaten gibt, entsteht ein Sicherheitsdilemma. Staat A hat eine Armee, um sich zu verteidigen. Dieser Staat möchte zwar keinen Krieg, aber fühlt sich sicherer je größer die eigene Armee ist. Ein anderer Staat, der gleichermaßen keinen Krieg möchte, rüstet ebenfalls auf, da er sich vor Staat A verteidigen möchte. Es kommt zu einer Rüstungsspirale, die im Extremfall auch in einen echten Krieg münden kann. Obgleich beide Staaten keinen Krieg möchten, führt die gegenseitige Verunsicherung zu einem Rüstungswettlauf. Auch an dieser Stelle kann diese Problematik vermieden werden. Durch frühzeitigen Dialog und organisierten Austausch können Meinungsverschiedenheiten zwischen zwei Staaten präventiv gelöst werden. Kompromisse wirken deshalb entlastend und führen zu friedlichen Lösungen. Außerdem kann eine enge wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit zur Konfliktlösung beitragen. Gegenseitige Abhängigkeit zweier Länder sorgt dafür, dass beide Staaten



Interesse daran haben Konflikte zu vermeiden um stabile Handelsbeziehungen aufrechtzuerhalten. Insgesamt lässt sich sagen, dass dem Weltfrieden sowohl politisch als auch gesellschaftlich viele Hindernisse im Weg stehen. Belastend wirken Faktoren wie Chancungleichheit, absolute Armut und die damit verbundene Konkurrenz um Ressourcen sowie Vorurteile und schlechte Kommunikation auf internationaler Ebene. Diese Herausforderungen lassen sich jedoch mit effektiven Reformen in der Bildungspolitik, dem internationalen Austausch und der Schaffung gemeinnütziger Zusammenschlüsse wie der UNO beheben. Auffällig ist auch, dass sich der Weltfrieden historisch gesehen bereits Stückweit etabliert hat. Dies ist Studien des PRIO zu entnehmen. Der Global Peace Index verzeichnet insgesamt weniger Kriegstote weltweit und auch die Dauer der Kriege nimmt ab. Somit kann man dem PRIO entnehmen, dass in Mitteleuropa aktuell die längste Friedensphase auf diesem Gebiet verzeichnet wird. Zwar ist deutlich festzustellen, dass der angestrebte Weltfrieden ein langwieriger Prozess ist, der sich erst entwickelt. Jedoch kann man durchaus davon ausgehen, dass er nicht nur theoretisch existieren kann, sondern auch zur Realität wird, wenn die Ursachen rechtzeitig und effektiv bekämpft werden.

### **3. Preis: 400 EUR, Lonit Rustemi des Helmholtz-Gymnasiums Heidelberg, Stufe 11**

#### **Hoffnung des Zweifels**

„Vergiss die Rose nicht, mein Schatz!“, „Natürlich nicht, Mutter“ antwortete ich und packte die rote Rose ein. Ich ging aus dem Haus, stolperte fast über eine weiße Taube und eilte zu meinem Ziel: Café de Flore. Dort saß sie, Désirée, mit ihren blauen Augen und ihrem unschuldigen, weißen Gesicht. „Guten Tag, Desperôn“, begrüßte sie mich. „Man hat mich aufgehalten“, entschuldigte ich mich für die Verspätung.

In diesem Moment kam der Kellner. Sie hatte sich einen milden Cappuccino und mir einen starken Espresso bestellt. Ich setzte mich.

„Wie war dein –“. Sie wurde vom Geschrei zweier am Tisch nebenan streitender Kinder unterbrochen. „Sogar die Kinder“, bemerkte ich. „Wie?“, fragte sie.

„Es scheint in uns zu liegen. Wohin man auch sieht: Krieg. Selbst bei ihnen.“

Ich traf eine empfindliche Stelle. Sie riss ihre Augen weit auf, ich versank in ihrem Blau. „Es liegt nicht in uns!“, erwiderte sie naiv. „Interesengegensatz“, „gescheiterte Diplomatie“, all jenes erklärte sie mir vehement, ich ließ mich aber darauf ein. „Macht und Reichtum als Ursache für das Blutvergießen von Millionen Menschen?“, die Diskussion wurde hitziger, „Der Mensch ist dem Menschen Wolf“, sagte ich.

Ich schilderte ihr Thesen einiger Philosophen. Der natürliche Zustand des Menschen basiere auf existenzieller Angst um sein Überleben - Egoismus. Jeder Mensch strebe nach Macht und dem Erhalt seines Wohlergehens. „Resultat der Evolution“, fügte ich hinzu. Ich spürte den Kaffee.

„Und wenn!“, setzte sie dagegen und fuhr damit fort, dass sich der Mensch durch seinen Verstand und seine Vernunft von jenen Ideen lösen könne.

Das Wissen darüber gebe uns die Freiheit, uns für den Frieden zu entscheiden. Das Wohlergehen anderer sei auch unser. „Interdependenz“, sagte sie.

Ich hielt mich zurück. Ich glaubte nicht, was ich hörte. Es gab nie einen Zeitpunkt in der Geschichte menschlicher Existenz ohne Krieg. Warum dann jemals?

Und selbst wenn, von welchem Wert ist ein Frieden, der auf Angst, einem Gleichgewicht des Schreckens, beruht? Fragen, die ich ihr nicht stellte.

Die Dynamik des Gesprächs schien sich zu beruhigen. Ihre roten Wangen verloren wieder an Farbe. Sie schien zufrieden zu sein. Sie hatte Spaß. Ich freute mich, bloß verfolgte mich die Idee des unaufhörlichen Krieges des Menschen. Solch Absurdität in einem Handeln, das bloß Reue, Verlust und Trauer mit sich bringt.

Der Abend nahm seinen gewohnten Lauf. Wir bezahlten, gingen spazieren, ich begleitete sie nach Hause. Ich verabschiedete mich, schließlich hatte ich noch etwas zu erledigen.

Es war dämmrig, als ich den Ort erreichte. Stille. Wie die Ruhe auf dem Schlachtfeld nachdem alles vorbei war. Ich fand, wonach ich suchte.

Ich packte Mutters Rose aus, legte sie vor mich auf den fein polierten Stein und las bloß die Zahlen: „1883-1914“.

„Eine Welt ohne Kriege“, dachte ich, „Eine Utopie?“. Vielleicht hatte sie recht.

Letzten Endes liegt es in unseren Händen, für eine friedliche Welt, eine Welt ohne Kriege, zu sorgen.

#### **4. Preis: 300 EUR, Katinka Marie Thomas des Bergstraßen-Gymnasiums Hemsbach, Klasse 9b**

Stille. Nur das Rascheln der Blätter dringt an meine Ohren. Dann höre ich Menschenstimmen. Sie lachen. Langsam öffne ich meine Augen. Ich liege auf einer Wiese, die Sonne scheint mir in mein Gesicht. Links neben mir ist ein Wald, große und kleine Bäume, Sträucher und Blumen kann ich sehen. Ich drehe mich nach rechts.

Dort sehe ich eine große Feuerstätte. Viele Menschen laufen herum, Menschen mit verschiedenen Hautfarben, Gesichtszügen und Klamotten. Jung und Alt sitzen zusammen am Feuer, sie wirken glücklich. Lachen dringt an meine Ohren, immer mehr Menschen setzen sich an die Feuerstelle. Ich frage mich, wer diese Menschen sind und wie sie so friedlich hier sitzen können, obwohl sie allen Anscheins nach komplett verschieden sind. Ich richtete mich auf, war aber noch nicht sicher, was ich tun sollte. Zu diesen Menschen gehen? Ich war mir nicht sicher, ich wollte ihren Frieden und ihr Glück nicht stören. Andererseits wollte ich schon wissen, wer diese Menschen sind und warum sie hier so friedlich zusammensitzen.

Ich bin hin und her gerissen, bis ein Ruf mich aus meinen Gedanken reißt: „Hey du da oben, komm doch runter und setz dich zu uns ans Feuer!“ Plötzlich war ich mir sehr unsicher. Was, wenn es eine Falle ist? Doch dann überwiegt meine Neugierde und ich mache mich auf den Weg durch das hohe Gras mit den vielen bunten Blume hinüber zu der Feuerstelle.

Schon auf halbem Weg zu den Menschen weht eine leichte Brise zu mir und bringt meine langen, offenen Haare leicht durcheinander. Außerdem bringt sie Gesang mit sich, ein freudiges Stimmengewirr, das eine schöne Melodie vorträgt. Die letzten Meter überwinde ich schneller als gedacht und stehe schließlich am Rand der großen Feuerstelle. Doch es ist nicht nur eine Feuerstelle. Unzählige Lagerfeuer sind auf der kleinen Anhöhe aufgebaut und hunderte Menschen sitzen zusammen, essen, lachen und singen. Alle harmonieren miteinander, sie geben ein sehr schönes Bild ab.

Eine junge Frau und ein älterer Herr kommen auf mich zu. Er breitet noch im Laufen seine Arme aus und schließt mich in eine freundschaftliche Umarmung. Irritiert bleibe ich stehen. „Herzlich Willkommen hier bei uns!“, sagt die Frau. „Komm zu uns und setz dich mit ans Feuer, du kommst gerade rechtzeitig zum Essen. Später kannst du uns dann auch noch etwas über dich erzählen. Ich heiße Fiona und das ist Frank. Wer bist du?“

Das sind schon fast zu viele Informationen für mich. Trotzdem antworte ich: „Mein Name ist Yvonne. Wo bin ich hier?“ Daraufhin sieht mich die Frau etwas verwirrt an: „Weißt du das nicht? Heute ist der Beginn des großen Friedensfestes der ganzen Welt. Jeder ist dazu eingeladen, zusammen zu sitzen, essen, trinken, reden, tanzen und lachen. Jedes Jahr wird dieses Fest mehrere Wochen lang gefeiert. Wie kommt es, dass du davon nichts weißt?“ „Ich habe hieran keinerlei Erinnerungen. Ich erinnere mich nur an Krieg, Gewalt und Brutalität. Wie kann es sein, dass so viele Nationalitäten und so viele unterschiedliche Persönlichkeiten hier zusammensitzen?“, frage ich. Ist tatsächlich eingetreten, was Martin Luther King sich schon damals mit seiner Rede „I have a dream“ gewünscht hat? Gibt es tatsächlich Frieden, Hoffnung und Freiheit für alle Menschen? Ivonne reißt mich aus meinen Gedanken und fragt: „Was meinst du mit Krieg, Gewalt und Brutalität? Wir hatten schon seit Jahrhunderten keine gewaltsamen Auseinandersetzungen mehr. Wir leben in Frieden miteinander, durch alle Bevölkerungsschichten, Nationalitäten und Sexualitäten hindurch.“ Mit diesen Worten führt

sie mich durch die Menschenmenge zu einer Bank an einem großen Lagerfeuer. In den folgenden Stunden genieße ich die Zeit mit diesen, mir fremden, Menschen. Wir tanzen, lachen, essen, trinken und reden viel.

Plötzlich dringt ein schriller Ton an meine Ohren. Anscheinend kann nur ich ihn hören, denn alle anderen tanzen und lachen weiter. Langsam drehe ich mich um mich selbst, um die Ursache des Tons ausmachen zu können. Ich stolpere durch die Menge, doch niemand scheint mich zu bemerken. „Was passiert hier?“, frage ich mich. Der Ton wird immer lauter und immer schriller. Es ist nicht mehr zum auszuhalten, ich presse meine Hände auf meine Ohren und sinke auf die Knie. In meinem Kopf dreht sich alles, immer schneller und schneller wirbeln die Farben und Geräusche in meinem Kopf herum, bis ich plötzlich aus meinem Bett hochfahre.

Desorientiert blicke ich mich um. Um mich herum herrscht komplette Schwärze, doch nun kann ich das laute, schrille Geräusch zuordnen. Es kommt von meinem Wecker. Ich schalte ihn aus und mache mein Nachtlicht ein. Mein Wecker zeigt 6:45 Uhr morgens, es ist Zeit, aufzustehen. Meine Eltern sind schon weg, nur noch mein kleiner Bruder ist zu Hause. Ich mache für uns Frühstück, packe meine Schulsachen und bringe dann in den Kindergarten. Danach mache ich mich mit meinen Freundinnen auf den Weg in die Schule.

Dort angekommen warten wir auf die ersten beiden Stunden, Gemeinschaftskunde. Unserer Lehrerin kommt in den Raum herein, doch sie lächelt uns nicht an wie sie es sonst immer tut, sie hat einen leicht abwesenden Gesichtsausdruck. Sie begrüßt uns etwas außer der Spur und setzt sich vorne ans Pult. Sie holt tief Luft und sagt: „Leute, sorry falls ich heute etwas neben der Spur bin, aber ich habe vorhin eine schreckliche Nachricht bekommen. Ich möchte jetzt auch gar nicht lange um den heißen Brei herumreden. Heute Nacht hat Russland die Ukraine angegriffen! Es herrscht Krieg in Europa!“

Einige Minuten lang sitzen wir geschockt auf unseren Stühlen. Krieg in Europa? Das kann doch nicht sein! So nah an Deutschland herrscht Krieg? Bisher gab und gibt es zwar immer noch Krieg überall auf der Welt, doch nie hab ich es

wirklich realisiert. Dann fällt mir mein Traum wieder ein, wird es jemals so sein, dass überall auf der Welt Frieden herrscht? Hatte ich eine Zukunftsvision oder wurde mir etwas gezeigt, dass nie passieren wird. Ich werde plötzlich durch ein Schluchzen aus meinen Gedanken gerissen.

Meine Lehrerin ist in ihrem Stuhl zusammengesunken und weint dicke Tränen. Einige meiner Mitschülerinnen und ich laufen zu ihr, wir nehmen sie in den Arm und versuchen, sie zu trösten. Dann erzählt sie uns den Grund für ihre Trauer. Ihr Mann und ihr volljähriger Sohn sind Ukrainer, sie werden ins Militär eingezogen werden, um das Land zu verteidigen. Unsere Lehrerin hat Angst, dass sie nie wieder zurückkehren. Kurz darauf klingelt es zur Pause. Bestürzt gehen wir auf den Pausenhof, jede von uns in ihre eigenen Gedanken vertieft. War es ein Zufall, dass ich gerade diese Nacht so einen Traum hatte. War es eine Vorhersage, oder wurde mir etwas gezeigt, was niemals wirklich werden kann? Ist es unmöglich, eine Welt ohne Krieg zu schaffen? Was müssen wir tun, um Frieden zu erreichen oder ist eine Welt ohne Krieg tatsächlich eine Utopie?

**5. Preis: 200 EUR, Davina Jaudes, Ceren Atmaca, Lenny Müller, Atalaya Caba, Emmelie Kraiter, Abrar Abras, Patryk Dzaman, Hasan Sayouf, Marvin Stahl der Marie-Marcks Schule des Sonderpädagogischen Bildungs- und Beratungszentrums Heidelberg, Klasse 8 und 9**

**Stop Motion Film „Krieg und Frieden“**





**Sonderpreis: 300 EUR, Clara Dietrich und Henriette Daun des Elisabeth-von-Thadden-Gymnasiums Heidelberg, Stufe 10**

**Facharbeit im Rahmen einer Projektwoche:**  
**UNITED NATIONS UN – sichert sie Frieden und Sicherheit ?**



## 1. Einleitung

### 1.1 Einführung

Im Folgenden beschäftigen wir uns mit der Aufklärung unseres Themas und der Beantwortung unserer Leitfrage: UN – Sichert sie Frieden und Sicherheit?

Zum Einstieg in unsere Facharbeit starten wir mit einer Definition der UN und ihrer Entstehungsgeschichte. Des Weiteren betrachten wir den Aufbau, die Aufgaben und die Ziele der UN und gehen mit Stärken und Schwächen weiter auf den Sicherheitsrat ein. Diese bekräftigen wir mit einem aktuellen Beispiel und kommen zu unserem Schluss, in dem wir unsere Leitfrage beantworten und unsere Straßenumfrage auswerten. Anschließend ordnen wir unser Thema in die Projektwoche ein. Zuletzt bringen wir eigene Reformvorschläge zur Lösung unserer herausgearbeiteten Probleme vor.

### 1.2 Definition

„Die Vereinten Nationen (kurz VN; englisch United Nations, kurz UN; auch Organisation der Vereinten Nationen (OVN) oder UNO (von englisch United Nations Organization); französisch Organisation des Nations unies (kurz ONU)) sind ein zwischenstaatlicher Zusammenschluss von 193 Staaten und als globale internationale Organisation ein uneingeschränkt anerkanntes Völkerrechtssubjekt.“<sup>1</sup>

### 1.3 Entstehung

Die Idee von einer Organisation kam während des Zweiten Weltkrieges auf<sup>2</sup>. Aufgrund der einschneidenden und extremen Auswirkungen des Zweiten Weltkrieges entwickelte der US – amerikanische Präsident Franklin D. Roosevelt „Atlantik – Charta“, in der konkrete Bedingungen für eine internationale Politik und Maßnahmen zur Sicherung des Friedens für die Zukunft vorkommen<sup>3</sup>. Am 1. Januar 1942 bekräftigten 26 Alliierte Länder diese Ziele und in den folgenden Jahren kamen immer mehr Unterstützer dieser Charta hinzu. Auf einer gemeinsamen Konferenz am 25. April 1945 begannen Delegierte die 111 Artikel der Charta niederzuschreiben<sup>4</sup>. Die Unterzeichnung durch die Regierungschefs fand am 26. Juni 1945 statt. Die offizielle Charta und die Vereinten Nationen traten am 24. Oktober 1945 in Kraft<sup>5</sup>.

### 2. Aufbau und Aufgaben

Die UN besteht aus 6 Hauptorganen und weiteren Nebenorganen. „Die Hauptorgane der Vereinten Nationen sind entsprechend der Charta:

die Generalversammlung, der Sicherheitsrat, das Sekretariat mit dem Generalsekretär, der Wirtschafts- und Sozialrat (ECOSOC)<sup>6</sup>, der Internationale Gerichtshof und der Treuhandrat<sup>7</sup>

Das politische Hauptorgan mit 193 Mitgliedsstaaten ist die **Generalversammlung**.<sup>8</sup> Zu ihrem Aufgabenbereich gehört die Ernennung des UN-Generalsekretärs, die Genehmigung des Haushalts, und Entscheidungen über die Besetzung von zentralen Ämtern.<sup>9</sup>

Der **Sicherheitsrat** besteht aus fünf ständigen Mitgliedern mit Vetorecht (USA, Großbritannien, Frankreich, Russland, China) und zehn weiteren Wechselnden, aus verschiedenen Regionen der Welt. Er hat die Sicherung des Weltfriedens zur Hauptaufgabe.<sup>10</sup>

Im **Sekretariat** ist neben einem Verwaltungsapparat der aktuelle Generalsekretär António Guterres zu finden. Als Hauptorgan der Vereinten Nationen ist das Sekretariat in organisatorischen Bereichen tätig.<sup>11</sup>

Von der Generalversammlung gewählt werden auch die 54 Mitglieder des **Wirtschafts- und Sozialrates** aus dem Kreis der UN-Mitglieds-

staaten. Seine Aufgabe ist es der Menschheit Gleichberechtigung bei persönlichem Wachstum und Wohlstand zu ermöglichen.<sup>12</sup>

Zu dem **internationalen Gerichtshof** gehören 15 Richter und Richterinnen, die die Lösung von internationalen Streitfällen zur Aufgabe haben.<sup>13</sup>

Der **Treuhandrat** hat mit der Beendigung des letzten Treuhandabkommens seine Arbeit eingestellt.<sup>14</sup>

### 3. Ziele der UN

Die Ziele der Vereinten Nationen sind in der Charta niedergelegt. Sie ist der Gründungsvertrag der Vereinten Nationen. Die Grundsätze bilden die Verfassung der Gemeinschaft, zu der sich alle 193 Mitgliedstaaten bekennen. Diese sind in Artikel 1 niedergeschrieben. Ein Ziel der Vereinten Nationen besteht darin, „den Weltfrieden und die internationale Sicherheit zu wahren“ . Dieses Ziel versuchen sie mit Kollektivmaßnahmen zu erreichen, um Friedensbedrohungen zu beseitigen. Außerdem wollen sie mit diesen Kollektivmaßnahmen „Angriffshandlungen und andere Friedensbrüche unterdrücken und internationale Streitigkeiten oder Situationen, die zu einem Friedensbruch führen könnten, durch friedliche Mittel nach den Grundsätzen der Gerechtigkeit und des Völkerrechts zu bereinigen“<sup>16</sup>. Ein weiteres der vier Ziele ist es Beziehungen zwischen den Nationen zu entwickeln, die auf dem Grundsatz der Gleichberechtigung und Selbstbestimmung ruhen. Und andere Maßnahmen zur Sicherung und „Festigung des Weltfriedens“<sup>17</sup> zu treffen. Sie setzen sich außerdem als Ziel durch die UN eine internationale Zusammenarbeit zu fördern, um Probleme internationaler Ebene zu lösen. Diese treten in wirtschaftlichen, sozialen, kulturellen, und humanitären Bereichen auf.<sup>18</sup> Der UN – Sicherheitsrat tritt also in verschiedenen Bereichen in Aktion. Er fördert die „Achtung vor den Menschenrechten und Grundfreiheiten“<sup>19</sup>. Diese sollen für alle Menschen individuell gelten, egal welchen Geschlechts, Sprache, Herkunft oder Religion. Die UN soll ein Mittelpunkt sein, in dem gemeinsame Ziele beschlossen und verwirklicht werden sollen.<sup>20</sup>

## 4. Stärken und Schwächen des Sicherheitsrates

### 4.1 Stärken

Der UN – Sicherheitsrat ist eine aus 193 Staaten zusammengesessene Organisation.<sup>21</sup> Das ermöglicht ihr international zu handeln und so auf der ganzen Welt für Frieden und Sicherheit zu sorgen. Sie hat also eine große Bandbreite und viele Möglichkeiten ihre Ziele durchzusetzen und zu erreichen. Die UNO kann „als die einzige Organisation bezeichnet werden, welche die universelle Gültigkeit ihrer Grundsätze und Ziele beanspruchen kann“.<sup>22</sup> Durch den großen Zusammenschluss ist es möglich den Kontakt zu allen Ländern der Welt zu suchen und somit die Vermeidung von globalen Kriegen zu unterstützen. Und im Falle eines Krieges ist dieser dazu in der Lage Sanktionen zu verhängen. Diese schränken bestimmte Länder in ihrem Handeln ein und sollen das Land dazu bewegen die Vorschriften in dem Fall die Charta zu befolgen. Außerdem baute der Sicherheitsrat eine Sammlung von Unterlagen zu internationalen Regeln auf, zusätzlich mit 560 internationalen Verträgen, mit den daraus folgenden Auswirkungen.<sup>23</sup> Abgesehen davon kann nur der Sicherheitsrat Resolutionen verabschieden und über Maßnahmen und Einsatz militärischer Mittel entscheiden. Das bedeutet, dass der Sicherheitsrat unabhängig von den anderen Hauptorganen agieren kann und folglich nicht von eben genannten eingeschränkt wird. Der Sicherheitsrat ist also ein eigenständiges, aus 193 Staaten bestehendes Organ, was durch Verhandlungen und Abstimmungen den Frieden versucht zu sichern. Im Laufe der Zeit stehen nicht mehr nur die Staaten im Vordergrund, „sondern zunehmend das Individuum und die „menschliche Sicherheit“ im Mittelpunkt ihrer Arbeit“<sup>24</sup>

### 4.2 Schwächen

Dadurch, dass die Siegermächte des Zweiten Weltkrieges ein Vetorecht und somit eine besondere Machtstellung besitzen, hat nicht jedes UN - Mitglied die gleiche Entscheidungsmöglichkeit. Die fünf ständigen Mitglieder des Sicherheitsrates China, Frankreich, Großbritannien, Russland und die USA haben sich bei der Gründung der UNO durch das Vetorecht eine besondere

Machtstellung gesichert, die ihnen die Möglichkeit gibt, jede Entscheidung zu unterbinden, die nicht in ihrem Interesse ist. Dieses Recht ist sehr problematisch, da schon ein Veto ausreicht, um den UN – Sicherheitsrat handlungsunfähig zu machen. „Bei seinen Entscheidungen kollidieren nationale Eigeninteressen allzu oft mit globalen Sicherheitsbedenken.“<sup>25</sup>

*„Kritische Stimmen werfen der Organisation daher mitunter Hilflosigkeit und Versagen angesichts der Weltprobleme vor.“<sup>26</sup>*

Zudem wird der UN vorgeworfen, dass die Strukturen und Maßnahmen nicht mehr zeitgemäß sind und dringend reformiert werden müssen.

## 5. Aktuelles Beispiel

Obwohl die Aufgabe des UN-Sicherheitsrates ist, für Frieden und Sicherheit zu sorgen, konnte Russland dennoch am 24.02.2022 einen Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine starten. Der Angriffskrieg Russlands widerspricht grundlegenden Prinzipien der Vereinten Nationen. Warum dies nicht verhindert werden konnte, hängt mit dem Veto-Recht zusammen, welches Russland als eines der ständigen Mitglieder besitzt und angewendet hat. Da schon Russlands Veto ausreicht, um jede Art von Entscheidung zu blockieren, wurde der Sicherheitsrat dadurch handlungsunfähig gemacht. Dennoch war die UN keineswegs untätig. Kurz bevor Russland den Angriff auf die Ukraine startete, fand eine Tagung des UN-Sicherheitsrates statt, um die Situation zu deeskalieren. Hinzu kommt die Unterstützung von Flüchtlingen im In- und Ausland und die Aufklärung der Öffentlichkeit über die Fluchtursachen und -folgen durch das UNO-Flüchtlingswerk UNICR und weitere UN-Organisationen. Das aktuellste Beispiel ist eine Sondersitzung der UN-Vollversammlung am 23.02.2023, in der eine Abstimmung über eine Resolution, die sich für ein Ende des russischen Angriffskrieges in der Ukraine ausspricht, durchgeführt wurde. In dieser stimmten 141 Mitglieder dafür, sieben dagegen und 32 enthielten sich.<sup>27</sup> Da diese Resolution der UN-Vollversammlung jedoch rechtlich nicht bindend ist, wie es bei einer Resolution des Sicherheitsrates der Fall wäre, entstehen keine direkten Auswirkungen. Dieser Stimmungstest zeigt, dass eine große Mehrheit der Vereinten

Staaten solidarisch hinter der Ukraine steht und übt so großen Druck auf Russland aus. Zudem wirkt es der Propaganda Russlands entgegen.<sup>28</sup>

„Die Welt will Frieden. Das haben die Staaten dieser Welt heute gemeinsam bei den Vereinten Nationen deutlich gemacht.“<sup>29</sup>

## 6. Fazit

### 6.1 Die UN – sichert sie Frieden und Sicherheit?

Zusammenfassend kann man sagen, dass die UN eine weltweite Organisation ist, die sich zum Ziel gesetzt hat, für internationale Sicherheit und Frieden auf der Welt zu sorgen. Sie ist „ange-sichts der zunehmend globalen Folgen von Kon-flikten, Wirtschaftskrisen, Unterentwicklung eine unverzichtbare Weltorganisation“<sup>30</sup>, welche jedoch bei der Durchsetzung dieses Ziels auf Schwierigkeiten ihres Systems trifft. Besonders im Sicherheitsrat wird dies durch die ungleiche Machtverteilung deutlich. Das Vetorecht hat zur Folge, dass die Siegermächte des Zweiten Welt-kriegs den Sicherheitsrat durch ihr Veto hand-lungsunfähig machen können. In Bezug auf die anfangs gestellte Frage: Die UN – sichert sie Frie-den und Sicherheit? Haben die Ergebnisse unse-erer Umfrage mit 7 positiven Antworten der Teil-nehmenden und 13 negativen Antworten ein deutliches Nein ergeben (siehe Anhang). Abschließend lässt sich sagen, dass die UN viele Maßnahmen, die ihrem Ideal entsprechen, nicht erzielen kann und damit ihrer Aufgabe nicht nachgehen kann. Dennoch ist sie unverzichtbar und ihre Existenz ist von großer Bedeutung in unserer Welt.

### 6.2 Zivilisation – Fluch oder Segen?

Bezogen auf die Leitfrage der Projektwoche: Zivi-lisation – Fluch oder Segen? Sind wir der Mei-nung, dass Zivilisation sowohl als Fluch als auch als Segen bezeichnet werden kann. Zivilisation ist in vielen Bereichen ein Segen. Es ist eine Gesellschaft, die sich immer weiterentwickelt. Dies führt zu einigen positiven Aspekten, aber auch negativen. Durch die ständige Weiterent-wicklung und Modernisierung entstehen viele Probleme. Gerade im Blick auf die Kriege der Welt. Die vielen neutechnischen Waffen machen es dem Menschen möglich lange und folgenrei-che Kriege zu führen. Eben aus diesem Grund

wurde die UN gegründet. Würden die Menschen friedlich miteinander leben und auch internatio-nale Konflikte vermeiden, würde es solche Orga-nisationen wie die UN überhaupt nicht geben müssen.

## 7. Reformvorschläge

Wenn man die verschiedenen Problemsituatio-nen der UN betrachtet, stößt man immer wieder auf das Problem des Vetorechts, welches den Sicherheitsrat wieder und wieder einschränkt und er somit nicht frei handeln kann. Unserer Meinung nach dürfen Entscheidungen nicht mehr von einem ständigen Mitglied blockiert werden. Deshalb sind wir für die Abschaffung des Vetorechts und dafür, dass die demokrati-sche Entscheidung von der Mehrheit abhängen sollte. Ungleiche Machtverteilungen sollen in genau solchen Bereichen nicht vorkommen, denn besonders dort spielen demokratische Ent-scheidungen eine tragende Rolle.

## Wir leben doch in einer Demokratie, sollte dann nicht auch demokratisch entschieden werden?

## 8. Anhang

### 8.1 Buchquellen

Die Vereinten Nationen S. 35 – 44  
Gareis, Sven Bernhard u. Warwick, Johannes, Die Vereinten Nationen, Opladen & Toronto 2014, S.  
Rudd, Kevin the Hon. (2016) UN 2030: Rebuilding Order in a Fragmenting World, Chair's Report, Independent Commission on Multilateralism, New York, International Peace Institute. S. 16 – 20  
Trent, John u. Schnurr, Laura, Renaissance der Vereinten Nationen, Opladen, Ber-lin & Toronto 2021, S. 67 – 71  
Wolf, Klaus Dieter, Die UNO Geschichte, Aufgaben, Perspektiven, München 2016, S. 12 – 18

### 8.2 Internetquellen

Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Generalversammlung, in: <https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/kosmos-weltalmanach/66260/generalversammlung/> (Abgerufen am: 23.03.2023)  
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Internationaler Gerichtshof, in: <https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/kosmos-weltalmanach/333942/internationaler-gerichtshof/> (Abgerufen am: 23.03.2023)  
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Sicherheitsrat, in: <https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/kosmos-weltalmanach/66261/sicherheitsrat/> (Abgerufen am: 23.03.2023)  
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Sekretariat, in: <https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/kosmos-weltalmanach/66256/sekretariat/> (Abgerufen am: 23.03.2023)  
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Wirtschafts- und Sozialrat, in: <https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/kosmos-weltalmanach/66254/wirtschafts-und-sozialrat/> (Abgerufen am: 23.03.2023)  
Coni – Zimmer, Dr. Melanie, Keineswegs Untätig! Die Vereinten Nationen und der Ukraine - Krieg, in: <https://frieden-sichern.dgvn.de/meldung/keineswegs-untaetig-die-vereinten-nationen-und-der-ukraine-krieg/> (Abgerufen am: 23.03.2023)  
Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen e.V., Die Gründung der Vereinten Nationen, in: <https://dgvn.de/un-im-ueberblick/geschichte-der-un/> (Abgerufen am: 22.03.2023)  
Erneuerte Vereinte Nation, Wirtschafts- und Sozialrat, in: <https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/izpb/209686/uno-staerken-und-schwachen-einer-weltorganisation/> (Abgerufen am: 20.03.2023)  
Internetredaktion LpB BW, Charta der Vereinten Nationen in: <https://www.lpb-bw.de/charta/> (Abgerufen am 20.03.2023)

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Die Geschichte der Vereinten Nationen, in: <https://www.kas.de/de/die-geschichte-der-vereinten-nationen> (Abgerufen am: 21.03.2023)  
 Rosert, Elvira: Die Möglichkeiten der UN im Ukraine-Krieg. Politik, Völkerrecht und Humanitäres: Welchen Handlungsspielraum haben die Vereinten Nationen in Russlands  
 Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine? Ein Überblick: 2022, in: <https://dgvn.de/meldung/die-moeglichkeiten-der-un-im-ukraine-krieg> (Abgerufen am: 22.03.2023)  
 Ständige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei den Vereinten Nationen, Aufbau der Vereinten Nationen Aufbau der Vereinten Nationen – Auswärtiges Amt (dipl.o.de) (Abgerufen am: 23.03.2023)  
 Tagesschau, 141 Länder fordern Russlands Rückzug, in: <https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/amerika/un-vollversammlung-141-fuer-frieden-101.html> (Abgerufen am: 23.03.2023)  
 UNRIC, Das System der Vereinigten Staaten, in: Das System der Vereinten Nationen - Vereinte Nationen - Regionales Informationszentrum für Westeuropa (unric.org) (Abgerufen am: 23.03.2023)  
 UNRIC, Die Geschichte der Vereinten Nationen, in: <https://unric.org/de/die-vereinten-nationen/geschichte-un/> (Abgerufen am: 22.03.2023)  
 Wikipedia, Vereinte Nationen, in: [https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vereinte\\_Nationen](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vereinte_Nationen) (Abgerufen am 20.03.2023)

### 8.3 Bildquellen

<https://elisabeth-von-thadden-schule.de/>  
[https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datei:Logo\\_of\\_the\\_United\\_Nations.svg](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datei:Logo_of_the_United_Nations.svg)

### Referenzen:

- 1 Wikipedia, Vereinte Nationen, 2010
- 2 Vgl. Deutsche Gesellschaft für die Vereinten Nationen, Die Gründung der Vereinten Nationen, 2020
- 3 Vgl. ebd.
- 4 Wolf, Die UNO, S.12ff., 2016
- 5 Vgl. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Die Geschichte der Vereinten Nationen, 2023
- 6 Economic and Social Council
- 7 UNRIC, Das System der Vereinigten Staaten, 2023
- 8 Ständige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei den Vereinten Nationen, Aufbau der Vereinten Nationen, 2023
- 9 Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Generalversammlung, 2011
- 10 Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Sicherheitsrat, 2011
- 11 Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Sekretariat, 2011
- 12 Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Wirtschafts- und Sozialrat, 2011
- 13 Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Internationaler Gerichtshof, 2011
- 14 Ständige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei den Vereinten Nationen, Aufbau der Vereinten Nationen, 2023
- 15 Internetredaktion LpB BW, Charta der Vereinten Nationen, 2022
- 16 ebd.
- 17 ebd.
- 18 ebd.
- 19 Internetreaktion LpB BW, Charta der Vereinten Nationen, 2022
- 20 Internetredaktion LpB BW, Charta der Vereinten Nationen, 2022
- 21 Gareis, UNO – Stärken und Schwächen einer Weltorganisation 2015
- 22 ebd.
- 23 Rudd, UN 2030: Rebuilding Order in a Fragmenting World, S. 16 – 20
- 24 Gareis, UNO – Stärken und Schwächen einer Weltorganisation, 2015
- 25 Trent, John u. Schnurr, Laura, Renaissance der Vereinten Nationen, S.71
- 26 Gareis, UNO – Stärken und Schwächen einer Weltorganisation, 2015
- 27 Rosert, Die Möglichkeiten der UN im Ukraine-Krieg, 2020
- 28 Tagesschau, 141 Länder fordern Russlands Rückzug, 2022
- 29 Baerbock, Annalena, 141 Länder fordern Russlands Rückzug, 2022
- 30 Gareis, UNO – Stärken und Schwächen einer Weltorganisation, 2015





### 8.3 Rechtsverbindliche Erklärung

#### Erklärung:

Hiermit versichere ich, dass ich diese Arbeit selbständig angefertigt und keine anderen als die von mir angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel verwendet habe. Die den benutzten Werken wörtlich oder inhaltlich entnommenen Stellen sind als solche gekennzeichnet.

Wiesbaden, 23.03.2023

Ort, Datum

Henriette Taun, Clara Dietrich

Unterschrift



**1. Preis:** von links nach rechts: Sönke Asmussen, Ines Palm, Gewinnerin Carolin Hering, Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers



**2. Preis:** von links nach rechts: Sönke Asmussen, Ines Palm, Gewinner Atakan Cakir, Gewinnerin Lamija Salkic, Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers



**3. Preis:** von links nach rechts: Sönke Asmussen, Anne-Kathrina Stephan, Gewinner Lonit Rustemi, Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers



**5. Preis:** von links nach rechts: Gewinnerin 8. Klasse, Sönke Asmussen, Gewinner 9. Klasse, Lisa Thull, Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers



**4. Preis:** von links nach rechts: Sönke Asmussen, Martin Schmidt, Katinka Marie Thomas, Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers



**Sonderpreis:** von links nach rechts: Sönke Asmussen, Isabelle Weber, Gewinnerinnen Clara Dietrich und Henriette Daun, Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers

**Thema | Topic:**

Russia's war in Ukraine and the "reinvention" of NATO: Is the Alliance doing enough to help Ukraine and to strengthen NATO's own deterrence and defence in Europe?

**1<sup>st</sup> Prize: 1000 EUR, Vilius Lapis (MRU)**

*"The price we pay as NATO Allies is measured in money.*

*While the Ukrainians, they pay a price which is measured in blood.*

*And if we allow Putin to win, all of us will have to pay a much higher price.*

*Authoritarian regimes around the world will learn that they can get what they want with brute force.*

*This would have direct consequences for our security. It would make the world more dangerous.*

*And us more vulnerable. That is the reason why we cannot allow President Putin to win in Ukraine.*

*So we need to stay the course together."* –

*Jens Stoltenberg*

**Introduction:**

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and the full-scale invasion in 2022 have upended the security landscape in Europe, marking a new and perilous chapter in modern history. This brazen act of aggression by Russia against a sovereign state has exposed the fragility of the post-Cold War European security order. However, despite these seismic shifts in the geopolitical landscape, questions remain about North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) response and its effectiveness in defending its member states and providing adequate support to Ukraine. In response to this aggression, NATO (2023) played a crucial role in addressing the crisis and supporting Ukraine.

NATO's involvement in the Ukrainian crisis was not without precedent. In the aftermath of Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the alliance began strengthening its eastern flank in response to the growing threat posed by Russia's aggressive actions towards Ukraine (Taylor and Edmonds, 2020). NATO conducted military exercises, deployed rotational battle groups in the Baltics, and enhanced intelligence sharing with regional partners. While these measures

were steps in the right direction, they were not enough to prevent the escalation of hostilities in 2022. Russia's aggression against Ukraine: a startling reality check in 2014 and the subsequent full-scale invasion in 2022 have shaken the security landscape in Europe (Becker, Duda and Douglas, 2022), marking a new and dangerous chapter in modern history (Paul, 2019). This brazen act of aggression by Russia against a sovereign state has exposed the vulnerability of the post-Cold War (Kozyrev, 2019) European security order and importance of the NATO role in Europe. However, despite these seismic shifts in the geopolitical landscape, discussions remain about NATO's response and its effectiveness in defending its member states and providing adequate support to Ukraine.

As the world closely observes the war in Ukraine, it raises a lot of critical questions about the role and effectiveness of NATO in responding to the crisis, safeguarding its members, and deterring further aggression in Europe. Even the NATO's Summit in Vilnius showed NATO's struggles to achieve a "common strategic perspective" on Ukraine and its potential membership. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has become a complex issue with wide-ranging implications for regional and international security, considering this summit's outcomes have drawn mixed reactions and raised some significant concerns not only from the positive side but even about NATO's ability to forge a completely unified stance on the "hottest" topic right now in Europe.

**1<sup>st</sup> part of description, NATO's Response and the Vilnius Summit:**

In response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, NATO sought to demonstrate solidarity with its member states in Eastern Europe and bolster its deterrence and defense capabilities. The NATO summit held in Vilnius, Lithuania, was expected to be a defining moment in addressing the crisis in Ukraine and charting a path forward for the alliance's response. However, the summit revealed challenges faced by NATO in reaching a unified stance on Ukraine's potential membership in the alliance. While some Central and Eastern European states, such as Poland and the Baltic countries, advocated for extending a clear

invitation to Ukraine, other members, including Germany and France, expressed opposition. The United States' stance on Ukraine's immediate invitation also surprised many observers, given its previous support for action plans for NATO membership for Ukraine at the 2008 Bucharest Summit. The removal of the membership action plan requirements for Ukraine further complicated the situation. The lack of a clear roadmap for Ukraine's NATO membership and the absence of concrete security guarantees from the alliance left Ukraine uncertain about its prospects and raised questions about the conditions required for membership.

*The Ambiguous Open-Door Policy*, has been a longstanding commitment, signaling the alliance's willingness to consider new members that meet the criteria for accession. However, Professor N. Gvosdev (2023) highlights that policy has often translated into reluctance among NATO members to extend actual invitations to potential new members. While the open-door policy is intended to be inclusive and cooperative, it has become more of a diplomatic formality rather than a genuine invitation to join the alliance. Ukraine and Georgia, both aspiring NATO members, have faced challenges (Kuzio, 2018) in their bids for accession, particularly due to Russia's strong opposition and the fear of potential military escalation. The ambiguity surrounding NATO's open-door policy has created uncertainty and frustration among countries seeking membership.

*Turkey's Role and Complex Relations*: Turkey's position within NATO and its approach to the Ukrainian crisis add complexity to the alliance's response. Concerns arise from President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's negotiations with NATO for military equipment, including the Russian S-400 missile system, raising doubts about Turkey's commitment to NATO's security. Erdogan's bargaining for NATO membership complicates cohesion within the alliance. As a NATO member, Turkey's actions are closely monitored due to its strategic location and relationship with Russia.

Turkey's policy towards Ukraine is described as non-binary, providing military support while maintaining economic ties with Russia. Turkey's calibrated response aligns with its strategic inter-

ests as it perceives both long-term threats from Russian control in Ukraine and short-term concerns. Domestic politics also influence Turkey's stance on Ukraine, with President Erdogan facing forthcoming challenging elections. Despite regular contact with Putin and economic ties, Erdogan expresses support for Ukraine's NATO membership aspirations (Russel, 2023). Turkey's approval of Sweden's NATO membership signals a shift towards the West. However, NATO must navigate these intricacies to uphold collective defense and regional stability.

*US Hesitation and the 2024 Presidential Election*: The United States' hesitancy in providing security guarantees to Ukraine is notably shaped by the prevailing domestic political landscape, particularly in light of the forthcoming 2024 presidential election. The Biden administration's cautious approach stems from the recognition that deeper involvement in the conflict could have far-reaching implications during the electoral process (Ciaramella, 2023). While public support for aiding Ukraine exists, the US carefully treads the line, considering the potential impact on both international security and its domestic political considerations.

This hesitancy significantly influences the US's overall approach to the conflict and reverberates within NATO's response. Striking the delicate balance between addressing global security challenges and accounting for electoral dynamics poses intricate challenges for US policymakers. The uncertainties surrounding the 2024 presidential election necessitate prudent decision-making to ensure a united front in the face of Russian aggression and to preserve the integrity of the NATO alliance (Ward, Gould and Mcleary, 2023). As President Biden announces his intention to seek reelection, the intersection of foreign policy initiatives and electoral calculations becomes increasingly salient. The administration's judicious navigation of this complex interplay will be pivotal in safeguarding national interests while upholding global responsibilities.

*The Uncertain Conditions for Ukraine's Membership and "Porcupine" Scenario*: The NATO communiqué from the Vilnius Summit left the conditions for Ukraine's potential membership open to interpretation. The lack of clarity regarding the

criteria and assessment process has added to Ukraine's uncertainty about its prospects for joining the alliance. Ukraine's potential membership in NATO is a contentious issue, given the ongoing conflict with Russia and the concerns about potential escalation. In the face of ongoing aggression, there have been discussions about Ukraine adopting a "porcupine" strategy (Karnitschnig, 2023). This approach would involve turning the country into a fortress armed with modern weapons, capable of deterring further Russian aggression. However, implementing such a strategy comes with significant challenges, including the need for substantial military and financial support.

## 2<sup>nd</sup> part of description, the efficacy of diplomatic efforts:

Diplomatic efforts have been a cornerstone of NATO's response to the crisis. The alliance, alongside international organizations like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), has actively engaged in peace talks and mediation efforts, including the Minsk agreements. However, despite numerous rounds of negotiations, a lasting solution remains elusive. The Minsk agreements have been repeatedly violated by both sides, and Russia's refusal to comply has raised doubts about the effectiveness of diplomacy alone.

### 1. Military Assistance: A Balancing Act

NATO's military assistance to Ukraine has been a topic of debate. Joint exercises with Ukrainian armed forces, like Exercise Rapid Trident, have aimed to enhance Ukraine's military capabilities and demonstrate solidarity. However, critics argue that more direct military support is necessary to deter further Russian aggression effectively. According to IPS Journal (2023), the new bureaucratic format agreed upon by NATO and Ukraine falls short of what Kyiv really wants. The question of providing lethal weapons to Ukraine has divided the alliance, with some member states emphasizing the potential risks of escalating the conflict.

### 2. Assessing NATO's Political Unity

The political unity of NATO (2023) member states has been essential in formulating a collective response to the crisis. However, political differences among member countries have often hin-

dered a united front. Some member states prioritize their own national interests over collective defense obligations, leading to fragmented responses and a lack of coherent strategies. This lack of unity has raised questions about NATO's ability to respond effectively to external threats.

### 3. Logistical Challenges in Assistance

According to CSIS (2023) logistical challenges have impeded NATO's ability to provide substantial assistance to Ukraine. Transporting resources and equipment over long distances is costly and time-consuming, and it has affected the speed and scale of support. While NATO's enhanced forward presence in Eastern Europe has bolstered regional defense, the need for rapid deployment of resources in a crisis situation remains a challenge.

### 4. NATO's Strategic Calculus

NATO's response to the Ukrainian crisis is also influenced by strategic considerations. Russia's possession of a significant nuclear arsenal creates a high-stakes environment. The alliance must carefully weigh the potential risks of direct military confrontation against the need to protect Ukraine's sovereignty (CNA.org, 2023). Striking a balance between deterrence and avoiding further escalation is a delicate and complex task.

### 5. Public Opinion in Ukraine: Perspectives on NATO Membership

The crisis has also brought to the fore the question of Ukraine's potential membership in NATO. While NATO's collective defense principles are designed to safeguard member states, expanding the alliance raises concerns for existing members. Public opinion in Ukraine regarding NATO membership has evolved over time, with a majority now supporting accession. However, this shift is not uniform across the country, with some regions still expressing reservations about joining the military alliance (CNN, 2023).

So, the diplomatic efforts, military assistance, political unity, logistical challenges, and NATO's strategic calculus are all factors that have influenced NATO's response to the Ukrainian crisis. Diplomatic efforts have been a cornerstone of NATO's response, with the alliance engaging in peace talks and mediation efforts, including the Minsk agreements (Mills, 2022). However, despite numerous rounds of negotiations, a last-

ing solution remains elusive. NATO's response to the Ukrainian crisis is also influenced by strategic considerations, with the alliance carefully weighing the potential risks of direct military confrontation against the need to protect Ukraine's sovereignty.

### **3<sup>rd</sup> part of description, future prospects for NATO-Ukraine relations:**

The future of NATO-Ukraine relations is uncertain and complex (CNN, 2023). Ukraine's desire for closer cooperation and security guarantees from the Alliance is evident through its application for NATO membership. However, NATO must carefully evaluate Ukraine's capabilities, reform progress, and overall readiness to meet the criteria for membership (Reuters, 2023). The Vilnius Summit Communiqué reaffirmed NATO's commitment to Ukraine's membership, but the conditions for membership remain open to interpretation. NATO must balance its commitment to collective defense and democratic values with the need to evaluate Ukraine's capabilities and readiness for membership. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine and Russia's aggression have necessitated a comprehensive and multifaceted response from NATO. Balancing military assistance, diplomatic efforts, political unity, and logistical challenges requires a nuanced and strategic approach (Frederick et al., 2022).

Simultaneously, the Alliance must continue to explore avenues for dialogue and de-escalation with Russia while providing steadfast support to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The issue of Ukraine's rapid accession to NATO is likely to be most difficult for all sides to navigate. Ukraine wants to see both the risks and the price of Russian revisionism shouldered more evenly. The same is true for the approximately 8 million Ukrainians who moved abroad after the Russian full-scale invasion (Roy, 2023).

The case of Ukrainian membership of NATO continues to be an example of where the price and risks of action are more evident, discussed, and affect decision-making, while the price and risks of inaction tend to be more ambiguous, unspoken, and do not affect policymaking in the way that might be warranted (Goldgeier, 2023). Before the 2022 invasion, it was said that the price of Ukrainian membership of NATO would

outweigh any benefits. The events that followed proved that the price of inaction tends to be higher than the price of action.

The success of a bold strategic decision to bring Ukraine into the Alliance as soon as the intensity of fighting ebbs will be assessed on the basis of sustainability and against the risks and costs of inaction. A viable Ukraine in NATO will be the best proof of the strategic defeat of Russia, whose leader wanted to destroy Ukraine and prevent the country's accession to NATO – and therefore the Alliance's enlargement. Without this step, the current chapter of Ukraine-Russia confrontation might not be the last.

So, the issue of Ukraine's potential membership in NATO is a complex issue that requires a multifaceted approach. NATO must balance its commitment to collective defense and democratic values with the need to evaluate Ukraine's capabilities and readiness for membership (Wesslau, 2023). However, only through collective action, unity, and a multifaceted approach can NATO rise to the challenge posed by Russia's actions and "reinvent" itself as a resilient, adaptable, and effective alliance in the face of evolving security threats.

### **4<sup>th</sup> descriptive part, NATO's Imperative to Evolve:**

The Russian war in Ukraine has presented NATO with an unprecedented challenge that demands continual adaptation and vigilance. While NATO has taken significant strides in reinforcing its capabilities and providing support to Ukraine, there are still critical gaps to address. The Alliance's response must be rooted in unity, transparency, and equitable burden-sharing among member states (Valasek, 2023).

As NATO continues to evolve, it must strike a delicate balance between reinforcing its collective defense capabilities and supporting Ukraine's defense efforts. Critical assessments of military aid and infrastructure bottlenecks are essential for an effective response to emerging threats. Additionally, NATO's nuclear deterrence strategy must be carefully calibrated to navigate the complexities of the modern security landscape (Magula et al. 2022).

A call for reflection can be noted as military assistance has been limited to joint exercises, leaving some critics dissatisfied with the level of direct support provided to Ukraine. The issue of providing lethal weapons to Ukraine reflects the alliance's internal divisions and the need to balance deterrence against further escalation. Moreover, logistical challenges and strategic considerations present constraints in providing comprehensive support. NATO's political unity has been tested, revealing differing priorities among member countries.

As the Ukrainian crisis continues to unfold, NATO faces critical decisions about its future direction. Public opinion in Ukraine supports NATO membership, but the alliance must carefully assess the implications of expanding its ranks even after the NATO Summit in Vilnius 2023.

Ultimately, NATO's success in countering Russia's aggression and supporting Ukraine will depend on its ability to rise above individual interests and act collectively in the face of shared challenges. A united, adaptive, and responsive NATO will be best positioned to safeguard its member states, defend democratic values, and maintain peace and stability in Europe and beyond (Chesnut, 2023). The Alliance must seize this opportunity to prove its resilience and relevance in the 21<sup>st</sup>-century security landscape.

### Conclusion:

The conflict in Ukraine has presented NATO with a defining moment in its history. The crisis has tested the alliance's resolve, unity, and ability to adapt to a rapidly changing security landscape. While the challenges are significant, NATO has the opportunity to emerge stronger and more effective by addressing key issues and maintaining a balanced approach. By reaffirming its commitment to collective security, supporting its Eastern members, and striking a delicate balance between the open-door policy and realpolitik, NATO can navigate the complexities of the crisis. The alliance's support for Ukraine's sovereignty and defense efforts, along with its engagement in diplomatic efforts, can contribute to finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

Furthermore, NATO must foster unity within the alliance and engage in constructive dialogue with all member states, including Turkey. Internal divi-

sions only serve to undermine NATO's solidarity and embolden external adversaries. The role of the United States in providing leadership and support to NATO and its Eastern members is paramount. The Biden administration must seize the opportunity to demonstrate unwavering commitment to NATO's principles and the security of its allies. So, while the alliance has demonstrated political and moral support for Ukraine, the efficacy of diplomatic efforts remains in question even after the NATO Summit in Vilnius 2023.

In light of these challenges, NATO must reflect on its response to the Ukrainian crisis and adapt its strategies to effectively address similar situations in the future. A more cohesive and united approach is essential to uphold the alliance's core principles of collective defense and safeguarding regional stability. Ultimately, the crisis in Ukraine provides NATO with the opportunity to reassert its relevance and strength in addressing 21<sup>st</sup>-century security challenges. By navigating the crisis with unity, resilience, and adaptability, NATO can uphold its role as a cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security and stability. Through cooperation and determination, NATO can overcome the challenges posed by Russia's aggression and emerge as a stronger and more effective alliance for the benefit of its member states and partners alike.

### Bibliography:

- Chesnut, M. (2023). US/NATO-Russian Strategic Stability and the War in Ukraine. CNA Corporation. Retrieved from <https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/06/us-nato-russian-strategic-stability-in-ukraine.pdf>
- Ciaramella, E. (2023). Envisioning a Long-Term Security Arrangement for Ukraine. Retrieved from <https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/06/08/envisioning-long-term-security-arrangement-for-ukraine-pub-89909>
- CNA.org. (2023). US/NATO-Russian Strategic Stability and the War in Ukraine. Retrieved from <https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/06/us-nato-russian-strategic-stability-in-ukraine>
- CNN (2023). Biden can leave Vilnius feeling like he got almost everything he wanted from the NATO summit. Retrieved from <https://www.cnn.com/2023/07/12/politics/joe-biden-nato-summit-day-2/index.html>
- CNN. (2023). Ukraine's NATO dilemma: How the West can help without provoking Russia. Retrieved from <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/10/politics/ukraine-nato-western-dilemma/index.html>
- CSIS (2023). European Warfighting Resilience and NATO Race of Logistics: Ensuring That Europe Has the Fuel It Needs to Fight the Next War. Retrieved from <https://www.csis.org/analysis/european-warfighting-resilience-and-nato-race-logistics-ensuring-europe-has-fuel-it-needs>
- D'Anieri, P. (2019) Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Frederick, B., Charap, S., Boston, S., Flanagan, S. J., Mazarr, M. J., Moroney, J. D. P., and Mueller, K. P. (2022). Pathways to Russian Escalation Against NATO from the Ukraine War. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Retrieved from <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1971-1.html>
- Goldgeier, J. (2023). Why NATO Should Accept Ukraine. Retrieved from <https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/07/13/why-nato-should-accept-ukraine-pub-90206>
- Gvosdev, N. (2023). Prof. Nikolias Gvosdev on the Vilnius Summit and NATO's "Hobbit Diplomacy". Georgia Today. Retrieved from <https://georgiatoday.ge/prof-nikolas-gvosdev-on-the-vilnius-summit-and-natos-hobbit-diplomacy/>

IPS Journal (2023). A dangerous balancing act. Retrieved from <https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/a-dangerous-balancing-act-6832/>

Becker, J., Duda, M. and Lute, D. (2022) From context to concept: history and strategic environment for NATO's 2022 strategic concept. *Defence Studies* 22:3, pages 489-496.

Karnitschnig, M. (2023). Ukraine: NATO's new protectorate?. *Politico*. Retrieved from <https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-protectorate-russia-war-nato/>

Kendall-Taylor, A., Edmonds J. (2020). "The Evolution of the Russian Threat to NATO." In *Future NATO: Adapting to New Realities*, edited by John Andreas Olsen, 54-66. London, UK: Taylor & Francis Group.

Kozyrev, A. (2019). "Russia and NATO Enlargement: An Insider's Account." In *Open Door: NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security After the Cold War*, 449-458. Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University SAIS.

Kuzio, T. (2018) "The Case for Ukraine's Membership of NATO.", *New Eastern Europe*, Retrieved from <https://neweasterneuropa.eu/2018/05/18/case-ukraines-membership-nato>.

Magula, J., Rouland, M., Zwack, P. (2022) NATO and Russia: defense and deterrence in a time of conflict *Defence Stud.* 2022; 22(3): 502-509.

Mills, C. (2022). Ukraine: Russia's Red Line. United Kingdom. Retrieved from <https://policycommons.net/artifacts/2265492/cbp-9401/3025162/>

NATO (2023). NATO's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Retrieved from [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_192648.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm)

NATO (2023). Vilnius Summit Communiqué issued by NATO Heads of State and Government. Retrieved from [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_217320.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm)

Reuters (2023). NATO summit declaration says "Ukraine's future is in NATO". Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-summit-declaration-says-ukraines-future-is-nato-2023-07-11/>

Roy, D. (2023). How Bad Is Ukraine's Humanitarian Crisis a Year Later? Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/ukraine-humanitarian-crisis-refugees-aid>

Russel, G., (2023). Ukraine wins Turkey's backing for Nato membership but Biden urges caution on timing. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/08/ukraine-wins-turkeys-backing-for-nato-membership-but-biden-urges-caution-on-timing>

Valasek, T. (2023). Russia's War against Ukraine: Rethinking the Global Order and Lessons Learned for NATO. Political Committee (PC) | NATO PA. Retrieved from <https://www.nato-pa.int/content/political-committee-pc>

Ward, Gould and Mcleary (2023). U.S. and allies negotiating security guarantees for Ukraine. Retrieved from <https://www.politico.com/news/2023/06/14/ukraine-nato-biden-zelenskyy-00101960>

Wesslau, F. (2023). Securing Ukraine: NATO, Security Guarantees, and Weapons. Retrieved from <https://sceeus.se/en/publications/securing-ukraine-nato-security-guarantees-and-weapons/>

## 2<sup>nd</sup> Prize: 600 EUR, Volodymyr Tsybka (MRU)

Since the start of the Russia's war against Ukraine NATO has been at the center stage of world affairs. What might seem a surprising comeback for the 70-year-old security alliance following a great deal of soul searching is essentially the modern world's throwback to the Cold War era. In the renewed existential standoff between democracies and autocracies, with the return of the 20th century's nuclear shadow, NATO is being looked up to as the primary protector of the rules-based international order and the best hope for the advancement of freedom. The road to victory and sustainable peace requires decisive actions reminiscent of the days of the organization's founding. To master the courage and effectively manage the risks, it is important to recognize the basic drivers of the conflict whose ultimate battlefield is not the grand chessboard of global politics but the human soul.

## Colors of war

What are the colors of war at the crossroads of Europe and Russia that is tearing Ukraine apart and threatening to bring down the world order? Its basic palette is made up of traditional khaki green, ash grey and dirt brown, blood red and fire orange. For millions of Ukrainians and supporters of their cause it is also sky blue and wheat yellow that often comes across as proud shiny gold. While the enemy colors often hide in the background behind the newly invented pro-war 'Z' symbol, the dark blue NATO flag and the Chinese red revolutionary banner fly high over the warring parties, casting the conflict as a rematch of the Cold War.

Every day, the war is experienced in full color – as a reality unfolding in front of our eyes and on digital screens, shot with multiple cameras and angles. And all too often it is colorless – when your mind or the lights black out, when the space between life and death shrinks so much that the whole world collapses into black and white. This temporary loss of color vision and the development of razor-sharp contrasts can help to survive and rediscover sense in the world that seems to have lost all sense. And it is the great gift the war gives to all of us. It is an antidote to greyness of everyday life that pushes us out of comfort zone and forces to take sides – and arms – to defend what is right. It is a mind-decluttering experience that make us re-evaluate priorities and focus on matters of real consequence. It gives a new perspective on the familiar adding depth to the debates. Ultimately, it helps to chart the course to victory and beyond, explaining why a transatlantic security alliance, unexpectedly to many, have once again proved up to the task.

## The war that should not be

"That's just a stupid thing to do!" These words were my initial reaction to Russia's military threats and continue to mark my attitude to the war amid the shock at the tragedy it has brought to my country and to my family. There is a growing global consensus that the Russo-Ukrainian conflict is not just another morally wrong act of the dictator, not just another Russian war gone wrong, but is a completely senseless enterprise undertaken at a wrong time, in a wrong place, for wrong reasons, using wrong methods.



After two decades in power Vladimir Putin for many came to embody a new brand of authoritarian leader whose power rests on engineering support through the distortion of information and simulation of democratic procedures rather than on violence and direct coercion (Guriev, 2022). Volodymyr Zelensky, a professional entertainer and the youngest head of state in the history of Ukraine, joined the growing cohort of populists whose media stardom catapulted them to political fame. Both countries – the former first and second largest Soviet republics, struggling with high levels of poverty and corruption and the lack of social cohesion – were hardly ready to bear the burden of an all-out war despite long history of violence and the armed conflict simmering since 2014.

The twenty-first century was poised to see further decline of violence with powerful historical forces and our better angels orienting humanity toward cooperation and altruism (Pinker, 2011). This trend was further accelerated by the demand for collective action to deal with climate change, future pandemics, and the rise of artificial intelligence. With more and more of our lives taking place online and demise of power hierarchies (Naim, 2013), large-scale power plays and territorial claims looked particularly anachronistic. Absent political or economic models that could challenge liberal democracy, the anticipated “clash of civilizations” largely confined to fighting marginalized religious extremists, and most of the world population having access to the vast online pool of shared knowledge (Statista, 2023b), there seemed to be no force willing and able to start a large-scale brutal war and throw the world out of balance.

On February 24, 2022 we were once again reminded that human stupidity is one of the most important forces in history. The aging dictator living in his fantasy world launched a colonial war against the newly independent neighbor state in an attempt to resurrect the vanished empire (Snyder, 2022) and to turn the clock back on modernity, bringing back the days when the status of the country was determined by the size and ruthlessness of its army and the effectiveness of its arsenal (Etkind, 2023). Or was it an act of evil genius? After all, Kyiv was expected to fall in days, and its Western allies – indifferent, divid-

ed, dependent on Russian energy supplies – were supposed to react with “deep concern” and token sanctions, letting Putin get away with yet another military adventure. Following the crushed hopes of the Arab Spring and the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, Ukraine could have become another domino falling in the global decline in democracy.

What happened in the next days and months defied all expectations. Ukrainian armed forces pushed Russians back in many parts of the country and relegated the 2nd best military in the world to the status of the 2nd strongest in Ukraine. Its allies formed 54-member strong Rammstein coalition providing everything short of fighter jets, with total bilateral aid to Ukraine over fifteen months of the war exceeding 100 bn euros (Statista, 2023c). Within days after the attack Russia became the most-sanctioned country in the world, and when the war entered its second year, its president was issued an international arrest warrant. The aggressor, in its turn, quickly lost the veneer of civilization revealing the genocidal character of the war through endless list of crimes – from kidnapping children to mass murders, attacks on civilian infrastructure and creation of technogenic catastrophes, backing up escalation with nuclear threats.

The story of the unexpected war that keeps delivering surprises while pushing the world to the nuclear brink is a cautionary tale about the dangers of wishful thinking, misplaced priorities, ignored threats, wrong estimates and lost chances. Yet, it is also an opening chapter of the bildungsroman about humanity coming of age in the new era, discovering things that truly matter, their fragility and their price, seizing opportunities, forging new and rekindling old ties. It is about disenchantment with kaleidoscopic changes of bright colors and the hope to discover the guiding light. When the scene is set, it’s time to meet the main characters.

### **The chief beneficiary**

The past year and a half has left little unchanged. Following the ups and downs of countries, organizations and industries experts and journalists produced an impressively long list of beneficiaries of this war. It features recipients of windfall gains and third-party power brokers, the

warring parties and their partners, leaving room for new entrants and fueling speculations about the outcome of the war. With no end of hostilities in sight, the list remains highly inconclusive and the fate of its members is impossible to predict. Yet, when examined for the most likely contenders for the status of the new center of global gravity, the list quickly shortens to two entries – and produces a clear winner.

One prospective candidate is China who, no matter the outcome of the war, is going to see one or two of its major rivals weakened, further expand its economic, diplomatic and military reach, and possibly even make territorial gains (Heath, 2023; Michta, 2023). Though this is unlikely to be enough to overcome geopolitical constraints on the way to superpower status, it will seriously improve the country's outlook and create a powerful legacy for its leader (Bekkevold, 2023).

NATO, the second and major contender to the status of the chief beneficiary, is equal in age to the People's Republic of China. Yet, unlike its rival who is celebrating half-a-century long rise to the global prominence, the Alliance spent last thirty years fending off critics, left and right, who questioned its relevance to post-Cold War world, and survived attempts of its traditional leader, the US, to pull out. But today, more than ever before, people entrust it to maintain global peace and security (Anderson and Meaney, 2023).

Looking at NATO from historical perspective, its Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg outlined the three ages of its evolution, with the Alliance reorienting away from collective defense to managing conflicts beyond its borders after the end of the Cold War, and reclaiming the original role to maintain dual focus on defense and conflict management after Russia seized Crimea in 2014 (Stoltenberg, 2016). These shifting priorities mark the transition from bipolar to multi-polar world with a brief unipolar moment in between. More importantly, they acknowledge that the dangers of the new world order are no less profound than those that brought the Alliance to life in 1949. Something about the new threats seems obvious, something – puzzling, something seems to defy comparison.

While it is normal to expect a period of instability after considerable shifts in global power distribution, genuine multipolarity can hardly let anyone amass enough strength to threaten the alliance whose member states' total GDP equals almost half of the world economy (Global Economy, 2022) and whose leader has the strongest military on the planet (Global Firepower, 2023), spending on it nearly as much as the rest of the world combined (Statista, 2023a). Moreover, today's Russia is a pale shadow of the USSR, and in stark contrast to it lacks consistent ideology and is emphatically anti-modern.

What is perfectly clear, though, is that in the 21st century freedom, democracy and the rule of law once again came under attack, and while the global freedom has been declining since 2006 (Freedom House, 2023), after the events of 2014 and 2022 the conflict has taken on an exceedingly existential character. NATO's military potential (earlier mocked as a relic of the past) is what determines its principal role in the conflict today. Its constant emphasis on democratic institutions and free markets it what makes it relevant beyond the war horizon.

The future of the Alliance as the main protagonist of the new era heavily depends on its success in Ukraine, and on Ukraine's success as its 33rd member. To secure both, NATO may need to reduce hesitancy and heal divisions, focusing on the most fundamental sources of the conflict and opening a new front.

### **Living with the enemy**

It is always good to know your enemy. Predicting its moves, you can prevent the attack or win the fight and secure lasting peace through inclusion and dialogue. Yet, often the one you seem to know best becomes the most dangerous of enemies – they can catch you off guard and stab in the back. It happened in Ukraine in 2014 and repeated again eight years later, with so many people still unable to wrap their minds around Russia's brutality directed at the neighbor, while some survivors of deadly attacks on Ukrainian cities continue to side with the aggressor and blame the victim for provoking the war. Even mature democracies experience no shortage of genuine Putin's sympathizers. When you share

so much in common with the attacker, you are dying to know what exactly sets you apart and how far the animosity can go.

Democracies seem to be most vulnerable in this regard. The ideal of rationality makes their values seem self-evident and universal, and empathetic celebration of individual uniqueness emphasizes benevolence and makes large-scale collective actions seem less likely. Dictatorships often look much more effective, always on the lookout for threats, unrestrained in exploiting divisions and appealing to the dark side of human nature.

The previous big war on the European continent generated a lot of scholarship on the nature of evil. It demonstrated to the astonished public that blind obedience to authority and various forms of authoritarian behavior are typical of most individuals under certain conditions (Milgram, 1974; Zimbardo, 2007). Convincing proof of the banality of evil quieted talks of “good” and “bad” people and shifted attention to social institutions that regulate human life, making their creations and development a priority for many international organizations, including NATO (Anderson and Meaney, 2023). Recent research in political and economic history shows this focus was not misplaced (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Fukuyama, 2012).

Growing ideological divisions and culture wars rekindled interest in the human mind that produces wildly divergent views of right and wrong. Equipped with new methods and tools of cognitive and neuroscience, we advanced our knowledge of the role of emotions in political life, the nature of two distinct systems of morality that produce opposite attitudes to power hierarchies, and the fact that most people have (at least latently) versions of both of them (Lakoff, 2002; Westen, 2008). This research exposed the potential roots of the perennial conflict between freedom and tyranny and reminded us that no individual is completely immune to forces working against democracy.

These findings could not have been timelier. The world entered a phase where power decay is weakening traditional institutions (Naim, 2013), social media platforms are encouraging people

to self-segregate into echo-chambers that amplify their views and can quickly turn mild disagreement into extreme polarization (Sunstein, 2017), AI assistants are developing capacity to covertly alter our political views (Mims, 2023), and increasingly autocratic Russia is employing political warfare against Western democracies, creating divisions and exporting problems prior experienced by frontline states between the RF and the EU (Orenstein, 2019).

Yet, these discoveries have remained largely underappreciated. Prior to 2022, the West decisively lost the information war to Russia (Stengel, 2019; Jankowicz, 2020) and went through a string of crises that dramatically undermined the reputation of democracy. While the war reversed this course of events, the divisions are lying bare, ready to be exploited by Russia and its allies, encouraging long and exhausting war of attrition. Even successful attempts to counter Russian propaganda seem to be defensive ad hoc measures lacking strategic foresight and offensive potential.

Possibly the best next step the Alliance can make to strengthen its collective defense, manage conflict at its borders and usher in a new era of long peace is to launch a sustained communication campaign to increase awareness in three related areas. First, it should continue to expose cases and methods of information manipulation used by democracy opponents. Second, it should explicitly emphasize values of the Enlightenment and benefits of democracy, free markets and the rule of law. Disenchantment with them may be completely unfounded, but it is widespread, deep and creates strong tensions. An effective way to counter it is to tap into the growing body of research aimed at celebrating human progress and dispelling popular myths of modern decay (Pinker, 2019; Piketty, 2022). Also, we should never let democracy sceptics forget the ugly faces of new Russian totalitarianism and Chinese surveillance state, while the two countries continue to attract admirers by demonstrating return to traditional values and effective management practices. Finally, instead of promoting moral judgment based on universal reason or preaching moral relativism, we should

have a deep conversation about the nature of our differences, showing why and how a healthy balance between daring progressivism and cautious conservatism can be destroyed and set a society on a path to war.

Less constrained by short-term electoral cycles and possessing a well-developed information apparatus, the Alliance is best suited to run such a campaign. Its messages should be tailored to target not only people in NATO member countries and the allies, but the opponents as well. With reportedly over 70 % of Russians supporting the actions of its military forces in Ukraine (Levada-Center, 2023a) and over 80 % approving activities of Putin as the country's president (Levada-Center, 2023b), it is easy to deem the effort utterly futile. Still, we should remember that the Russian proverb "from love to hate, one step" perfectly tells the story of mood swings in dictatorships.

I am sure that the campaign will transform NATO itself, giving it more optimism and a greater sense of control. It will embolden the Alliance to provide Ukraine with weapons that can effectively end the war and welcome it as a new member – in a complete disincentive for Russia to continue the war or plot another attack.

Our ability to see the world in black and white is the painful gift of war. And it bears a warning: Never let the distance between US and THEM, between ME and YOU, or between the NEW ME and the OLD ME grow too large to blind us to colors. Another step away can put out the light – and the colors may be gone forever. We must heed this warning. For in the end, in the words of Bertrand Russell, "War does not determine who is right – only who is left."

#### Reference List

Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. (2012) *Why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity and poverty*. London: Profile Books.

Anderson, G. and Meaney, T. (2023) 'NATO isn't what it says it is', *New York Times*, 11 July. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/11/opinion/nato-summit-vilnius-europe.html> (Accessed: 12 July 2023).

Bekkevold J. I. (2023) 'Why China is not a superpower', *Foreign Policy* (2 March). Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/02/china-superpower-us-new-cold-war-rivalry-geopolitics> (Accessed: 15 June, 2023).

Etkind, A. (2023) *Russia against modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Freedom House (2023) *Freedom in the world 2023: marking 50 years in the struggle for democracy*. Available at: [https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/FIW\\_World\\_2023\\_DigitalPDF.pdf](https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/FIW_World_2023_DigitalPDF.pdf) (Accessed: 5 July 2023).

Fukuyama, F. (2012) *The origins of political order: from prehuman times to the French revolution*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Global Economy (2022) *Percent of world GDP – Country rankings*. Available at: [https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/gdp\\_share/NATO](https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/gdp_share/NATO) (Accessed: 7 July 2023).

Global Firepower (2023) *2023 Military Strength Ranking*. Available at: <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php> (Accessed: 7 July 2023).

Gurieiev, S. (2022) *Spin dictators: the changing face of tyranny in the 21<sup>st</sup> century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Heath, T. R. (2023) 'Why is China strengthening its military? It's not all about war'. Rand Corporation, 24 March. Available at: <https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/03/why-is-china-strengthening-its-military-its-not-all.html> (Accessed: 15 June, 2023).

Jankowicz, N. (2020) *How to lose the information war: Russia, fake news, and the future of conflict*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Lakoff, G. (2002) *Moral politics: how liberals and conservatives think*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Levada-Center (2023a) 'Conflict with Ukraine: assessments for late June 2023', 14 July [Press release]. Available at: <https://www.levada.ru/en/2023/07/14/conflict-with-ukraine-assessments-for-late-june-2023> (Accessed: 16 July 2023).

Levada-Center (2023b) 'Putin's approval rating'. Available at: <https://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/> (Accessed: 16 July 2023).

Michta, A. A. (2023) 'China stands to gain from a weakened Russia. The West should prepare now'. Atlantic Council, 1 June. Available at: <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/china-stands-to-gain-from-a-weakened-russia-the-west-should-prepare-now> (Accessed: 15 June 2023).

Milgram, S. (1974) *Obedience to authority: an experimental view*. Reprint, New York: Harper Perennial, 2009.

Mims, C. (2023) 'Help! My political beliefs were altered by a chatbot!', *Wall Street Journal*, 13 May. Available at: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/chatgpt-bard-bing-ai-political-beliefs-151a0fe4?mod=djemalertNEWS> (Accessed: 15 May 2023).

Naim, M. (2013) *The end of power: from boardrooms to battlefields and churches to states, why being in charge isn't what it used to be*. New York: Basic Books.

Orenstein, M. (2019) *The lands in between: Russia vs. the West and the new politics of hybrid war*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Piketty, T. (2022) *A brief history of equality*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Pinker, S. (2011) *The better angels of our nature: why violence has declined*. New York: Viking.

Pinker, S. (2019) *Enlightenment now: the case for reason, science, humanism, and progress*. New York: Viking.

Snyder, T. (2022) 'The war in Ukraine is a colonial war', *New Yorker* (28 April). Available at: <https://www.newyorker.com/news/essay/the-war-in-ukraine-is-a-colonial-war> (Accessed: 27 May 2023).

Statista (2023a) *Countries with the highest military spending worldwide in 2022*. Available at: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/262742/countries-with-the-highest-military-spending> (Accessed: 7 July 2023).

Statista (2023b) *Number of internet users worldwide from 2005 to 2022*. Available at: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/273018/number-of-internet-users-worldwide> (Accessed: 5 July 2023).

Statista (2023c) *Total bilateral aid commitments to Ukraine between January 24, 2022 and May 31, 2023, by type and country or organization*. Available at: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1303432/total-bilateral-aid-to-ukraine> (Accessed: 5 July 2023).

Stengel, R. (2019) *Information wars: how we lost the global battle against disinformation and what we can do about it*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press.

Stoltenberg, J. (2016) *The three ages of NATO: an evolving alliance*. Available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_135317.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_135317.htm) (Accessed: 21 June 2023).

Sunstein, C. R. (2017) *#Republic: divided democracy in the age of social media*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Westen, D. (2008) *The political brain: the role of emotion in deciding the fate of the nation*. New York: Public Affairs.

Zimbardo, P. G. (2007) *The Lucifer effect: understanding how good people turn evil*. New York: Random House.

### 3<sup>rd</sup> Prize: 400 EUR, Andra Mažrimaitė (MRU)

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has emerged as one of the most critical geopolitical crises of our time, presenting multifaceted challenges to regional security and stability. For several years, this conflict has resulted in a deepening crisis, marked by thousands of deaths and widespread political and economic instability in the region. Rooted in historical tensions, ethnic divisions, and geopolitical competition, the conflict escalated dramatically in 2014 with Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and its subsequent support for separatist rebels in Eastern Ukraine. The situation further deteriorated in 2022 when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine<sup>1</sup>.

Amidst this complex and volatile backdrop, NATO, as a prominent military alliance consisting of 30 countries, has played a pivotal role in responding to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. As an organization founded on the principles of collective defense and deterrence, NATO's primary objective has assumed greater importance in the face of this crisis<sup>2</sup>. NATO has taken concrete steps to bolster its deterrence and defense capabilities in Europe, such as establishing the Enhanced Forward Presence initiative, increasing defense spending, and engaging in military exercises.

Moreover, NATO has extended its support to Ukraine in various ways, aiming to assist the country in its defense efforts and mitigate the impact of the conflict. While NATO's involvement has been commendable, there are debates and criticisms regarding the extent and nature of its support. Some argue that NATO should provide more substantial military aid, including lethal military assistance, to enable Ukraine to defend itself effectively against Russian aggression. Others emphasize the importance of diplomatic dialogue and addressing the root causes of the conflict.

### Current State of the Conflict: A Deepening Crisis

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has been ongoing for several years, resulting in thousands of deaths and causing significant political and economic instability in the region. The root causes of the conflict are multi-faceted, including historical tensions between Russia and Ukraine, ethnic and linguistic divisions within Ukraine, and geopolitical competition between Russia and the West<sup>3</sup>.

The conflict escalated in 2014 when Russia illegally annexed Crimea, a territory recognized as part of Ukraine by the international community. Subsequently, Russia provided support to separatist rebels in Eastern Ukraine, leading to a protracted armed conflict that has been characterized by territorial disputes and human rights violations. The situation further deteriorated in 2022 when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, setting off the bloodiest conflict in

Europe since World War II. The war has had significant implications for regional security and stability, and it has strained relations between Russia and the West, leading to increased tensions and a deterioration of trust<sup>4</sup> <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia>.

### Role of NATO: Strengthening Deterrence and Defense

NATO, as a military alliance consisting of 30 countries, has played a crucial role in responding to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The primary objective of NATO is to provide collective defense against any potential aggression against its member states. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has expanded its membership and taken on new roles, including peacekeeping and counterterrorism operations<sup>5</sup>.

In response to the conflict in Ukraine, NATO has taken concrete steps to strengthen its deterrence and defense capabilities in Europe. One significant measure has been the establishment of the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) initiative. This initiative involves the deployment of multinational battalions in the Baltic states and Poland to demonstrate the Alliance's commitment to its Eastern members and deter potential aggression from Russia.

NATO has also increased its defense spending, with member states committing to allocate 2% of their GDP to defense by 2024. This financial commitment aims to bridge the capability gap between NATO and Russia and ensure the Alliance's ability to deter any potential threats<sup>6</sup>.

NATO has taken several actions to support Ukraine in response to the conflict with Russia. Here are some specific actions that NATO can take to further support Ukraine in the ongoing war in 2023:

1. Provide lethal military aid: NATO could provide lethal military aid to Ukraine to help it defend itself against Russian aggression. This could include weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment. The provision of lethal military aid has been a controversial issue, with some NATO member states being cautious about providing such aid for fear of escalating the conflict<sup>7</sup>.

2. Increase economic pressure on Russia: The international community, including NATO, could increase economic pressure on Russia, including through sanctions and other measures. This could help to weaken Russia's ability to continue its aggression against Ukraine. Economic pressure has been used as a tool to influence Russia's behavior in the past, and it could be effective in this case as well. However, there are concerns about the impact of economic sanctions on the Russian people, and the international community will need to balance the need for pressure with the need to avoid harming innocent civilians<sup>8</sup> [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_192648.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm).
3. Enhance communication and information sharing: NATO could help Ukraine enhance communication and information sharing with NATO, which will improve interoperability between Ukrainian and Allied forces. This could include providing training and education to Ukrainian armed forces personnel to help them become familiar with NATO standards and procedures.
4. Provide training and education: NATO could provide training and education to Ukrainian armed forces personnel to help them become familiar with NATO standards and procedures. This could include training in areas such as logistics, communications, and command and control. It could also involve providing education on topics such as human rights and the rule of law, which are important values for NATO and its member states.
5. Improve logistics and infrastructure: NATO could help Ukraine improve its logistics and infrastructure, which will enable the country to better support NATO operations and missions. This could include providing assistance with the maintenance and repair of equipment, as well as the construction of new infrastructure such as airfields and ports. Improving logistics and infrastructure will help Ukraine better support NATO operations and missions, which will enhance interoperability and strengthen the alliance's deterrence and defense capabilities in the region [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_192648.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm)<sup>9</sup>.
6. Increase military presence in the region: NATO could increase its military presence in the

region, including by stationing more troops in eastern Europe, on the territory of alliance members such as Lithuania and Poland. This could help to deter further Russian aggression and enhance the alliance's deterrence and defense capabilities in the region. However, increasing military presence could also escalate the conflict and provoke a direct confrontation with Russia, so NATO will need to carefully consider the potential risks and benefits of such a move.

At the NATO summit in Lithuania, several agreements were made regarding Ukraine. One of the key agreements was the reaffirmation of Ukraine's future membership in NATO. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated that the summit reaffirmed Ukraine's future membership in NATO, demonstrating the alliance's commitment to Ukraine's integration into NATO. Another significant agreement was the removal of the requirement for a Membership Action Plan (MAP), which is a step towards NATO membership<sup>10</sup>. This decision streamlines the process for Ukraine's accession to NATO.

NATO also agreed on a strong package of support for Ukraine aimed at boosting deterrence and defense. This package includes various forms of assistance to enhance Ukraine's capabilities and resilience in the face of the conflict. Allies at the summit agreed to support Ukraine further with a multi-year assistance program, providing Ukraine with sustained support over an extended period, helping the country in various areas, including security and development.

The agreements made at the NATO summit in Lithuania demonstrate the alliance's commitment to supporting Ukraine and enhancing regional security. While there are debates and criticisms regarding the extent and nature of NATO's support, the alliance's efforts to strengthen deterrence and defense capabilities in Europe and provide assistance to Ukraine are crucial in maintaining stability in the region.

### **Assisting Ukraine: Evaluating NATO's Efforts**

NATO has provided political, economic, and military support to Ukraine in response to the conflict. The Alliance has expressed solidarity with Ukraine, condemning Russia's actions and calling for a peaceful resolution to the crisis<sup>11</sup>. Economi-

cally, NATO has offered financial assistance and technical expertise to support Ukraine's economic and democratic reforms.

However, there have been criticisms that NATO's support for Ukraine has been insufficient:

1. Limited military support: One criticism of NATO's assistance to Ukraine is the limited extent of military support provided. While NATO has coordinated Ukraine's requests for assistance and delivered humanitarian and non-lethal aid, there have been calls for more substantial military aid, including the provision of lethal weapons. Critics argue that without stronger military support, Ukraine may struggle to effectively defend itself against Russian aggression.
2. Balancing act: NATO's response to the conflict has been a delicate balancing act between providing support to Ukraine and avoiding open conflict with Russia. This cautious approach is understandable given the potential risks of escalation. However, some argue that NATO should take a more assertive stance to deter further Russian aggression and protect Ukraine's sovereignty.
3. Reluctance to engage in direct confrontation: NATO's reluctance to engage in direct confrontation with Russia has been a point of criticism. While the alliance has increased its military presence in the region and strengthened deterrence measures, there are concerns that this may not be sufficient to deter Russian aggression. Critics argue that a more robust response is needed to effectively address the conflict.
4. Interoperability challenges: Enhancing interoperability between Ukrainian and NATO forces is a crucial aspect of assistance. However, achieving full interoperability poses challenges due to differences in equipment, training, and doctrines. Critics argue that more comprehensive efforts are needed to bridge these gaps and ensure effective coordination between Ukrainian and NATO forces.
5. Political considerations: NATO's assistance to Ukraine is also influenced by political considerations among member states. There are divisions within the alliance regarding the timing and process of Ukraine's potential NATO membership. These divisions can impact the

level and nature of support provided to Ukraine, leading to differing opinions on the adequacy of NATO's assistance<sup>12</sup>.

Some argue that the Alliance should provide more robust military aid to Ukraine, including lethal military assistance. Such aid could enhance Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian aggression and act as a stronger deterrent. Others argue that NATO should take a more proactive approach in addressing the root causes of the conflict. Engaging in dialogue with Russia and addressing the political and economic grievances of separatist rebels could be vital in finding a long-term resolution to the crisis. It is important to note that while these agreements demonstrate NATO's commitment to Ukraine, there are still divisions among NATO member states regarding the timing and process of Ukraine's membership<sup>13</sup>.

However, some member states are cautious about providing a straightforward invitation or setting a specific date for Ukraine's accession to NATO. The agreements made at the NATO summit in Lithuania reflect NATO's efforts to support Ukraine and strengthen its deterrence and defense capabilities. The removal of the Membership Action Plan requirement and the multi-year assistance program highlight NATO's commitment to Ukraine's future membership and long-term support<sup>14</sup>. However, the complexities and differing perspectives among NATO member states regarding Ukraine's membership also remain a factor to consider.

In conclusion, while NATO's support for Ukraine has been significant in the face of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, we also see that there are legitimate concerns and criticisms regarding the level and nature of this assistance. Addressing the challenges of limited military support, the delicate balancing act with Russia, the reluctance to engage in direct confrontation, interoperability issues, and political considerations within the Alliance will be crucial in effectively assisting Ukraine and fostering regional security.

### Implications for Regional Security

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has significant implications for regional security. It has strained relations between Russia and the West, leading to increased tensions and a deterioration of trust.

The conflict has also raised concerns about the potential for further instability and conflict in the region.

One major consequence of the conflict has been the reinforcement of the importance of collective defense and deterrence in Europe. NATO's response to the crisis has emphasized the need to strengthen the Alliance's military capabilities and readiness to defend its member states effectively<sup>15</sup>.

Moreover, the crisis has highlighted the importance of unity and solidarity among NATO member states. The Alliance's commitment to supporting Ukraine and deterring further aggression has showcased the strength of the collective security approach<sup>16</sup>. However, divisions and differing perspectives within NATO regarding Ukraine's NATO membership have also posed challenges in presenting a unified front.

While NATO has provided assistance to Ukraine in response to the conflict with Russia, there are valid criticisms regarding the limited military support, the cautious approach taken, challenges in achieving full interoperability, and political considerations within the alliance. These criticisms highlight the complexities and challenges faced by NATO in effectively supporting Ukraine in the war. The Russia-Ukraine conflict presents a critical and ongoing challenge to regional security, and NATO's role in responding to this crisis has been instrumental. The Alliance's efforts to strengthen deterrence and defense capabilities in Europe, as well as its unwavering support for Ukraine, demonstrate its commitment to maintaining stability in the region.

Navigating the Russia-Ukraine conflict poses both challenges and opportunities for NATO. As the crisis persists, NATO must remain vigilant and united, upholding its commitment to collective defense and peacekeeping while actively seeking diplomatic solutions. By doing so, the Alliance can effectively respond to the Russia-Ukraine conflict and maintain stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. Unity, resilience, and adaptability are essential attributes to address the complex and evolving security challenges that lie ahead<sup>17</sup>.

Moreover, NATO's engagement with various stakeholders, including the international community, regional partners, and key actors like Russia, is of paramount importance. Diplomatic efforts complement NATO's deterrence and defense approach and can contribute to finding a lasting resolution to the conflict<sup>18</sup>. NATO should continue prioritizing its support for Ukraine's security and ongoing reforms. The Alliance's assistance in training and equipping Ukrainian forces, bolstering cyber defense capabilities, and countering disinformation campaigns is crucial in strengthening Ukraine's resilience against Russian aggression.

Furthermore, exploring opportunities for enhanced cooperation with other regional security organizations, such as the European Union, will foster a comprehensive and coordinated response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Collaborative efforts will leverage the collective strength of various regional actors to address security challenges effectively.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict also offers NATO an opportunity to reaffirm its relevance and adaptability in the ever-changing security landscape. By adopting a holistic approach that combines deterrence, defense, and diplomacy, NATO can effectively respond to the crisis while upholding the principles of international law and supporting the liberal international order.

### Conclusion

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has put NATO's deterrence and defense capabilities to the test in Europe. The Alliance's response to the crisis has demonstrated its commitment to supporting Ukraine and deterring further aggression in the region. However, criticisms have highlighted the need for ongoing adaptation and unity within NATO.

To navigate the complexities of this regional challenge, NATO must continue investing in its capabilities and readiness to respond effectively to emerging security threats. Remaining open to dialogue and cooperation with other regional and international stakeholders will be vital in fostering a comprehensive approach to resolving the crisis.



As NATO continues to navigate this evolving security landscape, it must reinforce its commitment to collective defense, deterrence, and diplomatic engagement while upholding the principles of international law and promoting stability in the Euro-Atlantic region<sup>19</sup>. The Alliance's resilience and steadfastness will be key in addressing the Russia-Ukraine conflict and ensuring the security and prosperity of its member states and the wider international community.

The war in Ukraine has caused immense suffering and instability in the region, with thousands of lives lost and widespread political and economic turmoil. The war in Ukraine is not just a regional conflict, but a global issue that requires a just and lasting peace. As we reflect on the implications of this conflict, we must continue to stand with Ukraine and support its efforts to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity #SlavaUkraini.

#### Remarks

- 1 James Ellison, Michael Cox, Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Hope M. Harrison, N. Piers Ludlow, Angela Romano, Kristina Spohr & Vladislav Zubok (2023). The war in Ukraine, *Cold War History*, 23:1, 121-206, DOI: 10.1080/14682745.2023.2162329
- 2 Brian Michael Jenkins (2023). Consequences of the War in Ukraine: NATO's Future. Available at: <https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/03/consequences-of-the-war-in-ukraine-natos-future.html>
- 3 NATO (2022). The consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine for international security – NATO and beyond. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/07/07/the-consequences-of-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-for-international-security-nato-and-beyond/index.html>
- 4 Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia (2022). Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia>
- 5 Foreign Policy (2022). NATO Leaders Plan Defense Overhaul at Madrid Summit. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/28/nato-summit-russia-war-ukraine-defense-security-china/>
- 6 NATO (2023). Funding NATO. Available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_67655.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm)
- 7 The New York Times. (2023). Russia Moves to Expand Conscription, Bolstering Its Army. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/07/25/world/russia-ukraine-news>
- 8 NATO (2023). NATO's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_192648.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm)
- 9 The New York Times. (2023). Russia Moves to Expand Conscription, Bolstering Its Army. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/07/25/world/russia-ukraine-news>
- 10 NATO (2023). Vilnius Summit Communiqué Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius 11 July 2023. Available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_217320.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm)
- 11 NATO (2022). The consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine for international security – NATO and beyond. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/07/07/the-consequences-of-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-for-international-security-nato-and-beyond/index.html>
- 12 Brian Michael Jenkins (2023). Consequences of the War in Ukraine: The End and Beyond. Available at: <https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/03/consequences-of-the-war-in-ukraine-the-end-and-beyond.html>
- 13 Sabine Siebold, John Irish and Andrew Gray (2023). NATO welcomes Ukraine's membership but stops short of invitation. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/nato-summit-seeks-agreement-ukraine-bid-after-turkey-deal-sweden-2023-07-10/>
- 14 Council on Foreign Relations (2023). Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia. Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia>
- 15 Brian Michael Jenkins (2023). Consequences of the War in Ukraine: NATO's Future. Available at: <https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/03/consequences-of-the-war-in-ukraine-natos-future.html>

- 16 Jeff Neal (2023). One year later, how Russia's invasion of Ukraine 'reinvigorated' the EU and NATO. Harvard Law School. Available at: <https://hls.harvard.edu/today/one-year-later-how-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-reinvigorated-the-eu-and-nato/>
- 17 Robert G. Bell (2019). NATO Nuclear Burden-Sharing Post-Crimea: What Constitutes "Free-Riding"? Available at: <https://sites.tufts.edu/fletcherussia/files/2022/11/Robert-G.-Bell-PhD.pdf>
- 18 Kathleen J. McInnis (2022). Why Americans Still Need NATO. The alliance is one of the best bargains in geopolitics. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/28/us-nato-alliance-madrid/>
- 19 John Kampfner et al. (2023). Seven ways Russia's war on Ukraine has changed the world. Available at: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/02/seven-ways-russias-war-ukraine-has-changed-world>

#### References:

- 1 Brian Michael Jenkins (2023). Consequences of the War in Ukraine: NATO's Future. Available at: <https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/03/consequences-of-the-war-in-ukraine-natos-future.html>
  - 2 Brian Michael Jenkins (2023). Consequences of the War in Ukraine: The End and Beyond. Available at: <https://www.rand.org/blog/2023/03/consequences-of-the-war-in-ukraine-the-end-and-beyond.html>
  - 3 Council on Foreign Relations (2023). Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia. Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia>
  - 4 Foreign Policy (2022). NATO Leaders Plan Defense Overhaul at Madrid Summit. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/28/nato-summit-russia-war-ukraine-defense-security-china/>
  - 5 James Ellison, Michael Cox, Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Hope M. Harrison, N. Piers Ludlow, Angela Romano, Kristina Spohr & Vladislav Zubok (2023). The war in Ukraine, *Cold War History*, 23:1, 121-206, DOI: 10.1080/14682745.2023.2162329
  - 6 Jeff Neal (2023). One year later, how Russia's invasion of Ukraine 'reinvigorated' the EU and NATO. Harvard Law School. Available at: <https://hls.harvard.edu/today/one-year-later-how-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-reinvigorated-the-eu-and-nato/>
  - 7 John Kampfner et al. (2023). Seven ways Russia's war on Ukraine has changed the world. Available at: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/02/seven-ways-russias-war-ukraine-has-changed-world>
  - 8 Kathleen J. McInnis (2022). Why Americans Still Need NATO. The alliance is one of the best bargains in geopolitics. Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/28/us-nato-alliance-madrid/>
  - 9 NATO (2022). The consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine for international security – NATO and beyond. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/07/07/the-consequences-of-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-for-international-security-nato-and-beyond/index.html>
  - 10 NATO (2023). Funding NATO. Available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_67655.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm)
  - 11 NATO (2023). NATO's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_192648.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_192648.htm)
  - 12 NATO (2023). Vilnius Summit Communiqué Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius 11 July 2023. Available at: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_217320.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm)
  - 13 Robert G. Bell (2019). NATO Nuclear Burden-Sharing Post-Crimea: What Constitutes "Free-Riding"? Available at: <https://sites.tufts.edu/fletcherussia/files/2022/11/Robert-G.-Bell-PhD.pdf>
  - 14 Sabine Siebold, John Irish and Andrew Gray (2023). NATO welcomes Ukraine's membership but stops short of invitation. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/nato-summit-seeks-agreement-ukraine-bid-after-turkey-deal-sweden-2023-07-10/>
  - 15 The New York Times. (2023). Russia Moves to Expand Conscription, Bolstering Its Army. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/07/25/world/russia-ukraine-news>
- Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia (2022). Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia>



From left to right: Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers, Rector (MRU) Prof. Dr. Inga Žalėnienė.  
**Winner:** Volodymyr Tsybka, Andra Mažrimaitė, Vilius Lapis. Prof. Virgis Valentinavičius (MRU)



**1<sup>st</sup> prize:** Vilius Lapis



**3<sup>rd</sup> prize:** Andra Mažrimaitė



**2<sup>nd</sup> prize:** Volodymyr Tsybka

**Thema | Topic:****Emotional Climates in the Beirut Blast Anniversary Protests (Emotionale Klimata bei den Protesten zum Jahrestag der Explosion in Beirut)**

**Preis: 5.000 EUR, Masterarbeit –  
Laura Henselmann,  
Institut für Politikwissenschaften der  
Universität Heidelberg**

Am 4. August 2021 strömten Tausende Demonstranten auf die Straßen Beiruts; das resultierende Protestereignis sollte das größte seit der libanesischen Protestbewegung von 2019 werden (Enders 2021). Einige Monate später, am 29. Oktober 2021, marschierten Hunderte Palästinenser nahe der Stadt Kafr Qasim und hissten Fahnen in wütendem Protest (MEE 2021), und ein weiteres Jahr später, am 14. November 2022, demonstrierten Hunderte in ganz Chile; es kam zu Auseinandersetzungen mit der Polizei (teleSUR 2022). Was diesen kollektiven Aktionen gemeinsam war, ist, dass sie an Jahrestagen kollektiv traumatischer Ereignisse stattfanden: Die Libanesen demonstrierten am ersten Jahrestag der gewaltigen Explosion, die Beirut am 4. August 2020 verwüstet hatte (Enders 2021); die Palästinenser marschierten am 65. Jahrestag des Massakers von Kafr Qasim (Arnaout 2021); und die chilenischen Demonstranten protestierten am vierten Jahrestag der Tötung eines jungen unbewaffneten Mapuche durch die chilenische Polizei (teleSUR 2022). Obwohl derartige Proteste an Jahrestagen empirisch häufig vorkommen (Carter/Carter 2020: 1797-8), haben sie in der Wissenschaft bisher vergleichsweise wenig Beachtung gefunden. Wenn sie untersucht werden, werden sie als instrumentell angesehen: entweder als „Performances“ (ElGendi 2017: 45), die inszeniert werden, um kollektive Erinnerungen und Identitäten zu konstruieren, oder als „fokale Momente“ (Carter/Carter 2020: 1797), die helfen, Dilemmata kollektiven Handelns zu überwinden, indem sie die Organisation der Demonstrationsteilnehmenden erleichtern.

In der Psychologie ist bekannt, dass nahende Jahrestage traumatischer Ereignisse psychologische und physische ‚Jahrestagsreaktionen‘ (Anniversary reactions) auslösen. Neben Flashbacks, intrusiven Gedanken und Erinnerungen sowie zahlreichen körperlichen oder psychosomatischen Symptomen können solche Reaktionen auch in Form starker Emotionen auftreten, die mit dem ursprünglichen traumatischen Ereignis bzw. der individuellen Reaktion darauf in Verbindung stehen (Chow 2009: 55). Solche starken Emotionen werden wiederum von Sozialpsychologen und Politikwissenschaftlern bereits seit den späten 1990er Jahren mit kollektivem Handeln und Handlungstendenzen in Verbindung gebracht (Goodwin et al. 2000): Während bestimmte, insbesondere negative Emotionen wie Wut und Empörung empirisch mit einem Drang zum (individuellen und kollektiven) Handeln in Verbindung gebracht werden konnten und somit als „ermutigend“ betrachtet werden, ließ sich für andere, „entmutigende“ Emotionen wie Trauer und insbesondere Angst ein gegenteiliger (Rückzugs-)Effekt feststellen (Pearlman 2013, Jasper 2018). Aus der bisherigen empirischen Forschung hat sich Wut als „die prototypische Protestemotion“ (van Stekelenburg/Klendermans 2013: 893, Hervorhebung im Original) herauskristallisiert; vor allem einige jüngere Studien verweisen jedoch auch auf die hervorgehobene Bedeutung positiver Emotionen, die eine zentrale Rolle bei der Motivation zum Handeln spielen könnten, allen voran die Hoffnung (Cohen-Chen/Van Zomeren 2018, Greenaway et al. 2016). Die Mehrheit der bisherigen Studien zum Zusammenhang zwischen Emotionen und kollektivem Handeln lenken das Augenmerk auf individuelle oder gruppenbasierte Emotionen. Es finden sich jedoch Hinweise, dass für kollektives (Protest-)Handeln und Nicht-Handeln emotionale Klimata von größerer Bedeutung sein könnten (Trinn/Schulte 2020). Emotionale Klimata bestehen aus kollektiven Emotionen; kollektiv wird eine Emotion durch einen Prozess namens ‚soziales Teilen‘ (social sharing): Wenn zahlreiche Mitglieder einer bestimmten Gruppe oder Gemeinschaft eine ähnliche Emotion empfinden, meist

als Reaktion auf einen äußeren Stimulus, dann teilen sie diese emotionale Erfahrung mit ihren Mitmenschen. Diese wiederum empfinden die Emotion nach, und teilen diese Erfahrung je nach Stärke der Emotion gegebenenfalls mit einer dritten Person und so weiter. Je mehr Menschen betroffen sind und je stärker die ‚Ausgangsemotion‘ ist, desto weiter verbreitet sich die Emotion durch diese ‚Kettenreaktion‘ in der betreffenden Gemeinschaft. Hierdurch wird eine Emotion kollektiv, und die verschiedenen, derart entstandenen kollektiven Emotionen bilden schließlich das emotionale Klima der betreffenden Gemeinschaft. Ein emotionales Klima kann also als eine aus starken, relativ stabilen kollektiven Emotionen gebildete, gruppen- oder landesweite emotionale Atmosphäre verstanden werden. Die im emotionalen Klima vorherrschenden kollektiven Emotionen können dann wiederum Auskünfte über die kollektive Handlungs- bzw. hier Protestbereitschaft der jeweiligen Gemeinschaft geben: Bei einem ermutigenden emotionalen Klima steigt die Handlungsbereitschaft; wenn entmutigende Emotionen überwiegen, ist sie geringer (de Rivera 1992, de Rivera/Paez 2007, Rimé 2007).

Aufbauend auf diesen Erkenntnissen aus der Sozialpsychologie, der Psychologie und der Politikwissenschaft stellte die Masterarbeit „Emotionale Klimata bei den Protesten zum Jahrestag der Explosion in Beirut“ die Frage: Gibt es einen ‚Jahrestageeffekt emotionaler Klimata‘ (‚Anniversary Effect of Emotional Climates‘), und wenn ja, wie wirkt er sich auf das kollektive Handeln an den Jahrestagen kollektiv traumatischer Ereignisse aus? Konkret wurde untersucht, ob ein psychologischer Jahrestageeffekt vor dem Jahrestag eines kollektiv traumatischen Ereignisses starke emotionale Reaktionen bei den Mitgliedern einer Gemeinschaft auslösen kann, wodurch wiederum ein starkes emotionales Klima entsteht. Dieses resultierende ‚Jahrestagsklima‘ wurde dann auf seinen Zusammenhang mit kollektivem, selbstorganisiertem Jahrestagsprotest untersucht, wobei als sekundäre Forschungsfrage betrachtet wurde, ob es Emotionen oder Emotionskonstellationen gibt, die für kollektives Handeln besonders förderlich oder notwendig sind. Zu diesem Zweck wurde der Fall des Libanon seit der Explosion in Beirut am 4. August 2020

analysiert, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf den beiden folgenden Jahrestagen des Ereignisses am 4. August 2021 und am 4. August 2022 lag. Ziel war es, Hypothesen über einen Jahrestageeffekt des emotionalen Klimas und seiner Wirkung aufzustellen; folglich handelt es sich um einen induktiven Forschungsansatz, da das Ziel die Generierung von Hypothesen war. Zur Durchführung der Analyse wurde ein Mixed-Methods-Design gewählt: Quantitative Daten wurden mittels einer Twitter-Sentimentanalyse erhoben und ausgewertet. Hierbei wurden relevante Tweets aus der Zeit vor den jeweiligen Jahrestagen auf ihren Emotionsgehalt hin analysiert. Qualitative Daten stammten zunächst aus einer Prozessanalyse relevanter Nachrichten- und Social-Media-Quellen sowie anderer Primärmaterialien wie Interviews und Videos. Darüber hinaus wurden acht semi-strukturierte Experteninterviews mit Personen aus Zivilgesellschaft und Politik geführt, für die ein bekannter Journalist, vier Mitarbeiter und Leiter von vor Ort tätigen NGOs, zwei Politiker neuerer politischer Parteien sowie eine Psychologin als Interviewpartner gewonnen werden konnten. Um die Perspektive von Aktivist\*innen und Demonstrierenden einzubeziehen, wurde eine Online-Umfrage unter Demonstrationsteilnehmenden aus den Jahren 2021 und 2022 durchgeführt.

Die Ergebnisse der Analyse bestätigten den oben beschriebenen Mechanismus weitgehend und führten zu der Schlussfolgerung, dass wir tatsächlich von einem Jahrestageeffekt des emotionalen Klimas sprechen können. Es wurde festgestellt, dass in den zwei Monaten vor dem Jahrestag der kollektiv traumatischen Explosion in Beirut starke emotionale Reaktionen bei direkten und indirekten Opfern (wieder) auftraten. Die betroffenen Personen teilten ihre Reaktionen mit Mitgliedern ihrer Gruppe oder ihrer Gemeinschaft sowohl in persönlichen Gesprächen als auch in den sozialen Medien, was mitfühlende und sekundäre emotionale Reaktionen bei der/den ‚Zielperson(en)‘ auslöste. Mitfühlende emotionale Reaktionen bestehen im Erleben einer Emotion, die der geteilten ähnlich ist, während sekundäre emotionale Reaktionen von der Einschätzung abhängen, die der/die Empfänger/in von der Situation vornimmt. So kam es zum Beispiel häufig vor, dass eine direkt betroffene Per-

son ihre Trauer und Angst vor dem herannahenden Jahrestag teilte, andere, indirekt Betroffene darauf aber wiederum mit Wut reagierten, da die Trauer und Angst der betroffenen Person ihnen die ausgebliebene Aufklärung durch den Staat sowie die schlechte Behandlung der Opfer vor Augen führte. Diese sekundären emotionalen Reaktionen scheinen entscheidend dafür zu sein, ob im emotionalen Klima der Gemeinschaft ermutigende oder entmutigende kollektive Emotionen erzeugt oder verstärkt werden: Wenn eine Mehrheit auf geteilte Trauer mit Trauer reagiert, verstärkt sich diese entmutigende Emotion im emotionalen Klima; reagiert sie allerdings mit Empörung auf die Trauer der Opfer, wird die ermutigende Emotion Wut verstärkt. In letzterem Fall steigt die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer groß angelegten kollektiven Selbstorganisation und eines anschließenden groß angelegten Protestes am Jahrestag: Im Juni-August 2021 fanden sich im emotionalen Klima des Libanon neben kollektiver Angst eine starke kollektive Wut und kollektive Hoffnung (auf Veränderung, auf eine baldige Aufklärung der Explosionsumstände), und somit zwei starke ermutigende Emotionen. In diesem Jahr fanden große Jahrestagsproteste statt; Tausende strömten auf die Straßen. Im Juni-August 2022 hingegen gesellte sich zu kollektiver Angst und kollektiver Wut eine starke entmutigende Emotion, nämlich kollektive Erschöpfung und Verzweiflung: Ein weiteres Jahr ohne Hilfe und Aufklärung war verstrichen, und auch die lang ersehnten Wahlen im Mai 2022 hatten nicht die erhofften politischen Veränderungen gebracht. Große Jahrestagsproteste blieben aus, nur wenige hundert Menschen versammelten sich.

Auf Grundlage der Analyse wird der ‚Jahrestagseffekt des emotionalen Klimas‘ definiert als individuelle emotionale Reaktionen auf einen nahenden Jahrestag eines kollektiv traumatischen Ereignisses. Diese individuellen Reaktionen breiten sich in einer bestimmten Gemeinschaft über den Mechanismus des sozialen Teilens in den zwei Monaten vor dem Jahrestag aus und tragen gemeinsam mit den mitfühlenden und sekundären emotionalen Reaktionen, die bei den Empfängern des Teilens erzeugt werden, dazu bei, kollektive Emotionen im emotionalen Klima der genannten Gruppe, Gemeinschaft oder Gesellschaft zu erzeugen oder zu verstärken.

Daraus folgt, dass die Monate vor dem Jahrestag nicht nur individuell, sondern auch kollektiv emotionsgeladene Zeiträume sind, in denen kollektives Handeln entweder wahrscheinlicher oder unwahrscheinlicher ist als in Zeiten ohne Jahrestag, je nach der emotionalen ‚Ladung‘, die der Jahrestagseffekt dem emotionalen Klima verleiht: Wenn die erlebten und verbreiteten Jahrestagsreaktionen dazu dienen, entmutigende kollektive Emotionen zu erzeugen oder zu verstärken, die in der Emotionskonstellation des Klienten vorhanden sind, sinkt die Wahrscheinlichkeit kollektiven Handelns am und um den Jahrestag; wenn sie ermutigende kollektive Emotionen erzeugen oder verstärken, tritt der gegenteilige Effekt ein.

Interessant sind auch die spezifischen Emotionskonstellationen der beiden Jahre, denn beide enthalten die in der Forschung als stark entmutigend eingestufte Emotion Angst sowie die als stark ermutigend eingestufte Emotion Wut. Diese Emotionen waren bereits vor dem Herannahen des Jahrestages im emotionalen Klima des Landes vorhanden, wurden allerdings durch die Jahrestagseffekte zunehmend salienter gemacht. Warum jedoch waren die Menschen nur in einem der beiden Jahre in der Lage, ihre Angst zu überwinden und sich den Protesten anzuschließen, um ihrer Empörung und Wut Ausdruck zu verleihen? Die Antworten der Befragten und der Umfrageteilnehmer auf diese Frage waren sehr eindeutig: Sie betonten einstimmig, dass der entscheidende Faktor hierbei die Hoffnung war, die 2021 noch vorhanden war und 2022 nicht mehr. Basierend auf der Analyse hierzu werden zwei Hypothesen zu Konstellationen bestimmter kollektiver Emotionen aufgestellt. Erstens wird postuliert, dass (1) kollektive Hoffnung im emotionalen Klima zusammen mit anderen ermutigenden Emotionen wie Wut vorhanden sein muss, um kollektive Handlungsbeziehung zu fördern. Wenn es keine kollektive Hoffnung gibt, kommt es auch nicht zu kollektivem Handeln. Schließlich wird postuliert, dass, (2) wenn die Konstellation von kollektiver Hoffnung und starker kollektiver Wut in einem emotionalen Klima vorhanden ist, andere kollektive entmutigende Emotionen wie Angst oder Traurigkeit die Menschen nicht davon abhalten, sich an kollektiven Aktionen zu beteiligen. Wenn die spezifische Kombination aus kollektiver Hoffnung

und Wut vorhanden ist, kann es also trotz starker entmutigender Emotionen im Klima zu kollektivem Handeln kommen.

Zukünftige Forschungen zum Jahrestageeffekt des emotionalen Klimas sollten sich idealerweise auf den gesamten Zeitraum vor und nach dem Jahrestag konzentrieren, um festzustellen, ob die Bereitschaft zu kollektivem Handeln über den Jahrestag selbst hinausgeht und zu mehr Protesten nicht nur am, sondern auch um den Jahrestag herum führt. Als möglicher erster Test könnte eine Analyse der beiden eingangs erwähnten Beispiele dienen: Sowohl die Chilenen, speziell die Volksgruppe der Mapuche, als auch die Palästinenser haben in ihrer jeweiligen Geschichte zahlreiche kollektiv traumatische Ereignisse erlebt und sich noch Jahre danach an groß angelegten kollektiven Aktionen zum Jahrestag beteiligt (siehe Seite 1). Was die Erforschung von Emotionen und kollektivem Handeln im Allgemeinen betrifft, so weisen die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit eindeutig auf die entscheidende Rolle von Hoffnung hin; diese häufig vernachlässigte oder als selbstverständlich betrachtete Emotion (Cohen-Chen/Van Zomeren 2018) verdient somit weitere Aufmerksamkeit in der Protestforschung.

Abschließend bleibt zu sagen, dass es sich selbstverständlich nicht leugnen lässt, dass Reaktionen auf Jahrestage im Allgemeinen mit der Zeit an Intensität verlieren und dies ein völlig natürlicher Prozess ist. Dennoch hofft diese Masterarbeit gezeigt zu haben, wie wichtig Jahrestage für Gemeinschaften sind, die ein kollektiv traumatisches Ereignis erlitten haben. Es ist unklar, ob die Libanesen jemals Gerechtigkeit erfahren werden für die Explosion, die ihre Stadt und noch viel mehr zerstört hat; was jedoch sicher ist, ist, dass die Jahrestage dieses Ereignisses noch jahrelang kollektiv hochemotionale Phasen sein werden.

#### Zitierte Quellen:

- Arnaout, Abdel Raouf. 2021. "Palestinians Mark 65th Anniversary of Kafr Qasim Massacre." Anadolu Agency. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/palestinians-mark-65th-anniversary-of-kafr-qasim-massacre/2406727> (14. February 2023).
- Carter, Erin Baggott, und Brett L. Carter. 2020. "Focal Moments and Protests in Autocracies: How Pro-Democracy Anniversaries Shape Dissent in China." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 64(10): 1796–1827.
- Chow, Amy Y. M. 2009. "Anticipatory Anniversary Effects and Bereavement: Development of an Integrated Explanatory Model." *Journal of Loss and Trauma* 15(1): 54–68.
- Cohen-Chen, Smadar, und Martijn Van Zomeren. 2018. "Yes We Can? Group Efficacy Beliefs Predict Collective Action, but Only When Hope Is High." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 77: 50–59.

- ElGendi, Yosra. 2017. "Coptic Commemorative Protests and Discourses of Egyptian Nationalism: A Visual Analysis." <https://archiv.ub.uni-mar-burg.de/ep/0003/2017/190/6027> (February 12, 2023).
- Enders, David. 2021. "Lebanese Mark One-Year Anniversary of Blast With Protests, Rage, and Remembrance." *Foreign Policy*. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/08/05/lebanon-beirut-blast-anniversary-protests-economic-crisis/> (12. February 2023).
- Goodwin, Jeff, James Jasper, und Francesca Polletta. 2000. "The Return of The Repressed: The Fall and Rise of Emotions in Social Movement Theory." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 5(1): 65–83.
- Greenaway, Katharine H. et al. 2016. "Feeling Hopeful Inspires Support for Social Change: Hope and Social Change." *Political Psychology* 37(1): 89–107.
- Jasper, James M. 2018. *The Emotions of Protest*. Chicago ; London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Pearlman, Wendy. 2013. "Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings." *Perspectives on Politics* 11(2): 387–409.
- Rimé, Bernard. 2007. "The Social Sharing of Emotion as an Interface Between Individual and Collective Processes in the Construction of Emotional Climates." *Journal of Social Issues* 63(2): 307–22.
- de Rivera, Joseph. 1992. "Emotional Climate: Social Structure and Emotional Dynamics." In *International Review of Studies on Emotion (Volume 2)*, ed. K. T. Strongman. Chichester: Wiley.
- de Rivera, Joseph, und Darío Páez. 2007. "Emotional Climate, Human Security, and Cultures of Peace." *Journal of Social Issues* 63(2): 233–53.
- teleSUR. 2022. "Chileans Remember the Murder of Camilo Catrillanca." *TeleSUR English*. <https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Chileans-Remember-the-Murder-of-Camilo-Catrillanca-20221115-0008.html> (13. Februar 2023).
- Trinn, Christoph, und Felix Schulte. 2020. *Sparking Events, Emotional Climates, and Cascades of Cultural Identity Conflicts*. (Unveröffentlichter Projektantrag) van Stekelenburg, Jacquelin, und Bert Klandermans. 2013. "The Social Psychology of Protest." *Current Sociology* 61(5–6): 886–905.



Von links nach rechts: Rektorin der Universität Heidelberg Prof. Dr. Frauke Melchior, Laura Henselmann, Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers

# Pressemitteilungen | Press releases

|                                  |     |
|----------------------------------|-----|
| Gründung der Stiftung 2018.....  | 182 |
| Pressemitteilungen 2019.....     | 183 |
| Pressemitteilungen 2020.....     | 189 |
| Pressemitteilungen 2021.....     | 191 |
| Pressemitteilungen 2022.....     | 192 |
| Pressemitteilungen 2023.....     | 195 |
| Pressemitteilungen 2024.....     | 198 |
| Universität Heidelberg 2022..... | 199 |
| Universität Heidelberg 2023..... | 200 |

## Frieden stiften

*Der Heidelberger Abgeordnete Karl A. Lamers ruft eine Stiftung ins Leben – Aufruf an junge Menschen*

**Heidelberg.** (we) Wie krönt man ein Lebenswerk? Der Heidelberger Bundestagsabgeordnete Karl A. Lamers stellte sich im vergangenen Jahr diese Frage. Und fand die richtige Antwort: Der CDU-Politiker gründete im Dezember eine Friedensstiftung. „Frieden und Freiheit, das sind die beiden Werte, für die ich mich nicht zuletzt als Politiker in den letzten 25 Jahren eingesetzt habe“, so Lamers gegenüber der RNZ. Da sei es nur ein kleiner Schritt gewesen, eine Stiftung ins Leben zu rufen, die genau diese beiden Themen jungen Menschen näherbringt.

Einmal im Jahr schreibt die Lamers-Stiftung einen Preis aus, den vornehmlich junge Menschen gewinnen können. Sie müssen sich nur im Rahmen eines Wettbewerbs engagieren. Lamers denkt an Schüler der 5. und 6. Klasse – die genauen Regularien wird der Stiftungsvorstand noch festlegen.

Von den jährlich 6000 Euro an Preisgeldern sollen jedenfalls zu einem Drittel Schülerinnen und Schüler aus Lamers' Wahlkreis (Heidelberg-Weinheim) profitieren. Weitere 2000 Euro werden unter den Studierenden der Mykolas Ro-



Mit Stolz: Die Unterzeichnung der Erklärung zum Stiftungsgeschäft zur Errichtung der Dr. Karl A. Lamers Friedens-Stiftung. Foto: Becker

merus-Universität im litauischen Vilnius ausgeschrieben werden. Dort lehrt Lamers selbst als Honorarprofessor – und in einer zweiten Stufe sollen sich auch Studierende der dortigen Universität Vilnius bewerben können. Das letzte Drittel des Preisgeldes soll jungen Wis-

senschaftlern, Studierenden oder Journalisten mit Bezug zum Nato-Parlament in Brüssel zugutekommen. Lamers ist einer der 266 Nato-Abgeordneten (aus 29 Ländern) und nahm dort bereits mehrmals herausragende Positionen ein.

Läutet er mit Gründung der Stiftung zugleich das Ende seiner Politikerlaufbahn ein? Mitnichten. Lamers sieht die Einrichtung vielmehr als konsequente Fortsetzung seiner Arbeit. Auf zehn Jahre ist die Stiftung finanziert. Wobei Spenden natürlich willkommen sind.

Lamers wäre nicht Lamers, hätte er nicht auch für den Stiftungsvorstand eine Mischung aus regionalen und international bekannten Persönlichkeiten gewinnen können. Der Heidelberger Politologe Sebastian Harnisch gehört ebenso dazu wie die Gastronomin Claudia Kischka, dann die Unternehmer Ulrich Zeitel, Andreas-Norbert Fay und Ahmet Pekkip, der Anwalt Jobst Wellensiek sowie der frühere Bundesminister Heinz Riesenhuber, Karl-Heinz Kamp, Präsident der Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, und neben dem Namensgeber seine „rechte Hand“, Monika Becker.



METROPOLREGION

Dienstag 10. JANUAR 2019 / Seite 32

www.morgenweb.de

MORGEN

Friedens-Preis: 6000 Euro jährlich für junge Engagierte

Karl Lamers gründet Stiftung



HEIDELBERG. Der CDU-Fraktionsgruppenchef des Wahlkreises Heidelberg/Weinheim, Karl A. Lamers, hat eine Friedens-Stiftung gegründet.

„In einer Zeit, in der ja schon die dritte Generation aufwächst, die keinen Krieg erleben musste, ist es wichtig, besonders wichtig Menschen bereits in jungen Jahren zu vermitteln, dass Frieden nicht ein Ziel ist, sondern ein Zustand, den man nicht selbstverständlich hat.“

„Herzenswunsch“ des Stifters. Thema werde nun jedes Jahr der Dr. Karl A. Lamers Friedens-Preis vergeben, der mit 6000 Euro jährlich vergeben wird.



Der Skorpion bewacht das Exemplar in der Wohnung in Karlsruhe.

Einmal: Polizei holt Spinner in Dörsheim ab

Skorpion im Wohnzimmer

DÖRSHEIM. Vom Schreck bekam am Dienstagmorgen eine 30-Jährige Frau in Dörsheim, als sie kurz vor Mitternacht einen Skorpion in ihrer Wohnung entdeckte.



Während des ersten Verfahrens trug Angehörige Paula mit dem Bild der getöteten Senna im Gerichtssaal

Justiz: Frankenthaler Prozess um den gewaltsamen Tod der zwei Monate alten Senna nimmt neue Wendung

War „Babymord“ Totschlag?

Von unserer Rechtsanwältin Simone Jakob

Strafgesetzbuch

- Der Mord wird wegen Mordes eines Kindes als Mord eingestuft.
■ Die Tatbestand des Mordes wird von Paragraph 211 des Strafgesetzbuchs erfüllt.
■ Die Justiz unterscheidet zwischen Tötungsdelikt zwischen Tötung und Mord.
■ Der Mord wird durch ein größeres Unrecht im Vergleich zum Tötungsdelikt charakterisiert.
■ Steht das Gericht fest, dass es sich um einen Mord handelt, wird der Täter gemäß zu einer Lebenslange Freiheitsstrafe verurteilt.



Verteidiger Alexander Schwaninger hat Verteidigungsbefugnisse erlangt.

Antragsgabefrist, was Kleinart-Verfassungsschwende vorantreibt. Darüber hinaus wird bislang nicht...

Lange Untersuchungszeit. Hintergrund der Verfassungsschwende von Verteidiger Alexander Klein sein, in der sich alle Kriterien erfüllen...

Hoher Einfluss von Kokain. In der Tatbestand des Mordes wird die Tatbestand des Mordes erfüllt...

Ein Prozess, dass der psychische Zustand des Täters ein wichtiger Faktor für die Beurteilung der Schuld ist...

IN KÜRZE

Radfahrer stirbt nach Aufprall. Ein Radfahrer (46 in Berlin) ist gegen eine Bushaltestelle geprallt und hat sich dabei tödlich verletzt...

Acht Verletzte bei Busunfall. Ein Bus (1000) ist am Samstagmorgen in der Nähe von Mannheim von der Autobahn abgefahren...

FÜHRUNG

Ein Rundgang mit dem Nachtwächter. Ein Rundgang mit dem Nachtwächter (45) durch die Stadt...

Erhebliche Mängel an Lkw-Bremsen. Ein Lkw-Fahrer (45) hat die Polizei bei einer Kontrolle auf der A61 bei Darmstadt informiert...

Nach Kollision weggefahren. Ein Lkw-Fahrer (45) hat die Polizei bei einer Kontrolle auf der A61 bei Darmstadt informiert...

Was morgen wichtig ist

Verbindung Elbstadt-Weinheim. Wegen großer Verkehrsstaus auf der Elbstadt-Weinheimer Straße...

Bildung: In Bad Bergzabern könnte das erste Elektrotechnikzentrum des Landes entstehen / „Antwort auf Bedürfnisse der Wirtschaft“

Südpfalz will IT-Fachschule

BAD BERGZABERN. Wäld, Wirtschaftsschule. Wäld, Wirtschaftsschule. Wäld, Wirtschaftsschule...

Beginn mit dem Bau. Beginn mit dem Bau. Beginn mit dem Bau...

in einem entsprechenden Beruf. in einem entsprechenden Beruf...



Ein Schüler arbeitet an einer Smart-TV-Station

Zusammenfassend

Kind mit Helikopter in Klinik gebracht

SPREMINGEN. Ein einjähriges Kind wurde am Samstagmorgen mit einem Helikopter in die Klinik gebracht...

PRESEMITTEILUNGEN | PRESS RELEASES

**In Balance bleiben!**  
Gelassenheit und Ruhe gewinnen



„Achtarmut“ für ein selbst zu erhaltendes Gleichgewicht und Schutzräumen zu nutzen, das über die Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer ab Donnerstag, 24. Januar, in Kurs bei Helberg.

Helberg: Jeder hat sich häufig gewünscht, sich im hektischen Alltag Gelassenheit und Ruhe zu gewinnen. Wie das geht, ist das Thema der Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer ab Donnerstag, 24. Januar, in Kurs bei Helberg. Die Kursleiterinnen sind die Heilpädagogin Heide Köhler und die Sozialpädagogin Heide Köhler.

**Themen:**

- Verdrängungsmechanismen
- Verdrängungsmechanismen
- Verdrängungsmechanismen
- Verdrängungsmechanismen
- Verdrängungsmechanismen
- Verdrängungsmechanismen
- Verdrängungsmechanismen
- Verdrängungsmechanismen
- Verdrängungsmechanismen
- Verdrängungsmechanismen

**Ausländischer Berufsabschluss**  
Beratung zur Anerkennung

Helberg: Zweimal pro Woche gibt es eine Beratung zur Anerkennung ausländischer Berufsabschlüsse in Heidelberg. Die Beratung findet dienstags und donnerstags von 9 bis 12 Uhr und mittwochs von 13 bis 16 Uhr im Amt für Chancengleichheit (Zust. Nr. 2.05, Flughafenstraße 2) statt. Die Beratung ist ein Angebot für Bewerberinnen und Bewerber, die ihren ausländischen Berufsabschluss in Deutschland anerkennen lassen möchten. Die Beratung ist kostenlos und wird von der Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BAG) unterstützt.

Die Beratung ist am Donnerstag, 24. Januar, von 9 bis 12 Uhr im Amt für Chancengleichheit (Zust. Nr. 2.05, Flughafenstraße 2) statt. Die Beratung ist ein Angebot für Bewerberinnen und Bewerber, die ihren ausländischen Berufsabschluss in Deutschland anerkennen lassen möchten. Die Beratung ist kostenlos und wird von der Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BAG) unterstützt.

**„Frieden und Freiheit sind nicht selbstverständlich“**  
Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers errichtet Friedens-Stiftung

Helberg: Die CDU-Bundestagsabgeordnete Dr. Karl A. Lamers hat eine Friedens-Stiftung gegründet. Die Stiftung wird von der CDU-Bundestagsabgeordnete Dr. Karl A. Lamers geleitet und hat ihren Sitz in Heidelberg. Die Stiftung wird von der CDU-Bundestagsabgeordnete Dr. Karl A. Lamers geleitet und hat ihren Sitz in Heidelberg.

Die Stiftung wird von der CDU-Bundestagsabgeordnete Dr. Karl A. Lamers geleitet und hat ihren Sitz in Heidelberg. Die Stiftung wird von der CDU-Bundestagsabgeordnete Dr. Karl A. Lamers geleitet und hat ihren Sitz in Heidelberg.



Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers bei der Eröffnung der Friedens-Stiftung.

**Kreuzgemeinde Wieblingen**  
Gottesdienst im Radio

Helberg: Der Radiogottesdienst der Kreuzgemeinde Wieblingen findet am Donnerstag, 24. Januar, um 10 Uhr im Radio statt. Der Gottesdienst wird von Pastorin Heide Köhler geleitet und ist über den Sender 102,7 FM zu empfangen.

Der Gottesdienst wird von Pastorin Heide Köhler geleitet und ist über den Sender 102,7 FM zu empfangen. Der Gottesdienst wird von Pastorin Heide Köhler geleitet und ist über den Sender 102,7 FM zu empfangen.

**Anglistenorchester Heidelberg**  
Erstes Semesterkonzert

Samstag, 19. Januar, in der Peterskirche



Das Anglistenorchester Heidelberg (v.l.) beim ersten Semesterkonzert in der Peterskirche.

Helberg: Im letzten Konzert des Jahres hat das Anglistenorchester Heidelberg sein erstes Semesterkonzert in der Peterskirche gegeben. Das Konzert fand am Samstag, 19. Januar, um 19 Uhr statt. Das Anglistenorchester Heidelberg besteht aus Musikern der Anglistenschule Heidelberg.

Das Anglistenorchester Heidelberg besteht aus Musikern der Anglistenschule Heidelberg. Das Anglistenorchester Heidelberg besteht aus Musikern der Anglistenschule Heidelberg.

**Parkausweise**  
Online verlängern

Helberg: Die Stadt Heidelberg hat eine Online-Plattform für die Verlängerung von Parkausweisen geschaffen. Die Plattform ist unter [www.stadt-heidelberg.de/parkausweise](http://www.stadt-heidelberg.de/parkausweise) erreichbar.

Die Plattform ist unter [www.stadt-heidelberg.de/parkausweise](http://www.stadt-heidelberg.de/parkausweise) erreichbar. Die Plattform ist unter [www.stadt-heidelberg.de/parkausweise](http://www.stadt-heidelberg.de/parkausweise) erreichbar.

**DAS GRÖSSTE SECONDHAND KAUFHAUS DER REGION**

MARKTHAUS 630

100% NATÜRLICHE ERZEUGNISSE

RECHNE MIT UNSEREM KUNDENSERVICE

MARKTHAUS 630

**LADY ROSE WATSON'S BLACK GOSPEL**

ROSE WATSON und GOSPEL-LEGENDE QUEEN YAMINA

LIVE in Concert, die Besten-Robert ROSE WATSON und GOSPEL-LEGENDE QUEEN YAMINA

25.01.2019, Heidelberg, Providenzkirche

Tickets an allen bekannten VVK-Stellen

08 00 8 99 40 00

**Caritasverband Heidelberg e.V.**  
Kostbare Zeit schenken

Helberg: Die Hospizgruppe sucht Unterstützer. Die Hospizgruppe sucht nach Unterstützern für ihre Arbeit. Die Hospizgruppe sucht nach Unterstützern für ihre Arbeit.

Die Hospizgruppe sucht nach Unterstützern für ihre Arbeit. Die Hospizgruppe sucht nach Unterstützern für ihre Arbeit.

**15. Jähriges Jubiläum**

Die himmlische Nacht der Tenöre

15.02.2019 Heidelberg, Providenzkirche

Tickets an allen bekannten VVK-Stellen

**MARKISEN**

Jetzt Winter-Preise

Raumtex

Helfen Sie durch eine Patentschaft!

**HEIZOL HOLZPELLETS**

Wolfgang Krawinkel Wärme

Ihre kostenlose Wärme-Hotline: 08 00 8 99 40 00

minera

**stadtblatt**

Liebe Leserinnen und Leser, gemeinsam mit dem Wochen-Kurier wird Ihnen das Stadtblatt, der Amtsanzeiger der Stadt Heidelberg, zugestellt. Falls Sie das Stadtblatt nicht erhalten sollten, können Sie sich gerne an die kostenlose Vertriebs-Hotline 0800/06221-20 wenden.

# Wodurch wird Frieden heute bedroht?

*Dieser Frage gingen Schüler im Wettbewerb der Friedensstiftung von Karl A. Lamers nach – Jetzt wurden Preisträger ausgezeichnet*

Von Fritz Quoos

**Heidelberg.** Rund ein Jahr nach der Gründung seiner mit 60 000 Euro aus privatem Vermögen ausgestatteten Friedensstiftung hat der CDU-Bundestagsabgeordnete des Wahlkreises Heidelberg/Weinheim, Karl A. Lamers, die ersten Preisträger ausgezeichnet. Gewinner sind Klassen und Arbeitsgemeinschaften von Schulen seines Wahlkreises, die sich mit kreativen Textbeiträgen an einem von der Stiftung ausgeschriebenen Wettbewerb beteiligt haben. Das Motto lautete: „Wodurch wird der Frieden heute bedroht – was können wir dagegen tun?“ Der Stiftungsgründer selbst zeigte sich im Beisein prominenter Vorstands- und Jury-Mitglieder beeindruckt von dem Engagement und der Kreativität der jungen Teilnehmer, die er mit ihren Lehrerinnen und Lehrern zur Preisverleihung im Alten Hallenbad in Heidelberg begrüßte.

Lamers ist überzeugt davon, dass die Zukunft von Frieden und Freiheit, die den Deutschen geschenkt wurden und für die er selbst seit Jahren wirkt, ein starkes Engagement gerade der jungen Generation erfordert. Drei Gruppen hat er sich dafür ausgesucht: Neben den Schulen seines Wahlkreises sind es Studenten der Uni-

versität in Litauen, mit der er besonders verbunden ist, sowie Studenten aus Nato-Staaten. Im ersten Essay-Wettbewerb dieses Jahres bewerteten die einen die 15-jährige Nato-Mitgliedschaft der baltischen Staaten, während sich die anderen der Zukunft des Bündnisses widmeten.

Wie Lamers zollte auch Ministerialrat Sönke Asmussen, Leiter des Referats Sonderpädagogik im Ministerium für Kultus, Jugend und Sport Baden-Württemberg sowie Mitglied der Jury, den Preisträgern aus den Schulen hohe Anerkennung. Lehrkräften und Schülern sei es in den Beiträgen gelungen, das Thema konkret zu bearbeiten. Und

schon jetzt rief der Stiftungsgründer dazu auf, sich auch am nächsten Wettbewerb 2020 zu beteiligen, dessen Thema lautet: „30 Jahre Mauerfall – was ist noch zu tun?“. Die Bewerbungsfrist läuft bis Juli 2020.

Lebhafter Beifall galt an diesem Nachmittag nicht nur den Gewinnern, sondern auch den Mitgestaltern der Veranstaltung. Schülerinnen und Schüler der Leistungskurse Musik der Elisabeth-von-Thadden-Schule Heidelberg sorgten für einen ansprechenden Rahmen und die „Breakdancer“ vom Haus der Jugend für akrobatische Freestyle-Einlagen.

---

*Jury beeindruckt  
von Kreativität*

---

# TROPOLREGION

Samstag/Sonntag, 16./17. November 2019 11



CDU-Bundestagsabgeordneter Karl A. Lamers (Mitte) zeichnete die jungen Gewinner aus Heidelberg, Hemsbach und Ladenburg im Alten Hallenbad in Heidelberg aus. Vor rund einem Jahr hat Lamers seine Friedensstiftung gegründet. Foto: Alex

Die Thadden-Schule war es auch, deren Klasse 8 d den mit 600 Euro dotierten ersten Preis der Stiftung entgegen nahm. Die regelmäßig in die Gottesdienstgestaltung der Schule eingebundenen Schülerinnen und Schüler setzten sich mit Aufrüstung, Atomkrieg und Frieden auseinander. Der zweite und mit 500 Euro verbundene Preis ging an die Klasse 8 b der Werkrealschule Unterer Neckar in Ladenburg, deren Botschaft für das Zusammenleben in der Gesellschaft lautet: „Wir las-

sen uns nicht gegeneinander aufhetzen – für uns ist Vielfalt ganz normal.“ Den dritten Preis und 400 Euro holte sich die Arbeitsgemeinschaft „Macht der Worte“ der Klassen 7 bis 9 der Carl-Engler-Realschule aus Hemsbach und den vierten Preis (300 Euro) die Klasse 8 b der Friedrich-Schiller-Gemeinschaftsschule Hemsbach, die sich intensiv mit Flucht und Vertreibung und den Lebensverhältnissen in anderen Staaten auseinandergesetzt hat. Schließlich gab es noch einen Sonderpreis

in Höhe von 200 Euro für den 15-jährigen Schüler Sebastian Ohlig vom St. Raphael-Gymnasium in Heidelberg für seine ehrgeizige Arbeit über „Privatheit und Überwachung im Internet“.

Auf hohem Niveau hat er nach dem Urteil der Jury die Bedeutung des Informationsaustausches im Netz, die Chancen, aber auch die Probleme moderner Informations- und Kommunikationsmedien analysiert und daraus seinen Beitrag über das Grundrecht auf Privatheit abgeleitet.

Politik: Der Bundestagsabgeordnete Dr. Karl A. Lamers gründet eine Stiftung und möchte damit junge Menschen für freiheitliche Werte begeistern

## Seine neueste Mission: Friedensstifter

**WEINHEIM/HEIDELBERG.** Dr. Karl A. Lamers hatte einen Hezzenwunsch, nun hat er ihn sich selbst erfüllt: Der hiesige CDU-Bundestagsabgeordnete hat eine nach ihm benannte Friedensstiftung gegründet, die seit gut drei Wochen anerkannt ist und sich speziell an junge Menschen richtet. Der Politiker hat für 60 000 Euro aus seinem Vermögen zur Verfügung gestellt.

Die Dr. Karl A. Lamers Friedensstiftung, so der ausführliche Name, nimmt Bezug auf seine jahrzehntelange Tätigkeit in der Politik. Als Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages, des Verteidigungsausschusses und der Parlamentarischen Versammlung der NATO setzt er sich seit 25 Jahren eigenen Angaben zufolge seit Jahrzehnten für Frieden und Freiheit in Deutschland, Europa und der Welt ein.

„Es waren bislang Interesse und prägende Jahre und daher stelle ich mir irgendwann auch die Frage, wie ich davon etwas zurückgeben kann“, erzählt er. Die Folge: Er gründet die Stiftung mit dem Willen, junge Menschen zu fördern und auszuzeichnen, die in diesem Geiste

handeln. „In einer Zeit, in der jetzt schon die dritte Generation aufwächst, die keinen Krieg erleben musste, erscheint es mir besonders wichtig, Menschen bereits in jungen Jahren zu vermitteln, dass Frieden und Freiheit nicht selbstverständlich sind, sondern kostbare Güter dazustellen, um die konstant gerungen werden muss.“

### Preisgeld von 6000 Euro pro Jahr

Er krönt gewissermaßen sein „Lebenslanges politisches Wirken für Frieden und Freiheit“, das er auch weiterhin praktizieren wird. Mit der Stiftung möchte er Schüler, Studierende, junge Wissenschaftler und Journalisten in der Region, in dem Land und in der Institution stärken, die sein Leben in besonderer Weise geprägt haben.

Dazu gehören der Wahlkreis Heidelberg/Wehrheim, die Republik Litauen – sie begleitete er unter anderem auf dem Weg als Mitgliedstaat der Europäischen Union und der NATO – sowie die Parlamentarische Versammlung des Atlantischen Bündnisses. Nun wird künftig der Dr. Karl A. Lamers Friedenspreis

vergeben, der mit 6000 Euro jährlich dotiert ist. Insgesamt stellt er so für die nächsten zehn Jahre 60 000 Euro zur Verfügung.

Im hiesigen Wahlkreis richtet sich sein Blick auf die Schüler der fünften und sechsten Klassen aller Schularten. Im Rahmen eines Wettbewerbs sollen sie eine Projektarbeit zu einem festgelegten Thema ausarbeiten und präsentieren. Die genauen Rahmenbedingungen legt in Kürze der zehnköpfige Vorstand der Stiftung fest. Themen könnten zum Beispiel „Was verstehen junge Menschen unter Frieden?“ oder auch „Was kann man für den Erhalt des Friedens tun?“ lauten. 2000 Euro an Preisgeldern stehen hierfür zur Verfügung. Weitere 2000 Euro werden unter den Studenten der Mykolas Romeris-Universität im litauischen Vilnius ausgeschrieben, Lamers ist dort als Honorarprofessor tätig.

Die restlichen 2000 Euro sind gedacht für Studierende, junge Wissenschaftler und Journalisten, die einen Bezug zum NATO-Parlament in Brüssel haben.

Hier schließt sich ebenfalls ein



Dr. Karl A. Lamers hat eine Friedensstiftung gegründet und fügt damit seiner politischen Karriere einen weiteren Baustein hinzu. Damit möchte er im Rahmen eines Wettbewerbs junge Menschen für die Themen Frieden und Freiheit begeistern.

BYD MARCO SCHLUNG

Kreis: Lamers ist einer der insgesamt 290 NATO-Abgeordneten und hatte bereits mehrere führende Positionen inne. Auch dort hat er seine Stiftung vorgestellt und mit Vertretern aller 29 Mitgliedsstaaten vorab

gesprochen. Die Reaktion sei bei allen durchweg positiv gewesen, berichtet er.

In Kürze wird der Stiftungsvorstand die Ausschreibungsmodalitäten bekannt geben.

2019 werden derzeit vorbereitet und dem zuständigen Regierungspräsidium Karlsruhe übergeben.

Ihnen und Ihren Familien wünsche ich ein gutes, gesundes neues Jahr.

Ihr Stadtrat der Freien Wähler  
Raimund Beisel



**Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers  
MdB errichtet Friedens-Stiftung**

Heidelberg, 7. Januar 2019 – Der CDU-Bundestagsabgeordnete des Wahlkreises Heidelberg/Weinheim, Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers, hat eine Friedens-Stiftung gegründet.

Die von ihm mit Stiftungsgeschäft vom 4. Dezember errichtete

Dr. Karl A. Lamers Friedens-Stiftung

mit Sitz in Heidelberg ist vom Regierungspräsidium Karlsruhe mit Schreiben vom 27. Dezember 2018 als rechtsfähige Stiftung des bürgerlichen Rechts (Verbrauchsstiftung) anerkannt worden.

Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers, der sich als Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages, des Verteidigungsausschusses und der Parlamentarischen Versammlung der NATO seit Jahrzehnten für Frieden und Freiheit in Deutschland, Europa und der Welt einsetzt, gründet diese Stiftung mit dem Willen, junge Menschen zu fördern und auszuzeichnen, die in diesem Geiste handeln.

„In einer Zeit, in der jetzt schon die 3. Generation aufwächst, die keinen Krieg erleben musste, erscheint es mir besonders wichtig, Menschen bereits in jungen Jahren zu vermitteln, dass Frieden und Freiheit nicht selbstverständlich sind, sondern kostbare Güter darstellen, um die konstant gerungen werden muss.

In konsequenter Fortführung meines lebenslangen politischen Wirkens für Frieden und Freiheit möchte ich mit meiner Friedens-Stiftung hierzu einen Beitrag leisten und Schüler, Studierende,

junge Wissenschaftler und Journalisten in der Region, in dem Land und in der Institution stärken, die mein Leben in besonderer Weise geprägt haben:

1. Mein Wahlkreis Heidelberg/Weinheim
2. Die Republik Litauen und die
3. Parlamentarische Versammlung der NATO.

Hierzu wird jedes Jahr der

Dr. Karl A. Lamers Friedens-Preis vergeben, der mit 6.000 € jährlich (2.000 € für jede der unter 1. - 3. Benannten) dotiert ist. Insgesamt stelle ich für die nächsten 10 Jahre 60.000 € zur Verfügung.

Ich bin überzeugt, dass wir damit dem Zweck der Stiftung gerecht werden. Mein Dank gilt den Mitgliedern des Vorstandes, die mit mir zusammen die Stiftung zum Erfolg führen wollen sowie denjenigen, die meine Friedens-Stiftung künftig unterstützen.

Mit der Anerkennung dieser Stiftung geht für mich ein Herzenswunsch in Erfüllung, das Engagement junger Menschen für Frieden und Freiheit zu wecken und zu fördern“, so Karl A. Lamers.

Bild: Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers bei der Unterzeichnung der Erklärung zum Stiftungsgeschäft zur Errichtung der Dr. Karl A. Lamers Friedens-Stiftung am 04. Dezember 2018



# Schüler gegen Mauern in den Köpfen

Karl A. Lamers übergab in Schulen die Preise des Essay-Wettbewerbs seiner Friedensstiftung

Von Fritz Quoss

Heidelberg/Schriesheim. Eigentlich hatte die Karl-A.-Lamers-Friedens-Stiftung wieder eine Party mit Schülerinnen und Schülern geplant, doch machte die Corona-Pandemie einen Strich durch die Rechnung. Stattdessen gab es persönliche Besuche des CDU-Bundestagsabgeordneten und Preisstifters in Schulen seines Wahlkreises Heidelberg/Weinheim, die beim jüngsten Essay-Wettbewerb der Stiftung mit Preisen ausgezeichnet wurden. „30 Jahre Mauerfall – Was ist noch zu tun?“ lautete die Frage an die achten und neunten Klassen, und was dazu alles geäußert wurde, hat ihn, die hochkarätig besetzte Jury und den Experten Sönke Asmusen vom Stuttgarter Kultusministerium beeindruckt.

Lamers dankte allen Beteiligten für ihr Engagement, überreichte Urkunden und Geldpreise und hatte auch noch Kuchen im Gepäck. Gleichzeitig lud er schon zum Wettbewerb für das Schuljahr 2020/21 ein, der dem aktuellen Thema „Zusammenhalt in der Gesellschaft – gerade auch in schwierigen Zeiten“ gewidmet ist.

Ein mit 800 Euro dotierter erster Preis ging diesmal an die Klasse 9 d der Elisabeth-von-Thadden-Schule Heidelberg. Deren Autorinnen erkannten, „dass wir alle in einer Welt aus Mauern leben, tatsächlich und denen, die in den Köpfen sitzen“, dass Mauern schützen, aber auch abgrenzen und ausgrenzen. Das Errichten von Mauern und „Zum-Einstürzen-Bringen“ werde zu einem alltäglichen



Die Heidelberger Elisabeth-von-Thadden-Schule gewann einen ersten Preis. Foto: zg

Thema jedes einzelnen Menschen.

Ebenfalls einen ersten Preis errangen Schülerinnen der Klasse 9 b des Bergstraßen-Gymnasiums Hemsbach. In ihrer Erzählung mit Hörspielcharakter zeigen sie, dass die Mauer nicht nur Deutschland in Ost und West geteilt hat, sondern dass ein Riss auch durch einzelne Familien ging, besonders durch ostdeutsche. Plädert wird für die Aufarbeitung der Geschichte, Vorschläge für das Zusammenleben und die Aussöhnung. Einen zweiten Preis und 500 Euro holte sich die Klasse 9 des privaten Heinrich-Sigmund-Gymnasiums in Schriesheim mit

einem Textbeitrag und einem Modellbau, der die Mauer vor dem Brandenburger Tor zeigt. Im Text geht es um Vorbehalte der Menschen in Ost und West sowie um Unterschiede, die heute noch in den Köpfen, aber auch real bestehen. Und herausgearbeitet werden Vorschläge, wie Menschen im Osten dabei einen Schritt vorankommen. Ein dritter Preis (400 Euro) wurde einer Projektgruppe der Klasse 9 c der Gregor-Mendel-Realschule Heidelberg zuerkannt.

Sie hat unterschiedliche Lebensverhältnisse in den neuen und alten Bundesländern recherchiert und deutlich ge-

macht, dass Hürden in den Köpfen auf beiden Seiten ein rasches Zusammenwachsen erschweren. Einstellungen der Menschen müssten sich ändern und ungleiche Lebensverhältnisse abgebaut werden.

Vorausgegangen war der Preisverleihung eine akademische Feier in Litauen. Zusammen mit der Rektorin der Universität in Vilnius überreichte der Stiftungsgründer Friedenspreise an drei Gewinner eines Essay-Wettbewerbs zu der Frage, welche Prioritäten aus der Sicht der baltischen Staaten im Jahr 2020 die Hauptherausforderungen für die Nato erhalten sollten.

Im November wird Lamers zudem im Rahmen der Jahrestagung des Nato-Parlaments die drei Gewinner des diesjährigen Essay-Wettbewerbs der Stiftung bekannt geben, der für Studenten aller Nato-Mitgliedsländer ausgeschrieben wurde. Dabei ging es um die Frage, welche kohärente Strategie die Nato und ihre Mitgliedsstaaten im 21. Jahrhundert gegenüber der Volksrepublik China entwickeln können.

Mit seiner Friedens-Stiftung, die er mit 60 000 Euro ausgestattet hat, will Karl A. Lamers junge Menschen – Schülerinnen und Schüler, Studierende und junge Nachwuchswissenschaftler – ermutigen, über die Bedeutung von Frieden und Freiheit in der Welt nachzudenken. Denn er ist überzeugt, dass die Zukunft von Frieden und Freiheit ein starkes Engagement gerade der jungen Generation erfordert.

ANSTIEG DER PROBLEME

Die Pandemie hat Auswirkungen auf die Arbeit der Suchtberatung Weinheim

Montag 26. OKTOBER 2020

LOKALES

www.wnoz.de

SPORTGEMEINDE HEMSBACH

Fußballer und Tänzer übernehmen im Verein das Kommando



Millionenprojekt: Haussanierung startet in der kommenden Woche

Weinheim. In der ersten Novemberwoche beginnen die Sanierungsarbeiten am städtischen Wohnraum in der Maffelheimer Straße 14 bis 20 in Weinheim. Wie die Stadt Weinheim mitteilt, erfolgt die Einrichtung der Baustellen zum Teil, unter anderem wird entlang der Straße ein Gestell aufgebaut...

Preisverleihung! Bergstraßen-Gymnasium auf Platz eins bei Wettbewerben der Lamers-Friedensstiftung

Von Mauern und Rissen

Bergstraße, Frieden und Freiheit sind Begriffe, die nicht hoch genug zu schätzen sind. Oder wie es der CDU-Bundespräsident sagt. In Karl A. Lamers' Rede...

Welche Belastungen für Familien entstehen, die ihrem Zehnjährigen zuhause bleiben müssen und wie viele Familien am Ende aus dem Thema auch herausholen können...



Rekord: Inhabere Fester zusammen mit den Preisträgerinnen Felicia Tefaghbe, Karim Amiri, Celine Foltz (von links) sowie Dr. Karl A. Lamers.

Coronavirus: Zahlen steigen auf beiden Seiten der Landesgrenze an

Eindringlicher Appell an Bürger

Regier. Der Landkreis des Rhein-Neckar-Kreises, Stefan Hüllig, weist dringliche Worte: Die Lage ist sehr ernst...

Immer weniger Menschen in der Silber-Folge werden im Rhein-Neckar-Kreis und in der Stadt Heidelberg schnell ansteigen...

Gerinnungsförderer liegen. So ist und Landkreis somit hat einen Wert von 83,3. Die sieben Tage-Inzidenz...

MOMENT MAL

Mal schnell am Zeiger drehen

Inher, wie die Zeit vergeht. Gefühl ist es auch gar nicht so fassbar, dass die Winterzeit in den Sommermonaten...

Sogar Albert Einstein hat sich schon mit seiner Sicht auf die Definition der Relativität damit befasst...

WIKIKRIS NACHRICHTEN. Includes a table with names and phone numbers, and a list of services.

PRESEMITTEILUNGEN | PRESS RELEASES



### Schüler spenden ihr Preisgeld

Pandemiebedingt entschlossen sich einige der diesjährigen Absolventen der Gregor-Mendel-Realschule, ihr Preisgeld in Höhe von 400 Euro der gemeinnützigen Organisation „Ein Kiwi gegen Krebs“ zu spenden, um die Forschung des Kindertumorzentrums zu unterstützen. Im Schuljahr zuvor nahm die Gruppe eigenständig am Wettbewerb „30 Jahre Mauerfall – Was gibt es noch zu tun?“ der Karl A. Lamers Friedensstiftung teil. Sie gewannen den dritten Platz und bekamen im November das Preisgeld überreicht, das ihnen zur freien Verfügung stand. Statt einen gemeinsamen Ausflug zu unternehmen, entschieden sich die Absolventen zur Spende. Der CDU-Bundestagsabgeordnete Lamers erhöhte daraufhin die Spende um weitere 100 Euro.



Vertreter der Gregor-Mendel-Realschule mit Politiker Karl A. Lamers (2. v. r.). Fotos: zg

## RHEIN-NECKAR/SCHWETZINGEN

# Der Honorarkonsul ist begeistert

Schülerwettbewerb: Karl-A.-Lamers-Friedens-Stiftung hat Preise an verschiedene Schulen vergeben

Von Fritz Quoos

**Heidelberg/Rhein-Neckar.** Menschen bereits in jungen Jahren zu vermitteln, dass Frieden und Freiheit nicht selbstverständlich, sondern kostbare Güter sind, um die konstant gerungen werden muss, ist das Ziel der Dr.-Karl-A.-Lamers-Friedens-Stiftung. Diese hat zum dritten Mal seit ihrer Gründung herausragende Arbeiten eines von ihr ausgeschriebenen Schülerwettbewerbs ausgezeichnet.

„Zusammenhalt in der Gesellschaft – gerade auch in schwierigen Zeiten“ lautete das Motto des Wettbewerbs für Schülerinnen und Schüler der siebten und achten Klassen in zwölf Städten und Gemeinden des Bundestagswahlkreises Heidelberg/Weinheim, den Lamers lange Jahre als direkt gewählter CDU-Abgeordneter vertreten hat.

Der Stifter zeigte sich auch diesmal tief beeindruckt von dem Ernst und der Fantasie, die die Teilnehmer trotz der schwierigen, coronabedingten Umstände in ihre Arbeiten investiert haben. „Ich bin begeistert“, sagte der Ex-Abgeordnete bei seinen Besuchen in den Schulen während der Gespräche mit Preisträgern, Schulleitern und Gemeinschaftskunde-Lehrern. Gleichzeitig rief er zu weiterem Zusammenhalt in der Gesellschaft auf, „denn unsere Demokratie wird heute von innen und auch von außen bedroht und angegriffen“.

Als ein Beispiel nannte Lamers den Sturm vom 6. Januar 2021 auf das Kapitol in Washington, „der mir heute noch einen Schauer über den Rücken treibt“. Demokratie und Rechtsstaat, Frieden und Freiheit seien hohe Werte, für die er sich wie in seiner 27-jährigen Zugehörigkeit zum Bundestag weiterhin engagieren werde, sagte Lamers, der auch als neuer Honorarkonsul der Republik Estland für Baden-Württemberg die Arbeit seiner Friedens-Stiftung fortsetzen will.

Der Aufruf zum nächsten Wettbewerb für das Schuljahr 2021/22 soll schon in den nächsten Tagen an die Schulen gehen. Er steht unter dem Motto: „Die Krise in der Welt bekämpfen – im Kleinen beginnen“.



Der dritte Preis des Wettbewerbs ging an die Elisabeth-von-Thadden-Schule in Heidelberg-Wieblingen (oben). Am Heidelberger Bunsen-Gymnasium freuten sich die Schüler über zwei Preise. Immer dabei: Initiator und Honorarkonsul Karl A. Lamers (rote Krawatte). Fotos: privat

Der mit 600 Euro dotierte erste Preis des jüngsten Wettbewerbs ging an die 17-jährige Schülerin Maya Seitz vom Heidelberger Bunsen-Gymnasium, der zweite (500 Euro) an Annika Portuné vom Dietrich-Bonhoeffer-Gymnasium Weinheim und der dritte Preis (400 Euro) an die Tansania-AG der privaten Elisabeth-von-Thadden-Schule in Heidelberg, die in der Pandemie neue Formen der Zusammenarbeit mit der Partnerschule in Tansania entwickelte.

Carlotta Ritzhaupt vom „Bunsen“ konnte sich über den vierten Preis (300 Euro) freuen, außerdem teilen sich Faizrou Tchagbele, Katrin Arndt und Caitlin Follo aus der Klasse 10 b des Bergstraßen-Gymnasiums Hemsbach den fünften Preis (200 Euro). Lamers, der die Preise

persönlich überreichte, dankte allen Teilnehmern für ihr Engagement.

Zuvor hatte der Stifter bereits Arbeiten von Studenten aus Litauen und der Ukraine zur Rolle der baltischen Staaten in der Nato ausgezeichnet, für die ein Wettbewerb an der Mykolas-Romeris-Universität in Litauen gelaufen war.

Außerdem kürte er anlässlich der Herbsttagung der Parlamentarischen Versammlung der Nato in Lissabon Preisträger aus Staaten des Nordatlantikpacts in einem Wettbewerb zu der Frage, wie die Organisation ihren Teil zur Verteidigung und Fortentwicklung der Demokratie und der demokratischen Werte stärken kann. Preisträger waren Studenten, die in Paris, Helsinki und Bulgarien studieren.

Preisverleihung: Wettbewerb der Lamers-Friedens-Stiftung befasst sich mit dem Zusammenhalt in der Gesellschaft / Zwei von fünf Preisen gehen an die Bergstraße

# Junge Menschen mitten im Hier und Jetzt

Hemsbach/Region. Das Motto hätte mit Blick auf das abgelaufene Jahr 2021 nicht aktueller gewählt werden können: „Zusammenhalt in der Gesellschaft – gerade auch in schwierigen Zeiten“. Mit diesem Thema hatten sich Schüler in den zwölf Städten und Gemeinden des Wahlkreises Heidelberg/ Weinheim auseinandergesetzt, die an einer weiteren Wettbewerbsrunde der Dr. Karl A. Lamers Friedens-Stiftung teilnahmen. Ziel der Stiftung des ehemaligen CDU-Bundestagsabgeordneten ist es, Menschen bereits in jungen Jahren zu vermitteln, dass Frieden und Freiheit nicht selbstverständlich sind, sondern kostbare Güter darstellen, um die konstant gerungen werden muss. Insgesamt fünf Preise wurden vergeben, zwei davon gingen an Annika Portuné vom Dietrich-Bonhoeffer-Gymnasium Weinheim sowie Falzrou Tchagbele, Katrin Arndt und Caitlin Follo vom Bergstraßen-Gymnasium in Hemsbach.

## Nachdenkliche junge Menschen

„Auch im Schuljahr 2020/21 haben sich Schüler aus meinem bisherigen Wahlkreis Heidelberg/Weinheim an dem Wettbewerb meiner Friedens-Stiftung beteiligt. Ich freue mich, dass dieses Thema offensichtlich auf große Zustimmung gestoßen ist und sich viele eingehend Gedanken darüber gemacht haben, wie sie an das Thema herantreten, ich bin begeistert, wie nachdenklich junge Menschen sich damit auseinandergesetzt und wie viel Mühe sie sich gegeben haben, ihre Gedanken zu Papier zu bringen oder gar in einem Video zu formulieren“, sagt dazu der Initiator Dr. Lamers. Er kam persönlich an den jeweiligen Schulen vor-



Stolze Preisträgerinnen: Katrin Arndt, Caitlin Follo und Falzrou Tchagbele (vorne von links) vom Bergstraßen-Gymnasium Hemsbach zusammen mit Schulleiterin Isabelle Ferrari, Dr. Karl A. Lamers und Stefan Weber. Bild: (1) und (2) 2022

bei, um die Preise zu überreichen und das Gespräch mit den Schülern zu führen. „Das hat mir gereizt, wie begeistert alle bei der Sache waren und wie gern sie sich trotz der schwierigen coronabedingten Umstände an dieser Ausschreibung beteiligt haben. In meiner Würdigung der Leistungen der Schüler an den jeweiligen Schulen habe ich darauf hingewiesen, dass wir heute in einer Zeit leben, in der unsere Demokratie von innen und auch von außen bedrängt und angegriffen wird“, schildert der langjährige Abgeordnete und außenpolitische Experte seine Eindrücke. Demokratie und Rechtsstaat, Frieden und Freiheit seien hohe Werte und es sei ihm zeit seines Lebens ein Herzensanliegen, seinen, wenn auch vielleicht nur bescheidenen Beitrag zu Frieden und Freiheit leisten zu können. Dies war

auch die Motivation, die nach ihm benannte Frieders-Stiftung zu gründen, um in seinem bisherigen Wahlkreis, in Litauen, aber auch in den anderen Mitgliedstaaten der NATO junge Menschen für Frieden, Freiheit und Demokratie zu begeistern. Als Honorarkonsul der Republik Estland für Baden-Württemberg wurde er die Arbeit der Friedens-Stiftung wie bisher fortsetzen. Der nächste Wettbewerbsaufruf für das aktuelle Schuljahr lautet übrigens „Die Krise in der Welt bekämpfen – im Kleinen beginnen“.

## Gedicht gibt Antworten

Was den abgelaufenen Wettbewerb betrifft, so wurden insgesamt fünf Projekte unter den vielen Einsendungen prämiert, der zweite Preis ging dabei an Annika Portuné von der DBS Weinheim, die sich mit ei-

nem Gedicht betitelt. Darin geht es um die Angst einer alten Dame, auf der Intensivstation beim Sterben allein zu sein, weil niemand während der Pandemie zu ihr darf. Doch plötzlich ist Krankenschwester Anna da. Sie lächelt ihr zu, drückt sanft ihre Hand, obwohl sie das eigentlich nicht darf, und flüstert ihr leise zu, wie dankbar sie ihr sei, so lange durchgehalten zu haben und für diese Welt da gewesen zu sein. In diesem Sinne ist für die Schülerin die Krankenschwester eine „Heldin“, weil sie für einen Menschen da war, der sie mehr als alles andere braucht. Die letzten Worte der Sterbenden waren: „Wenn nur mehr Menschen wären wie du“, die sie ganz leise haucht. Das bringt die Autorin dazu, zu vermuten, dass das genau der Zusammenhalt in der Gesellschaft ist, den man am meisten

braucht. Die Jury bewertete den Beitrag unter anderem so: „Für Menschen da zu sein, die uns mehr als alles andere brauchen, heißt Antwort auf die Frage zu geben, welche Zusammenhalt die Gesellschaft braucht. Der Wettbewerbs-Teilnehmerin Annika Portuné ist das sehr überzeugend gelungen.“

## Kritische Auseinandersetzung

Falzrou Tchagbele, Katrin Arndt und Caitlin Follo aus der Klasse 10 b vom Bergstraßen-Gymnasium Hemsbach schrieben ebenfalls ein Gedicht und produzierten zusätzlich einen Videobeitrag zu der Frage: „Ist das Zusammenhalt? Ihr Hintergrund beziehungsweise das Themenspektrum beinhalteten Begriffe wie Pandemie, Klimawandel, Generationenkonflikt und Rassismus.“

Zu jedem Themenschwerpunkt folgt ein altersgemäßer und zugleich sehr kritischer Problemaufriss. Abgerundet werden die Themenschwerpunkte mit einem jeweils hoffnungsvollen Ausblick. (Refrain: „Es gibt Hoffnung am Ende der Straße, möge sie sich verbreitern im großen Ausmaß.“)

Die Jury meint dazu: „Seh als Zehntklässler als Gedichtschreiber in gesundheitspolitischen, umweltpolitischen und gesellschaftspolitischen Fragestellungen zu versuchen, ist schon eine besondere Herausforderung. Den Gedichtschreibern ist es gelungen, ihren schonungslosen und kritischen Blick sehr sachlich und zugleich eindringlich – aber ohne Anklage und Vorwurf – vorzutragen. Mit bewisen die jungen Poeten damit, ihr Gedicht in einem Videobeitrag festzuhalten.“ Auch das verdiente Respekt und Anerkennung. af

## Lamers übergab seinen Friedenspreis

Ukrainische Studentin für Arbeit über baltische Staaten und transatlantische Beziehungen geehrt

**Heidelberg/Vilnius.** (08) Angesichts des russischen Angriffskriegs in der Ukraine gewinnt die Friedens-Stiftung des langjährigen Heidelberger CDU-Bundestagsabgeordneten Karl A. Lamers mehr als Symbolkraft. Gemeinsam mit der Rektorin der Mykolas-Romeris-University im litauischen Vilnius, Inga Zaleniene, übergab Lamers den mit 1000 Euro dotierten ersten Preis des Stiftungs-Wettbewerbs 2021 an die junge Ukrainerin Veronika Horchakova. Die Masterstudentin des europäischen und internationalen Business-Rechts erhielt den Zuschlag für ihre Arbeit zu der Frage, welchen Beitrag die baltischen Staaten Estland, Lettland und Litauen für die Stärkung der transatlantischen Beziehungen leisten können.

Zuvor hatte Lamers vor rund 150 Studierenden und 20 Mitgliedern des diplomatischen Korps eine Rede gehalten, in der er scharf den Bruch aller Regeln des Völkerrechts in der Ukraine und zahlreicher, auch von Russland unterzeichneter Verträge sowie die Zerstörung der auf Kooperation angelegten europäischen Si-



Karl A. Lamers (2. v. r.) mit Preisträgerin Veronika Horchakova (2. v. l.), Universitätsrektorin Inga Zaleniene (l.) und Professor Virgis Valentinavicius. Foto: privat

cherheitsarchitektur verurteilte. Russlands Präsident Wladimir Putin habe sich jedoch getäuscht, meinte Lamers. Denn der Westen stehe zusammen – in der EU und in der Nato. Das sei letztlich ein Lehrstück für den russischen Diktator. Nach

einer Begegnung mit der belarussischen Bürgerrechtlerin Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, mit der er sich eingehend über das Schicksal ihres Landes austauschte, traf Lamers den litauischen Staatspräsidenten Gitanas Nausėda und dessen Chefberaterin Asta Skaisgirytė zu einem längeren Gespräch. Nausėda war erst kürzlich mit seinen Kollegen aus Estland, Lettland und Polen zu einem Gespräch mit dem ukrainischen Staatspräsidenten Wolodymyr Selenskyj nach Kiew gereist.

Auf Einladung des Präsidenten der Parlamentarischen Versammlung der Nato, Gerry Connolly, ist Lamers inzwischen nach Litauen zurückgekehrt, um an der diesjährigen Frühjahrstagung der Parlamentarischen Versammlung teilzunehmen.

## Weil Frieden und Freiheit nicht selbstverständlich sind

*Friedensstiftung von Karl A. Lamers zeichnete erneut Schüler für herausragende Arbeiten aus*



Joshua Kumbartzki vom Bunsengymnasium (Mitte) nahm mit Schulleiter Volker Nürk die Urkunde für den ersten Preis von Karl A. Lamers (r.) entgegen. Foto: zg

os. „Die Krisen in der Welt bekämpfen – im Kleinen beginnen“ war das Motto des jüngsten Wettbewerbs, den die Friedensstiftung des ehemaligen CDU-Bundestagsabgeordneten Karl A. Lamers 2022 für Schülerinnen und Schüler der siebten und achten Klassen in den zwölf Städten und Gemeinden seines ehemaligen Wahlkreises Heidelberg/Weinheim ausgeschrieben hatte. Die Schüler waren aufgerufen, eine Zeichnung oder einen Aufsatz zu diesem Motto einzureichen. Jetzt übergab der Stifter persönlich die Preise.

Der heutige Honorarkonsul der Republik Estland hatte die Stiftung 2018 mit dem Ziel gegründet, Menschen schon in jungen Jahren zu vermitteln, dass Frieden, Freiheit und Rechtsstaat nicht selbstverständlich sind, sondern dass täglich um sie gerungen werden muss. Und er zeigte sich auch jetzt hochofregt, dass sich wieder Schülerinnen und Schüler an die Arbeit gemacht und an dem Wettbewerb teilgenommen hatten. Für Lamers sind dies erfreuliche Zeichen, gerade in dieser Zeit. Dabei verweist er vor allem auf den „barbarischen Angriffskrieg“ Russlands gegen einen unabhängigen, souveränen Staat, die Ukraine, die er selbst mehrmals besucht hat und mit deren ehemaligen Parlamentskolleginnen und -kollegen er weiter in persönlichem Kontakt steht. Dieser Krieg zeige, wie gefährdet und fragil der Frieden in der Welt sei.

Lamers sieht auch Demokratien immer stärker von innen und außen herausgefordert. Der Sturm auf das Kapitol in Washington am 6. Januar 2021 und kürzlich in Brasilien auf das Parlament, den Präsidentenpalast und den Obersten Gerichtshof sowie hierzulande die Angriffe von „Reichsbürgern“ auf den Rechtsstaat zeigten, „dass wir wachsam bleiben müssen“. Junge Menschen in Deutschland haben dem ehemaligen Abgeordneten zufolge bislang in ihrem Leben zum Glück nur Frieden in einer freiheitlichen Gesellschaftsordnung erleben dürfen. Mit seiner Friedensstiftung will er ihren Sinn schärfen und ihre Aufmerksamkeit darauf lenken, „dass wir für unsere Werte eintreten müssen“. Zugleich müssten sie erkennen, dass autoritäre und diktatorische Staaten wie Russland, Iran und auch China alles daran setzten, die freiheitlichen Staaten zu unterminieren und die regelbasierte Ordnung in der Welt zu zerstören. Dem gelte es entgegenzuwirken und dafür solle die Friedensstiftung einen Beitrag leisten.

„Wir haben nur eine Chance, wenn wir die Köpfe und Herzen gerade auch der jungen Menschen gewinnen“, betonte Lamers nach seinen persönlichen Besuchen in den Schulen, wo er Preise und Urkunden übergab und in Gesprächen mit Preisträgern und Schulleitern für die Ideen seiner Friedensstiftung warb. Der mit 600 Euro dotierte erste Preis ging an den Schüler Joshua Kumbartzki vom Heidelberger Bunsengymnasium, der zweite Preis (500 Euro) an Akshita Gudla und Sonja Exmann vom Heidelberger Privatschulzentrum (HPC) und der dritte Preis (400 Euro) an Nea Brunn vom Dietrich-Bonhoeffer-Gymnasium in Weinheim. Iga Ciereszko und Hanna Sauer vom HPC teilen sich den vierten Preis (300 Euro); außerdem kann sich Johanne Kuhr vom Bunsengymnasium über den fünften Preis (200 Euro) freuen. Lamers dankte allen Teilnehmern für ihr Engagement und kündigte für Februar schon den nächsten Wettbewerb für das Schuljahr 2023 an.

Zuvor hatte der Stifter in Vilnius bereits Arbeiten von Studierenden aus Litauen, der Ukraine und Georgien ausgezeichnet, für die ein Wettbewerb an der Mykolas-Romeris-Universität in Litauen ausgeschrieben worden war. Hier ging es um das Thema „Die Nato und der russisch-ukrainische Konflikt: Was steht für die baltischen Staaten auf dem Spiel?“. Außerdem hatte Lamers auf der Herbsttagung der Parlamentarischen Versammlung der Nato in Madrid Preisträger aus den 30 Nato-Staaten ausgezeichnet. Sie hatten Essays zu der Frage geschrieben, welches die zwei wichtigsten Lektionen sind, die die Nato aus dem Angriff Russlands auf die Ukraine lernen soll.

## Entschlossen an der Seite der Ukraine

Karl A. Lamers traf in Litauen mit Regierungschefin Ingrida Simonytė zusammen – Er übergab zudem die Preise seiner Friedensstiftung

Von Fritz Quoss

**Heidelberg/Vilnius.** Große Wertschätzung erfuhr kürzlich der langjährige Heidelberger CDU-Bundestagsabgeordnete und Nato-Parlamentarier Karl A. Lamers, als ihn die Regierungschefin der Republik Litauen, Ingrida Simonytė, zu einem Gedankenaustausch in ihren Amtssitz in Vilnius empfing.

„Dass sie sich bei ihrem vollen Terminkalender eine ganze Stunde Zeit dafür nahm, ist schon außergewöhnlich, gab uns zugleich aber auch die Möglichkeit, alle aktuellen Fragen der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik in der Region und weltweit zu besprechen“, berichtet Lamers nach seiner Rückkehr. Er sei beeindruckt von ihrer entscheidungsfreudigen Politik und der Klarheit ihrer Konzepte.

Dass Litauen – gemeinsam mit Estland und Lettland – seit Beginn des russischen Angriffskriegs die Ukraine in ihrem Abwehrkampf massiv unterstützt, nötigt Lamers besonderen Respekt ab. „Was sie haben, schicken sie den Ukrainern. Was sie können, machen sie – und zwar immer sehr schnell“, lobt Lamers. Die litauische Regierungschefin und er würdigten auch die

Entscheidung von Verteidigungsminister Boris Pistorius (SPD), sobald als möglich eine Brigade deutscher Soldaten permanent in Litauen zu stationieren. Mit der Entsendung von 4000 Soldatinnen und Soldaten und deren Familien sehe Russlands Präsident Wladimir Putin, dass Deutschland und die Nato es mit der Verteidigung der Ostflanke ernst meinten. Das Signal sei klar, dass im Falle eines Angriffs auf einen Nato-Staat dies den Bündnisfall für alle auslöse.

„Was sie haben,  
schicken sie“

Nachdem Lamers der Regierungschefin dabei zuhörte, wie sie aus dem Nähkästchen über den jüngsten Nato-Gipfel in Vilnius berichtete, folgte sie mit Interesse seinem Bericht über die sicherheitspolitische Debatte in Deutschland. Lamers selbst zählt zu denjenigen, die zum Beispiel eine rasche Lieferung von Taurus-Marschflugkörpern fordern, um die Ukraine in die Lage zu versetzen, sich effektiv gegen die brutalen russischen Angriffe zur Wehr setzen zu können. Jedes Zuwarten, davon ist Lamers überzeugt, kostet Menschenleben.

Unmittelbar nach seiner Ankunft in Vilnius war Lamers vom neuen deutschen Botschafter Cornelius Zimmermann empfangen worden, der erst einen Tag zuvor

mit seinem Antrittsbesuch bei Staatspräsident Gitanas Nausėda sein Amt übernommen hatte. Stark beachtet war dann die Rede, die Lamers anlässlich der Eröffnung des neuen akademischen Jahres an der Mykolas Romeris University (MRU) hielt. Im Rahmen eines Festakts, an dem auch der ehemalige Präsident Litauens,

Vytautas Landsbergis, teilnahm, appellierte Lamers an die Studierenden, ihre Chancen zu einer großartigen Ausbildung in einem freien Land zu nutzen.

„In Euren Händen liegt die Zukunft“, rief er den Studierenden zu, bevor er zusammen mit der Rektorin der Universität, Inga Zalėnienė, Preise an drei Studierende überreichte, die in diesem Jahr erfolgreich an der Ausschreibung der „Dr. Karl A. Lamers Friedensstiftung“ an der MRU teilgenommen hatten. Die vor fünf Jahren gegründete Stiftung hat das Ziel, junge Menschen an die Werte von Freiheit, Recht und Demokratie heranzuführen. Gerade in Zeiten eines Krieges sei dies wichtiger denn je, meint der Stifter.

Vor seiner Rückreise traf Lamers erneut mit Swetlana Tichanowskaja zusammen, der Ikone des politischen Widerstands in Belarus. Der Heidelberger gehörte seinerzeit zu den ersten westlichen Parlamentariern, die sie nach der Niederschlagung des Widerstands in Belarus und ihrer Flucht nach Litauen aufgesucht hatten. Beide sind inzwischen freundschaftlich miteinander verbunden. Lamers hat die nach seinen Worten „bemerkenswerte, couragierte Frau“ nach Heidelberg eingeladen, bevor er sie eines Tages in ihrer Heimat besuchen will, wenn Belarus ein freies, demokratisches Land ist.



Die litauische Regierungschefin Ingrida Simonytė empfing Karl A. Lamers zum einseitigen Gedankenaustausch. Foto: zg

# Stummer Zeuge russischer Kriegsverbrechen

Zerschossener ukrainischer Rettungswagen am Uniplatz –  
Karl A. Lamers-Friedensstiftung spendete 3000 Euro



Auch zivile Ziele werden in dem grauenhaften Krieg in der Ukraine immer wieder getroffen. Beispielhaft dafür steht ein zerschossener Krankenwagen. Foto: Arndt

sm. Da stand er auf dem Universitätsplatz als erschütterndes Zeugnis eines grauenhaften Krieges gegen die Ukraine – der zerschossene Krankenwagen aus Derhatschi. Mitten zwischen flanierenden und bei einem Kaffee oder Bier plaudernden Menschen war der von der russischen Armee am 12. März 2022 in dem Vorort von Charkiw zerschossene Rettungswagen am Sonntag vom Verein Fellas for Europe zusammen mit der Deutsch-Ukrainischen Gesellschaft (DUG) platziert worden. Der Fahrer überlebte schwer verletzt, das Krankenhaus wurde zerstört.

Das Wrack, das zurzeit durch viele deutsche Städte zieht, ist ein stummer Zeuge dessen, welche Verbrechen an zivilen Zielen seit dem Beginn des Krieges geschehen. Es soll aber auch Anlass sein, die Gräueltaten nicht nur zu dokumentieren, sondern auch ihre Folgen, so gut es geht, zu mildern. Am besten mit Spenden. „Maria, wir müssen was machen“, hatte ein Mitglied der DUG der Vorsitzenden Maria Melnik gesagt, nachdem er den zerstörten Krankenwagen in Stuttgart gesehen hatte. Und so kam dieser jetzt nach Heidelberg, wo die Spendenbereitschaft groß war. So konnte Karl A. Lamers vor Ort über seine 2018 gegründete Dr. Karl A. Lamers-Friedensstiftung einen Scheck über 3000 Euro überrei-

chen, der ehemalige GAL-Stadtrat Gerd Guntermann eine Summe von 1000 Euro spenden, die Grünen steuerten über Stadtrat Nicolá Lutzmann 500 Euro bei, und auch der Verein Alt-Heidelberg gab 500 Euro.

Das alles lief nicht ohne die Verurteilung des russischen Aggressors ab. „Tag für Tag verstößt Putin gegen das Völkerrecht, Tag für Tag werden in der Ukraine Menschen zu Tode gebombt“, rief Lamers in die kleine Menge, die sich vor dem Autowrack spontan versammelt hatte, „aber Tag für Tag müssen wir deshalb auch unsere Solidarität unter Beweis stellen“, mahnte der ehemalige CDU-Bundestagsabgeordnete an. Das bedeute für ihn, beispielsweise auch die Lieferung von Taurus-Marschflugkörpern in die Ukraine zu genehmigen.

Sein Lob ging an die DUG, die im Rahmen des Geschehens auf dem Universitätsplatz auch für ihre Aktivitäten sammelte, zum Beispiel für Hilfslieferungen in die Ukraine, die sich bisher auf 140 Transporte mit Sach- und Geldspenden summieren. Mit der ukrainischen Nationalhymne wurde der offizielle Teil der Veranstaltung beendet, die bis zum frühen Abend zunehmend Aufmerksamkeit bekam und noch weitere Spenden, sowohl für den Krankenwagen als auch für die DUG, nach sich zog.

## „Wir müssen für unsere Werte eintreten“

Dr. Karl A. Lamers Friedens-Stiftung zeichnete erneut Schüler aus

**Heidelberg.** (os) „Eine Welt ohne Kriege – eine Utopie!“ war das Motto des jüngsten Wettbewerbs, den die Friedens-Stiftung des ehemaligen CDU-Bundestagsabgeordneten Karl A. Lamers 2023 für Schülerinnen und Schüler der siebten bis zwölften Klasse in den zwölf Städten und Gemeinden seines früheren Wahlkreises Heidelberg/Weinheim ausgeschrieben hatte. Sie waren aufgerufen, einen Aufsatz, eine Zeichnung oder einen Filmbeitrag zu diesem Motto einzureichen. Jetzt übergab der Stifter persönlich die Preise, erstmals nach Corona wieder in Anwesenheit aller Ausgezeichneten, ihrer Schulleitungen, Lehrkräfte und teilweise auch ihrer Eltern im Restaurant „Zum Goldenen Schaf“ in Heidelberg.

Der heutige Honorarkonsul der Republik Estland hatte die Stiftung 2018 mit dem Ziel gegründet, Menschen schon in jungen Jahren zu vermitteln, dass Frieden, Freiheit und Rechtsstaat nicht selbstverständlich sind, sondern dass täglich um sie gerungen werden muss. Auch jetzt zeigte er sich hocherfreut über die lebhafteste Teilnahme an dem Wettbewerb, für ihn ein erfreuliches Signal gerade in dieser Zeit, die geprägt ist von dem barbarischen Angriffskrieg Russlands gegen einen unabhängigen, souveränen Staat, die Ukraine, sowie dem brutalen

Überfall der Terrororganisation Hamas auf Israel. Dies zeige, wie gefährdet und fragil der Frieden in der Welt sei.

Junge Menschen in Deutschland haben dem ehemaligen Abgeordneten zufolge bislang zum Glück nur Frieden in einer freiheitlichen Gesellschaftsordnung erleben dürfen. Mit seiner Friedens-Stiftung will er ihren Sinn schärfen und ihre Aufmerksamkeit darauf lenken, „dass wir für unsere Werte eintreten müssen“. Der mit 600 Euro dotierte erste Preis ging an Lily Carolin Hering vom Heidelberger Bunsen-Gymnasium. In ihrem Beitrag weist sie darauf hin, dass zum Beispiel mit den Vereinten Nationen und der Europäischen Union deutliche Zeichen der Hoffnung gesetzt seien. Solange der Wunsch nach Frieden existiere, sei dieser auch erreichbar und müsse deshalb Ziel allen Handelns sein.

Der zweite Preis wurde aus besonderem Anlass an zwei Schüler (zweimal 500 Euro) verliehen, an Atakan Cakir und Lamiji Salkic, ebenfalls vom Bunsen-Gymnasium. Während Cakir sich mit Kant und seiner Schrift „Zum ewigen Frieden“ auseinandersetzt, kann nach Auffassung von Salkic ein die Welt umfassender Frieden nur dann Realität werden, wenn die Ursachen für seine Bedrohung rechtzeitig und effektiv bekämpft werden. Mit dem



Stifter Karl A. Lamers (Fünfter von rechts) mit den geehrten Schülerinnen und Schülern. Foto: os

dritten Preis (300 Euro) wurde Lonit Rustemi vom Heidelberger Helmholtz-Gymnasium für seinen kreativen Textbeitrag ausgezeichnet. In seiner Erzählung berichtet er über ein junges Paar, das in einem Café über mögliche Ursachen des Krieges streitet. In seiner Analyse kommt er zu dem Ergebnis, dass es „in unseren Händen liegt“, für eine friedliche Welt, eine Welt ohne Kriege, zu sorgen.

Über den vierten Preis (300 Euro) freute sich Katinka Marie Thomas vom Bergstraßen-Gymnasium in Hemsbach. In ihrer Erzählung berichtet sie von einem Traum, in dem sie auf Menschen trifft, die schon seit Hunderten von Jahren in Frieden und Freiheit leben. Am nächsten Morgen teilt die Lehrerin der Klasse mit,

das Russland in der Nacht die Ukraine angegriffen habe. Und die Erzählerin fragt sich, ob es Zufall war, dass sie ausgerechnet in dieser Nacht den Traum von einem Weltfriedensfest hatte, und ob eine Welt ohne Krieg unmöglich oder eine Utopie sei.

Freuen konnte sich auch die Klasse 8/9 der Marie-Marcks-Schule in Heidelberg über Platz fünf (200 Euro) für ihren Trickfilm. Am Ende des Films ziehen Herzen über die Soldaten, und sie verlieren ihre Waffen, als wenn ein Zauber sie erfasst hätte. Einen Sonderpreis (300 Euro) verlieh die Jury an Clara Dietrich und Henriette Daun vom Heidelberger Elisabeth-von-Thadden-Gymnasium für eine exzellente Facharbeit, in der sie

sich mit Aufgaben und Zielen sowie Stärken und Schwächen der Vereinten Nationen auseinandersetzen. Als eine wesentliche Schwäche sehen sie das Vetorecht im Sicherheitsrat, und ihr Reformvorschlag lautet, es abzuschaffen. Für Karl A. Lamers war dies Anlass für eine Bitte an Generalsekretär Guterres, sich innerhalb der Vereinten Nationen damit zu befassen. Lamers vertritt seit Langem den Standpunkt, dass es notwendig sei, kriegführenden Staaten im Sicherheitsrat ihr Vetorecht zu nehmen.

Die Preisverleihung fand in einem feierlichen Rahmen statt, mitgeprägt durch das Vokalensemble „Fabulous“ der Musikschule Ladenburg unter der Leitung von Jeanette Friedrich.





STIPENDIUM

## DEUTSCHLANDSTIPENDIEN AN STUDIERENDE VERGEBEN

15. Dezember 2022

### BEI DER FESTLICHEN VERANSTALTUNG WURDE ZUDEM EINE POLITIKWISSENSCHAFTLERIN FÜR IHRE DOKTORARBEIT MIT DEM PREIS DER DR. KARL A. LAMERS FRIEDENS-STIFTUNG AUSGEZEICHNET

Mehr als 160 Studierende der Universität Heidelberg können sich in einer erneut ausgeschriebenen Förderunde über die Unterstützung durch ein Deutschlandstipendium freuen. Im Rahmen einer festlichen Veranstaltung in der Aula der Alten Universität überreichte der Rektor der Ruperto Carola, Prof. Dr. Bernhard Eitel, gemeinsam mit den Förderern die Urkunden. Erstmals verliehen wurde zudem der Preis der Dr. Karl A. Lamers Friedens-Stiftung. Die mit 5.000 Euro dotierte Auszeichnung erhielt Dr. Kerstin Zettl-Schabath für ihre politikwissenschaftliche Dissertation zum Thema Cyberkonflikte.

Das traditionelle Festvortrag hielt Prof. Dr. Manfred Berg, Inhaber der Curt Engelhorn-Stiftungsprofessur für Amerikanische Geschichte am Historischen Seminar der Universität Heidelberg. Mit seiner Ausführungen zum Thema „Frieden, Sicherheit und Freiheit sind die Zehnenden“ spannte er dabei den Bogen zu der neu ins Leben gerufenen Auszeichnung der Dr. Karl A. Lamers Friedens-Stiftung. Ausgezeichnet wurden herausragende Masterstudierende und Wissenschaftler der Universität Heidelberg, die im Rahmen ihrer Abschlussarbeiten, ihrer Juniorprofessur oder Nachwuchsgruppenleitung herausragende Leistungen zum Themenkomplex „Frieden – Freiheit – Sicherheit“ erbracht haben, und die damit neue Impulse für die Forschung liefern und eine hohe gesellschaftliche Relevanz besitzen. Geflohen wird die Auswahl durch dieselbe universitätsinterne Kommission, welche auch für das Deutschlandstipendium zuständig ist.



Prof. Dr. Dr. Karl A. Lamers (rechts) mit Preisträgerin Dr. Kerstin Zettl-Schabath und Rektor Prof. Dr. Bernhard Eitel. (© J. G. Bommert)

Die erste Preisträgerin, Dr. Zettl-Schabath, wurde am Institut für Politische Wissenschaft der Ruperto Carola zum Thema „Proxy im staatlichen Cyberkonfliktstrateg“ promoviert. Ihre Dissertation ist eine vergleichende Analyse der Vorkonflikte China, Russland, der USA und Israel. Aktuell ist die Wissenschaftlerin Teil des an der Universität Heidelberg koordinierten internationalen Forschungskonsortiums „European Repository of Cyber Incidents“, das zum besseren Verständnis der Bedrohungslage durch Cyber-Vorfälle beitragen soll. Das unabhängige Konsortium wird vom Auswärtigen Amt und dem Deutschen Außenministerium gefördert. Die Urkunde überreichte Prof. Dr. Dr. Karl A. Lamers, dessen Stiftung den Preis auslobt hat.



STUDIUM

# 170 STUDIERENDE ERHALTEN DEUTSCHLANDSTIPENDIUM

20. Dezember 2023

## FESTLICHE VERANSTALTUNG ZUR ÜBERGABE DER STIPENDIENURKUNDEN – PREIS DER DR. KARL A. LAMERS FRIEDENS-STIFTUNG AN STUDENTIN DER POLITIKWISSENSCHAFTEN VERGEBEN

„Das Deutschlandstipendium zeigt die ganze Vielfalt der Universität Heidelberg, da es für alle Studierenden sämtlicher Fachrichtungen offensteht“, so die Rektorin der Ruperto Carola, Prof. Dr. Frauke Melchior: Im Rahmen einer festlichen Veranstaltung in der Aula der Alten Universität überreichte sie gemeinsam mit den Förderern die Stipendienurkunden. 170 Studierende können sich in einer neuen Förderrunde über die Unterstützung durch ein Deutschlandstipendium freuen. Das Stipendienprogramm richtet sich an Studierende aller Nationalitäten, die hervorragende Leistungen in Studium und Beruf erwarten lassen oder bereits erbracht haben. Zudem erhielt Laura Henselmann den Preis der Dr. Karl A. Lamers Friedens-Stiftung, die herausragende Arbeiten zum Themenkomplex „Frieden – Freiheit – Sicherheit“ würdigt.

## Universität Heidelberg 2023 (Fortsetzung)

Die Laudatio auf die diesjährige Preisträgerin hielt Prof. Dr. Silke Hertel, Prorektorin für Studium und Lehre und zugleich Vorsitzende der Auswahlkommission. Laura Henselmann erhielt die zum zweiten Mal vergebene Auszeichnung für ihre am Institut für Politikwissenschaften entstandene Masterarbeit „Emotional Climates in the Beirut Blast Anniversary Protests“. Sie widmet sich darin der Fragestellung, inwiefern die Jahrestage nach dem traumatischen Explosionsereignis am 4. August 2020 im Hafen der Hauptstadt Beirut das kollektive Protesthandeln im Libanon beeinflusst haben. Überreicht wurde die Urkunde von Prof. h.c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers, dessen Stiftung den mit 5.000 Euro dotierten Preis trägt.



Prof. h.c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers (rechts) mit Preisträgerin Laura Henselmann und Rektorin Prof. Dr. Frauke Melchior | © Sabine Arndt

Ich danke allen Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmern der **Schulen in meinem ehemaligen Wahlkreis** Heidelberg/Weinheim für die Teilnahme an den Ausschreibungen in den letzten fünf Jahren. Mein besonderer Dank gilt den Schulleiterinnen und Schulleitern sowie der Lehrerschaft für den ausgezeichneten Kontakt und ihre Hilfe bei allen Ausschreibungen.

An der **Mykolas Romeris Universität (MRU) in Vilnius, Litauen**, haben viele Studentinnen und Studenten aus zahlreichen Ländern an den Ausschreibungen teilgenommen. Mein besonderer Dank gilt Herrn Prof. Dr. Gintaras Aleknonis, der den engen Kontakt zur MRU aufgebaut und die Ausschreibungen ins Leben gerufen hat. Danken möchte ich auch der Rektorin der MRU, Prof. Dr. Inga Žalėnienė, mit der mich bis zum heutigen Tag ein sehr enger, freundschaftlicher Kontakt verbindet. Darüber hinaus schätze ich die hervorragende Arbeit von Prof. Dr. Virginijus Valentinavičius, der seit vielen Jahren der engagierte Koordinator des Teams von Experten an der Mykolas Romeris Universität ist. Respekt an sie alle für ihre großartige Arbeit und die Unterstützung.

Bei der **Parlamentarischen Versammlung der NATO**, die mir von 2019 bis 2022 die Möglichkeit gab, die Ausschreibungen in allen Mitgliedsstaaten der NATO zu bewerben, bedanke ich mich sehr herzlich für die gute Unterstützung.

Von 2024 an werden die Preise in Zusammenarbeit mit der **Deutschen Atlantischen Gesellschaft (DAG)**, der **Youth Atlantic Treaty Association Germany (YATA Germany)** und der **Youth Atlantic Treaty Association International (YATA)** vergeben.

Seit 2022 vergibt die Friedensstiftung jährlich einen Sonderpreis an der **Universität Heidelberg** für besonders herausragende Arbeiten auf dem Gebiet der Sicherheit.

Magnifizienz Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Bernhard Eitel und seiner Nachfolgerin, Magnifizienz Prof. Dr. Frauke Melchior, danke ich von Herzen für diese Möglichkeit und Jochen Ridinger für die stets perfekte Vorbereitung.

Den Mitgliedern des **Vorstands**, der Geschäftsführerin Monika Becker und ihrer Assistentin Bruni Hähnel sowie den Mitgliedern der **Jury** unter Leitung von Sönke Asmussen gilt mein herzlicher Dank für ihr leidenschaftliches Engagement.

Nicht zuletzt danke ich allen Sponsoren der Dr. Karl A. Lamers Friedens-Stiftung, die mit ihrer Spende einen wesentlichen Beitrag zum Aufbau und zum Erfolg der Stiftung leisten und das Stiftungsziel, die Friedensförderung, nachhaltig unterstützen.

*I express my gratitude to all participants from the **schools in my former constituency** of Heidelberg/Weinheim for taking part in the competitions in the past five years. My special thanks go to the school headmasters and teachers for the excellent contact and their help with all the calls for tenders.*

*At **Mykolas Romeris University (MRU) in Vilnius, Lithuania**, many students from numerous countries took part in the essay competitions. My special thanks go to Prof. Dr. Gintaras Aleknonis, who established close connection with MRU and initiated the competitions. I am also thankful to the current Rector of the MRU, Prof. Dr. Inga Žalėnienė, for our very close and friendly contact. Further, I highly appreciate the great work of Prof. Dr. Virginijus Valentinavičius who is the dedicated coordinator of the team of experts at Mykolas Romeris University since many years. Respect to all of them for their amazing work and support.*

*I would like to thank the **NATO Parliamentary Assembly**, which gave me the opportunity to promote the call for papers in all NATO member states from 2019 to 2022, for their excellent support.*

*From 2024 onwards, the prizes will be awarded in cooperation with the **German Atlantic Association (DAG)**, the **Youth Atlantic Treaty Association Germany (YATA Germany)** and the **Youth Atlantic Treaty Association International (YATA)**.*

Since 2022, the Peace Foundation has awarded an annual special prize at the Heidelberg University for particularly outstanding works in the field of security.

I would like to sincerely thank Magnificence Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Bernhard Eitel and his successor Magnificence Prof. Dr. Frauke Melchior for this opportunity and Jochen Ridinger for the always perfect preparation.

My heartfelt thanks go to the members of the **Executive Board**, Managing Director Monika Becker and her assistant Bruni Hähnel, as well as the members of the **jury** headed by Sönke Asmussen for their passionate commitment.

Last but not least, I would like to thank all the sponsors of the Dr. Karl A. Lamers Peace-Foundation, whose donation makes a significant contribution to the development and success of the foundation and sustainably supports the foundation's goal of promoting peace.



Dominique und Raimund Gründler | Gabriela und Dr. Ulrich Naumann



# LISTE DER GEWINNERINNEN UND GEWINNER | LIST OF WINNERS

| <b>Titel   Name</b><br><b>Title   Name</b> | <b>Institution</b><br><b>institution</b>                   | <b>Jahr des Gewinns</b><br><b>Year of winning</b> | <b>Seite</b><br><b>Page</b>          |
|--|--|---|--------------------------------------|
| Klasse 7                                   | Schiller-Gemeinschaftsschule   Hemsbach   Deutschland      | 2019  | <b>19</b>                            |
| Klasse 8                                   | Heinrich-Sigmund-Gymnasium   Schriesheim   Deutschland     | 2020  | <b>54</b>                            |
| Klasse 8b                                  | Werkrealschule Unterer Neckar   Ladenburg   Deutschland    | 2019  | <b>15</b>                            |
| Klasse 8d                                  | Elisabeth-von-Thadden-Gymnasium   Heidelberg   Deutschland | 2019  | <b>14</b>                            |
| Klasse 9b                                  | Bergstraßen-Gymnasiums   Hemsbach   Deutschland            | 2020  | <b>48</b>                            |
| Klasse 9c                                  | Gregor-Mendel-Realschule   Heidelberg   Deutschland        | 2020  | <b>55</b>                            |
| Klasse 9d                                  | Elisabeth-von-Thadden-Gymnasium   Heidelberg   Deutschland | 2020  | <b>52</b>                            |
| Tansania AG                                | Elisabeth-von-Thadden-Gymnasium   Heidelberg   Deutschland | 2021  | <b>86</b>                            |
| Abrar Abras                                | Marie-Marcks Schule   Heidelberg   Deutschland             | 2023  | <b>155</b>                           |
| Kipras Adomaitis                           | Mykolas Romeris University   Vilnius   Litauen             | 2019<br>2020                                      | <b>28</b><br><b>57</b>               |
| Laura Antanavičiūtė                        | Mykolas Romeris University   Vilnius   Litauen             | 2019  | <b>33</b>                            |
| Katrin Arndt                               | Bergstraßen-Gymnasium Hemsbach   Deutschland               | 2021  | <b>91</b>                            |
| Ceren Atmaca                               | Marie-Marcks Schule   Heidelberg   Deutschland             | 2023  | <b>155</b>                           |
| Imre Bartal                                | NATO   Ungarn  | 2019  | <b>38</b>                            |
| Peer K. Braak                              | NATO   Frankreich  | 2021  | <b>109</b>                           |
| Nea Brunn                                  | Dietrich-Bonhoeffer-Gymnasium   Weinheim   Deutschland     | 2022  | <b>121</b>                           |
| Atalaya Cabas                              | Marie-Marcks Schule   Heidelberg   Deutschland             | 2023  | <b>155</b>                           |
| Atakan Cakir                               | Bunsen-Gymnasium   Heidelberg   Deutschland                | 2023  | <b>151</b>                           |
| Iga Ciereszko                              | Heidelberger Privatschulzentrum   Heidelberg   Deutschland | 2022  | <b>122</b>                           |
| Henriette Daun                             | Elisabeth-von-Thadden-Gymnasium   Heidelberg   Deutschland | 2023  | <b>156</b>                           |
| Clara Dietrich                             | Elisabeth-von-Thadden-Gymnasium   Heidelberg   Deutschland | 2023  | <b>156</b>                           |
| Pierre Dugué                               | NATO   Frankreich  | 2019  | <b>44</b>                            |
| Patryk Dzamans                             | Marie-Marcks Schule   Heidelberg   Deutschland             | 2023  | <b>155</b>                           |
| Sonja Exmann                               | Heidelberger Privatschulzentrum   Heidelberg   Deutschland | 2022  | <b>120</b>                           |
| Caitlin Follo                              | Bergstraßen-Gymnasium Hemsbach   Deutschland               | 2021  | <b>91</b>                            |
| Larissa Fehrke                             | Carl-Engler-Realschule   Hemsbach   Deutschland            | 2019  | <b>16</b>                            |
| Marita Gorgiladze                          | Mykolas Romeris University   Vilnius   Litauen             | 2022  | <b>134</b>                           |
| Stephan Gräfe                              | NATO   Deutschland   | 2020  | <b>81</b>                            |
| Akshita Gudla                              | Heidelberger Privatschulzentrum   Heidelberg   Deutschland | 2022  | <b>120</b>                           |
| Noah Heinemann                             | NATO   Deutschland   | 2022  | <b>139</b>                           |
| Laura Henselmann                           | Universität Heidelberg   Heidelberg   Deutschland          | 2023  | <b>179</b>                           |
| Lily Carolin Hering                        | Bunsen-Gymnasium   Heidelberg   Deutschland                | 2023  | <b>150</b>                           |
| Ivanna Horaichuk                           | Mykolas Romeris University   Vilnius   Litauen             | 2022  | <b>125</b>                           |
| Veronika Horchakova                        | Mykolas Romeris University   Vilnius   Litauen             | 2021  | <b>95</b>                            |
| Davina Jaudes                              | Marie-Marcks Schule   Heidelberg   Deutschland             | 2023  | <b>155</b>                           |
| Eglė Juozėnaitė                            | Mykolas Romeris University   Vilnius   Litauen             | 2020  | <b>63</b>                            |
| Vladimir Komarnickiy                       | Mykolas Romeris University   Vilnius   Litauen             | 2022  | <b>130</b>                           |
| Velislava-Mihaela Krachunova               | NATO   Bulgarien   | 2019<br>2020<br>2021                              | <b>41</b><br><b>74</b><br><b>112</b> |
| Emmelie Kraiter                            | Marie-Marcks Schule   Heidelberg   Deutschland             | 2023  | <b>155</b>                           |
| Johannes Kuhr                              | Bunsen-Gymnasium   Heidelberg   Deutschland                | 2022  | <b>120</b>                           |
| Joshua Kumbartzki                          | Bunsen-Gymnasium   Heidelberg   Deutschland                | 2022  | <b>120</b>                           |
| Vilius Lapis                               | Mykolas Romeris University   Vilnius   Litauen             | 2023  | <b>163</b>                           |

| <b>Titel   Name</b><br><i>Title   Name</i> | <b>Institution</b><br><i>institution</i>                   | <b>Jahr des Gewinns</b><br><i>Year of winning</i> | <b>Seite</b><br><i>Page</i> |
|--|--|---|-----------------------------|
| Tim B. Lienemann                           | NATO   Frankreich  | 2020  | <b>78</b>                   |
| Aida Lorca Arce                            | NATO   Niederlande   | 2022  | <b>142</b>                  |
| Andra Mažrimaitė                           | Mykolas Romeris University   Vilnius   Litauen             | 2023  | <b>172</b>                  |
| Lenny Müller                               | Marie-Marcks Schule   Heidelberg   Deutschland             | 2023  | <b>155</b>                  |
| Sebastian Ohlig                            | St. Raphael-Gymnasium   Heidelberg   Deutschland           | 2019  | <b>20</b>                   |
| Rimvydas Pekauskas                         | Mykolas Romeris University   Vilnius   Litauen             | 2020  | <b>68</b>                   |
| Annika Portuné                             | Dietrich-Bonhoeffer-Gymnasium   Weinheim   Deutschland     | 2021  | <b>85</b>                   |
| Kathrin Rief                               | NATO   Deutschland   | 2022  | <b>144</b>                  |
| Carlotta Ritzhaupt                         | Bunsen-Gymnasium   Heidelberg   Deutschland                | 2021  | <b>89</b>                   |
| Lonit Rrustemi                             | Helmholtz-Gymnasium   Heidelberg   Deutschland             | 2023  | <b>153</b>                  |
| Arnoldas Rutkauskas                        | Mykolas Romeris University   Vilnius   Litauen             | 2021  | <b>104</b>                  |
| Oles Sahan                                 | Mykolas Romeris University   Vilnius   Litauen             | 2021  | <b>100</b>                  |
| Lamija Salkic                              | Bunsen-Gymnasium   Heidelberg   Deutschland                | 2023  | <b>152</b>                  |
| David Santos                               | Carl-Engler-Realschule   Hemsbach   Deutschland            | 2019  | <b>16</b>                   |
| Hannah Sauer                               | Heidelberger Privatschulzentrum   Heidelberg   Deutschland | 2022  | <b>122</b>                  |
| Hasan Sayoufs                              | Marie-Marcks Schule   Heidelberg   Deutschland             | 2023  | <b>155</b>                  |
| Lara Schulz                                | Carl-Engler-Realschule   Hemsbach   Deutschland            | 2019  | <b>16</b>                   |
| Maya Seitz                                 | Bunsen-Gymnasium   Heidelberg   Deutschland                | 2021  | <b>84</b>                   |
| Naile Spasoli                              | Carl-Engler-Realschule   Hemsbach   Deutschland            | 2019  | <b>16</b>                   |
| Fabian Stamm                               | Carl-Engler-Realschule   Hemsbach   Deutschland            | 2019  | <b>16</b>                   |
| Marvin Stahl                               | Marie-Marcks Schule   Heidelberg   Deutschland             | 2023  | <b>155</b>                  |
| Ana Šurpickaja                             | Mykolas Romeris University   Vilnius   Litauen             | 2019  | <b>25</b>                   |
| Faizrou Tchagbelet                         | Bergstraßen-Gymnasium Hemsbach   Deutschland               | 2021  | <b>91</b>                   |
| Katinka Marie Thomas                       | Bergstraßen-Gymnasium   Hemsbach   Deutschland             | 2023  | <b>154</b>                  |
| Volodymyr Tsybka                           | Mykolas Romeris University   Vilnius   Litauen             | 2023  | <b>168</b>                  |
| Alexander Weber                            | NATO   Deutschland   | 2021  | <b>116</b>                  |
| Melina Weißwange                           | Carl-Engler-Realschule   Hemsbach   Deutschland            | 2019  | <b>16</b>                   |
| Dr. Kerstin Zettl-Schabath                 | Universität Heidelberg   Heidelberg   Deutschland          | 2022  | <b>148</b>                  |

## **Redaktion/Koordination |**

### ***Editorial/Coordination***

Monika Becker

Bruni Hähnel

## **Layout/Satz | Layout/Typesetting**

twenty4hrs GmbH

Heppenheimer Straße 13-15

68309 Mannheim/Germany

## **Druck | Print**

Stolzenberger Druck und

Werbung GmbH & Co.KG

In der Gerberswiese 2

69181 Leimen/Germany

Gedruckt in Deutschland.

*Printed in Germany.*

Satzfehler vorbehalten.

*Sentence errors reserved.*

## **Hinweis | Note**

Rechtschreibfehler in den Beiträgen wurden von uns nicht korrigiert.

*We have not corrected any spelling mistakes in the contributions.*











**Dr. Karl A. Lamers Friedens-Stiftung | *Dr. Karl A. Lamers Peace-Foundation***

Vangerowstraße 18/1 | D-69115 Heidelberg

Tel: +49 (0)6221 3 54 54 74 | [geschaeftsstelle@lamers-stiftung.de](mailto:geschaeftsstelle@lamers-stiftung.de)

[www.karl-lamers.de](http://www.karl-lamers.de)