



Deutsche Atlantische Gesellschaft e.V.

Dr. Karl A. Lamers Peace-Foundation

Federal Minister (ret.) / (Bundesminister a.D.) Christian Schmidt

Prof. h. c. Dr. Karl A. Lamers

At the NATO summit experts said:

“NATO is becoming more European.”

What does this mean?

Name:

Sebastian Wagenbrenner

University:

University of the German Armed Forces
(Munich)

Student year group:

2023 Human Resources Management

Table of Contents

1	Introduction.....	1
2	Historical Context	2
3	Political Dimension.....	3
4	Military Dimension	4
5	Economic and Industrial Factors	5
6	Security Environment.....	5
7	Transatlantic Relations.....	7
8	Conclusion	8
	Bibliography.....	10

1 Introduction

At the 2025 NATO summit, a notable remark by several security experts resonated across diplomatic circles: “NATO is becoming more European.” This statement encapsulates a subtle but profound shift within the transatlantic alliance.¹ While NATO has always been a collective defence pact, it has historically been underpinned by U.S. military power, resources, a strategic leadership. Today, in a shifting geopolitical environment characterised by Russia’s ongoing aggression, increasing instability in the Middle East, rising Chinese assertiveness, an unpredictable domestic politics in the United States of America, Europe is stepping into a more assertive role.² The idea of a “more European NATO” can be interpreted in multiple ways. From a structural perspective, it points to Europe’s growing share of NATO’s defence burden, both in terms of financial contributions and operational capacity.³ From a political standpoint, it suggests a gradual rebalancing of influence, where European capitals coordinate more closely to define strategic priorities.⁴ From an industrial perspective, it reflects Europe’s investment in defence production capacity, prompted by the war in Ukraine and reinforced by industrial cooperation frameworks such as the European Defence Fund.⁵ From a cultural and symbolic perspective, it signals that NATO’s identity is adapting. No longer seen merely as a U.S.-led shield, but increasingly as a transatlantic framework in which Europe is an equal partner rather than a junior ally.

The evolution is neither sudden nor without precedent. Since NATO’s founding in 1949, the alliance has adapted to various phases of geopolitical change, from the Cold War to post-Cold War enlargement and now renewed great-power competition. The European “pillar” has been discussed since the 1960s, but only in recent years it gained tangible momentum. The 2025 Hague Summit made this trend explicit, setting concrete targets such as the “5% investment commitment” for defence industrial capacity and increased forward deployments in Eastern Europe.⁶ As a European, and as someone who has served in uniform, I see this shift merely as a

¹ cf. NATO, NATO Summit in The Hague, 2025

² cf. Yaffa, NATO's Existential Moment, in Newyorker, 2025

³ cf. Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank, *Five Key Priorities for NATO after the Summit in The Hague and How to Make Progress*, 2025

⁴ cf. NATO after the Hague Summit, 2025

⁵ cf. Moneycontrol, *Europe Builds for War as Arms Factories Expand at Triple Speed*, 2025; LeMonade, *How the French Arms Industry Is Scaling Up*, 2024

⁶ cf. NATO, The Hague Summit Declaration issued by NATO Heads of State and Government, 2025; Ruitenbergh, NATO allies agree to boost defense spending to 5% at The Hague summit, 2025

policy adjustment but as a generational challenge. A more European NATO will require Europe not only to spend more, but think more strategically, act more decisively, and take on political risk previously deferred to Washington. This is not only about hardware and budgets; this is about the maturity of Europe as a geopolitical actor.

2 Historical Context

When the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was established in April 1949, the immediate context was the emerging Cold War. Western Europe, devastated by the Second World War, was economically weakened and militarily vulnerable. The United States, whose industrial base was intact and whose military capabilities were unmatched, took the lead in guaranteeing the security of Western Europe against the perceived Soviet threat.⁷ In those early decades, the U.S. provided not only the bulk of NATO's nuclear and conventional deterrence but also much of its political direction. The asymmetry was structural. The Marshall Plan had rebuilt European economies, but Washington's commitment to the continent's defence was the keystone. The Korean War (1950-1953) reinforced the urgency of military preparedness, promoting the rearrangement of West Germany and the creation of integrated NATO command structures. By the 1960s, NATO had developed its dual-pillar identity with both political cohesion and military self-sufficiency. France's partial withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command in 1966 highlighted tensions between European strategic autonomy and alliance unity.⁸

The post-Cold War period brought a different set of dynamics. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the immediate existential threat to Europe disappeared. NATO adapted by expanding its membership eastward, integrating former Warsaw Pact states and, later, Baltic republics. This enlargement was accompanied by a shift in operational focus. The alliance engaged in crisis management and out-of-area operations, from Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s to Afghanistan after 2001.⁹ Yet this period also saw a "peace dividend" in Europe, as many NATO members reduced defence budgets, relying on U.S. capabilities for high-end warfare. The United States accounted for roughly 70% of NATO defence spending throughout the 2000s, a disproportion that fostered recurring debates over burden-sharing.¹⁰ Two

⁷ cf. NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty, 2023

⁸ cf. Kimmel, Militarisierung des Marshallplans ab 1950, 2005

⁹ cf. NATO, NATO operations and missions, 2025b

¹⁰ cf. Atlantic Council, A European manifesto: It's time for a New NATO, 2024

developments in the 2010s began to alert the equation. First, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 shattered the post-Cold War security assumption that interstate war in Europe was obsolete. NATO responded with the Readiness Action Plan, enhanced forward presence in Eastern Europe, and renewed emphasis on collective defence.¹¹

3 Political Dimension

The notion of a “European pillar” within NATO is not new. It dates back to the 1690s, when discussions around the European Defence Community and later the Western European union sought to give Europe greater strategic weight within the alliance. However, these efforts were limited by Cold War realities like the U.S. nuclear umbrella and military supremacy which made any substantial European autonomy both politically unnecessary and logically impractical. The post-Cold-War period offered opportunities for Europe to take a more prominent role, but the combination of reduced defence budgets and reliance on U.S. expeditionary capabilities meant that Europe remained, in strategic terms, a junior partner. The geopolitical upheavals of the last decades have given new urgency to the European pillar concept. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 exposed Europe's overreliance on U.S. enablers, from strategic lift to precision munition, and revealed critical shortfalls in ammunition stocks and air defence capability.¹² Simultaneously, shifts in U.S. domestic politics have made European policymakers acutely aware that Washington's strategic focus is increasingly divided between Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific threats.¹³ At the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, allies agreed on a package of measures explicitly framed as strengthening NATO's European Capacity. The “5% investment commitment”. This commitment goes beyond the familiar 2% GDP spending target. Politically, the 2025 summit also reinforced mechanisms for EU-NATO coordination. While the EU remains distinct from NATO in membership and competencies, the two organisations now hold regular joint meetings at the highest political and military levels.¹⁴ Today, key European capitals, notably Paris, Berlin, Warsaw, and London, are increasingly proactive in shaping alliance policy. These are designed to harmonise capability development plans, avoid duplication, and ensure that initiatives such as the EU's Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) complement

¹¹ cf. NATO, Readiness Action Plan, 2025c

¹² cf. NATO, *NATO after the Hague Summit*, 2025

¹³ cf. Yaffa, *NATO's Existential Moment*, 2025

¹⁴ cf. *Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank, Five Key Priorities for NATO after the Summit in The Hague – and How to Make Progress*, 2025

NATO's defence planning process. The growing emphasis on European capacity also reflects a subtle but important shift in political culture. For decades, NATO decision-making often followed a transatlantic dynamic in which Washington set the tone and European allies responded. Today, key European capitals like notably Paris, Berlin, Warsaw, and London, are increasingly proactive in shaping alliance policy. The Hague Summit saw European leaders propose and negotiate major capability initiatives, with the U.S. playing more of a supportive than directive role.

4 Military Dimension

A "more European NATO" is not simply a matter of rhetoric or political will; it manifests most concretely in the alliance's military posture and capability development. Over the past three years, Europe has begun to close some of the most critical capability gaps that were exposed during the early months of the war in Ukraine. Particularly in the areas of air defence, long-range fires, and ammunition production. The allies agreed on expending the forward-deployed multinational battlegroups in Eastern Europe into brigade-sized formations, increasing combat readiness and deterrence credibility. Second, the summit formalised the "5% investment commitment". Several European states are leading by example. Poland has ramped up its defence spending from 2.7% of GDP in 2022 to 4.2% in 2024, with plans to reach 4.7% in 2025, which is the highest percentage of GDP among NATO members.¹⁵ Its procurement program focuses heavily on armoured forces, such as the K2 and Abrams main battle tanks, and advanced air defence systems like Patriot and Narew.¹⁶ Germany, meanwhile, utilised a €100 billion special defence fund (Zeitenwende) to raise its expenditures to €90.6 billion (2.12% of GDP) in 2024, and passed legislation enabling a €500 billion boost to defence and infrastructure budgets.¹⁷ These developments are significant. For decades, the United States provided around 70% of NATO's overall defence expenditure. Increasing European investment helps to balance the ledger, but more importantly, it enables Europe to take the lead in regional contingencies.¹⁸ As the Atlantic Council has argued, a credible European pillar should be able

¹⁵ cf. *NATO, NATO Review - Sharing the Burden, 2025*; *European Parliament, EU Member States' defence budgets, 2024*

¹⁶ cf. *Euro News, Poland's President Vows to Spend 4.7% of GDP on Defence This Year, 2025*

¹⁷ cf. *European Parliament, EU Member States' defence budgets, 2025*; *Ulatowski, The Illusion of Germany's Zeitenwende, 2024*

¹⁸ cf. *Atlantic Council, A European manifesto: It's time for a New NATO, 2024*

to provide at least half of NATO's conventional defence capability in Europe's immediate neighbourhood. Another area of progress is interoperability. NATO has long relied on common standards to ensure that forces from different nations can operate together. In recent years, Europe has invested more heavily in joint training exercises, integrated command structures, and standardised procurement. The 2025 summit reaffirmed the importance of the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) as the central mechanism for aligning national capability goals with alliance requirements.

5 Economic and Industrial Factors

Russia's attack on Ukraine shifted Europe's security order from a "peace dividend" to permanent deterrence. NATO responded with the 2022 Strategic Concept, the DDA framework, and new burden-sharing rules. The EU complements this with ASAP¹⁹, EDIRPA, and EDA initiatives for ammunition production and procurement. Companies like Rheinmetall are expanding plants to strengthen Europe's autonomy.²⁰ Major projects such as the Eurodrone secure long-term capabilities.²¹ Financially, Poland's >4% GDP defence spending and Germany's €100 billion special fund²² mark turning points. Linguistically, the shift from "peace dividend" to "war economy" is striking. These decisions create path dependencies: investments in power plants or drones embed a Europe of resilience that must be reconciled with the principles of a liberal order.²³

6 Security Environment

The push towards a more European NATO emerges against a complex and diverse security environment. NATO's concept of hybrid threats, a blend of military and non-military methods like disinformation, cyberattacks, economic coercion, and irregular armed actors, is central to understanding these risks. These tactics aim to destabilize societies while remaining below the

¹⁹ cf. European Commission, Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), o. J.

²⁰ cf. Rheinmetall, Ceremonial handover of new ammunition factory in Hungary, 2024a; Rheinmetall, Rheinmetall builds new ammunition plant in Germany, 2024b; Rheinmetall, Artillery ammunition for international customers, 2025

²¹ cf. OCCAR, MALE RPAS - medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft System, o. J.-a

²² cf. Dorn et al., Zeitenwende in der Verteidigungspolitik?, 2022

²³ cf. European Commission, Around €2 billion to strengthen EU's defence industry readiness, 2024; European Parliament, EU Member State defence expenditure, 2025a; NATO, Strategic Concepts, 2022a

threshold of traditional war, making them particularly insidious.²⁴ European nations and NATO have taken a structured approach to countering these hybrid threats. Since 2016, the Cyber Defence Pledge has encouraged investments and training in cyber infrastructure. NATO established the Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, provides annual Locked Shield exercises, and recently founded a Cyberspace Operations Centre to coordinate cyber activities.²⁵ To bolster societal resilience, NATO and the EU collaborate on defensive strategies. The NATO-EU cooperation on hybrid threats, including coordinated exercises and shared alert systems like NIS2 and the Strategic Communication task forces, demonstrates a recognition that military responses alone cannot counter these emergent challenges.²⁶ Regionally, threat perceptions vary across Europe. Eastern Europe continues to view Russia as the principal threat, driven by proximity and recent aggression. Southern Europe faces instability emanating from the Middle East and North Africa, including fragile states in the Sahel, migration flows, and terrorism. Northern Europe, particularly the Arctic and High North, is confronted with melting ice facilitating new sea lanes, resource competition, and rising great-power rivalry. In the Arctic, the idea of “Arctic exceptionalism”, the notion of region insulated from geopolitical rivalry, is collapsing. Climate change and geopolitics have made it a strategic stress-test, with great power competition accelerating. Russia’s military buildup, China’s interests, and diminished multilateral governance explain why Nordic states now prioritise defence coordination alongside NATO.²⁷ Research further shows that NATO members in High North differ in their approaches. Norway prioritizes Arctic security, while Finland and Sweden balance Baltic defence and Nordic cooperation; all acknowledge the need for cooperation but in institutional preferences (EU vs. NATO).²⁸ The variety of security perceptions across Europe highlights both strength and challenge. While regional nuances compel Europe to tailor response, ironically, the result is more holistic European security mindset. The Arctic, once seen as academic or obscure, now symbolizes our collective fragility, but also our capability to adapt. The security of one region is increasingly inseparable from that of another.

²⁴ cf. NATO, Countering hybrid threats, 2024

²⁵ cf. OSW - Centre for eastern studies, *Towards Greater Resilience*, 2020

²⁶ cf. International Centre for Defence and Security, NATO-EU Cooperation in the Context of Hybrid Threats, 2016; European Council, *Hybrid Threats*, 2025

²⁷ cf. European Union Institute for Security Studies, *Arctic Stress Test*, 2020

²⁸ cf. Atlantic Council, *All security is local*, 2022

7 Transatlantic Relations

The transatlantic relations remain the backbone of NATO, yet it is undergoing significant strain and transformation. The United States has consistently been the largest contributor to NATO's collective defence, accounting for around 68% of total alliance defence spending as of 2023.²⁹ This structural imbalance has long raised questions about European dependency on American security guarantees. The war in Ukraine intensified these debates. On one hand, U.S. leadership, through military aid, intelligence sharing, and reinforcement of NATO's eastern flank, demonstrated Washington's indispensable role. On the other, concerns emerged about the sustainability of this commitment, particularly in light of growing U.S. strategic competition with China. As CSIS notes, while the U.S. continues to uphold its commitments, Europe must now step up its defence capabilities to match changing global responsibilities. Scholars have observed that Washington increasingly views Europe as a "secondary theatre", with the Indo-Pacific as its primary focus. European leaders have responded with varying strategies. France continues to emphasize strategic autonomy, seeking to ensure Europe can act independently if U.S. attention wanes. Germany, by contrast, stresses the importance of strengthening NATO cohesion, as underscored by Chancellor Scholz's *Zeitenwende* speech.³⁰

Meanwhile, Eastern European states, especially Poland and the Baltic countries, push for an enduring and robust U.S. presence, seeing Washington as the ultimate guarantor of deterrence. Institutionally, NATO has sought to balance these dynamics. The 2022 Strategic Concept reaffirmed the alliance's commitment to both the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific, recognizing China as a "system challenge" while maintaining Russia as the most direct threat.³¹ This dual orientation reflects an evolving bargain: Europe must invest more in its own defence to keep the U.S. engaged, while the U.S. commits to NATO's credibility as part of its global posture. Transatlantic relations are also shaped by political uncertainty. American electoral cycles create anxieties in Europe about the durability of U.S. commitments. The debate surrounding U.S. military aid to Ukraine in Congress during 2023-2024 exemplified the fragility

²⁹ cf. NATO, Defence expenditures and NATO's 5% commitment, 2025

³⁰ cf. Bergmann et al., *Transforming European Defense*, 2022; Simón, *Strategic studies quarterly - Europe as a Secondary Theatre?*, 2021

³¹ cf. NATO, *Strategic Concepts*, 2022

of bipartisan consensus.³² European policymakers thus face a dilemma. While They seek to “Europeanize” NATO, they must also maintain the U.S. anchor that underpins deterrence.

8 Conclusion

The trajectory towards a more European NATO reflects a convergence of strategic necessity, industrial adaption, and political will. The war in Ukraine has served as the ultimate catalyst, bringing an end to decades of underinvestment and the “peace dividend”. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept reaffirmed the alliance’s purpose of collective defence, outlining deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security as its core task. This strategic orientation underscores the central message that Europe must become not only a consumer of security but also a primary guarantor of it.

Industrial and economic shifts reinforce this reality. Initiatives such as the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and EDIRPA hav laid the foundation for a revitalized European defence industrial base.³³ National efforts, including Germany’s Rheinmetall investments and France’s Nexter expansions, point to a genuine momentum the contracts with the inertia of previous decades.³⁴ At the same time, flagship project like the Eurodrone or the Future Combat Air System illustrate both the ambition and the difficulty of pan-European defence cooperation.³⁵ Politically, Europe is gradually redefining its role. The NATO-EU joint declarations since 2016, and most recently in 2023, demonstrate that institutional cooperation is no longer optional but essential.³⁶ National strategies diverge – Germanys Zeitenwende, France’s strategic autonomy, Poland’s defence surge – but together they point towards the same outcome: a stronger European pillar with NATO.³⁷ Enlargement with Finland and Sweden has further consolidated the alliance’s northern flank, reflecting NATO’s enduring adaptability. Yet challenges remain. Regional threat perceptions from Russia in the east, to instability in the south of Arctic tensions in the north, complicate the creation of a unified strategy. Above all,

³² cf. Tausendfreund, US elections and European cohesion, 2024

³³ cf. European Commission, Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), 2024

³⁴ cf. Rheinmetall, Rheinmetall Builds New Ammunition Plant in Germany, o. J.

³⁵ cf. OCCAR, *MALE RPAS - medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft System*, o. J.

³⁶ cf. NATO, Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation, 2023

³⁷ cf. Simonet, The third EU-NATO joint declaration, 2023

the transatlantic relations remain indispensable. U.S. military power and leadership are unmatched, but American attention is increasingly split with the Indo-Pacific.³⁸

Europe's ability to shoulder greater responsibility is therefore not an alternative to transatlantic solidarity but its precondition.

³⁸ cf. *European Parliament, The Third Joint EU-NATO Declaration*, o. J.

Bibliography

- Auerswald, D. (2022). All security is local: Arctic defense policies and domain awareness. *Atlantic Council*. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/all-security-is-local-arctic-defense-policies-and-domain-awareness/>
- Bergmann, M., Wall, C., Monaghan, S., & Morcos, P. (2022). *Transforming European Defense*. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/transforming-european-defense>
- Bezaf, J.-M., & Malécot, V. (2024). *How the French arms industry is scaling up*. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/economy/article/2024/04/20/how-the-french-arms-industry-is-scaling-up_6668967_19.html
- Dorn, F., Potrafke, N., & Schlepper, M. (2022). *Zeitenwende in der Verteidigungspolitik? 100 Mrd. Euro Sondervermögen für die Bundeswehr – (k)ein großer Wurf*. <https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/sd-2022-sonderausgabe-april-potrafke-et-al-sondervermoegen-bundeswehr.pdf>
- Euronews. (2025). *Poland's president vows to spend 4.7% of GDP on defence this year*. Euronews. <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/02/05/polands-president-vows-to-spend-47-of-gdp-on-defence-this-year>
- Europe builds for war as arms factories expand at triple speed*. (2025). Moneycontrol. <https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/europe-builds-for-war-as-arms-factories-expand-at-triple-speed-13441988.html>
- European Commission. (o. J.-a). *Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP)*. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en
- European Commission. (o. J.-b). *Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP)*. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/asap-boosting-defence-production_en
- European Commission. (2024). *Around €2 billion to strengthen EU's defence industry readiness, including to ramp up ammunition production to 2 million per year in 2025*. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/around-eu2-billion-strengthen-eus-defence-industry-readiness-including-ramp-ammunition-production-2-2024-03-15_en
- European Council. (2025). *Hybrid threats*. Consilium. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/hybrid-threats/>
- European Parliament. (o. J.). *The third joint EU-NATO declaration*. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2023/739333/EPRS_ATA\(2023\)739333_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2023/739333/EPRS_ATA(2023)739333_EN.pdf)
- European Parliament. (2025a). *EU Member State defence expenditure*. Epthinktank. <https://epthinktank.eu/2025/05/07/eu-member-states-defence-budgets/eu-member-state-defence-expenditure/>
- European Parliament. (2025b). *EU Member States' defence budgets*. <https://epthinktank.eu/2025/05/07/eu-member-states-defence-budgets/>
- European Union Institute for Security Studies. (2020). *Arctic stress test*. <https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/arctic-stress-test>

European Union Institute for Security Studies. (2025a). *NATO after the Hague summit: Building the European pillar*. <https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/commentary/nato-after-hague-summit-building-european-pillar>

European Union Institute for Security Studies. (2025b). *NATO after the Hague summit: Building the European pillar*. <https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/commentary/nato-after-hague-summit-building-european-pillar>

Five key priorities for NATO after the summit in The Hague – and how to make progress | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank. (2025a). <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/06/five-key-priorities-nato-after-summit-hague-and-how-make-progress>

Five key priorities for NATO after the summit in The Hague – and how to make progress | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank. (2025b, März 19). <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/06/five-key-priorities-nato-after-summit-hague-and-how-make-progress>

International Centre for Defence and Security. (2016). *NATO–EU Cooperation in the Context of Hybrid Threats*. ICDS. <https://icds.ee/en/natoeu-cooperation-in-the-context-of-hybrid-threats/>

J. Cookson. (2024). *A European manifesto: It's time for a New NATO*. *Atlantic Council*. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-european-manifesto-its-time-for-a-new-nato/>

Kimmel, D. E. (2005). *Militarisierung des Marshallplans ab 1950*. bpb.de. <https://www.bpb.de/themen/nachkriegszeit/marshallplan/40059/militarisierung-des-marshallplans-ab-1950/>

NATO. (2022a). *Strategic Concepts*. NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm

NATO. (2022b). *Strategic Concepts*. NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm

NATO. (2023a). *Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*. NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_210549.htm

NATO. (2023b). *The North Atlantic Treaty*. NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm

NATO. (2024). *Countering hybrid threats*. NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_156338.htm

NATO. (2025a). *Defence expenditures and NATO's 5% commitment*. NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm

NATO. (2025b). *NATO operations and missions*. NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm

NATO. (2025c). *Readiness Action Plan*. NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_119353.htm

NATO. (2025d). *Sharing the burden: How Poland and Germany are shifting the dial on European defence expenditure*. NATO Review. <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2025/04/14/sharing-the-burden-how-poland-and-germany-are-shifting-the-dial-on-european-defence-expenditure/>

NATO. (2025e). *The Hague Summit Declaration issued by NATO Heads of State and Government*. NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_236705.htm

OCCAR. (o. J.). *MALE RPAS - medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft System*. <https://www.occar.int/our-work/programmes/male-rpas-medium-altitude-long-endurance-remotely-piloted-aircraft-system>

OSW Centre for Eastern Studies. (2020). *Towards greater resilience: NATO and the EU on hybrid threats*. OSW Centre for Eastern Studies. <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2020-04-24/towards-greater-resilience-nato-and-eu-hybrid-threats>

OSW Centre for Eastern Studies. (2025). *NATO summit in The Hague: Trump's return and a two-component 5% of GDP on defence*. OSW Centre for Eastern Studies. <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2025-06-26/nato-summit-hague-trumps-return-and-a-two-component-5-gdp>

Rheinmetall. (2024a). *Ceremonial handover of new ammunition factory in Hungary*. Rheinmetall. <https://www.rheinmetall.com/en/media/news-watch/news/2024/07/2024-07-30-rheinmetall-takes-over-new-ammunition-factory-in-hungary>

Rheinmetall. (2024b). *Rheinmetall builds new ammunition plant in Germany*. Rheinmetall. <https://www.rheinmetall.com/en/media/news-watch/news/2024/02/2024-02-12-rheinmetall-builds-new-ammunition-factory-in-unterluess-ground-breaking-ceremony-with-chancellor-scholz>

Rheinmetall. (2025). *Artillery ammunition for international customers*. Rheinmetall. <https://www.rheinmetall.com/en/media/news-watch/news/2025/01/2025-01-13-artillery-ammunition-for-international-customers>

Ruitenbergh, R. (2025). *NATO allies agree to boost defense spending to 5% at The Hague summit*. Defense News. <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2025/06/25/nato-allies-agree-to-boost-defense-spending-to-5-at-the-hague-summit/>

Simón, L. (2021). *Europe as a Secondary Theater? Competition with China and the Future of America's European Strategy*. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15_Issue-1/Simon.pdf

Simonet, L. (2023). *The third EU-NATO joint declaration (10 January 2023): Was it worth the delay?* https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/90185/ssoar-2023-simonet-The_third_EU-NATO_joint_declaration.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2023-simonet-The_third_EU-NATO_joint_declaration.pdf

Tausendfreund, R. (2024). *US elections and European cohesion – Scenario implications for Ukraine and transatlantic security*. https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/2024-10/e-paper-us-elections-and-european-cohesion_scenario-implications-for-ukraine-and-transatlantic-security.pdf

Ulatowski, R. (2024). *The Illusion of Germany's Zeitenwende*. *The Washington Quarterly*. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2024.2398318>

Yaffa, J. (2025a). NATO's Existential Moment. *The New Yorker*. <https://www.newyorker.com/newsletter/the-daily/natos-existential-moment>

Yaffa, J. (2025b). NATO's Existential Moment. *The New Yorker*. <https://www.newyorker.com/newsletter/the-daily/natos-existential-moment>